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This thesis focuses on the mature development of Christine Brooke-Rose’s 
experimental fiction, taking particular interest in the exemplary texts Between and 
Thru. I argue that these texts both critically refigure and respond to central aspects of 
the poststructuralist debate. I investigate Between and Thru specifically in relation to 
the theories of Irigaray, Barthes (in the case of Between), Derrida and Kristeva (in 
the case of Thru), demonstrating how the two novels develop these theorists’ core 
tenets in an innovative manner that critics have fail d to recognise up to this point. 
Starting – in the first chapter – from Brooke-Rose’s first four conventional 
novels, I explore the issues which lie at the basis of the experimental direction she 
comes to take, and investigate her first two experim ntal novels, Out and Such. The 
second chapter explores Between in relation to the debate over language and identity, 
whereas the third chapter investigates the way the nov l addresses the gender issue as 
related to language. The fourth chapter concentrates on Thru’s narrative technique in 
order to better elucidate – in the fifth and sixth chapters – how the novel succeeds in 
resolving both the tension generated by the notion of language as linked to the 
representation of an ontologically unstable reality, and the narrative anxiety deriving 
from the dispute around the death of the author andthe ontological status of 
characters. The seventh chapter offers an overview of Brooke-Rose’s fictional output 
after Thru, while the eighth and final chapter aims at further positioning Brooke-
Rose in the context of the postmodern debate, showing how her work represents a 
countertendency to the nihilist attitude engendered by the major critical tenets of 
postmodernism. 
The thesis thus sheds light on the importance and role of Brooke-Rose as a 
highly innovative intellectual figure, while rethinki g some of the main literary 
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                                                   To life and to the languages that life speaks. 
         To myself, which is not only me.  
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My interest in Christine Brooke-Rose’s fiction has been firstly elicited by the 
great linguistic understanding which distinctively shapes both her narrative technique 
and issues. The author’s deep concern with language, with its mechanisms and 
creative possibilities, has led her to highly innovati e linguistic experiments and to 
the exploration of language as constitutive of identity in terms of fictional practice. 
For Brooke-Rose, not only does the language spoken by i dividuals “determine” or, 
to say it better, “shape” the reality they live in, but also the way in which they use a 
language is strictly related to the forging of their own identity. As the author herself 
puts it, a language is “not only a language to use, but a language to think in” 
(Hayman and Cohen 10).  
Brooke-Rose has always been deemed a “difficult” writer and this supposed 
difficulty has marginalised her from a wider reading public. One of the reasons for 
her “obscurity” is that in each of her novels her exp rimenting has different 
connotations, exploring the possibilities of different narrative devices. The intriguing 
effect of Brooke-Rose’s works derives from her invetive writing technique, which 
disrupts the traditional patterns critics generally rely upon in interpreting a text. Not 
only has Brooke-Rose always succeeded in eluding any label critics have tried to 
attach to her fictional practice, but at all times she has also had a critical approach to 
any rigidly held labelling system within literary criticism.  
I find it particularly bewildering to see that Brooke-Rose’s novels and critical 
works have not been reprinted – apart from The Christine Brooke-Rose Omnibus 
edition in 1986 – and therefore are not obtainable in bookshops across Great Britain. 
Most strikingly, when her latest novel, Life, End Of, was published by Carcanet in 
2006, it still was not accessible in bookshops in Edinburgh and the only way to 
obtain it was to order it from the publisher or through the internet. Her latest 
collection of essays, Invisible Author: Last Essays (2002), was published in the 
United States and, again, is unavailable in the booksh ps of the United Kingdom. My 
wish to contribute to the knowledge of such an innovative author stems from the 
distress I feel about the scant consideration Brooke-Rose has both among the general 
public and within the University syllabus. Instead of being appreciated for her 
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ground-breaking and constantly humorous narrative solutions, she is often seen as 
austere, obscure, forbidding and inaccessible. 
In the first chapter, after an account of the author’s life, I will evaluate her first 
four novels and demonstrate how, though still conventionally structured, these early 
works already bear the most significant features of her future fictional creations in an 
embryonic stage. I will subsequently consider why and how Brooke-Rose starts 
developing such features in new directions, exploring her first two experimental 
novels, Out and Such. I will then delineate the French panorama Brooke-Rose came 
in contact with when she moved to France in 1968, and t ke into consideration the 
postmodernist critical and creative literary output which flourished during the sixties 
and seventies. This will serve the purpose of setting a wider context for the 
understanding of Brooke-Rose’s literary practice. Contemporary writers whose 
creative output stands in a relation of analogy to Br oke-Rose’s work – in terms of 
issues and/or technique – will be considered, while the major literary influences 
evident in the author’s work, in particular Ezra Pound and Samuel Beckett, will be 
traced. Finally, I will outline the issue of her reception, the major innovative 
characteristics of her narrative technique, and clarify the way this thesis proposes to  
contribute to an original understanding of her work.  
The second and third chapters will investigate Between. In chapter two, I will 
first focus on the novel’s unconventional technique, by means of which its issues are 
presented and explored. I will analyse the distinctive way in which language is 
present in the text as linked to its central character’s existential condition, and 
therefore the way the novel inscribes itself into the heoretical debate of the time. In 
chapter three, I will readdress the novel’s language s connected to the gender of its 
central character, and show how the latter succeeds in remoulding language to 
acquire patterns capable of expressing her own identity. 
The fourth, fifth, and sixth chapters will focus onBrooke-Rose’s Thru. Starting 
– in chapter four – from its technical features which are inextricably linked to the 
topics tackled, I will demonstrate – in chapters five and six – how Thru is a more 
self-conscious engagement with, and playful pathway out of, the major theorists of 
the contemporary critical debate. I will expand on the positive subversion the text 
brings about, showing how the author succeeds in overc ming the sources of tension 
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generated by the literary debate of the time, reshaping them for the original 
construction of her fictional work. Thru posits itself as a practical and positive exit 
out of that very debate’s dead-ends, thus attaining the status of “critical fiction” or 
“fictional criticism” and representing a countertend cy within the postmodernist 
literary trend. 
The seventh chapter will delineate Brooke-Rose’s fictional output subsequent 
to Thru by way of providing a more inclusive account of her literary career but also, 
most specifically, of better supporting my choice of c ncentrating my dissertation 
specifically on the author’s first tetralogy, and particularly on Between and Thru. 
I will conclude my thesis by first showing how the linguistic scepticism 
endorsed by Brooke-Rose’s two major literary influenc s – Pound and Beckett – is 
reworked in her work into a positive affirmation of the play of language and into a 
reaffirmation of language’s referential value. I will then further position Brooke-
Rose in the context of the postmodern debate, and show how her work distinguishes 
itself from the negativism and the “crisis thinking” of some of the main critical tenets 
of postmodernism. While a detailed analysis of the postmodern debate would be 
beyond the scope of my dissertation, I will concentrate only on those aspects of the 
debate which will help me support my claim of a countertendential facet in Brooke-
Rose’s novels. Specifically, I will consider the dangers implicit in the more than 
prolific “generative machine” (Connor 16) of the postmodern debate, as well as the 
risky concept of nihilism which the anti-foundationalist aspect of those theories 
seems to call forth. I will thus demonstrate that Brooke-Rose’s writing practice does 
something more than simply embodying the widely shared postmodernist 
assumptions of impossibility of representation and collapse of metanarratives. This 
will serve the purpose of showing how Brooke-Rose actively contributes to the 
critical debate on postmodernism, producing what can be defined as “critical fiction” 
or “fictional criticism”.  
My thesis’ specific focus on Between and Thru – an in particular on Thru – 
derives from the fact that these are key-texts, published in a moment when the 
poststructuralist debate was reaching its theoretical climax but its inherent dangers 
were not yet envisaged. Apart from being exemplary texts by a writer in the process 
of a transition of style and technique, they can be considered as the pitome of 
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Brooke-Rose’s countertendential experimentalism. While playfully addressing 
contemporary critical theories, in fact, they critically deal with their implications, 
already pointing out their possible outshoots and implicit risks. Thru, in particular, 
offers a matchless illustration of Brooke-Rose’s countertendency. As I will show, it 
anticipates issues which were to be at the centre of the theoretical debate only many 
years after the novel was published. For this reason, Thru, more than any other novel 
by Brooke-Rose, can be defined as a unique instance of “fictional criticism” or 
“critical fiction”.   
The abundant employment of quotations in my work is not intended to be 
gratuitous, but rather a way of better showing the dir ct correlation of Brooke-Rose’s 
texts with the critical theories they address. Even though my aim is not to explain 
such shared readings, I found myself needing to recall directly many of their crucial 
points in order to demonstrate more clearly their expr ss relationship to Brooke-
Rose’s practice. 
Among the authors who deal with Brooke-Rose’s writing, those I am most 
indebted to are Sarah Birch and Michela Canepari-Lab b, who both provided 
extensive critical analyses of the author’s oeuvre, Maria Del Sapio Garbero, who 
gave a crucial interpretation of her work, and Ellen G. Friedman and Richard Martin, 
who edited a collected volume of fundamental importance for the understanding of 
Brooke-Rose’s fiction.  
As regards the methodological approach followed, I have availed myself 
mostly of poststructuralist theories and assessed Brooke-Rose’s practice in relation to 
them. However, it needs to be said that her narrative seems to forever exceed any set 
method of analysis. I have, therefore, often used a “free-ranging” methodology, 
contemporaneously benefiting from both structuralist, poststructuralist, and feminist 
theories, varyingly disposing of different concepts which could help illuminate the 
salient features of her irremediably chameleonic work. In fact, as will clearly emerge 
in the course of my disquisition, Brooke-Rose’s fictional practice is by no means 
reducible to any single literary trend. If the nouveau roman gave a strong input to her 
experimentalism, and if poststructuralism necessarily influenced its issues and 
technique, the author’s playful texts never fail to offer new and creative pathways 
which, while engaging with the contemporary critical debate, find languages and 
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forms that avoid the dead-ends and introspections of ome of its theories. While 
interweaving many aspects of the intellectual climate of the time and putting into 
practice its speculations, Brooke-Rose’s work always remains defiantly original and 
independent, providing a more enabling, refreshing a d restorative passageway out 




Chapter 1  
Introduction and early experimentalism in context                                                    
Most of the biographical material available on Brooke-Rose is to be found 
disseminated in reference works such as World Authors (Wakeman), British 
Novelists (Levitt), Contemporary Novelists (Hall 1976), An Encyclopaedia of English 
Women Writers (Schlueter), and The Oxford Guide to British Women Writers 
(Shattock). Within the various critical essays which deal with her oeuvre, one finds 
only small fragments concerning her life. Among thecritical works dealing with 
Brooke-Rose’s overall literary career, Sarah Birch (Birch) and Ellen G. Friedman 
(Friedman 1995) treat the topic of her life’s experiences in an extensive way. 
However, if compared to the enormous amount of information offered by critics on 
most of the contemporary novelists’ lives, in the case of Brooke-Rose one has to 
cope with a relative lack of detailed data. 
The cause of these circumstances lies not only in the scarce interest raised by 
her work and figure among readers and critics, but also in the author’s fundamental 
resistance to biographers’ queries. In other words, I find this situation to be, to a 
certain extent, symptomatic of Brooke-Rose’s sceptiism about the crucial 
importance of a writer’s life-experiences for the understanding and analysis of their 
literary work. Brooke-Rose has always been reluctant not only to give interviews, but 
also and particularly to supply extended information about her own life, insisting on 
giving the Text for its own sake primary importance. In this belief, she concurs with 
the position of both New Criticism and poststructuralism, movements which have 
deeply influenced her literary perspective. New Criticism was in fact the most 
influential critical approach during her University years, while she plunged into 
poststructuralism in France at the beginning of her academic career. Although very 
different in their approach to a literary text, these two theoretical trends concurred in 
“rejecting” the author, considering the knowledge of authors’ lives as no longer basic 
to the understanding of their work and deeming the text worth analysing in and for 
itself.  
Even though I share to some extent Brooke-Rose’s idea of the predominant 
importance of the textual analysis, I shall neverthless provide a survey of her life. 
Although I do not intend to establish a basic relation of cause and effect between her 
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life and her writing, I believe some circumstances of Brooke-Rose’s life have 
contributed to her literary orientation. In this rep ct, it is important to note how even 
one of the most “textually-based” critical theorists, Jacques Derrida, does not merely 
look at the written text as a per se phenomenon, but expands the concept of Textso 
as to include its outside “context” within it. The t rm Text comes to designate the 
whole tissue subtending human experience.  
If the text is always already embedded in a context, an overview of what we 
know about Brooke-Rose’s personal experiences would he p the reader put her in 
“context”. Likewise, the innovative characteristics of her work can be better 
appreciated in the light of the cultural atmosphere sh  lived in. Moreover, it seems to 
me worth collecting the available information about the author’s lifetime and 
presenting it here to so as to contribute in some way to the increase of knowledge 
about her figure in general. 
Christine Frances Evelyn Brooke-Rose was born in Geeva, Switzerland, on 
January, 16, 1923. Her mother, Evelyn Blanche Brooke, was half Swiss and half 
American. Her father, Alfred Northbrook Rose, was English. Christine was the 
younger of two daughters. Her parents’ marriage dissolved when she was still a child 
and Christine and her mother went to live with her grandparents in Brussels. Indeed, 
she moved several times between Switzerland, Belgium and England, speaking 
alternatively French and English. She became perfectly bilingual and could speak 
German as well, but felt that French was actually her first language. After her 
father’s death (1934), at the age of 13 she was permanently sent to Folkestone, where 
she attended school. Brooke-Rose remained in England throughout the war, during 
which period she joined the British Women’s Auxiliary Air Force, working at 
Bletchey Park as an intelligence officer, translating intercepted messages from 
German into English. On May, 16, 1944 she married Ro ney Ian Shirley Bax, whom 
she met through her work. They divorced in January 1948, and their marriage was 
later annulled. Meanwhile, she had been attending Somerville College, Oxford, 
where she studied English Philology and Medieval Literature. She took her BA in 
1949 and her MA in 1953.  
On February, 13, 1948, Brooke-Rose married Jerzy Peterki wicz, a Polish poet 
and novelist. She went to London University where sh completed her PhD with a 
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dissertation on Medieval French and English literature. In her doctoral thesis, 
Brooke-Rose analysed in particular the grammatical aspects of metaphor in Old 
French and Middle English poetry, comparing the twolanguages and highlighting 
the influence of French usage over English rehearsal during the Middle Ages. Shortly 
after finishing her thesis in 1954, Brooke-Rose published Gold, a book of poetry. 
From 1956 to 1968 she worked in London as a freelanc  literary journalist, regularly 
writing reviews and essays for important weekly publications such as The Observer, 
The Sunday Times, The New Statesman d The Times Literary Supplement. Her first 
novel, The Languages of Love, was published in 1957. Sarah Birch informs us that
the author wrote it “as a form of therapy” (Birch 1) to oppose the stress deriving 
from a near-fatal illness which hit her husband in 1956. In 1958 she published A 
Grammar of Metaphor, a critical work written as an outgrowth of her doctoral thesis. 
It is a survey on the use of metaphor in fifteen English poets, ranging from Chaucer 
to Dylan Thomas. In the same year her second novel, Th  Sycamore Tree, was also 
published. Two other novels followed, The Dear Deceit in 1960, and The 
Middlemen: A Satire in 1961. Brooke-Rose’s first four novels are amusing and 
humorous, yet still relatively conventional. In 1962 Brooke-Rose suffered from a 
serious illness, which was to last about two years and made it necessary to submit to 
kidney surgery. After her illness, in 1964, Brooke-Rose published her first 
experimental novel, Out, which she had been writing during her period of recovery 
from surgery. In 1966 she wrote the novel Such and in 1968 another novel, Between, 
was published.  
In 1968, Brooke-Rose separated from her husband and accepted an invitation 
to teach at the Université de Paris VIII at Vincenns. The newly created institution 
had grown out of the 1968 student revolution. It was an open-admission University 
whose foundation was due in particular to Hélene Cixous and Jacques Derrida. 
Invited by Cixous, Brooke-Rose worked as a teacher of Anglo-American Literature 
in the English department of the University for twenty years. She also taught courses 
on Literary Theory, Linguistics and Translation. During her academic career, she 
was occasionally invited as visiting lecturer to some American Universities. As a 
professor, Brooke-Rose was able to concentrate on her fiction only during summer 
breaks, when she also travelled extensively. 
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In 1970 Brooke-Rose published a collection of short stories, Go When You See 
The Green Man Walking. In 1971 and 1976 she published two studies on Pound, 
respectively A ZBC of Ezra Pound and A Structural Analysis of Pound’s Usura 
Canto. In 1975 her novel Thru was released, and in 1981 she wrote A Rhetoric of the 
Unreal, a collection of essays analysing different narrative techniques in 
heterogeneous sorts of fiction. From 1981 to 1982, she was briefly married to Claude 
Brooke, her cousin, who was a physicist. Nine years lapsed between the publication 
of Thru and that of the novel Amalgamemnon (1984), which was followed by 
Xorandor in 1986. 
Brooke-Rose retired in 1988 and went to live in the South of France, first in 
Les Maquignons, and then in Cabrières d’Avignon, where she currently lives. Since 
her retirement she has published her other six novels, in chronological order 
Verbivore (1990), Textermination (1991), Remake (1996), Next (1998), Subscript 
(1999) and Life, End Of (2006), as well as two collections of critical essays, Stories, 
Theories and Things (1991), which contains essays inspired by the structu al analysis 
of literary texts as well as general discussions on literary theory, and Invisible 
Author: Last Essays (2002), in which she looks back at her career and for the first 
time openly describes some of the aspects and addresses some of the theoretical 
implications of her own narrative technique. 
Brooke-Rose’s earliest four novels were almost conventional realistic works. 
They were generally acknowledged by the critics andliterary establishment, and 
earned her a reasonable literary reputation. However, while writing them the author 
became gradually unsatisfied with the conventions of realistic fiction and her 
narrative practice underwent a basic shift which would lead to her experimental 
phase. In the essay “Self-Confrontation and the Writer” (1977), Brooke-Rose 
distances herself from her identity as author, calling it “John” and reproaching him 
for having paid too much attention to the accepted standards and public opinion: 
“The rat race. The mousetrap in the House of Fame or Fiction. John is eager to 
please. John is built by the House […] John and I, flattered at first by the sweet smell 
of success” (Brooke-Rose 1977 132)1. Her landing on experimentalism clearly 
                                                
1 Brooke-Rose clearly employs the Chomskyan “John”, i.e. the name Chomsky uses for many of his 
linguistic examples (Cf. in particular Chomsky 1957 and 1965). Moreover, the male ascription seems 
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appears with the new solutions she adopts in Out and Such, is further developed in 
Between and reaches its full expression in Thru. The change of direction took place 
gradually and although strictly related to the cultural panorama the author came in 
contact with in France at the end of the sixties, it is not to be entirely associated with 
it. In fact, Brooke-Rose started experimenting before going to France and indeed I 
believe that although still conventional in most of heir aspects, it is possible to detect 
in her first four novels the mark of her later experimentalism. It is as if they already 
presented in vitro most of the main characteristics of Brooke-Rose’s later works. 
Let us therefore consider her earlier fictional works and see how her later 
innovative solutions were already paving their way through them. We will then focus 
on the various reasons which precipitated Brooke-Rose’s landing on experimentalism 
and led to her two first experimental works.  
The protagonist of Brooke-Rose’s first novel, The Languages of Love, is Julia 
Grampion. She bears some external resemblance to her creator, as she is a recent 
PhD graduate in Medieval studies and lives in London. Julia finds herself facing two 
dilemmas and for each of them two different solutions are possible. On the 
professional side, she has to choose between a scholarly career as a university 
lecturer and a much more exciting life as a novelist. On the personal side, Julia has to 
decide between Paul Brodrick, whom she loves but cannot marry, since she is 
divorced and he is a practising Catholic, and Bernard Reeves, who attracts her 
physically but whom she does not love because he is s lfish and dishonest, besides 
being married. 
In both cases, the choice Julia is presented with is to be made between what 
can be defined the “serious” and the “frivolous”: the first is initially viewed as 
tedious and unoriginal, whereas the second is present d as attractive and interesting. 
In the end, Julia will realise that, if the frivolous precludes the serious, the serious 
does not exclude the interesting and the creative, so that the initially mutually 
exclusive options become complementary aspects of the newly-found unity of the 
protagonist: she will renounce the selfish, physical attraction for Bernard, become a 
practising Catholic and embark on her academic career. 
                                                                                                                                
to hint at the fact that most of the contemporary well-accepted writers were men who wrote in 
accordance with conventional standards and public opini ns. 
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Although conventionally structured and narrated, The Languages of Love 
already presents one of the most outstanding characteristics of Brooke-Rose’s future 
experimental works, i.e. the concern with language, th  interest in language as a live 
tool, a creative instrument, a “process” and, together with it, the tendency to see 
personal identity and social dealings in terms of language. 
The multiple layers of meaning the novel presents, the philological, the 
romantic and the religious, correspond to different “languages” or “levels” of 
language Julia learns to speak. Considering in particular the philology she comes to 
appreciate, it is interesting to note how, if at first she sees its jargon as lifeless and 
unexciting, she later comes to perceive it as “in a constant state of flux” (LL 67), thus 
becoming “interested in language as a process, not a thing or an essence” (LL 66). 
This revelation renders her conscious of her vocatin: “Even phonology seemed 
worthwhile now […] and the job […] seemed interesting and desiderable” (LL 69). 
In this novel, we also notice the constant use of puns, which, from now on, will 
never leave Brooke-Rose’s writing. Julia’s linguistic transgressions, her linguistic 
games, such as poly-semantic words and phrases, are initially seen as indicative of 
her lack of moral integrity, since she employs them in order to drop serious topics, as 
a way of escaping seriousness. Moreover, as Birch points out, in religious terms 
punning suggests sin, 
the covert substitution of one meaning for another by a linguistic sleight of hand is practiced by 
Milton’s Adam and Eve after the Fall, indicating tha  they have sundered the prelapsarian unity of 
divine order. (Birch 28) 
 
In my own view, linguistic transgression is here at first negatively connoted by 
the author and amorally used by Julia because of her ignorance of the “languages of 
love”. However, when she begins to apprehend them, she perceives that there might 
be another way of employing linguistic play, a morally positive and creative one, 
“the true humour of life” (LL 147), as she calls it. Indeed. Brooke-Rose’s use of 
linguistic jokes will bear an absolutely positive connotation in her subsequent works.  
The central character of Brooke-Rose’s second fictional work, The Sycamore 
Tree, is the fashion journalist Nina Jackson. Married to Gael, an American novelist 
who teaches philosophy at Oxford and is specialising in theories of perception, she 
loves her husband but is physically attracted to Howard Cutting, a man she otherwise 
dislikes because of his dishonesty and moral basenes . After Nina capitulates and 
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commits adultery with Howard, she falls prey to a breakdown. She eventually 
repents and reconciles with her husband. A series of complicated events and plot 
devices lead Zoltan, a Hungarian poet (and, like Nina, a “split” personality), to shoot 
Nina, who dies. 
As in the previous novel, the problem the heroine has to face is that of a split 
identity and a double, contrasting desire. However, if Julia, in The Languages of 
Love, goes through her “apprenticeship”, “learns the languages of love”, makes her 
choice and finds her unity, Nina’s status is much more unstable at its basis. To begin 
with, Catholicism, which was seen as a salvaging anchor in the previous novel, is no 
longer presented as a solution to the fragmentation of the self. In addition, the 
philosophy of indeterminacy appears as a background in the novel to undermine the 
very basic assumption of an objective perception of reality, challenging its 
ontological status.  
The novel questions the issue of reality vs. fictional representation: the 
ontological status of fictional characters is uncertain, their verisimilitude dismissed. I 
find this choice extremely significant of Brooke-Rose’s gradually changing attitude 
towards fiction. Rather than coherent and realistic representations of individuals, 
characters are treated as discursive instances, merely serving for discourses to pass 
through them. No longer complete representations of real indiv dualities, they 
become hollow conveyors of impulses and ideas. For instance, Nina is described as 
“one of those women who make sweet, devoted wives to sweet devoted husbands, 
but to whom most men find it impossible to talk without making some crude 
reference to her physical attractions” (ST 24). 
Already at this point in Brooke-Rose’s career, the idea of fiction as 
representing reality begins to weaken in her writing practice. From this moment on, 
her novels will become more and more conscious of their status as mere fictional 
constructs, through which an ontologically dubious “reality” is mediated. Moreover, 
anticipating the metafictional representation of Thru and its mix of narrative levels, 
Gael is writing a novel which bears the same title as Brooke-Rose’s novel and the 
work is significantly described as an analysis of the ontological status of reality. 
Even more revealing is the fact that at the end of the novel Gael, who is an atheist, 
lives and decides to rewrite his novel, whereas Nina, who is Catholic, dies. What 
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therefore survives is the fiction within the fiction, whose status of non-reality has 
been wholly recognised as such. 
Another important feature the novel presents is one we have already 
appreciated in the previous text: the use of linguistic humour. Nina jokes in fact with 
the possibility of multiple meaning formulae, such as when a waiter in a restaurant 
asks her “How many are you, madam, one?” and she is temped to answer “There are 
at least a hundred of me today” (ST 218). Consequently, it can be said that in The 
Sycamore Tree two of the main features of Brooke-Rose’s experimentalism are to be 
found already: the focus on language and its playfuness, and the awareness of the 
fictionality of fiction as related to a dubious ontlogy.  
The central character of Brooke-Rose’s third novel, The Dear Deceit, Philip 
Hayley, embarks on a search after the life and personality of his dead father, Alfred 
Northbrook Hayley. The latter turns out to have been a spendthrift who depleted his 
entire existence deceiving other people and exploiting heir work, to the point of 
having adopted numerous false identities throughout is life. However, discovering 
the complete “truth” about his father’s life turns out to be impossible for Philip, who 
eventually mingles reality and invention in order to tell his story. He realises that 
making an account of someone’s personality and private experiences necessarily 
implies a process of distortion and re-creation. The remembered past will not be the 
“truth”, but only an authoritarian act of interpretation. Just like fictional narration, to 
remember means to reformulate the past: “Some call it truth, some creation, some 
fiction, history, memory or mere jingling of bells. Perhaps all these are one, beyond 
analysis” (DD 40). Narration is thus opposed to “reality”: the process of writing 
inevitably implies falsification. This notion is brought to its extreme consequences 
by the narrative technique, which disrupts the conventional linear account of facts 
and the causal logic of events. After the first two chapters, Northbrook’s life is in fact 
recorded backwards, each section further receding into the past, so that the reader is 
presented with the story of his life from his death to his childhood.  
Another significant issue the novel presents is the way human behaviour is 
affected by fictional stereotypes. In 1959 Brooke-Rose had already explained how, in 
everyday life, people are in contact with what she defines as “signpost language” 
(Brooke-Rose 1959 45): the languages of novels, films and other media are made up 
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of clichés, where standard situations are continually presented as true, influencing 
our interpretation of life and determining our behaviour. In The Dear Deceit, Philip 
becomes aware of the role of “signpost language” and the mechanism for which we 
proceed according to the fictional stereotypes we are presented, applying false 
paradigms of action to our experiences. Philip’s conception of life is in fact initially 
governed by Victorian and Edwardian novelistic clichés, so that when he first 
apprehends that his father had been imprisoned, he takes for granted that he had 
committed a great and magnificent crime, “something o  a grand scale, something 
melodramatic, like murder, something novelistic” (DD 29). Such expectations are 
destined to be frustrated as his father’s crimes have been only minor and trivial ones. 
Strictly related to the notion of narrative clichés is the treatment of literary references 
and quotations. These are really copious in the novel, and in most cases purposely 
placed within an improper context. The overflowing and inappropriate use of literary 
references seems to exemplify the way people parallel their own specific situations 
with literary paradigms, applying ready-for-usage thoughts to catalogue or 
pigeonhole their life’s circumstances, whereas they should distinguish the peculiarity 
and uniqueness of each experience and analyse its specificity by means of their own 
reason. 
Along with Philip’s unfulfilled expectations, the reader’s assumptions are 
frustrated as well. The reader goes through the same backward process of 
investigation and discovery experienced by Philip, presupposing the existence of a 
significant, “originary” cause which motivates Alfred’s crimes, only to realise that 
there exists no extraordinary, determining driving force at the basis of his actions as 
he turns out to be just an insecure little boy. 
It is clear how in The Dear Deceit many of the characteristics of Brooke-
Rose’s later experimental production are already to be appreciated: the idea of 
identity as a “construct”, as a product of our system of representation which is 
ineluctably affected by the language we live in, the idea that representation always 
implies a process of distortion of what we think as “reality”, the disruption of a 
temporarily consequential plot and the procedure of frustrating the reader’s 
anticipations, of playing with the audience’s convetional expectations which are 
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based on traditional literary clichés. These will all be chief features of the author’s 
novels henceforth. 
The Middlemen: A Satire is the last of Brooke-Rose’s “conventional” novels. 
As suggested by its subtitle, the novel is a satiric l portrait of the contemporary 
social system, a bitter attack on the class of so-called middlemen, people who 
conform to society and profit by its rules. One of the two main characters of the 
novel is Serena, a psychoanalyst who constantly tries o keep herself under control 
and rationalizes every aspect of her life. Not only does she maintain to have settled 
all her unconscious desires, but also claims to be abl to solve, through her work, 
other people’s inner problems and contrasts between bodily drives and soul’s desires. 
She thus embodies the perfect middleman, fully integrated into the social order, 
living in it and serving its aims. Serena is delineated in opposition to her twin sister 
Stella, who resists the domestication and constraints of society. Being the only 
character of the novel who is not a middleman, the only one which possesses an 
independent life-force, Stella survives the destruction of the middlemen class. 
Significantly enough, whereas the exponents of middlemanship (including Serena) 
die in a sudden volcanic eruption on a Greek island which takes place towards the 
end of the novel, Stella survives and is depicted, in its final scene, as unaware of her 
sister’s death while adventuring into a new job. 
However, it needs be pointed out that Serena and Stella seem to be 
complementary characters, in that they embody two opposite aspects of the same 
dissatisfaction with contemporary society. One can o form to social conventions 
and pretend to act in accordance with them or, inversely, one can oppose the widely 
accepted values of society but his/her resistance would only result into a troubled and 
unstable situation. In both cases, Brooke-Rose show how contemporary moral 
values generate dissatisfaction in the individual.  
By eliminating the major representative figures of middlemanship, Brooke-
Rose seems to suggest that the class is doomed to self-de truction, whereas Stella 
still retains the possibility to free herself completely from that society. The end of the 
novel could be seen as a representation of a future apocalyptic ending of civilization. 
The volcano which suddenly erupts is at first said to be safe, as the last eruption was 
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a slow one which lasted six years, “just like the last war” (MM 207). The eruption is 
thus implicitly compared to a next world war, an unexpected and fatal one. 
In The Middlemen, Brooke-Rose further develops the gradual disruption of 
traditional realist technique she had begun in her pr vious novels. The realistic mood 
of writing undergoes a breakdown as the subconsciou narratorial comment is often 
inflated to the point of parody and the novel furnishes several examples of 
middlemanship without coherently linking them to one another. The notion of 
individual, unified identity is abandoned and satirised. Another feature the novel 
presents and which will constitute a significant characteristic of Brooke-Rose’s 
following narrative output is the mixture of various jargons: discourses drawn from 
different fields of knowledge, such as advertising slogans, psychoanalytic jargon or 
phrases from travel brochures are all fused together throughout the novel.  
It can be therefore concluded that, although still conventional in most of their 
aspects, Brooke-Rose’s first four novels not only mark the author’s gradual 
dissatisfaction with conventional fiction and serve as rehearsal ground for her to be 
able to approach a fundamental reformulation of her writing, but also and most 
importantly they already bear, in embryonic stage, th  main disruptive features (the 
“seeds”) of her following innovative creations. 
Before analysing Brooke-Rose’s first two experimental ovels, Out and Such, 
let us explore the diverse circumstances that lie at the basis of her rising 
dissatisfaction with traditional writing, and therefore of her new literary direction. 
The main experimental characteristics which will appear in Out and Such derive 
mostly by Brooke-Rose’s cognisance of the new scientific theories of uncertainty in 
physics – which undermined the scientific law of caus lity and foregrounded a 
subjective way of experiencing reality – and by herappreciation of the nouveau 
roman. 
Already from the beginning of the century, different scientists had begun to 
undertake what was to be labelled as a revolution in modern science: “Science was 
actively engaged in redefining its aims and examining the means it employed to 
achieve them” (Birch 4). Traditional scientific methods were based on the 
formulation of universal rules derived from the observation of external phenomena, 
so that our experience of the material world would correspond to a given and 
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objective reality and be, through scientific languae, objectively expressed in 
scientific formulae. Contrary to such traditional views, Einstein’s Theory of 
Relativity (1915) started revolutionising the conception of the universe and reality. 
His theory undermined the claim of universal truths which could be discovered by 
science, for it demonstrated that the notions of space and time were not absolute, but 
rather interdependent on each other. The universe was no longer seen as static, and 
the measurement of time and space could vary according to the parameters of the 
experiment. In 1900, Max Planck formulated the basic pr nciples of the Quantum 
Theory, and in 1926, Werner Heisenberg theorised th Uncertainty Principle. On the 
basis of the Uncertainty Principle, such scientists as Heisenberg, Schrödinger, and 
Dirac formulated the theory of Quantum Mechanics. The theory considered particles 
and waves as existing in a quantum state, i.e. a state where position and velocity 
were combined and interdependent. As a result, calculating once and for all either 
position or velocity of a particle was impossible. The theory thus introduced the 
concept of unpredictability in science: determining with certainty the result of a 
scientific experiment was no longer possible. In his work Physics and Philosophy 
(1958), Heisenberg illustrated how the discourse of science is a subjective 
reconstruction of the external phenomena by our mind. Scientific language is only a 
specific expression of natural language, and the pictures it creates in our mind “have 
only a vague connection with reality” (Heisenberg 181). The traditional conception 
of scientific language was thus turned upside down as the discourse of science 
became conscious of its distance from its object. The result was that scientists could 
no longer claim an objective knowledge of the world and had to accept that their 
understanding of “reality” was only the result of their subjective way of experiencing 
it. 
This conceptual revolution in science had direct consequences for literary 
criticism, as many debates originated around the possible link between science and 
literature. Although different in their approach to a literary work, both structuralist 
and poststructuralist theories assumed that language is basic to our understanding of 
“reality” and that we, as mere “tools” of language, are programmed by discourses to 
construct our realities according to their stipulations and forms. As a consequence, 
the human subject is no longer seen as the “maker” of meaning, but rather as a 
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“product” of language. It is not the subject which generates meaning, but it is rather 
language which generates the subject. Our comprehension of the external world 
passes through a variety of linguistic systems, each system having its own 
conventions. Therefore, what we call “truth” is relative to the conventions of the 
specific domain in question. As a direct result, scientific and poetic knowledge, 
science and literature, are not different in status: they only represent different uses of 
the same linguistic system. 
However, structuralism and poststructuralism crucially disagreed on whether 
language is knowably fixed as an object of science (structuralism), or rather unstably 
indeterminate and slippery (poststructuralism). From this basic difference between 
the two critical approaches, opposite conclusions ensu d about the relation between 
literature and science. For structuralists, literature is a form of science, and criticism 
can develop a scientific analysis of texts, a “scien e of literature”, whereas for 
poststructuralists, science is a form of literature and scientific language can be 
employed in literature. 
Brooke-Rose showed a deep interest in the relationsh p between language and 
“truth”, language and reality: in agreement with struc uralism and poststructuralism, 
she assumed that reality is language. In “Dynamic Gradients”, an article about the 
relation of the new scientific theories to literature, Brooke-Rose identifies 
Heisenberg’s theory of uncertainty as the cause of the polyvalent way of seeing 
external reality, which nowadays everyone experiences and according to which 
something is neither true nor false, but has only a certain degree of possibility of 
being true. Literature, she declares, must “attempt to evolve a language that 
corresponds to what we know of empirical reality today” (Brooke-Rose 1965 92), 
exploring the implications of the uncertainty principle for our relation to the world. 
Man is now faced with what Brooke-Rose will later call “a philosophy of 
indeterminacy and a multivalent logic” (Brooke-Rose 1981 7). The once steady and 
fixed reality now appears as a construction of language, subject to linguistic 
constraints and indeterminate. As a consequence, the fixed meaning of the realist 
novel can no longer be tolerated. Since the reality of everyday life, influenced by the 
new theories, has changed, the conventional novel is no longer able to express this 
reality, 
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People can go on writing the nineteenth-century novel until the year 2000 if they want, but that won’t 
alter the fact it’s dead, and that you are simply pouring into old forms a reality that has completely 
changed. We now have to evolve new forms to suit this new reality. (Hall 1970 9) 
 
The same need for new forms had been already envisaged by the exponents of 
the nouveau roman. For them, as well as for Brooke-Rose, the modern novel should 
explore the possibilities of language in light of the contemporary new reality. In 
1963, Alain Robbe-Grillet publishes a series of “reflections on literature” (Robbe-
Grillet 9) which was to be considered the manifesto of the nouveau roman. 
Translated in English as For a New Novel in 1965, the essays delineate the main 
reasons and issues behind the practice of a new mode of writing. Robbe-Grillet calls 
for a reformulation of the aims and form of the novel: “the novel’s forms must 
evolve in order to remain alive” (Robbe-Grillet 8). He explains how, all the features 
of the traditional realistic novel such as the “systematic use of the past tense and the 
third person, unconditional adoption of chronological development, linear plots, 
regular trajectory of the passions, impulse of each episode toward a conclusion, etc.” 
were meant to express “the image of a stable, coherent, continuous, unequivocal, 
entirely decipherable universe” (Robbe-Grillet 32). Nowadays, the intelligibility of 
the world has been utterly questioned and as a consequence the realistic system “is 
no more than a memory”, a “dead system” (Robbe-Grillet 33). In accordance with 
the new reality, man should be seen “as a being in the world, as radically situated as 
any other object” (Waugh 1992 4). He consequently advocates a form of literature in 
which the surface reality would be described as subjectively perceived by the 
consciousness which looks at it: “we must try, then, to construct a world both more 
solid and more immediate. Let it be first of all bytheir presence that objects and 
gestures establish themselves, and let this presenc continue to prevail over whatever 
explanatory theory that may try to enclose them in a system of references” (Robbe-
Grillet 21). 
Already in La Jalousie (1957), Robbe-Grillet had identified the past tense a  
the distinctive trait of traditional narrative, and had begun adopting the present tense 
in his works. However, it needs be pointed out thatit was not the tense in itself which 
marked the originality of the text, but rather the way it was employed. He had 
replaced the traditional past with a completely objective “speakerless” present: in the 
novel there is a total objectivization of what its consciousness perceives, without any 
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reference to the latter as the central subject who experiences those perceptions. As a 
result, no consciousness seems to speak; the accent is put on “the very movement of 
the description” (Robbe-Grillet 148). Brooke-Rose defines Robbe-Grillet’s use of the 
present tense “scientific” since “as in a scientific law, or indeed as in our critical 
language […] there is no seer, only the seen” (Brooke-Rose 2002b 138).  
Apart from being driven by the wish to develop a form of literature which 
embodies the new reality as discovered by science, Robbe-Grillet is evidently 
influenced by Sartre’s philosophy, as are Nathalie Sarraute and Michel Butor. The 
nouveau roman description of the outer world of objects seems to be linked to the 
idea of self-determination which the existentialism envisaged as the basic 
characteristic of the individual. The objects described in the new novels exist as 
utterly separate from the human eye which observes th m, they are inanimate but 
independent from the human perception, “autonomous” we could say. The human 
being is seen as no longer endowing things with meaning. 
Together with the past tense, Robbe-Grillet rejects the linear order of events of 
realist fiction: “in the modern narrative, time seems to be cut off from its temporality. 
It no longer passes. It no longer completes anything” (Robbe-Grillet 155). Les 
Gommes (1953) presents no linear chronology and offers different versions of the 
same event. In La Jalousie, it becomes impossible to distinguish moments thatare 
“really” observed from those that are merely projections of the jealous narrator’s 
mind. In Dans le Labyrinthe (1959), an erratic chronology deconstructs conventional 
concepts of time and space. What these narratives present is a mental perception of 
time, a time where it is impossible to distinguish w at is “real” from what is a 
projection of the mind.  
Together with Robbe-Grillet, Nathalie Sarraute is among the leading theorists 
of the nouveau roman. Her famous Tropismes (1939) was republished in 1957 and 
received much more attention than when it first appeared. The work is made up of a 
series of brief passages where unnamed characters are presented as interrelated to, 
and interdependent on, each other. In Sarraute’s words, tropisms are “mouvements 
intérieurs […] actions invisibles, très rapides et précises qui s’accomplissent en nous, 
que nous sentons confusément avant qu’elles ne parviennent à notre conscience” 
(Sarraute 1996 1651). Tropisms are the instinctive movements that cross our 
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consciousness very rapidly; they subtend our life and determine, albeit 
unconsciously, our relationships with others. They are the imperceptible sensations 
which link us to other people and make us interact with them in one way or another. 
Tropisms – which become the unifying thread among the various sketches of 
Sarraute’s novel – are therefore our mind’s inner movements which, albeit 
involuntary, influence our behaviour. Sarraute particularly developed the ideas of the 
nouveau roman in such works as Portrait d’un Inconnu (1948). In it, the flux of 
narrative which is constantly interrupted and the reliability of the narrator’s 
observations are undermined, emphasising the author’s rejection of any kind of 
objective representation of reality. Instead of objectivity, the reader only finds 
incertitude and contradiction. L’Ère du Soupçon (1956) – Sarraute’s most famous 
collection of essays – analyses the new literary foms of the nouveau roman. Here 
Sarraute totally dismisses the need for a cohesive narrative, and welcomes the death 
of the “character” in fiction: “le personnage n’est plus aujourd’hui que l’ombre de 
lui-même” (Sarraute 1956 72). The realist character is eplaced by “une matière 
anonyme comme le sang, […] un magma sans nom, sans contours” (Sarraute 1956 
74). 
The experimental solutions of the nouveau romanciers certainly represented 
new forms in relation to a new “reality”, and surely Brooke-Rose considered the 
solutions of Alain Robbe-Grillet and Nathalie Sarraute as a “successful attempt to 
redefine the discursive status of the novel in terms of a modern scientific conception 
of the relation of language to reality” (Birch 190). Already in her essay “The 
Baroque Imagination of Robbe-Grillet” (1965), Brooke-Rose exhaustively expounds 
on the nouveau roman practices. In the revised version of the article, included in A 
Rhetoric of the Unreal, she explains how Robbe-Grillet’s “obsessive dwelling” on 
objects and external reality has the purpose of recreating “a psychological reality 
which is far more convincing, for our time, than that re-created by description of 
psychology or other means in the realistic novel” (Brooke-Rose 1981 297). The 
original example of the nouveau roman as related to the new scientific theories 
functioned as a primary stimulus for Brooke-Rose to approach her new literary 
perspective. However, it needs to be pointed out tha e new scientific theories 
delineated above contributed to the development of Br oke-Rose’s experimentalism 
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for another, crucial reason. At the beginning of the sixties, when Brooke-rose became 
more and more involved with such theories, she also realised that scientific language 
“bred” its own poetry, i.e. that technical jargons possessed highly metaphorical value 
and could be therefore employed at the service of literature. In other words, she 
realised how the scientific terminology could be employed in literature to express 
metaphorical meaning. As she explains in an interview, the jargon used in science 
“bred [its] own curious poetry”. The terminology and specific sentences used in 
scientific books, “fired [her] imagination as poetic metaphors for what happens 
between people, and people are and always will be the stuff of the novel” (Wakeman 
224). This intuition that a peculiar kind of poetry could be derived from technical 
idiom, together with the need to evolve new literary forms to suit newly discovered 
reality, and with example of the nouveau roman, lead to the new solutions evident in 
her first experimental novel.  
In Out in fact, she discards the past tense – which had always been used in 
order to reassure the readers on the reliability of events – and adopts what she defines 
as “SPT”, i.e. a “simultaneous” or “scientific present tense” (Brooke-Rose 2002b 2, 
140) where the figure of the narrator vanishes and the author – who does not furnish 
authorial guidance – puts herself into the consciousness of the characters, to see with 
their eyes and represent what they see or hear around themselves, to represent their 
very capacity to look around but in an u reflective way. The result is a “detached” 
narrative which aims at expressing the new reality of the scientific theories and our 
changed relation to the world.   
The narrative is speakerless in the sense that the reader can only identify the 
consciousnesses of the moment by the context: it is impossible to identify a narrator 
in the conventional sense of “paper-character”, as if the text itself was speaking. The 
“invisible” author limits herself to represent percptions impersonally and avoids the 
conventional and familiar use of the past tense in order to express objectively “the 
constant impact of outside phenomena on an active but not always reflective 
consciousness” (Brooke-Rose 2002b 153-4). 
Out also utterly discards traditional ideas of characters and plot and presents 
the peculiar use of specialized jargon as metaphor which was to become one of 
Brooke-Rose’s distinctive traits, thus marking the turning point in her mode of 
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writing, setting out the experimental direction she had come to take, both in relation 
to the new scientific theories, to the example of the nouveau romanciers and to her 
own original intuitions about the metaphorical use of jargons.  
The novel is set in a future dystopian world where an unexplained catastrophic 
event known as “the displacement” has led to a geographical, political and social 
readjustment. In geographical terms, there is a newdivision of continents: Afro-
Eurasia, Sino-America and Chinese Europe. In politica  and social terms, the colour 
bar has been turned upside down: the white race is subordinated to the coloured ones. 
Black people are the richest and most powerful, but even pink and yellow races are 
wealthier than white people. Indeed it is stated that if “Pink is a colour. Yellow is a 
colour. Beige is a colour […] White is the colour of the mal-[ady]” (O 48), a peculiar 
disease, a sort of radiation poisoning which causes ch mical mutation and which has 
spread on the earth after the displacement. The “melasian races” are totally immune 
to this “malady” and have therefore become powerful, while the white race, suffering 
from this sickness, has lost its former supremacy and its members live ghettoized in 
settlements of shacks, working as servants. They ar considered as irresponsible and 
inattentive workers. Quite revealingly, white people are defined “Colourless”. This 
term is used by Brooke-Rose not by chance: it alludes in fact to the lack of colour 
rather than being the “wrong” colour. Lack of colour is viewed as symptomatic of 
lack of character and strength. In contrast to black people who are defined “warm-
hearted” (O 161), colourless people are indeed considered “cold fish, cold-blooded, 
cold-hearted” (O 149): “the cold-hearted kind, they call us, you know” (O 158), says 
a white man to the central character of the novel. 
The displacement is said to have been “the displacement from cause to effect” 
(O 119, 120,174). I read this last statement as implying that it could be the white race 
that has undergone a shift from cause to effect. Whereas, before the displacement, 
the white race was the cause of the world social order, holding the economic and 
political power, exploiting the black race’s resources and exhibiting/perpetuating 
racism against coloured people, now all the mistakes and wrongs the colourless have 
done revolt against themselves, the white race being therefore no longer the cause, 
but the effect of its very previous actions. Throughout the novel we find peculiar 
images that strike us as subversive of our ‘traditional’ representation of the “world 
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order”, such as black mannequins in the shop windows (O 82), or a black woman 
who sits “at her dressing table, brushing her thick black hair” or “having her thick 
long black hair brushed” (O 25). These images, which reverse habitual paradigms 
and dismantle conventional socio-historical representations, had obviously a much 
stronger impact in 1964 than they could have today. 
The central consciousness of the novel is a white old man, unnamed and with 
no specific pronoun referring to him. He is sick and spends most of his time between 
the shack where he lives with his wife, Lilly, and the Labour Exchange, where he 
goes in search of an occupation. He first finds a job as a gardener, working for the 
rich Mrs. Mgulu. Yet, unable to carry on his task properly because of his illness, he 
loses his job. Willing to help him, Mrs. Mgulu eventually employs him again as a 
construction worker in her house, but his sickness get  worse and worse and he is 
finally confined to his shack where his wife looks after him. Apart from his bodily 
weakness, the central character of Out is considered psychologically sick by the other 
members of society. He is thought to suffer from a psychological disease, in that he 
searches for his origins, trying to find out what he was before the displacement and 
consequently to understand what he is now. He continuously reinvents his past 
identity: he claims to have been an electrician (O 24), a welder (O 62), a fortune-
teller (O 62), a psychopath (O 127), or else – demonstrating a peculiar subversive 
humour – he says that he was a builder and “built the tower of Pisa and it leant” (O 
19-20). However, the notion of diachronic identity is shown to be old-fashioned in 
the new society, and the concept of memory is considered obsolete too: “there is no 
such thing as the past […] that’s an article of faith” (O 118). In order to be cured 
from his peculiar disease, the old man is submitted to “psychoscopy” (O 135-141), a 
psychoanalytic treatment performed with a newly inve ted machine which shows a 
person’s “biogram”, “the extracted absolute of your unconscious pattern throughout 
your life […] your harmonious rhythm, your up and down tendencies” (O 149). In 
other words, psychoscopy is a sort of re-building of the self, a brain-restructuring 
process. The treatment supplies the patient with a new notion of present identity and 
cures his willingness to look for origins and causes. By means of psychoscopy 
people are given precise thoughts and ideas, aims, a bitions and even working 
attitudes. Such an aggressive psychoanalytic method is however presented as a sort 
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of “luxury” (O 148), since “very few Colourless get it” (O 148). In fact, the old man 
undergoes psychoscopy only thanks to Mrs. Mgulu, who rites a letter to Dr. Fu 
Teng in order to recommend her employee for the treatm nt (O 132). We even 
apprehend from Mrs. Joan Dkimba, a rich friend of Lilly’s, that 
All politicians are psychoscoped regularly. And their wives. Well, they have to be. I mean the 
situation would be too dangerous otherwise […] it’s thanks to psychoscopy that everything is running 
as smoothly as it has, quite under control in fact. (O 150) 
 
This newly-generated civilization is therefore presented as a really coercive 
one, a society where everything is planned and controlled and which eventually 
moulds the minds of its members. As if to confirm the control society exercises on 
people, eventually by re-organizing their way of thinking to suit its aims and 
procedures, the doctor tells the protagonist of the novel during the treatment: “I am 
your doctor, father, God. I build you up. I know everything about you” (O 138). The 
sentence “I build you up” could be read in an ironical literal sense, implying the 
notion of fictional “character building” instead ofthat of curing a person. 
Mrs. Mgulu is said to “take an interest” in the white man’s health because of 
her relationship to the man’s wife, but in reality she does not make him any better by 
recommending him for psychoscopy. The protagonist does not want to be 
“psychoscoped”, as he tells, or probably imagines tlling Mrs. Mgulu after the 
treatment, 
I don’t want it. I never wanted it, I was happy watching flies and eating gruel and talking to myself 
and making mental love to my wife. Why did you have to take an interest? I didn’t ask to be 
confronted with your accomplishments and your possessions. Why did you have to flaunt your 
privileges at me? All privilege brings its dissatisfactions and the privilege of health is no exception. I 
didn’t ask to be psychoscoped. It’s made me ill. I wasn’t ill before. Why did you have to enter and 
occupy me in this way? I don’t even like you. (O 161-2)  
 
As narration progresses, the central consciousness of Out gradually gets more 
and more alienated from society and the institutions which try to maintain him under 
control. His perceptive stimuli undergo a process of distortion and deconstruction. 
Unable to find his own identity and deprived of his memory, the old man has to 
surrender to the sheer impossibility of finding ontological and epistemological 
certainties and has to admit that “Knowledge certain or indubitable is unobtainable” 
(O 60). The deconstructed and deconstructing consciu ness of Out is incapable (and 
the reader along with him) to determine the ontological status of the “reality” he 
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perceives, to distinguish between “real” objects around him and imagination, 
experiencing a “breakdown of reality-testing” (Birch 60).  
As already pointed out, a major aspect of Brooke-Rose’s experimentalism in 
Out centres around the “objectification of the point of view”. The reader apprehends 
just what moves by chance into the field of perception of a centre of consciousness 
which has got no “sense of himself as a narrator, as a functioning self” (Little 1995 
68). In this, Out appears to have been greatly influenced by Robbe-Grillet’s fictional 
practice, in which there exists no narrator directing the information provided and the 
reader is offered only what “invades” the consciousness of the speaking or thinking 
subject. In Out, there are in fact no characters in the traditional sense. The reader 
feels like being inside the consciousness of the old man and directly or indirectly 
hearing voices which are not mediated by a narrator. Everything the character’s 
consciousness perceives is objectively presented. Moreover, since this consciousness 
is damaged, the reader is unable to distinguish whether the audio-visual perceptions 
presented are “objective” representations or misperceived/misrepresented ones, only 
mere products of his imagination. The text itself suggests several times the potential 
unreliability of some events, warning for instance, 
This dialogue will not necessarily occur (O 12); it is difficult to tell who’s talking in this kind of 
dialogue (O 63); Either the conversation has partially occurred, the beginning for instance, the 
remainder being suppressed […] Or the conversation has wholly occurred, and been wholly 
manipulated, transformed, schematised, because inunderstood. (O 108-9) 
 
Within this particular kind of “self-reflexivity”, the text also states inversely 
the objectivity and reliability of its circumstances, “The sequence has occurred” (O 
48), “The conversation is real, repeat real” (O 101). 
Along with his consciousness, the central character’s language is likewise 
deteriorating. We could indeed trace a parallel betwe n Lacan’s theory on the 
acquisition of language (Cf. Lacan 1989) and the peculiar backward process which 
the old man is subject+ to. If for Lacan the acquisition of language inaugurates the 
entrance of the subject into the Symbolic order of society and law, the character in 
Out is evidently going through a disacquisition of langua e and an exit from the 
social order. As the novel progresses, the protagonist’s use of language becomes in 
fact more and more transgressive. In this connection, I would not interpret this just as 
a deterioration of language, but I would rather read the transgression of the 
character’s language as subversive of the establishment he lives in. The protagonist 
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of Out goes through an identity crisis and along with his identity his language gets 
disrupted. Unable to have a precise identity within the new society and therefore 
unable to speak the same language as its members, he willingly alienates himself 
from the social order and decides to regain a sense of identity by manipulating the 
conventional language spoken by the others. In fact, he seems to be reconstructing a 
consciousness of his own through the pieces of discour es wrenched from other 
people’s languages, restructuring these discourses in his own way. Linguistic 
transgression is crucially performed in the novel through the use of metaphor. It is 
important to specify the peculiar way in which Brooke-Rose employs this device: her 
conception of the term “metaphor” is in fact an extended one; it means not only, as 
traditionally conceived, the displacement of meaning from one word to another, but 
also the displacement of significance at the much larger level of entire discourses. 
Meaning is thus dislocated from one discourse to anther. Disparate fields of 
knowledge or action come together giving birth to highly metaphorical passages 
where a specific concept or situation is totally re-contextualized. 
In Out, he central character’s linguistic transgression csists in that different 
perceptive stimuli are over and again associated with each other by him, leading to 
the fusion of different semantic fields. For instance, observing the bark of a fig-tree, 
he compares it with a thigh of creased denim: “the rough grey bark is wrinkled in the 
bend of the trunk like a thigh of creased denim shot with darker thread” (O 28), or 
else a double row of fig trees looks to his perception like “a network of bare branches 
[…] a corridor of cobwebs full of traps for flies, woven by a giant spider behind huge 
prison bars” (O 23). In this last image, the spider could also be a metaphor of the 
narrative practice as a texture woven by the writer. 
The character’s perceptive stimuli are described mostly by means of 
biochemical imagery, as for example when he observe th  kitchen table in the 
moonlight and the wrinkles of the wood are associated with the veins in his wrist; 
soon after, a picture of “protozoan” life under the microscope is connected to an 
image of road traffic,  
The pool of light engulfs the entire table and part of he red stone floor. The wrinkled wood is quite 
static in the light, as static, at any rate, as the network of minute lines on the back of the wrist. A 
microscope might perhaps reveal which is the more static of the two. The protozoan scene under the 
microscope is one of continual traffic jams and innumerable collisions. (O 58) 
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When the old man is visited by a doctor, he is advised: “You have a heart 
condition. Symptoms? Verbal diarrhoea, sanguine complexion […] blood, belonging 
like words to the element of fire” (O 40). In fact, we could say that the fragments of 
discourses re-handled through his own vision of the world are like sparks, which 
threaten to disrupt the society he lives in. In a coer ive society that wants to silence 
him, he finds his own space, between the interstices of conventional language, setting 
fire to conservative discourses. He acquires a sense of identity through his subversive 
manipulation of language. 
The subtending trait of all of Brooke-Rose’s experimental works, i.e. the 
peculiar use and re-manipulation of language as a cre tive tool to express one’s own 
identity, is evident in Out. Yet, in the novel , as the author herself admits, she was 
very much under the sway of Robbe-Grillet and the nouveau roman. She would 
succeeds in developing her experimentalism away from their direct influence only in 
her next novel, Such, 
Robbe-Grillet did have a direct influence, at least on Out. […] but then with Such I really took off on 
my own. I don’t think there’s any more influence of Robbe-Grillet on Such. I would say that Such is 
my first really “Me” novel, where I don’t owe anything to anyone else. (Friedman and Fuchs 82-3) 
 
Owning to the points of contact between Brooke-Rose’s work and the solutions 
of the nouveau roman, the author has often been identified tout court with it. 
However, although she admired the exponents of the new movement and shared most 
of their theoretical postulates, she found, from Such onwards, her personal and 
original solutions. 
The central consciousness of Such is Larry. Married with two children, he 
works as a psychiatrist at a research centre together with a group of astrophysicists. 
While Larry is being submitted to a surgical operation, his heart stops and he is 
believed to be dead. After a short while, Larry incredibly comes back to life, having 
experienced a different kind of existence during the few minutes, hours or even days 
of his apparent death. 
The realistic mode of writing is here again broken down. What happens to 
Larry is presented objectively without any elucidaton intervening to make clear who 
speaks. The voices and perceptions of the characters m ge with one another, devoid 
of any narratorial explanation. The novel directly opens with Larry waking up, after 
his death, to his afterlife in a new world. He climbs out of his coffin in a world 
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described in astrophysical terms, a world where people are represented as “planets” 
or “moons” which “move in their orbits” (S 203). Larry meets a girl who carries “On 
her left spiral arm […] a row of quintuplets” (S 204). The girl claims to have no 
name, but since Larry insists on designating her in some way, she accepts being 
called “Something” and decides to call Larry “Someon ” (S 205). Someone-Larry 
wants Something’s five children to be baptized and named, as they will soon be, each 
after the title of a famous Blues song. The act of naming and the concept of the 
proper name – here clearly ironised – call into question the linguistic, psychoanalytic 
and literary theories of the period, as we will better consider in the next chapters.  
 After the babies are named, they go away “into orbit” (S 206) to return one 
after another to experience with Someone and Something some adventures and have 
in turn their life saved by Someone. As already mentioned, everything in the novel is 
described in astrophysical terms: Someone, Something a d the children have 
“meridians” instead of arms (S 302); they make a journey “above ultra violet” (S 
210), they land “on the left focus of an ellipse” (S 218) and live peculiar experiences 
in a cosmic surrounding. When Larry comes back to life, he is unable to cope with 
his previous relationships and tasks. He cannot communicate with the people around 
him and cannot return to his work. His wife and thepeople who try to help him 
eventually abandon him. He confounds his two children with the intergalactic 
offspring and continues to reason in astrophysical terms, seeing people as cosmic 
bodies or just waves or particles and even acquiring the peculiar faculty of “reading” 
people’s positive or negative waves and radiations. For instance, while conversing 
with a friend, he sees that “She […] bombards our conversation with those particles 
of anxiety that spiral at high velocity around the lightning zig-zag of magnetic field” 
(S 355). Throughout the novel, either during Larry’s death-experience or after he 
“resuscitates”, the author makes use of the specific language of astrophysics as a 
metaphor for everyday life. We have already noticed how Brooke-Rose’s notion of 
metaphor is an extensive one which acts at the level of entire sentences and 
discourses. 
As for Out, metaphor becomes here a structural principle of narration. 
However, there is a difference between the two texts. Brooke-Rose’s metaphoric use 
of language implies either the fusion of different discourses, or the metaphorical use 
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of one specialized jargon. In Out the use of biochemical jargon is applied as a 
metaphor to everyday circumstances, yet the novel’s mo t recurrent type of metaphor 
is at the level of different intertwining discourses, i.e. the different perceptions of the 
old man are all fused together and explained mostly (but not always) through 
biochemical imagery. On the contrary, the employment of one specialized 
terminology is in Such much more extended than the amalgamation of different 
discourses. In other words, all the events are “filtered” through the jargon of 
astrophysics. For instance a problem of identity and relation to other people is 
discussed by Larry and Elizabeth, a friend of his, through the metaphor of the 
scientific principle of uncertainty: 
- […] In psychic terms […] some of us preferring to pretend causality exists, and others, others 
preferring to prefer its absence. But you can never know with absolute certainty that what looks like 
the same particle, with the same identity – 
- Yes but for practical purposes you have to, Larry, in the chemistry of people. Otherwise how can 
you live? 
- You can’t. Not really. You pretend you do. To save the appearances. 
- Larry, you can’t honestly believe that. 
- I don’t know. I think I believe that every particle of ourselves, whether combined with those of 
others in normal electrovalence to make up this or that slice of us, or whether bombarded by those of 
others until this or that human element mutates into some other, every particle of ourselves returns. So 
that it has, in that sense, identity. But you can never quite identify it at any given moment. (S 387-8) 
 
The relations between people are seen in terms of particles that combine with 
each other and consequently influence one another. Each person has an “identity” 
which is not “fixed” and “identifiable”, but rather in a constant process of change. 
The metaphorical use of astrophysical idiom turns out t  be a specifically 
poetical device. Astrophysical jargon becomes a very dynamic metaphor for the 
relationships among people in regard to both recipro ty and to distance, to 
communication and its difficulty. Metaphor structures the whole text, which thus 
aspires to the condition of poetry. In Such, more than in Out, the beauty and poetical 
power of specialized language in context are fully appreciable.  
The experiences Someone-Larry goes through with Something and the five 
offspring could be viewed as “a hallucination experienced by Larry while his body is 
at a low level of psychic energy” (Birch 64). If one wishes to give a psychological 
interpretation to the incidents and characters described, Something could represent 
Larry’s unconscious and the five children could stand for various aspects of his life 
that he has tried, as a psychiatrist, to set aside by “cataloguing” them, giving names 
to them. As a matter of fact, the babies blame Someone for having named them and 
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tried to send them away, “We all remain. You can’t ge rid of us merely by giving us 
names and sending us into oblivion. Oblivion has its orbits, like everything, you 
know that” (S 329). Similarly, Something warns Larry, “I told you, Lazarus, you 
can’t get rid of origin by giving it names, except for a time. Origin comes back” (S 
322). I would maintain that Larry’s death experienc could be viewed as a sort of 
trial of his own self, a journey into his own unconscious which he embarks on in 
order to bring the problems of his subjectivity to the surface. To reinforce this 
interpretation is there the fact that Larry has “many names to answer to” (S 310). He 
is many times called “Lazarus” (S 223, 227, 309, 310, 322, 323, 324, 325, 331), the 
reborn man par excellence, and throughout the novel we encounter the image of 
Jonah (S 205, 227, 271, 290, 313, 344, 371), who acquired new life from his journey 
inside the whale. 
However, if we see it in the light of conventional social paradigms, Larry’s 
rebirth turns out to be a failure: he does not reintegrate into society and his use of 
language, which has been permanently altered, alienates him from society. He lives 
within a language that other people do not share. He remains entangled within the 
bounds of his own language, unable to return to his previous language use and 
consequently to reintegrate into society. 
To convey better the idea of Larry’s alienation by means of and within 
language, I would like to quote a section from the text which is particularly 
suggestive of this issue. This paragraph, which seem  particularly poetical to me, will 
help demonstrating how technical jargon can be submitted to narrative poetic aims. 
Larry is alone and stares at his own image reflected in the mirror. In recalling his 
death experience, he feels neither anger, nor love,but rather a “thin yet sharp” pain. 
When he closes his eyes, he continues to see his own image, as if he was looking 
inside himself at the man he was before his death:  
Inside the mirror on the landing of my consulting-room the shape stares back, spinning meridians, 
latitudes and spirals that grow and fill the entire glass but silently, emanating no messages, no nervous 
handwriting, no atoms of any anger, love or wonder. Something however creates the undulations and 
if not anger or love then some nebulous memory, surely, behind the eyes. But the eyes close to avoid 
the issue of their death and amazing recovery. The pain behind them resolves the optical image in the 
dark, as with a change of lenses, so that inside the mirror the tall thin man stares back, as before death, 
before recovery, as when life took its normal course through blood-vessels, nerve-fibres, muscle-
spindles, tendons, flesh and such. (S 302) 
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It should by now be clear how in Brooke-Rose’s first two fully experimental 
novels, Out and Such, the author’s main focus is put on the issue of language as 
related to one’s own consciousness. The identities of the central characters are 
closely, or rather inextricably linked to the acquisition/disacquisition of language. 
Language is viewed as the constitutive element of identity. If this latter is destroyed 
(as is the case in Out), language is disrupted along with it. Conversely, if the use of 
language is disturbed (as in Such), identity remains inevitably damaged. The central 
character of Out finds his own language and consequently gains a sense of identity 
by re-handling other people’s language out of a coercive society, into a creation of 
his own, which is a subversive language. Differently, in Such, Larry loses his identity 
and seems to feel uneasy in his newly-acquired linguistic universe: his loss of 
identity is the consequence of his loss of language. In my view, the reason for this 
distinction between the two characters lies in the fact that the “protagonist” of Out 
starts from a marginal position in the society he liv s in and consequently tries to 
subvert the establishment through his new use of langu ge, whereas Larry starts from 
an opposite standpoint: he is in fact a psychiatrist and therefore he is one of those 
who “control” society through language. Consequently, he cannot feel at ease when 
he loses his “master language” to acquire one which is subversive of the very 
establishment he was once part of. 
In these two novels, we also appreciate the use of ome of the most outstanding 
features of Brooke-Rose’s experimentalism, which will d stinguish her writing 
through most of her subsequent works: namely, the application of a specific jargon as 
a metaphor for everyday life and her peculiar employment of metaphor at the level of 
discourses. The novels also present other issues which will come back in Brooke-
Rose’s following works. As we have seen, the concepts of memory and origin are 
present in both Out and Such. In Out, the central character searches for his origins 
and tries to recuperate his memory along with his identity. In Such, Larry tries to cast 
into oblivion some aspects of his past experiences but does not succeed in doing so. 
The notions of memory and origin are of fundamental importance in Derrida’s theory 
and we will consider them at greater length when analysing Thru, where they are 
treated much more extensively and to more illustrative ends. Thru will also bring into 
focus the concept of one’s own identity as reflected by the mirror, an idea which is 
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already present in the above quotation from Such, where a doubly split subject is at 
the centre of a mirroring process reflecting its own idealized (unitary) image. This 
mirroring process will indeed be central to our analysis of Thru. Similarly, the idea 
of a split personality – present in both Out and Such – will come back much stronger 
in Between, with the aim of deconstructing the notion of fixed identity and the 
concept of fixed meaning. 
The metaphorical employment of different jargons and the fusion of discourses 
which we already appreciate in Out and Such, and which will be present in many of 
Brooke-Rose’s subsequent works, must be necessarily understood in the light of Ezra 
Pound’s modernist aesthetics in poetry. Pound is in fact, together with Samuel 
Beckett, one of the major influences evident in Brooke-Rose’s writing. 
The literary movements Pound promulgated in the first half of the twentieth 
century, Imagism and Vorticism, stressed precision and economy of language in the 
style of classical Chinese and Japanese poetry, with the aim of expressing ideas in a 
succinct and economical form. Pound also advocated fr e verse, which is not 
constrained by formal considerations. He privileged poetry as song, musical rhythm, 
and expressed his aspiration “to compose in the sequence of the musical phrase, not 
in the sequence of a metronome” (Pound 1934 335). 
Fenollosa’s unpublished notes on Chinese poetry and J panese drama, which 
Pound received after the former’s death, contributed to the strengthening of the 
modernist interest in Chinese and Japanese literatur . Pound re-elaborated the literal 
versions of classical Chinese poems by Fenollosa into free-verse lyrics in Cathay 
(1915). Fenollosa had explained the functioning of Chinese ideograms: each written 
character is a “condensed” visual metaphor. From this, Pound derived his idea of a 
new kind of poetry: one made up of signs as “physical” objects on the page, one 
which juxtaposed both images and different allusion, fragments and a complex use 
of quotations from different narratives and other languages. In particular, the 
mingling of languages is considered by Imagism and Vorticism as possessing a 
strong poetic power (Cf. Cianci 1991 112-124, 156-172). 
In this way, poetry would be both economical and deeply charged with 
meaning. This is the style of his encyclopaedic epic poem, The Cantos (1917-1960). 
The work presents its reader with an immense frame of r ference, each allusion and 
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quotation juxtaposed with others in order to let metaphorical meaning emerge. The 
Cantos is polyphonic in theme and presents a mosaic technique based on collage, one 
which passes from one quotation to another, fusing together or juxtaposing numerous 
evocative fragments. Pound rejected completeness and linearity, structuring his 
Cantos on recurrence, repetition and juxtaposition. Conventional syntax disappears, 
giving way to parataxis: short sentences without coordinating or subordinating 
conjunctions. 
Brooke-Rose particularly appreciated The Cantos. In A ZBC of Ezra Pound, 
she analysed in particular the way the many references Pound inserts in his poems 
interact with each other, while in A Structural Analysis of Pound’s Usura Canto, she 
used Roman Jakobson’s method of analysis and showed the ynamism of Pound’s 
work. Brooke-Rose analysed Pound’s poetry in other critical essays, among which 
“Cheng Ming Chi’ I’d” (Brooke-Rose 1991 123-142), which she wrote for Eva 
Hesse’s German translation of The Cantos (Hesse 1964). Pound’s legacy will be 
particularly evident in Between’s use of different languages, as well as in Thru’s 
collage of quotations, in its juxtapositions and repetitions which engender highly 
metaphorical meaning and bestow upon the novel a peculiar poetical charge. Already 
in Out and Such however, Pound’s legacy is clear in the metaphorical use of 
specialized jargon and in the juxtaposition of different discourses to create different 
nuances of meaning, as seen above. 
In the last chapter, I will further analyse Pound’s legacy in Brooke-Rose’s 
works and show, in light of Between and Thru, how Brooke-Rose succeeds in 
overcoming the linguistic scepticism inherent in Pound’s poetics. For the time being, 
and before analysing Between and Thru, however, I will further define the context in 
which her experimental works appear and to which they are connected. In fact, 
Brooke-Rose’s gradual dissatisfaction with conventional literary criteria and her 
approach to experimentation need to be understood nt only in relation to the new 
scientific theories delineated above, to the development of the nouveau roman, and 
to Pound’s influence. Her new narrative practice also needs to be analysed within the 
wider frame of the socio-cultural atmosphere of the sixties, both in Britain and in 
France, where she moved in 1968. We will therefore try to delineate this panorama, 
showing the parallelisms between Brooke-Rose’s work and that of other writers. In 
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fact, although Brooke-Rose’s experimentalism is in many characteristics distinctively 
her own, it is important to look at other contemporaries who share some basic 
features with her. It is also important to look at another main influence on Brooke-
Rose, that of Samuel Beckett.   
The social and literary environment of the sixties s obviously essential to 
“place” Brooke-Rose’s writing in context. From the end of the fifties, in fact, society 
had been going through a process of renewal which generated a new outlook on life 
and the dismissal of conventions. Several factors cncurred to generate this new 
liberal mood which eventually gave way to radical literary innovation. 
By the end of the Second World War, the world had un ergone geographical, 
political, social, and economical changes. The reality of the concentration camps 
came gradually to light, and was fully discovered with the trial of Adolf Eichmann in 
1961. The failure of rationalism became apparent as the rational utopias had led only 
to a monstrous genocide, as well as to the dropping of the atomic bomb and to the 
beginning of the Cold War. Hannah Arendt published Eichmann in Jerusalem in 
1963, focusing on the Eichmann trial and presenting he dangers implicit in the 
human yearning for meaning. The sense of the failure of reason and the collapse of 
rationalism lay at the roots of a widespread rejection of the values, morals and norms 
of society. As claimed by George Steiner, “the house of classic humanism, the dream 
of reason which animated western society, have large y broken down […] We come 
after” (Steiner 15). Concurrently, the war in Vietnam was strongly opposed in 
Britain, while the Cuban Missile Crisis in 1962 was n evident proof of the loss of 
power which Britain had undergone during the century. In 1964, the election of the 
Labour Government in Britain clearly marked a change of direction in the social 
consciousness. The rejection of old values and morals in ugurated a decade of deep 
social and cultural changes. Censorship was drastically reduced: Penguin Books 
published D. H. Lawrence’s Lady Chatterley’s Lover in 1960. In April 1966, the 
Time magazine officially announced the birth of the “swinging sixties”: an era of 
sexual freedom, music, fashion and celebration of youth. The women’s liberation 
movement with its widespread questioning of gender roles and conventions was 
gaining more and more strength. It was an evidently highly charged socio-cultural 
period which culminated in the ’68 student revolution in France, echoes of which 
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were heard all across Europe. All this generated more liberal attitudes to sex and 
opened up a new range of opportunities for women, both in the educative and in the 
working spheres. Paralleling the women’s liberation movement, the new social 
consciousness about the role and identity of women br d a huge development in 
women’s writing. Many women writers started questioning the conventional role of 
women in society and opened up new possibilities for the novel to represent the 
female consciousness and identity. In 1963, Betty Friedan published The Feminine 
Mystique, exposing the mechanism of the oppression of women which thrives on the 
myth of romantic love, so that what is generally seen as domestic bliss is in reality a 
comfortable concentration camp where women’s “capacity for self-determination” is 
“systematically destroyed” (Friedan 265). If conventio s were being questioned and 
rejected in the social sphere, so they were too in literature. Many novelists rebuffed 
the social realism and the conservatism of the fifties and embraced experimentation. 
A new strand of literature was indeed already developing by the time Brooke-Rose 
approached experimentalism, a strand which would later be called postmodernist. 
The term postmodernism first appeared in the context of American literary 
criticism in the fifties, and it was used in Charles Olson’s Causal Mythology (1969) 
and The Special View Of History (1970), where he elucidated his poetic 
engagements. At the same time, in France, the nouveau roman found its theorisation 
in the works of Robbe-Grillet, Nathalie Sarraute, and Claude Simon. With a parallel 
move, Susan Sontag rejected, in “Against Interpretation” (1966), “the idea that a 
work of art is primarily its content” and called for an “erotics of art” (Sontag 5, 14) 
which would replace the actual hermeneutics and focus on the form of literature. For 
Sontag, interpretation, “based on the highly dubious theory that a work of art is 
composed of items of content, violates art. It makes art into an article for use” 
(Sontag 10). If, in our culture, “To understand is to interpret” and thus amounts to 
discovering the “true meaning” of a work, for Sontag, to interpret is rather “to 
impoverish, to deplete the world – in order to set up a shadow world of ‘meanings’” 
(Sontag 7). Against this state of things, Sontag called for more attention to form in 
art and explained that “The most recent revolution in contemporary taste in poetry – 
the revolution that has deposed Eliot and elevated Pound – represents a turning away 
from content in poetry” (Sontag 10). At the same time, in his influential essay “The 
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Literature of Exhaustion” (1967), John Barth proposed to discard “the literature of 
exhausted possibility” (Barth 1967 29) in favour ofthe parodic mode of 
replenishment. The task facing the contemporary author, he explained, is that of 
making language live again. Barth’s essay, however, was largely “misread as one 
more Death of the Novel” (Barth 1984 64), and Barth published a second essay, “The 
Literature of Replenishment” (1980), clarifying tha his intention was only to point to 
possible directions towards which novel writing might move. Barth envisaged the 
chief qualities of the literature of replenishment, one which “requires expertise and 
artistry as well as bright aesthetic ideas and/or inspiration” (Barth 1984 66). Among 
these qualities are the disruption of the linear narrative, the frustration of 
conventional expectation on the reader’s part, the us  of ironical and paradoxical 
juxtapositions, a tone of epistemological mockery towards bourgeois rationality and 
the representation of distortions and subjective points of view, as opposed to the 
pretension of objective discourse of the bourgeoisi. He later published a third essay, 
“Postmodernism Revisited” (1988), to further clarify his claims.  
In “Cross the Border – Close that Gap” (1969), Leslie Fiedler questioned the 
gap between “high” or “serious”, and “popular” or mass art, suggesting a new art to 
“close the gap” between the two cultures and addressing works by authors such as 
John Barth, Leonard Cohen, and Norman Mailer. In The Dismemberment of Orpheus 
(1971), Ihab Hassan traced the development of what he defined the “literature of 
silence” and drew the differences between modernist and postmodernist fiction, 
while suggesting that the second is in some respect an extension of the first and in 
others a reaction against it. He used the term postmodern and talked about 
“postmodern spirit”, a spirit which started developing when the “crisis of the 
Western mind enter[ed] a new phase” after the terror of the Second World War and 
after the “Six Million” genocide (Hassan 139). Against this background, “The 
mythical world of recurrence, the historical world of continuity, prove inadequate 
temporal models of the world we are creating” (Hassan 247). Hassan expounded 
extensively on various writers and pinpointed some of the basic characteristics of 
postmodernist literature in opposition to modernism, a ong which are highlighted 
play, irony, performance, deconstruction, absence, discontinuity, and indeterminacy. 
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Many of these features are shared by the figures who are commonly defined as 
postmodernists. In addition to the ongoing work of writers such as Beckett, Pynchon 
or Robbe-Grillet, which bridge the supposed move from modernism to 
postmodernism, there did emerge a diverse group of writers often gathered under the 
name of the postmodern by critics. Under this heading are grouped writers as diverse 
as Muriel Spark, Iris Murdoch, B. S. Johnson, John Barth, John Fowles, Donald 
Barthelme Gabriel Garçia-Marquez, Jorge Luis Borges, Doris Lessing, Malcolm 
Bradbury, A. S. Byatt, Jeanette Winterson, Angela Carter, Salman Rushdie, Italo 
Calvino, and many, many others. Indeed, the term postm dernism and its definition 
has been the focus of a large and exhausting debate which has perpetrated itself up to 
the present day, and which has seen the initially aesthetic significance of the term 
shift to acquire a much wider socio-cultural valenc. We will, however, come back to 
this wider debate and its implications in our last chapter, in order to show how 
Brooke-Rose’s work acquires a distinctive countertendential charge in relation to 
postmodernism’s main tenets. Far from furnishing an exhaustive overview of 
postmodernist literature, we will here consider theworks of other writers who, 
between the sixties and the seventies, together with Brooke-Rose, contributed 
significantly to innovation within the novelistic genre.  
The new experimentalism which started developing from the sixties onwards 
mostly implied a “return” to the examples of modernist writers: the main 
experimental features of modernism were retaken and reworked, often expanded. In 
particular, if we look at the main areas of experimntation which modernism had set 
off, we can see how postmodernism actually addresses the same areas and brings 
them forward. These are, in particular: (1) the tendency to describe the inner world of 
human beings rather than any external “reality”; (2) a constant self-awareness of art 
and a strong attention upon the artistic medium itself, namely language; (3) 
experimentation with the time-structure of the novel, in particular the rejection of a 
linearly developing plot and the chronological presentation of events.  
The first of the characteristics delineated above is particularly exploited by 
women writers. As the feminist movement gained force, many women writers 
produced works which raised awareness of gender difference, analysing the causes of 
women’s oppression and/or describing the situation of women in contemporary 
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society. In 1965, Jean Rhys reappeared on the scene with Wide Sargasso Sea. Her 
writing provoked new interest and her earlier works were reissued. Rhys’ style and 
technique became an example of the way modernist techniques could serve the 
contemporary presentation of women’s consciousness and perspective. For instance, 
Edna O’Brien breaks with social realism in her novel Casualties of Peace (1966), 
which recalls Joyce’s style in the short and disconnected sentences of the 
protagonist’s thought. In 1970, Eva Figes publishes Patriarchal Attitudes, which 
unpicks the causes of women’s oppression. In the same year, Kate Millett’s Sexual 
Politics appears. In 1971, Fay Weldon’s Down Among the Women describes in crude 
terms women’s condition. Weldon abandons the past tense of realist fiction in favour 
of the present tense and purposely breaks up the fictional illusion in order to direct 
her reader’s attention towards the real, social concerns of her novel. Margaret 
Drabble’s The Waterfall (1969) also overtly addresses social issues and offers, like 
Feldon’s Down Among the Women, a double perspective: a first and a third person 
narrative which aims at rendering both the subjectiv  gaze of women upon 
themselves and the external gaze of society upon them. Anita Brookner does 
something similar in Providence (1982), where first and third person narratives 
alternate to render two different perspectives of the same character. These 
perspectives correspond to the heroine’s split ident ty: half English and half French, 
she is in fact split between different ways of seeing and considering herself which in 
part derive from the conventional roles society thrusts upon women. In the same line, 
Emma Tennant’s The Bad Sister (1978) scrutinises a divided female consciousness, 
also by means of her writing technique, which split down into the sections 
apparently written by the editor and the heroine’s journal.   
This attention to the inner consciousness of women d rives certainly from 
modernism, from Virginia Woolf as well as from Dorothy Richardson and May 
Sinclair, from their attention to what Woolf called the “room of one’s own” (Cf. 
Woolf 1929), the private space of consciousness which allows women to take an 
estranged view of reality and society. Among the most significant contemporary 
women writers is Doris Lessing. In 1962, Lessing published her most famous work, 
The Golden Notebook. Through Anna’s struggle – derived from the difficulty she 
experiences in integrating her different selves – Lessing presents various concerns 
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related to women’s identity and role as embedded in the social and political 
movements of her time. She expounds on culturally endorsed ideas about love, sex, 
family, and friendship. Lessing rejects conventional representation and significantly 
explores the inner and outer pressures which bear upon the protagonist. 
All the above-named authors clearly show affinities with Brooke-Rose. In 
Between, Brooke-Rose sets out to describe the causes of women’s oppression in 
contemporary society, in a language which aims at finding patterns capable of 
expressing the subjective feminine identity of the protagonist. The central character 
in Between is depicted as a split identity, thus positioning the text in line with such 
works as Providence, The Bad Sister, and The Golden Notebook. Like Anna in 
Lessing’s work, the protagonist of Between makes evident how a variety of socio-
cultural tenets such as love, sex, and religion, have their roots in a masculine-
dominated society and bear upon the expression of feminine identity. 
Another work which shows, perhaps more than any other, affinities to Brooke-
Rose’s Between is Brigid Brophy’s In Transit. The novel appeared in 1969, only one 
year after Between, and closely resembles the latter in many of its characteristics. It 
is set in an airport, where the protagonist, rather an departing to go somewhere, has 
decided to remain “in transit”, in a sort of comfortable limbo, conversing with her 
self, with the reader, and with other people at the airport. Like Between, In Transit 
presents different languages – those to be heard at the irport – as well as many kinds 
of linguistic puns. In particular, some of the double-reading puns are presented as 
reminiscences of the protagonist’s childhood, a featur  which makes Brophy’s novel 
resemble Between. The theme of sexual identity, or better of sexual indeterminacy, is 
central in both novels. Brophy’s protagonist puzzles the reader as she remarks, “It 
was during the scudding of the back of the spoon across the opaque liquid that I 
realized I could no longer remember which sex I was” (Brophy 71). There is no clear 
evidence of her gender and even her name – Evelyn Hi ary, called Pat – is sexually 
ambiguous. We find the same sexual indeterminacy in Between, where the 
protagonist, as we will see, seems to be more androgynous than feminine, uniting in 
her self both opposite genders. As in Between, Brophy’s protagonist has a suffered 
past which still and ineluctably affects her. Like B tween, In Transit is enjoyable and 
very funny, and offers a clear image of a changing world, one where air travel can 
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connect different parts of the world in a short span of time, one in which 
globalization and multilingualism are encroaching. The narrator of Brophy’s novel 
significantly reflects that “Perhaps our whole century is in transit” (Brophy 23). The 
narrative feature which distinguishes In Transit from Between is the former’s use of a 
first person narrator who explicitly refers to herself with the subject pronoun I, a 
feature which Between, diversely, rejects. Another difference, in my view, is that in 
Brophy’s novel we find more “completed actions” than in Between. The protagonist 
of In Transit is seen as directly conversing with other people, as well as witnessing 
various events which take place at the airport, whereas the protagonist of Between is 
never depicted as doing something specific or existing in a precise place and time; 
she is perennially seen as in between places and times. Another feature which 
apparently distinguishes In Transit from Between is the identification of Brophy’s 
protagonist’s with many different names. However, in my view, the presence of too 
many names prevents the heroine from fully identifying with any one of them, 
paradoxically functioning in the same way as the lack of name of Brooke-Rose’s 
translator.  
Lessing’s The Golden Notebook is also indicative of another basic development 
of postmodern fiction, namely the self-consciousnes and self-reflexivity of art which 
is largely present in fiction from the sixties onwards. Anna is both a woman and an 
author, and the pressures which bear upon her relate to both these aspects of her 
personality. In this way, Lessing focuses on the problematic concept of authorship, in 
a specifically female context, and on the relationship between author and characters. 
Anna’s anxieties extend into doubts about the very ability of language to represent 
reality and result in a critique of the act of writing: the protagonist admits that she is 
“incapable of writing […] a book powered with an intellectual or moral passion 
strong enough to create order, to create a new way of looking at life” (Lessing 76). 
She realises that knowing is an “illumination”, but “there is no way of putting this 
sort of knowledge into words” (Lessing 549). 
These anxieties about writing and its techniques perfectly exemplify the 
tendency toward self-awareness within postmodernist fiction, another major area of 
experimentation where the legacy of modernism is evdent. Far from trying to create 
realist illusion, postmodern fiction is nearly always self-conscious regarding its own 
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illusory status. Its attention is more and more directed towards the nature of 
language, its capacity to represent “reality” and the awareness of its limitations. 
Linguistic self-consciousness clearly derives from modernism, as it had increasingly 
been developed by Joyce. His work more and more focused on the primary medium 
of literature, language, from the reflections upon the connection of words to reality 
made by Stephen Dedalus in A Portrait of the Artist as a Young Man (1916), through 
the amazing linguistic creativity of Ulysses (1922), to the Work in Progress which 
would become Finnegans Wake (1939) and which would represent the “final stage” 
of Joyce’s parabola. In Finnegans Wake, in fact, language does not aim at 
representing the world any longer. Language takes ov r the content of the text, and 
all that seems to interest Joyce is the musicality, the sound-quality of the words: 
linguistic inventiveness and self-consciousness is celebrated as a means to itself. In 
Finnegans Wake, the reader’s attention is directed almost uniquely towards language, 
the relationships between words, their phonetic and/or etymological value. Joyce 
aims more at celebrating language than reflecting the world or telling a story, thus 
inaugurating what was described by Eugene Jolas as the “autonomy of language” 
(Jolas 79), and becoming the precursor to the self-referentiality and self-
consciousness of postmodernist fiction. After Joyce, and in his wake, other authors 
concentrated on the nature and “representative possibilities” of the linguistic means. 
In particular, Samuel Beckett, Joyce’s friend and follower, extends the “autonomy of 
language” Joyce initiated and specifically explores language’s frailty in his trilogy, 
Molloy, Malone Meurt, L’Innommable (1951-1953; English trans.1955-59). 
The work of Samuel Beckett is, together with Pound, another major literary 
influence on Brooke-Rose’s writing, one which cannot be abstracted from when 
considering her narrative. The three novels of the trilogy are written in the first 
person, in the form of monologues which further develop the fluidity of Joyce’s 
language: the flood of speech is presented to the reader in what sometimes seems to 
be “one endless breath”, mostly without formal breaks or pauses such as paragraphs. 
The monologues are however often discontinued by the narrators themselves, who 
stop and strive to find the right expression for what they “are trying to say”, or pause 
to consider problems of linguistic “inefficiency”. Beckett’s narrators are deeply 
concerned with words and with what words convey/do not convey. For example, in 
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Molloy, Molloy and Moran often break up the fluidity of speech with such remarks 
as “That last sentence is not clear, it does not say what I hoped it would” (Beckett 
1979 152). These kind of remarks progressively increase in Malone Dies and in The 
Unnamable2. Malone even describes the insurgence of practical problems which 
render difficult his writing, such as, for instance the disappearance of his exercise 
book and pencil. The narrators of the trilogy increasingly struggle to narrate, to 
articulate their words. The Unnamable will finally bring this self-consciousness 
about language to its limit, relentlessly pondering on the hopelessness of 
representation, on the inability of language to represent “reality”. The last novel of 
the trilogy is entirely focused on the linguistic means and the difficulties encountered 
in trying to convey something, anything. Its narrato  will come to the ineluctable 
“conclusion” that “it all boils down to a question of words”, that there are only 
words, “all words, there’s nothing else” (Beckett 1979 308, 381). 
Beckett’s narrators face the void of language, the “black void” where “all is 
silent”, and of which they “know nothing […] except that it is black, and empty” 
(Beckett 1979 278). This void represents the loneliness of the modern man in a 
universe where no ultimate meaning can be found. Yet, even in the face of these 
difficulties and of language’s unreliability, even i  the face of this void, and most 
probably because of this, Beckett’s narrators convey a strong sense of their u ge to 
speak: in their solitude, they need to articulate. The impulse towards language can 
neither rest, nor fulfil itself, given the impossibility of the linguistic medium 
representing anything. They try to confront the void by means of stories: they tell 
story after story only in order to distract themselves from the void. Language and 
narrative imagination are inextricably related to one another, as well as to the 
ultimate question of existence. Beckett’s narrators thus express and embody the 
inability of language to represent reality. In the end, they are revealed to be only 
story-tellers, hollow figures created in order to tell stories. Each of them is an 
additional imaginative construct, created by the next one, in order to distract himself 
from the void. In this sort of fictional spiral, the last narrator, the Unnamable, seems 
to point up to its creator, the author himself. Beckett’s trilogy thus deeply scrutinises 
the issue of language, its inability to express or represent, and the imagination which 
                                                
2 The title of the work in the English translation appears both as The Unnamable and The 
Unnameable. I will here use the term “Unnamable”, in accordance with the edition used.  
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almost desperately needs to narrate in order to keep th  void from advancing. The 
narrators of the trilogy convey a sense of emptiness, despair and seclusion, but they 
also present the reader with a fine dark humour and beautiful descriptions which 
seem to contradict the main assumption of language’s incapacity to convey meaning.  
Beckett’s influence on Brooke-Rose is palpable in the flowing syntax of 
Brooke-Rose’s novels. Although their technique of juxtaposition seems to derive 
mainly from Pound, the latter uses juxtaposition for his clear and economical style, 
i.e. in short, staccato sentences, whereas Brooke-Rs  employs juxtaposition at the 
larger level of long sentences or entire paragraphs, thus adopting the sheer flow of 
Beckett’s monologues. In Brooke-Rose, the mosaic style of Pound with its 
metaphorical charge, and the flowing syntax of Beckett, thus seem to converge. The 
narrators of Thru, like Beckett’s narrators, will be only story-tellers, paper inventions 
created in order to keep on telling stories upon stries. They embody the same urge 
to narrate, the same need to keep on inventing storie  we find in Beckett. They also 
continually discuss (though in different terms from Beckett) the issues of language 
and the void which linguistic structures presuppose r hide. In my view, however, 
Brooke-Rose’s writing surpasses the linguistic scepti ism posited in different ways 
by both Pound and Beckett. However, in order to discus  this issue, it is necessary to 
look first at Between and Thru. We therefore postpone further discussion of this until
the final chapter. We will then see how Brooke-Rose, writing in the wake of Beckett, 
nevertheless brings forward the autonomy of language into a positive reaffirmation 
of its referential value.  
Another to write in the wake of Joyce is Flann O’Brien. His novel At Swim-
Two-Birds, originally published in 1939, was reissued in 1960 and found a larger 
audience then. It is a humorous “story about stories”, or better a “story about telling 
stories”, where a publican locks his fictional characters in a hotel room in order to 
control them, but they eventually escape from his plot and take over the story. They 
all become story-tellers and compete against each other, finally telling a story about a 
man who writes a story about a man who writes a story about story-tellers. The novel 
becomes even more self-conscious as its “main” narrator presents other fragments of 
stories within the story and intrudes in the narration o discuss writing problems. The 
act of writing, or better the act of story-telling, thus becomes the central focus of At 
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Swim-Two-Birds. Thru will resemble Flann O’Brien’s work in its presentation of a 
multitude of narrators who struggle to impose their own version of the stories. Thru 
will also develop the metadiegetic technique of stories within stories ad infinitum 
and, again like At Swim-Two-Birds, it will present the figure of the narrator who 
seems to intrude in the narrative, though in a much more subtle and covert way than 
in Flann O’Brien’s novel.  
From the sixties onwards, the artistic self-consciousness initiated by 
modernism is reworked, often to extremes, by many British authors. The most 
experimental of them is probably B. S. Johnson, whose writing shows the influence 
of Joyce, Beckett and O’Brien. His first novel, Travelling People (1963), presents 
different narrative techniques, such as letters, journals and monologues. It also 
presents many blacked-out pages and shows already a self-consciousness regarding 
literary means which was to be further developed in his subsequent novels. In Albert 
Angelo (1964), Johnson radically challenges the time-structure of the conventional 
novel: the pages have holes in order to let readers see into the future. Fictional self-
awareness is brought to an extreme as the author interve es personally to declare that 
he is telling only a heap of lies. The Unfortunates (1969) challenges the time-
structure even further as the novel is presented in a box containing loose pages to be 
read and enjoyed at random. In this way, Johnson tries to overcome the constraint of 
the conventional novel: the book which forces the reader to read chronologically one 
page after the other in a serial order. In Christie Malry’s Own Double-Entry (1973), 
the author converses with the protagonist circa the ev nts of the story and their 
progression, pointing out the drawbacks of a narrative which presents an omniscient 
narrator.  
Others writers in the sixties and seventies, such as John Fowles and John 
Berger, share a highly developed self-consciousness about fiction writing and its 
mechanisms. Brooke-Rose parallels the experimentalism of these novelists in many 
ways. The artistic self-consciousness of Thru and its typographical display share in 
the self-aware discussions of the relationship betwe n fiction, language and reality 
which are widespread in postmodernist fiction. The int raction between the plane of 
the “real” and the fictional world, represented by the narrator’s intrusion into the 
narrative, exemplifies the ontological instability endorsed by postmodernist theories. 
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This is clearly linked to the issue of linguistic expression: language is unable to 
“represent” reality, meaning slips away from the subject, who therefore is no longer 
able to know “reality”. Many fictional works portray the instability, or better the 
fictionality, of the world we live in and the impossibility of knowing “reality”. They 
do so, for example, by giving the reader different versions of the same story. Since 
“reality” is unknowable and meaning depends only on interpretation and point of 
view, the presentation of different possible descriptions of the same event 
undermines the realistic monolithic approach to meaning. Lawrence Durrell’s The 
Alexandria Quartet (1957-60) offers the reader three points of view, and therefore 
three different versions of the same story. The quartet also inscribes itself into 
postmodernism for its self-reflexivity, its self-conscious discussion of literary issues, 
and for the different forms of writing it presents. In the same way, Brooke-Rose’s 
Thru will offer different possible interpretations of the stories narrated, and a range 
of different forms of writing which challenge the status of the novel as a genre.  
The same postmodernist ontological uncertainty is expressed by characters 
who can exist on different planes at once. They are ind ed able to wander from other 
texts or from “reality” into the text, as for instance in Doctorow’s Ragtime (1975), 
where Freud and Jung are happily together, or in Coover’s The Public Burning 
(1977), where Richard Nixon tries to seduce Ethel Rosenberg. Given the ontological 
instability of “reality”, writers play on our sense of the real, making possible worlds 
and planes of existence interact. Brooke-Rose will br ng this unstable ontology to 
extreme consequences in Thru, which presents an immense intertextual network of 
dramatis personae coming from both fictional texts and the “real” world. The same 
will happen in Textermination, where a conference held at the Hilton hotel in Sa
Francisco reunites fictional characters from disparate literary periods and present 
time TV characters, with the communal aim of praying for their survival in readers’ 
minds. 
Parody becomes one of the central aesthetic practices of postmodernist writers, 
a practice which is envisaged by Sontag as a strategic way of avoiding interpretation; 
a practice which is also recognised by Barth as an essential characteristic of the 
literature of replenishment. Parody becomes a strategy to focus on the fictionality of 
“reality”. In America, John Barth rejects realistic representation and moves towards 
 64 
parody and artistic self-consciousness already in The Sot-Weed Factor (1960) and 
Giles Goat-Boy (1966). Joseph Heller’s Catch-22 (1961) parodies the rationalism of 
the American military force by means of a mocking, almost fantastical exaggeration 
which is paralleled by the real human pain and death of he Second World War. This 
technique makes visible, by contrast, the effects of power. In Cat’s Cradle (1963), 
Kurt Vonnegut humorously criticises the liberal ideological consensus of the Cold 
War. Brooke-Rose’s Thru will employ parody in order to deconstruct the notion of 
fixed and stable meaning, and therefore the idea of reality which is given and 
knowable once and for all. Concurrently, the irony of Thru will aim at teasing the 
confusion of theories of post-structuralism and deconstruction.  
Another area of literary innovation which develops from the sixties onwards is 
concerned with the rejection of linearly-developing arratives. In the time-structure 
experimentalism of postmodernist fiction, the modernist legacy is, once again, 
evident. The “extraordinary discrepancy between time on the clock and time in the 
mind” (Woolf 1928 91) is already addressed by modernists, who advocate internal 
human time as opposed to the external time of the clock of realist fiction. The 
reliance on memory tends now to give life to non-linear narratives which had their 
most influential modernist examples in Joyce and Woolf, as well as in Proust’s À la 
recherche du temps perdu (1913-27). Time-structure innovation is evident for 
instance in William Golding’s Pincher Martin (1956), which represents a step 
forward in the line of the modernist “abbreviation” of time. The whole novel is in 
fact built upon a single instant in the mind of itsprotagonist. Brooke-Rose also 
discards the linear developments of events. Already Out and Such follow more the 
“wanderings” of the protagonists’ minds than the objective presentation of events in 
a causal order. Between will be constructed entirely on the “time of the mind”, on the 
associative reminiscences of its central character, while in Thru the temporal plane 
curiously seems not to exist, as everything is reduc  to the same time-plateau.  
From what we have said, it is clear that Brooke-Rose’s innovative approach to 
fiction shares in the wide context of the English (and American) experimentalism 
which developed from the sixties onwards. However, the author’s experimental 
solutions must be understood also in light of the Fr nch cultural panorama of this 
period. In 1968, Brooke-Rose moved to France, where sh  started working and 
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where she was to remain up to the present time. In Paris, she found herself in direct 
contact with a highly charged cultural atmosphere. She encountered the most 
luminary members of the various newly-created literary circles, with the Tel Quel 
group, with the OuLiPo group, with the most prominent feminist writers, as well as 
with the literary theorists of poststructuralism and deconstructionism. It is easy to 
imagine how strong the impact of the French speculative debate was to be on her 
literary practice. 
The Tel Quel group included among its members Roland Barthes, Georges 
Bataille, Jacques Derrida, Michel Foucault, Gérard Genette, Julia Kristeva, Philippe 
Sollers, and Tzvetan Todorov. The group was founded in 1960 and grew up in 
opposition to the established socio-cultural institutions. Its participants advocated a 
revolution in literary practice. Tel Quel posited itself as an instrument of cultural 
renewal and its review became one of the most influe tial literary journals in France. 
One of the imperative claims of the group was the absolute need to free language 
from the linguistic clichés of bourgeois society. The members of Tel Quel shared 
with Brooke-Rose the view that reality is a construct of language and attacked the 
realistic mode of representation as representative of the bourgeois ideological 
constructs. In particular Sollers shares with Brooke-Rose the extensive use of 
quotations and echoes from other texts.  
The OuLiPo – Ouvroir de Littérature Potentielle – group was founded in 1960 
by the mathematician François le Lionnais and the writer Raymond Queneau. 
Among its members were Georges Perec and Italo Calvino. The group’s declared 
aim was that of bringing together the distinct domains of literature and mathematics 
in order to produce experimental literature. With Calvino, Brooke-Rose shares an 
interest in linguistic play, while Perec parallels Brooke-Rose’s writing in his use of 
peculiar linguistic constraints or lipograms: his novel La Disparition (1969), in fact, 
is written entirely without the letter “e”. 
These innovative contemporary linguistic, psychological, and literary theories 
gave the intellectual scene a real twist: the debate w s developing around language as 
linked to one’s own identity, around the connection between language, reality and 
identity: Lacan’s psychoanalytic theory saw the subject as structured by means of its 
entrance into the Symbolic Order of language and society. Barthes declared the 
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Death of the Author and theorised the Text of pleasure. Derrida’s deconstruction of 
binary oppositions led to the exposure of the metaphysics of presence and to the idea 
of arche-writing and différance, which was followed by Kristeva’s – in opposition to 
Lacan’s masculine view – deconstruction of feminine identity and her conception of 
poetic language, where the Semiotic continually breach s the Symbolic and disturbs 
it. This extremely rich cultural milieu galvanised the shift from structuralism to 
poststructuralism. At the same time, theorists such as Hélene Cixous and Monique 
Wittig questioned the values and categories upon which traditional fiction relied 
from a theoretically militant feminist perspective. Irigaray, who taught at the 
University of Vincennes from 1970 to 1974, was at that moment a member of the 
EFP, “École Freudienne de Paris”, a school directed by Jacques Lacan. Her work 
challenged the establishment and was to influence the feminist movement for several 
decades. On account of the basic contentions of her doctoral dissertation, later 
published as Speculum: Of the Other Woman, Irigaray was expelled from the EFP 
and the University of Vincennes. 
The nouveau romanciers were producing highly unconventional fiction. If 
Brooke-Rose had already before 1968 looked at the new ovel as a source of 
inspiration, and in 1967 had even translated Robbe-Grillet’s Dans le Labyrinthe into 
English, now she enters into direct contact with the nouveau romanciers. Together 
with Robbe-Grillet and Sarraute, whose work we have lr ady analysed above, 
another major representative of the nouveau roman was Claude Simon. However, he 
detached himself from the movement through his use of metaphor and his 
employment of history. Most of his novels in fact describe with photographic 
objectivity his own family history. His texts present no beginning and no end, and 
are open to several interpretations. For instance, Le Vent (1957) presents the same 
event from different perspectives and thereby generates different interpretive 
possibilities. His novel L'Herbe (1958) – set in 1940, at the time of the German 
invasion in France – is an attack on the traditional writing of history: for the author, 
history is made up of everyday occurrences. Indeed, nothing really “happens” in the 
story, which is overflowing with descriptions of houses and gardens. In La Route des 
Flandres (1960), we find a double chronology, as scenes from the war are juxtaposed 
with scenes from after the war in the life of the protagonist. Triptyque (1973) 
 67 
concurrently presents different narratives – a wedding party, the drowning of a boy 
and a scene in a hotel room – mixed together and without any formal break. Simon 
mixes objective description with the stream of consciousness of his characters. His 
narrative often lacks punctuation and becomes a single, long flow. 
Also among the foremost French personalities of the period were Maurice 
Roche and Michel Butor. Although they did not take an active part in the nouveau 
roman movement, they are often assimilated with it in light of their highly 
unconventional fiction, which banished traditional rrative principles such as linear 
plot, causality and the realistic representation of characters, and focused on the 
subjective way of seeing reality. In Butor’s L’Emploi du Temps (1957), the 
protagonist moves among the streets and buildings of an English town, Bleston, 
where he has come to work for a year, experiencing a strong sense of disorientation 
as well as the feeling of being imprisoned in the surrounding reality. The novel 
presents a double chronology in the life and diary of the protagonist, as well as the 
minute description of objects (streets, buildings) in the style of the nouveau roman. 
La Modification (1957), Butor’s best-known novel, presents a story within a story 
and is told entirely in the second person plural. Indeed, the protagonist talks to 
himself during a train journey from Paris to Rome. During the voyage, he decides to 
modify his initial project – he will not leave his wife for his mistress – and to write a 
book which will eventually become La Modification. Other works by Butor include 
Degrés (1960), Description de San Marco (1963), and Portrait de l’artiste en jeune 
singe (1967). In the style of the nouveau roman, Butor’s novels offer a detailed 
description of everyday circumstances and objects, and discard traditional concepts 
of plot, and chronology. However, differently from the nouveau romanciers, Butor 
puts the accents more on the consciousness of his characters, on their inner reality, 
than on the obsessive description of objects and inanimate surfaces. Butor also 
published the journal I lustrations for 1964 onwards. He was an active literary critic 
and explored, in many of his essays, the intertextual relationship between other 
artistic systems – such as music and painting – and literary discourse. 
Maurice Roche, perhaps more than anyone else, parallels Brooke-Rose’s 
experimentalism. His fiction seems to be the nearest to Brooke-Rose’s practice for its 
sense of humour and its typographical devices. Like Brooke-Rose, Roche is a 
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polyglot, and approaches language with a great sense of linguistic humour. In his 
novels, he makes wide use of typographical display and of many other narrative 
features which are similarly employed by Brooke-Rose. Roche’s texts – Compact 
(1966), Circus (1972), CodeX (1974), Opéra Bouffe (1975), and Mémoire (1976) – 
radically discard conventional linearity and appear to all be linked to one another, to 
the point that it is almost impossible to determine pr cisely where one text ends and 
another begins. In his novels, Roche mixes together a multitude of signifying 
systems. The cabbala, the occult, alchemy, astrology, chiromancy, pictograms, 
ideograms, tattoos, cave paintings, hieroglyphs, runic characters, rebuses, symbols 
taken from the Michelin tourist guide, and street sign  are all present, concurring to 
shape highly polysemic texts which challenge any attempt to endow them with fixed 
meaning. Roche’s texts emphasise their own typographic l aspect in a myriad of 
ways: mirror writing, writing which must be read from right to left, bold types to 
reveal hidden meaning, acrostics (both in horizontal and in vertical on the page), 
fragments which resemble crossword puzzles, musical notations, and many other 
typographical tricks. Some fragments, for instance, ar  printed horizontally, but in 
opposite vertical directions, so that the reader has to turn the book around and around 
in order to read. All these features strongly recall Brooke-Rose’s Thru, as do many 
others, such as the proof corrections which appear in handwriting in Roche’s texts 
and which we will find in Thru, in the handwritten corrections and marks to the 
students’ homework. In Roche we also find the use of different languages, although 
not to the same extent with which Brooke-Rose employs them in Between. Like 
Brooke-Rose, Roche makes wide use of intertextual reminders. Roche’s texts, like 
Brooke-Rose’s, encourage the reader to participate actively in the making of the text, 
but also furnish the reader with precise advice on h w to interpret and read them. In 
numerous self-referential passages, the texts clearly furnish the reader with the rules 
of their functioning and explain the way they should be read in order for their 
peculiar visual/sound/meaning effects to be appreciat d. For instance, CodeX 
presents two chiastic images (once again recalling Brooke-Rose’s Thru) and explains 
that they can be read in two directions (Cf. Roche 1974 74). The functioning of 
Roche’s novels is made evident, offering the reader th  same dialectical movement 
between deceit and display which we will appreciate n Thru. The very suggestions 
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“No mystery, there’s the secret”, in Circus (Roche 1972 15), and “Do it yourself”, in 
CodeX (Roche 1974 62), strongly recall Thru’s “this is […] no mystery” (T 584), and 
its suggestion to the reader: “work it out for yourself it’s not very deep” (T 595). 
Roche’s texts play on the nature of fiction and stress the visual experience of 
reading, constantly emphasising the different ways images and words can be 
read/interpreted. Stressing the relativity of meaning, they put the accent on the 
reader’s capacity to interpret and look at things in multiple ways. In Compact, for 
example, a series of vertical lines are referred to as an “enseigne lumineuse”. Soon 
after, the text explains that this image should be read obliquely and almost parallel to 
the line of vision. If we do so, we amazingly read “EYES EXCHANGE BANK” 
(Roche 1966 122). The visual illusion here is generated by the superimposition of 
two axes of vision, which determines the optical phenomenon called anamorphosis. 
Another example of anamorphosis in Roche’s texts is the skull visible in Hans 
Holbein’s painting The Ambassadors. The painting is directly presented in Opéra 
Bouffe (Roche 1975 32), and the skull is a recurring symbol in Roche’s novels, often 
created with the arrangements of words on the page. This sort of concrete prose once 
again recalls Thru. Moreover, the presence of the anamorphosis in Roche’s work 
seems to imply that the apparent meaning of the texts is generated by an illusion. The 
same optical illusion will be constantly emphasised in Thru, where the image of the 
mirror is clearly said to produce such an illusory effect. The reader of Roche’s texts, 
like the reader of Brooke-Rose’s, has to learn to read the strong dialectical movement 
between literal and figurative meaning. It is as if the reader exchanged their eyes at 
the “EYES EXCHANGE BANK” of Roche’s texts and began to see things 
differently, to interpret them, always aware that there can be many ways of 
interpreting the same thing. As a result, we begin to question the logic of the fixed 
meaning and enjoy the free play of the signifier. 
From what has been said, it is easy to see how much Brooke-Rose shares with 
both the English experimental fiction and the French avant-garde writers of the 
period. Parody, linguistic self-consciousness, time-structure innovation, and the 
focus on the inner consciousness of the characters, are all features central the wide 
process of literary renewal which took place in thesixties in British fiction. At the 
same time, a parallel movement of innovation takes place in France, enhanced by 
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post-structuralist and deconstructionist theories, and by the strong tenets of the 
nouveau roman. The deconstruction of the concept of identity, the objectification of 
the external reality which exists in a realm separate from the human subject, and 
consequently the minute description of inanimate objects and the presentation of a 
subject which no longer endows things with meaning, are all features which position 
Brooke-Rose in relation to the French panorama.  
In addition, Pound’s influence is clear in the juxtaposition of disparate fields of 
knowledge for metaphorical purposes, as well as in the stress on the surface 
materiality of language, as will appear clearly in Between and Thru. Likewise, the 
flowing syntax of Brooke-Rose’s novels derives from Beckett’s strong influence, 
together with the accent on the ability of language to represent “reality”. In this light, 
Brooke-Rose shares with postmodernist writers such as B. S. Johnson and others the 
legacy of Joyce, the “autonomy of language” which he inaugurated.  
 It is also important to note here that, although Beckett was Irish, he lived and 
worked in Paris, and from the early 40s he wrote mostly in French, later translating 
his works into English. He lived in France throughout the war and his fiction is 
contemporaneous with the existentialism of Sartre and Camus. The bleak, pessimistic 
vision of Beckett’s narrators can be seen as connected to the French existentialist 
philosophy and to the experience of the War. The legacy of Beckett in Brooke-Rose, 
therefore, could be seen as being as much a part of her participation in French 
culture, as in its British counterpart. Indeed, as we will better see below, Brooke-
Rose stands at the border between the two cultures, and cannot be assimilated 
entirely with one or the other. Her experimentalism cannot, by any means, be 
reduced solely to the nouveau roman. She partakes both of the British and of the 
French cultures, showing in her work a deep understanding of both. However, 
despite her being perfectly bilingual, and although her novels often present French 
and a mixture of other languages, English remains their main vehicle and they were 
all published in Britain. This clear choice on Brooke-Rose’s part undoubtedly 
illustrates her wish to address an English-speaking audience.  
In light of her participation in the French cultural tmosphere, we could 
compare Brooke-Rose with some other British writers who present in their work an 
awareness of the French cultural milieu. The experim ntalism of the nouveau roman 
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in fact, significantly influences such authors as John Fowles, Muriel Spark, Rayner 
Heppenstall, and Giles Gordon, who all share with Brooke-Rose different features.   
John Fowles is indebted to the French fiction of the early twentieth century 
(Marcel Proust and André Gide), and to the new French i tellectual environment of 
the sixties. This is particularly evident in The French Lieutenant’s Woman (1969), as 
the narrator states that he lives in “the age of Alain Robbe-Grillet and Roland 
Barthes” (Fowles 97), and later refers again to the practice of the “theoreticians of 
the nouveau roman” (Fowles 389). Fowles imitates on the one hand the manner of 
the Victorian novelist, setting his story in the nineteenth-century, while on the other 
hand he shows himself as an author speaking from the twentieth century. The author 
intrudes in the story to comment ironically on the events, and to reveal overtly his 
authorial manipulation: 
This story I am telling is all imagination. These characters I create never existed outside of my own 
mind. If I have pretended until know to know my characters’ minds and innermost thoughts, it is 
because I am writing in […] a convention universally accepted at the time of my story: that the 
novelist stands next to God […] But I live in the age of Alain Robbe-Grillet and Roland Barthes; if 
this is a novel, it cannot be a novel in the modern se se of the word. (Fowles 97) 
 
At the end of the novel, Fowles offers three optional endings among which the 
reader can choose. Fowles explores in this way the issue of authorial control and 
plays with the reader’s expectations, trying to divest people of their passive reading 
habits, forcing them to participate in the novel by choosing one of the endings, but 
also overtly informing them of the fictive status of the story and providing 
elucidations on the various fictional techniques employed.  
Like Brooke-Rose, Muriel Spark began writing in the fifties and her writing 
shows the influence of the nouveau roman. In The Comforters (1957), Spark presents 
a heroine who, working on her novel, is disturbed by an unrelenting sound of 
typewriting which is attributed to “a writer on another plane of existence” (Spark 
63). Caroline will then suspect that someone above herself is arranging her life into 
“a convenient slick plot” (Spark 104). In The Prime of Miss Jean Brodie (1961), the 
heroine seems to be implicitly compared to an author-like figure who constructs the 
present lives of her characters (her pupils) and shapes their future. Not only does she 
seem to possess total authorial control over her pupils, but she also determines their 
lives. In fact, the novel’s anticipation of some events seems to have precisely the 
purpose of showing how Miss Brodie really affects/controls her girls’ future. In this 
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way, the novel shares with the nouveau roman and with postmodernism the concern 
with the nature of writing, as Brodie’s strong wilfulness makes her an authorial 
figure. In the same line, The Driver’s Seat (1970) presents a protagonist – Lise – who 
tries to re-appropriate for herself the authorial power of deciding upon her own life 
and, eventually, death. Spark’s novels, and in particular The Driver’s Seat, strongly 
reveal the influence of the nouveau roman in their objective tone, in their almost 
obsessive and minute description of objects and surfaces.  
The influence of the nouveau roman is evident, too, in the writing of Rayner 
Heppenstall. The Connecting Door (1962) shares indeed many of the characteristics 
of the new novel. Its protagonist is unnamed, in the style of Robbe-Grillet. The novel 
also presents a meticulous description of objects, notating the minutiae of their 
surfaces and concentrating on each detail. The narrator seems to be less concerned 
with action than interested in the observation of buildings and streets. Other main 
characteristics which show Heppenstall’s French influence are the rigorous use of the 
present tense, and the non-chronological order in the arrangement of events, as the 
novel concurrently presents two different periods of time. The connecting door of the 
title seems to be that of time and memory, or else that of different planes of 
existence: some of the characters, in fact, seem to exist on different plateaus, and at 
times they seem to be mere projections of the main protagonist’s mind. In all this, 
again, the influence of the nouveau roman is evident, as it is also in the time-
structure innovation of Two Moons (1977), where Heppenstall presents two different 
stories simultaneously.  
In the following decade, another writer whose work shows the influence of the 
new novel will be Giles Gordon. His Girl With Red Hair (1974), resembles the new 
novel in its description of objects. The novel is written entirely in the second person, 
like Michel Butor’s La Modification (1957). It also presents an index of characters, 
which recalls Brooke-Rose’s index of narrators in Thru. 
Another novelist who looks to the French panorama for the development of her 
fiction is Iris Murdoch. More than to the nouveau roman, however, she looks to the 
French existentialist philosophy of Sartre. The idea of the self-determination of the 
individual is tackled by Murdoch in many of her novels. The basic assumption of 
Sartre’s philosophy is in a way contrary to what Murdoch does as a writer, i.e. 
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imposing her patterns on characters. Murdoch, a teacher of philosophy herself, is 
well aware of this paradox, and her novels often show characters who try to escape 
from their “puppet master” or from the imposition of meaning from above. This 
renders Murdoch’s novel an outstanding example of artistic self-consciousness. In 
particular, in The Sea, the Sea (1978), the narratorial figure constantly worries about 
the morality of imposing his point of view on other people, or of writing the “reality” 
with words in his journal. 
Brooke-Rose’s work clearly shares many features with the above mentioned 
works. Fowles’ direct allusion to French culture and his technical elucidations will 
find in Thru a significant development, as the work will be constructed to a large 
extent on allusions to and quotations from the various theories of structuralism and 
poststructuralism, giving the reader direct information on its textual functioning and 
techniques. Similarly, in Thru, as in The French Lieutenant’s Woman, the figure of 
the author will play with the reader, even if with different modalities. Fowles’ wish 
to act on the reader’s habits is moreover a basic tenet of Brooke-Rose’s writing.  
Spark’s novels parallel Brooke-Rose’s in their objective description of surfaces 
and inanimate objects, as well as in their concern with the nature of writing and the 
role of the author. In particular, in Between, we will observe an obsessive and minute 
description of flat, rigid surfaces, while in Thru the role of the authorial figure is 
constantly alluded to but never directly seen by the c aracters, thus paralleling the 
author of The Comforters, whose faint typing sound Caroline hears. Moreover, the 
multitude of characters of Thru will try to reappropriate for themselves the role f 
narrators, and decide their stories (and therefore lives), as Lise does in The Driver’s 
Seat. Larissa, for example, will foresee some future evnts in advance, as if she were 
inventing them for herself.  
Heppenstall’s The Connecting Door strongly resembles Between in the 
namelessness of its protagonist, in the scrupulous use of the present tense, in the 
meticulous description of objects, in the peculiar “lack” of action, and in the 
predominance of memory and associative mental processes in the structuring of a 
non-chronological narrative, a narrative where past and present are concurrently 
presented. The different planes of existence of Heppenstall’s characters will also be 
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present in Thru, where the metadiegetic levels will proliferate to the point that 
distinguishing among them will be impossible.   
I have, up to this moment, delineated the different influences which bear on 
Brooke-Rose’s writing, considered the two cultural p noramas (French and British) 
in reference to which it should be understood, and drawn the major parallelisms 
between her work and that of other contemporary writers. In my view, however, 
Brooke-Rose’s writing possesses qualities which transcend any specific set of 
theories or cultural movement. She cannot be paired tout court with the nouveau 
roman in the way many critics have done, especially in the sixties and seventies. 
Before considering Between and Thru, therefore, I will tackle the issue of her critical 
reception during those years and make out the main characteristics of her writing 
which are distinctively her own and which therefore transcend the French panorama. 
I will then consider the successive re-evaluation of her work, and define the ways in 
which this thesis proposes to contribute to an original assessment of her literary 
practice.   
After Brooke-Rose’s early four novels, which, as alre dy mentioned, were on 
the whole welcomed by the critics, the critical response to her works and their 
success in terms of readership were not very propitious during the sixties and 
seventies. The novels of her first experimental quartet received scant consideration 
and were often discarded as too difficult and demanding. For instance, in reviewing 
Out, Francis Hope writes that “Miss Brooke-Rose has trotted out the whole Left 
Bank box of trucs – meaningless confusions, solipsistic riddles, obsessive galaxies of 
‘objective’ scientific terms”. Hope shows no attempt to understand the novel in 
different terms than its difficulty and continues by declaring that it possesses “the 
virtues of moral nullity and crucifying dullness: it is resplendently unreadable” 
(Hope 742). The novel had been indeed rejected by Brooke-Rose’s first publisher, 
Secker and Warburg, for its complexity. It was then accepted by Michael Joseph, 
which also published Such, Between and the collection of short stories Go When You 
See the Green Man Walking. Although Michael Joseph, being its publisher, writes a 
slightly more positive review of Out, he stresses once more its difficulty. After 
having summed up the plot of the novel, Joseph explains in fact that “the greater part 
of the book is concerned with the actual workings of [the protagonist’s] mind, and 
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this, though very ingeniously done, is exhausting ad less rewarding” (Joseph 1964 
1,033). Even though Joseph clearly praises Brooke-Rose’s “shiningly visible” 
intelligence, he finally declares that “it is very hard to be certain if one has grasped 
the point” (Joseph 1964 1,033). In reviewing Such, Joseph links it directly to the 
nouveau roman and underlines the effort the reader must be prepared to make if 
he/she wishes to approach the novel: “Such is very much a book for new-novel 
readers, who are used to this sort of hard work” (Joseph 1966 953). In more negative 
terms, in assessing Such, Seymour-Smith complains,  
The cleverness of all this is dazzling, and so are the intellectual implications. The difficulty is that the 
reader needs to work too hard, intellectually, all the way […] the whole is too much a stark ideological 
structure. One wants to work hard on books only when one has enjoyed them, responded to them […] 
I admired this novel, but I could not enjoy it. (Seymour-Smith 1966 593) 
 
Neither Out nor Such sold satisfactorily. As a direct consequence, the print-
runs of the subsequent novels became consecutively shorter. Out was printed in 
3.000 copies, Such had 2.500 prints and only 2.000 copies of Between were 
produced. 
Between, however, received more positive reviews and sold al  the copies. 
Joseph praises the “glittering surface” of the novel, with its “free-running 
associations” and “superb multilingual forgings”, stre sing its “comic extravaganza” 
and the very much actual topics of women’s emancipation and global air travel 
(Joseph 1968 1,218). John Whitley positively depicts Between as an interesting 
mixture of French and British literary features,  
The rare achievement of “Between” is to put the abstr ct etymological theorising of Lévi-Strauss and 
the Structuralists into tangibly crumpled light-weight suits, sawdust cafés; for one the characters of a 
nouveau roman are alive and well and living in free association. Better still, they have a sense of 
humour. (Whitley 1968 62) 
 
Whitley admires Brooke-Rose’s “glinting vein of irony” and defines Between 
“one of the most witty novels” of the contemporary literary panorama. For Whitley, 
Between is a “near-parody” (Whitley 1968 62) of the nouveau roman, a mixture of 
the British farce which the French lack and the ability for linguistic exploitation 
which the British lack. He thus sees that, while  participating of both cultures, the 
novel also possesses something which transgresses them. 
If Between was better received, when Thru appeared Brooke-Rose was, in her 
words, “regarded as totally incomprehensible” (Del Sapio Garbero 1991 91). The 
novel was published by Hamish Hamilton, “with a print-run of 1.500, of which 
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slightly over half were sold” (Birch 171). The majority of the reviews of Thru overtly 
(and negatively) associated Brooke-Rose to the nouveau roman. They did so almost 
automatically, without trying to recognise what were the features which 
distinguished Thru from the works of the nouveau romanciers. The novel’s much 
more overt connection with French theory engendered in almost all cases a highly 
hostile critical reception in Britain. As Glyn White clearly sees, “Thru convinced the 
majority that the author had ‘gone too far’” (White 2005 122). For instance, Francis 
King heavily criticises it by saying,  
Thru , with its incomprehensible diagrams, its typographical eccentricities, its repetitions and 
inconsequentialities, left me wholly baffled. After struggling off and on for a week to unravel its 
intentions, I suspect that this is the kind of work that ends up on the desks of grateful thesis-writers 
without passing through the intermediary of many readers’ hands. (King 1975 12) 
 
Thru is certainly not the kind of work to be understood in one week of “off and 
on” reading, but King does not show any attempt to put more effort in 
comprehending it, and easily dismisses its “eccentricities” as “incomprehensible”. In 
similar terms, Michael Mason judges negatively the “topics of linguistics and literary 
theory […] approached with characteristically French emphases”. He disapprovingly 
remarks that most of the book is made up of French a ademic talk, and doubts 
whether it is “appropriate to speak of this work as a ‘narrative’, except by courtesy” 
(Mason 1975 753). Mason is also particularly critical of Brooke-Rose’s photograph 
displayed on the book cover: for him, the Saint Laurent foulard she wears is a clear 
sign of the author’s wish to consolidate her role as a French academic. Like King’s 
one, Mason’s review does not show any attempt whatsoever to grasp the novel’s 
specificity. C. J. Driver also heavily condemns Thru: he is “not buying the package”, 
he tells us, and describes the novel solely in terms of “false and fresh starts and 
snippets”. For Driver, Thru lacks context and voice, and it is only “an English 
example of French narrative practice” (Driver 1975 14).  
The main reason for such a widespread hostile attitude owards the novel seems 
to be the peculiar sense of insularity still felt by the Anglo-Saxon intellectual world 
at the time Thru was published. The English literary panorama of theperiod 
appeared as if closed in itself and looked at what c me from other cultural 
environments as “suspicious”. English critics seemed to be more concerned with 
defining what were English literature’s specific features, as opposed to what they 
considered as “foreign”. In view of the fact that Brooke-Rose had been living and 
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working in France since 1968, writing novels which strongly resembled those of the 
nouveau romanciers, she was easily dismissed as “foreign”, cast aside as “not 
thoroughly English”. Thru was in almost all cases unenthusiastically associated with 
French experimentalism. An illuminating example of this attitude is given by Peter 
Ackroyd who, in reviewing the novel, defiantly declares,  
Thru is too little, and it is also too late. It tries to do for the English language what Denis Roche and a 
host of experimentalists did to the French, but Thru is neither here nor there. […] It is very brave of 
Miss Brooke-Rose to apply certain European strategies to the indigenous product, but like a great 
many Europeanisms they have a faded date-stamp upon them. The English have missed that particular 
development of modernism but it is too late to imitate it: we must go beyond. (Ackroyd 1975 52) 
 
Ackroyd criticises Thru for its resemblance to “European” experimentalism, 
for its use of “European strategies”, thus perfectly demonstrating that the hostile 
reception of the novel derived primarily from the Anglo-centric mind-set of the 
contemporary British academia. The unsympathetic attude shown by British critics 
towards Thru is defined by White as “cultural xenophobia”, for there does not appear 
to be, in their evaluations, “the slightest inclinat on to get to grips with the text 
itself”, and the novel is judged solely in relation to the French background it refers 
to. Thru was therefore dismissed as “both un-English and imitative, in the worst 
literary sense” (White 2005 123).   
Differently from King, Mason, Driver and Ackroyd, Frank Kermode praises 
Thru, and his admiration is reported on the dust-jacket of the novel, 
If we are ever to experience in English the serious practice of narrative as the French have developed 
it over the last few years, we shall have to attend to Christine Brooke-Rose. There has been writing in 
English about the subject, and even a small amount of timid pastiche; but Christine Brooke-Rose is 
the sole practitioner of the real thing. Incidentally the word ‘serious’ doesn’t rule out the word 
‘funny’. Thru is both. (Kermode) 
 
Kermode’s comment was later transcribed on the back of Amalgamemnon and 
of the Omnibus edition. However positive his commentary might be,it nevertheless 
strictly links, once more, Brooke-Rose’s practice to the French cultural panorama, 
thus again rendering problematical the acceptance of the novel into the English 
canon.  
Although Brooke-Rose’s writing is inextricably connected to the contemporary 
French critical and literary context, in my view, her experimentalism should not be 
automatically paired with the nouveau roman. The French cultural panorama and 
literary experimental example undoubtedly stimulated Brooke-Rose and helped her 
to investigate a new approach to fiction, yet delineating her work only with reference 
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to French fiction would preclude any considerable rcognition of her 
accomplishments. Her experimental writing developed an  needs to be understood 
also in light of her influences, Pound and Beckett, of the new scientific theories 
considered above, and it is strictly related to the broad trend of social renewal of the 
sixties in Britain, which engendered on a large scale a rejection of the realist 
conventions in literature. 
Brooke-Rose’s writing clearly participates of the British and the French 
cultural panoramas, but precisely because it stands t the border between one and the 
other, it becomes a most original synthesis of what t ese different backgrounds offer 
her. Her writing practice becomes a crossroad, “a junction where many roads 
converge” (Canepari-Labib 22). If we wish to “place” Brooke-Rose, therefore, we 
need to consider the many influences and stimuli which bear on her practice, as I 
have done above (structuralism, poststructuralism, deconstruction, feminism, 
nouveau roman, scientific theories, Pound, Beckett, British cultural innovation in the 
sixties). However, these considerations alone stillcannot account for some of the 
most distinctive features of her work, for her writing also developed in light of her 
personal  ideas and biographical circumstances.  
 In fact, it cannot be omitted that her experience of bilingualism has played a 
basic role in her fictional practice. Brooke-Rose’s multilingualism can be seen, in 
Del Sapio Garbero’s words, as a “privileged biographical condition”, one which has 
permitted Brooke-Rose to live and work in France from 1968 onwards, although she 
continued writing in English. Her bilingualism has therefore allowed her to live and 
“work between cultures, exploiting precisely the space of contiguity between the 
frontiers and discourses” (Del Sapio Garbero 1991 96). As Randall Stevenson 
explains,  
No author aware of two or more literary traditions can remain unquestioningly content with the 
conventions of any one of them. Contact with another culture and literature helps create for writers a 
sense of the character and limitations of their own, e couraging the pursuit of alternatives and 
possibilities of innovation and change. For writers anywhere, awareness of languages and cultures 
other than their own therefore encourages the self-conscious questioning. (Stevenson 1993 135) 
 
Brooke-Rose’s novels, in fact, draw features from both the British and the 
French cultures, yet they always present something which exceeds one or the other. 
This “something” is the profound awareness of the other culture. Brooke-Rose’s 
fictional works possess both a deep understanding of and a crucial distance from the 
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English and the French cultures. They present a constant awareness of the other way 
of looking at any given issue. The author never accepts passively the ideas and 
theories she tackles in her works, but always handles them critically, looking at them 
from an estranged perspective. This perspective derives precisely from her being 
both an “insider” and a “stranger” to the culture which heralds those ideas or 
produces those theories. The constant presentation of opposite viewpoints in her 
novels, the steady awareness of the other point of view, clearly stimulates the reader 
to see things from a different angle and to reject dogmatism and fundamentalism. For 
instance, we will see how Between exemplifies some of the basic tenets of Irigaray’s 
écriture feminine, while also surpassing them in the positing of a non-exclusive 
feminine subject. Similarly, Thru endorses the French poststructuralist and 
deconstructionist theories, but it approaches them with a pervasive tongue-in-cheek 
attitude which reveals the author’s peculiar stance, one which is both connected to 
and removed from the French critical environment. As we will see, in Thru we find 
not only a reflection of the critical theories whic developed in France at the end of 
the sixties, but also and most importantly an attitude of demystification towards those 
theories, an attitude which aims at exposing their inherent dogmatism. There is, in 
Brooke-Rose, always something which does not fit into one or the other cultural 
traditions. There is, as Canepari-Labib sees, a “feeling of not belonging to either 
French or British culture” (Canepari-Labib 19). Any attempt to see her writing within 
the limits of one national context or another inevitably fails: her novels remain 
defiantly personal and original, for they linger onthe border between cultures, 
exploiting precisely the space between them. 
Another distinctive feature of Brooke-Rose’s narrative practice is the 
omnipresent linguistic inventiveness of her novels, at the basis of which lies not 
merely her bilingualism, but also and most importantly her deep linguistic 
competence. The profound awareness of how distinct languages work derives 
certainly from the fact that the author studied philology and is a literary critic and 
theoretician. This knowledge has permitted Brooke-Rose to develop her writing in 
original directions, precisely because of her understanding of the structure and 
functioning of different languages. Brooke-Rose is deeply interested in the ways 
languages can be played on, in the infinite possibilities they offer to create each time 
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something new: “I must twist language in some way to pass the frontier, and that’s 
the pleasure” (Turner 1990b 31), she asserts significa tly. Her novels constantly play 
with and explore the possibilities given by the interaction of idioms. The thorough 
understanding of more than one language produces in the subject a critical distance 
to each one language, thus permitting them to better comprehend their mechanism 
and functioning, and consequently offering them theopportunity to play with 
different structures and usages, and with what they entail in terms of cultural 
attitudes. In Between, in particular, there is a constant attention at the different 
outlooks generated by different languages’ structures. Apart from Between, linguistic 
puns are ubiquitous in Brooke-Rose’s narrative: her linguistic competence is one of 
the basic sources of her literary approach and indelibly shapes all her novels.  
However, the multilingual aspect of Brooke-Rose’s novels does not exhaust 
her innovative narrative practice. Another feature which strongly concurs to shape 
her fiction and renders it distinctive is her highly technical attitude towards writing. 
The expert understanding of technical matters in literature, of narrative structures and 
their functioning, deeply informs all her works. Yet, the criticism of Brooke-Rose’s 
fiction has often failed to formalize her writing technique in precise terms. The 
peculiar narrative devices she employs have often been overlooked by critics, as the 
author herself has lamented (Cf. Brooke-Rose 2002b 6-15). If form and content are 
complementary aspects of each literary work, in the case of Brooke-Rose’s novels, 
the analysis of their form appears to be the first and compulsory step for their overall 
appreciation. Her works should be approached first of all by considering and 
understanding their technical features, rather thanby simply looking at their content. 
Overlooking the form of Brooke-Rose’s novels and considering them only in light of 
their content, would make us inevitably miss their most distinctive traits: their 
theoretical issues are inextricably linked to their t chnical characteristics and can be 
fully appreciated only in relation to them.  
In each of her novels since Out, Brooke-Rose employs specific constraints 
which irremediably shape her texts and affect both the writing and the reading 
practices. A narrative constraint, or lipogram (from the Greek lepein, remove, and 
gramma, letter or writing), is a self-imposed omission. Although “invisible”, it 
produces in the reader a feeling of unfamiliarity which, in Brooke-Rose’s intention, 
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should gradually lead to the pleasure of recognitio and consequently to a greater 
enjoyment of the reading practice. However, this hanot been the general case with 
her novels. Readers have frequently dismissed her “unfamiliar” texts, incapable of 
welcoming their originality: “the pleasure of recognition being generally stronger 
than the pleasure or puzzlement of discovery” (Brooke-Rose 2002b 1). Instead of 
being recognised for her innovative contribution, the author has often gained the 
label of “difficult”. 
Brooke-Rose’s major lipogram, the one she has used almost steadily from the 
moment she started experimenting and which constitutes the main feature of her 
narrative technique, is the avoidance of the narrative past tense in favour of a 
“simultaneous” or “scientific” present tense, as alre dy considered above. If Brooke-
Rose was directly influenced by Robbe-Grillet in her use of the present tense, she 
nevertheless develops this lipogram and plays upon its possible uses in her own 
original way. In Between, for instance, she combines the present tense with another 
constraint, the lack of the verb to be. These two features together concur to render the 
idea of a for-ever-on-the-move “non-identity”. In Thru, she further develops the 
technique of the nouveau roman – which focused obsessively on one perceptive 
consciousness – and uses the present tense for expressing a multitude of ceaselessly 
shifting viewpoints. The effect of this is that the reader can only try to identify the 
“consciousness of the moment” by means of the context. Moreover, due to the 
constant use of the present tense, the stories within s ories which multiply in Thru are 
reduced to one single, immense narration, where intertextuality loses its diachronic 
dimension. In Amalgamemnon, Brooke-Rose makes almost exclusive use of non-
realised tenses such as the future, the conditional, the subjunctive and the imperative. 
In Remake, she avoids personal pronouns and possessive adjectives. This abolishes 
“possessive” problems and creates a peculiar textual inst bility, in particular because 
the novel “should” be an autobiographical work. In Next, she avoids using the verb to 
have because of the topic treated: homeless people do not wn anything and the lack 
of such a verb strongly concurs to render the feeling of their existential status.  
Abolishing the verb to be, the verb to have, pronouns and possessive 
adjectives, or using only non-realised tenses, means doing away with the some of the 
most “stable” features of language. The employment of such lipograms determines 
 82 
the specificity of the narratives and shakes off the stability of the conventional text. 
The reader of Brooke-Rose’s novels experiences a strange effect of unfamiliarity at 
the textual use of language. The reading is unavoidbly slowed down by these 
invisible constraints, and the reader is forced to be more attentive to the actual words 
on the page. This is exactly one of the declared aims of Brooke-Rose, that of making 
the reader “stop and think”, (Brooke-Rose 2002b 153), an intent she clearly shares 
with Pound and to which we will come back in our last chapter. Other peculiar 
technical features of Brooke-Rose’s writing are herwide-ranging employment of 
metaphor, already observed above, and the typographical display which we will 
particularly appreciate in Thru.  
The constant awareness of different cultures and different ways of looking at a 
same topic, the omnipresent linguistic inventiveness of her novels, and the deep 
technical knowledge employed in them, are therefore the main characteristics which, 
in my view, render Brooke-Rose distinctive within the cultural panorama(s) of the 
period. These features have given life to highly unconventional texts which cannot be 
reduced to any set literary movement, for they transce d both French or the British 
cultures.   
Notwithstanding their original characteristics, Brooke-Rose’s first four 
experimental novels – and particularly Thru – did not attract much positive criticism 
and were read almost solely in relation to the nouveau roman, as already seen. Apart 
from the peculiar sense of insularity felt by the Anglophonic world during the sixties 
and seventies, another reason why Brooke-Rose did not initially receive the critical 
attention she deserved derives probably from her being a woman writer and, what is 
more, an experimental one. In fact, although the women’s liberation movement 
gained more and more strength in the sixties, and although the decade engendered a 
much more liberal attitude towards issues of gender, it was still difficult for a woman 
writer to break through the wall of a canonical literature which continued to be 
largely male-dominated. The author herself, looking back over her career, admits 
having had difficulties as a woman experimental writer (Cf. Friedman and Fuchs 81), 
and in her critical essay “Illiterations”, she specifically expounds on the difficulties 
women writers encounter in having their work assessed as the object of serious 
literary critical attention. She explains that there are “different types and levels of 
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critical attention, on a sliding scale that can be subsumed in the general opposition 
canonical/non canonical”, and that the level of attention granted to women writers 
generally tends to be less serious than that offered to male authors (Brooke-Rose 
1991 250). Moreover, Brooke-Rose continues, althoug it is difficult for a woman 
writer to enter the canon, it is more difficult for a woman experimental writer to be 
accepted as experimental. Traditionally, in fact, women have been considered as only 
capable of imitating male criteria, not able to create new forms: “the divine and 
metaphoric power of producing one thing out of another thing through the word is 
deeply felt as a male power”. As a consequence, a woman writer “must either use 
traditional forms or, if she dare experiment, she must be imitating an already old 
model” (Brooke-Rose 1991 258, 262). Consequently, women writers who “dare” 
experiment, who try to look in new ways at the reality around themselves and 
reread/rewrite their world, are rarely treated on the same level of seriousness as their 
male counterparts (Cf. Brooke-Rose 1991 261).  
After the negative reception of Thru, Brooke-Rose stopped publishing fiction 
for nine years. In 1984, Amalgamemnon was much better received, probably because 
it did not present the extreme experimentation of Thru, but also because the 
suspicious attitude towards foreign experimentation widely spread in the English 
academic world up until the seventies had started changing from the beginning of the 
eighties. The concept of “English literature” had been expanding as more and more 
non-strictly British novelists had chosen to write in English. The Anglo-centric bias 
which was still very much alive in the seventies had therefore started to give way to a 
more international attitude in English universities and critical forums. Today’s 
situation is radically different: especially during the last decades of the twentieth 
century, novelists who come from former English colonial territories such as 
Timothy Mo, Ben Okri, Salman Rushdie and Chinua Achebe – to name but a few – 
have addressed the British audience. Post-colonial literature has emerged out of the 
collapse of the Empire and has acquired a place within he now much wider 
definition of “English literature”. In the meanwhile, highly unconventional 
postmodernist writers such as Angela Carter, Alasdair Gray and many others have 
more and more affirmed themselves on the literary scene. Moreover, in the eighties, 
the awareness of the poststructuralist critical debat  had largely expanded and the 
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French theories of the sixties and seventies were much more widely known and 
accepted in British literary circles. Finally, the bias against women writers – still very 
much alive during the fifties and sixties – was being gradually overcome as more and 
more women writers from the seventies onwards were b ing widely recognised for 
their important and crucial literary contributions.   
All this, together with Brooke-Rose’s attempt towards more readability from 
Amalgamemnon onwards, engendered a thorough reconsideration of Brooke-Rose’s 
writing. Amalgamemnon received in almost all cases positive and constructive 
reviews. For instance, Marshall talks in particular of its “delight in language and 
word-play that attracts the pejorative label of ‘exp rimental’” and disapproves of the 
British prevailing critical attitude for which “authors should not display too much 
inventiveness and intelligence or be influenced by the French modes if British” 
(Marshall 1984 2,159). Marshall thus overtly addresses the hidden prejudice which 
had been working against Brooke-Rose up to that moment. Similarly, Brian Morton 
praises Xorandor and again condemns the Anglo-centric prejudice perpetuated 
against Brooke-Rose’s former novels, while trying to re-situate the author into the 
English tradition: “Brooke-Rose has been quietly dismissed as an unEnglish figure, 
disturbingly cerebral and ‘experimental’. But she resembles Robbe-Grillet less than 
Ivy Compton-Burnett” (Morton 767).  
All the novels from Amalgamemnon onwards did, on the whole, receive more 
positive reviews upon their appearance, with only a few exceptions: Turner, for 
instance, describes Verbivore as “old-fashioned and backward-looking” and defiantly 
declares that the author “falls between too many stool ” (Turner 1990a 91). Turner 
also makes clear that “among general readers [Brooke-Rose] is thought of, if at all, 
as a sterile academic prankster, not for the likes of you or me” (Turner 1990a 91). 
It needs be said, however, that even when praise of the later novels occurs, the 
bias against the theoretical aspects of Brooke-Rose’s pr vious texts, and in particular 
against the supposed difficulty of Thru, appears to be still very much alive at this 
point in time. Thomas Disch, for example, praises Xorandor, but he does so only for 
the novel appears to be much simpler and more straigh forward than the preceding 
ones. Recalling Francis King’s judgement, Disch describes the works of Brooke-
Rose’s first tetralogy as novels which “only very earnest Ph.D. candidates are likely 
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to mistake for good prose” (Disch 10). His judgement, thus, clearly reveals an 
enduring negative attitude towards Brooke-Rose’s former novels.  
Gradually, however, Brooke-Rose has been recognised by more and more 
critics as an important writer. She has been compared with Anthony Burgess for her 
linguistic inventiveness (Cf. Disch 10), with Brigid Brophy for her typographical 
display (Cf. Stevenson 1986 212), with B. S. Johnson for her technical constraints 
and typographical display (Cf. White 2005 120), and with John Fowles for her 
exposure of the relationship between reality and fiction (Cf. Clute 52). 
Though not unanimously acknowledged as one of the most innovative 
contemporary writers, many critics have, in the last thirty years, addressed Brooke-
Rose’s writing and considered it in positive terms. The volumes Breaking the 
Sequence (1989), edited by Friedman and Fuchs, and Utterly Other Discourse 
(1995), edited by Friedman and Martin, collect a serie  of constructive articles on 
Brooke-Rose’s work. Judy Little’s work The Experimental Self (1996) dedicates an 
insightful chapter to Brooke-Rose. Among the critics who have contributed to 
Brooke-Rose’s revaluation with various intuitive essays are also Maria Del Sapio 
Garbero, Hanjo Berressem, Damian Grant, Annegret Maack, Francesco Minetti, and 
Susan Rubin Suleiman. 
Many of the critics mentioned above have tended to approach Brooke-Rose’s 
practice through the lenses of feminist theories. They have considered it mostly in 
terms of feminist issues. However, in my view, Brooke-Rose cannot be viewed 
solely within the bounds of feminism. Defining her as a feminist writer would 
preclude the full recognition of her accomplishments. Many critics have failed to 
consider the way Brooke-Rose’s novels present a critique of the widespread militant 
feminist attitude of the sixties and seventies. It is rue that in Brooke-Rose’s works 
the reference to the position of women in a masculine society is insistent and the 
viewpoint adopted in many of her novels is significantly that of a female character. It 
is also true that  – as we will see – the language of Between exemplifies the écriture 
feminine Irigaray theorised. Brooke-Rose, however, does not appear to share the 
perspective of most militant feminists who insist on having their works viewed only 
in terms of women writing. Between, in fact, is concerned with analysing the 
possibilities of expressing one’s own identity in a masculine language, but the 
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problem the text confronts is less that of expressing one’s own feminine identity, than 
that of expressing one’s own creativity. In other words, creativity is seen as being 
inherently feminine, but not necessarily biologically so, and the novel’s protagonist, 
as we will see, is presented more as an androgynous creature than as a strictly female 
one. In contrast to the feminist separatist attitude, Brooke-Rose does not seem to 
postulate an equality between the biological sex of the speaker (and the author) and 
écriture feminine. While militant feminists such as Friedan or Cixous concentrate 
exclusively on feminist issues, trying to define an aesthetic of feminism, Brooke-
Rose is more concerned with deconstructing the binary opposition between 
masculine and feminine, as she does indeed in Between. The author thus seems to 
share Kristeva’s idea that écriture feminine can exist in both masculine and feminine 
writings. This will also appear clear in Thru, which utterly deconstructs the idea of 
gender identity by showing how man and woman are both subject and object of 
desire in their relationship with the opposite sex.  
As a result, if we wish to define the way Brooke-Rose’s could be considered as 
a feminist writer, we have to stress the balance her work tries to strike between the 
two opposite attitudes of the first and second waves of feminism. As Kristeva 
explains, the first two extreme phases of feminism respectively struggled for a “logic 
of identification”, i.e. for women’s total equality to men, and emphasised the 
uniquely feminine, seeking women’s radical differenc  from men, (Kristeva 1986 
194). For Kristeva, on the contrary, it is important that women find a balance 
between these two opposite poles, asking for identity and difference at the same time, 
or better re-conceiving the notions of identity and difference and their relationship, 
refusing to choose one over the other. Indeed, the very notion of identity should be 
deconstructed in order to allow individual differenc : “the very dichotomy 
man/woman as an opposition between two rival entitis may be understood as 
belonging to metaphysics” (Kristeva 1986 209). In line with Kristeva, Brooke-Rose 
believes that a separatist stance on the feminist side i  far from being a helpful 
approach to the gender issue. Writers, she explains, should be evaluated for what 
they write, not interpreted in the light of their sex. For Brooke-Rose, therefore, 
women and men should write in their own ways, without further problematizing the 
issue of their gender (Cf. Del Sapio Garbero 1991 10 -3). 
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Other academics, such as Patricia Waugh and Brian McHale, have addressed 
the novels of Brooke-Rose and contributed to their r valuation. In her work 
Metafiction (1984), Waugh considers the metafictional nature and the self-
referentiality of Thru and defines the novel as a “critical commentary in the novel 
form itself” (Waugh 1984 147-48). McHale analyses both the system of metalepses 
of Thru and its spatial displacement in his Postmodernist Fiction (1987), and engages 
with Brooke-Rose’s oeuvre more comprehensively in his Constructing 
Postmodernism (1992).  
  More recently, Slomith Rimmon-Kenan and Glyn White have crucially 
contributed to the reassessment of Brooke-Rose’s novels, and in particular of Thru. 
In A Glance beyond Doubt (1996), Rimmon-Kenan extensively deals with the 
question of representation in Thru and positions Brooke-Rose within the 
postmodernist literary panorama for the intricate relationship between language and 
reality the novel puts forward, for its metalanguage, intertextuality and graphic 
display. White’s interesting article on Thru, which appeared in Poetics Today (White 
2002) has been more recently followed by a very insightful chapter in her work 
Reading the Graphic Surface (2005), in which Thru’s typographical tricks are fully 
and deeply tackled and appreciated. White demonstrate  how Thru’s graphic display, 
rather than being a gratuitous and “incomprehensible” show, is inextricably linked to 
the issues the novel tackles, and cannot be abstracted from when interpreting it.  
There have been also two monographic publications on Br oke-Rose’s writing, 
that of Sarah Birch, and that of Michela Canepari-Lbib. These works show a 
definite attempt to illustrate the distinctive characteristics of her narrative practice 
and understand Brooke-Rose in much wider and label-escaping terms. In particular, 
Canepari-Labib asserts the impossibility to place Brooke-Rose within any set literary 
movement. 
A huge progress has therefore been made by the works mentioned above. 
However, I agree with Kermode when he says that “it’s hard to avoid the conclusion 
that the originality and skills of Brooke-Rose deserve a greater measure of 
admiration and respect than we have so far chosen to accord them” (Kermode 2006 
17). In my view, what still needs to be tackled more deeply and in the specific is the 
distinctiveness of each single work by Brooke-Rose. This is particularly true in the 
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case of Thru, which, as White declares, “still needs to be read” (White 2005 123). 
Birch’s and Canepari-Labib’s are all-inclusive monographs which have, on the one 
hand, the merit of accounting for all of her novels, but, on the other hand, for this 
same reason they necessarily allot a limited space to each one of them. That is why I 
have decided to restrict my attention on her first tetralogy, and in particular on 
Between and Thru. With my work, I wish to offer the first full-length account of 
these two novels, taking advantage of a space which otherwise would have been 
much more limited. Focusing specifically on Between and Thru, I have tried to 
provide an all-encompassing analysis of these works, which would not have been 
possible if I had to analyse all of her novels in the space at my disposal. Moreover, 
Brooke-Rose’s fictional works from Amalgamemnon onwards have been better 
received by both public and critics, and an attempt has been made to consider them 
not only in relation to the French cultural panorama. Between, on the contrary, has 
been too often read solely in terms of feminist writing or for its relation to the 
nouveau roman, while Thru has suffered from a negative attitude towards its 
demanding nature and has been always automatically associated to the French 
panorama. As White clearly sees, Thru is, more than any other novel by the author, 
“responsible for the perception of Brooke-Rose as a difficult writer” (White 2005 
122). I therefore felt the need to (1) show the peculiarities of Between as distinct 
from both nouveau roman and feminist writing, and (2) call for a revaluation of 
Brooke-Rose’s difficulty in relation to Thru, which still suffers from the negative 
widespread judgement of “too difficult and demanding”.  
Most importantly, as I will show in the last chapter, in my view, only Between 
and Thru can be defined as “critical fiction” or “fictional criticism”. I therefore wish 
to bring the attention on this specific characterisic of these two novels, a 
characteristic which has been often misinterpreted and never properly considered.   
In order to better tackle the issues which Between and Thru  call into question, 
I have decided to trace the development of Brooke-Rose’s experimentalism, from her 
early and still quite conventional works, through her initial approach to 
experimentalism with Out and Such, to her first two fully experimental novels. Thru, 
in particular, represents the climax of Brooke-Rose’s experimentalism and offers a 
matchless illustration of what I define her countertendential writing practice. In the 
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last chapter, in fact, I will show how Thru anticipates issues which were to be at the 
centre of the theoretical debate many years later. For this reason, Thru, more than 
any other novel by Brooke-Rose, can be defined as a unique instance “fictional 
criticism” or “critical fiction”.   
In terms of actually “placing” Brooke-Rose’s writing, I will on the one hand 
parallel it to the wide trend of postmodernist fiction for its clear addressing of 
poststructural and deconstructive theories, and for its characteristics of self-
reflexivity, intertextuality, parody, visual display and pastiche. However, my aim 
will be less that of setting her within the limits of such a literary trend, than that of 
showing how the author always succeeds in escaping its boundaries. If we want to 
situate Brooke-Rose’s writing within the postmodern debate, we necessarily have to 
better consider the main implications of the long and exhausting debate which 
evolved around the term from the seventies onwards. I will do so in the final chapter 
and consider, in light of this debate, the specific way we can place Brooke-Rose 
“within” the postmodernist trend. In fact, far from assimilating her writing to 
postmodernism, I will show how the former possesses characteristics which render it 
countertendential to some of the major tenets of postmodernism.  
Different labels have been thrust upon Brooke-Rose’s work – nouveau roman, 
feminist, postmodernist – yet they all are, I believe, incapable of providing a full 
acknowledgment of her achievements. I fundamentally gree with Brooke-Rose 
when she ironically dismisses any pigeonholing critical label as “sadly devoid of 
content” (Brooke-Rose 1981, 311) or “useful boxes to put authors into” (Brooke-
Rose 1991 262). If, in the author’s view, labels always “hide more than they reveal” 
(Blumberg 6), this is the more so in the case of her own work: any kind of label we 
could try to thrust upon her writing would unavoidably “hide more than reveal” its 
specificities. The main aim of this investigation will be thus to revaluate Brooke-
Rose’s writing by showing both the points of contact between Brooke-Rose and the 
nouveau roman, feminist writing or postmodernism, and the individual features of 
her work, those features which distinguish her novels from any set literary trend. Her 
experimentalism cannot be limited within the bounds of a specific movement, for it 




Between a fundamental disbelief in words and a passionate concern 
with language 
In my analysis of Between, I will start considering its genesis, outlining its 
“plot” and examining its innovative narrative technique, which is not only 
inextricably linked to its issues, but also ineluctably shapes them. Indeed, my 
considerations about the form of the novel will “automatically” call attention to the 
way Between addresses and critically responds to many of the li erary theories which 
were gaining ground on the international academic scene. Brooke-Rose’s text proves 
in fact to be a most innovative work in relation to the theories of such figures as 
Lacan, Derrida, Barthes, Kristeva and Irigaray. 
However, for an internal discursive economy, I have chosen to deal extensively 
only with some of the theories the text addresses and puts into practice, specifically 
Barthes’ death of the author and pleasure in reading in the present chapter, and 
Irigaray’s écriture feminine in the next one. My choice has indeed been dictated by 
the necessity of lengthily dealing with the other theories in light of my analysis of 
Thru. In fact, the theories of Lacan, Derrida and Kristeva are much more directly 
addressed in Thru as compared to Between. Consequently, exhaustively treating 
those theories in this section would have somewhat lessened the idea of the 
inextricable connection of Thru to them, whereas stressing their implications twice 
would have resulted in redundancy for the overall structure of my investigation.  
The Barthesian concepts of the text of pleasure and the death of the author are 
addressed and enacted by the narrative corpus of the discourses in Between, whereas 
Brooke-Rose’s presentation of the novel’s main character and her use of language 
connect directly to Irigaray’s theories of female identity and language. Yet, as we 
will see, there is a basic difference between Irigaray’s theories and Brooke-Rose’s 
ideas as regards the use of a specific feminine language, which will help us 
understand the relation of the author to the feminist movement. We will see not only 
how Between puts itself in strict relation to these theories, but also and above all, 
how it critically responds to them.  
If many are the points in common between the novel and the contemporary 
literary theories, the author never fails to refigure their theorisations by crucially 
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distancing herself from them in some respects, so as t  chieve her own personal and 
original solutions. So “masqueraded” in the fictional thread of her work, Brooke-
Rose’s significant contribution to the debate of those years has yet failed to be 
recognised in all its strength. What I wish to make clear is the value of Between as a 
contribution to that debate, as a part of the overall discussion on identity (here 
specifically feminine) and a language which could be able to express that identity. 
Moreover, it is important to note how, while “theorists were theorising”, Brooke-
Rose, in a way pulling herself apart of that dispute, decided to approach its issues in 
a different way, by means of experimenting with what w s the central focus of that 
debate, language and novel writing.  
Brooke-Rose started working at Between in 1964, but experiencing a sort of 
block in drawing the novel’s central character, she put the manuscript aside to 
resume it about three years later, after the appearance of Such, and finally published 
it in 1968. The novel was mostly written during theauthor’s stay at the castle of Ezra 
Pound’s daughter – Mary de Rachewiltz – in the Italian Tyrol. It is dedicated to Eva 
Hesse,3 “with love and gratitude” (B 393). Brooke-Rose deeply appreciated Hesse’s 
German translation of Pound’s Cantos (Hesse 1964) and wrote the critical essay 
“Cheng Ming Chi’ I’d” (Brooke-Rose 1991 123-142) for Hesse’s work. 
Between’s central consciousness is a woman who works as an interpreter, 
translating from French into German and constantly travelling from conference to 
conference among several countries. She is unnamed nd most of the novel sees no 
personal pronoun referring to her. She is said to be born in France, by a French 
mother and a German father who has left both her and her mother. After a Catholic 
upbringing in France, at the age of fifteen she is sent to Nuremberg to live for a year 
with some relatives and learn German. During this period, she wins a scholarship and 
therefore protracts her visit for another year. Shethen further prolongs her stay due 
to an illness. In the meanwhile however, World War II breaks out and the block of 
the frontiers compels her to remain in Nazi Germany, where  she starts working as a 
translator for the German Censorship office and obtains a degree in Medieval and 
Modern French studies. After the war, she marries an English officer and works at 
                                                
3 Eva Hesse (1936-1970). In 1964, Hesse spent over a y ar living in Kettwig-am-Ruhr, Germany, and 
intermittently travelling to Italy, France and Switzerland. It is in this period that Brooke-Rose 
probably met the artist.  
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translating German documents for the occupying forces. As her marriage eventually 
breaks up, she returns to France and works as an interpreter from French into 
German. In the course of time she gives up her job and after many years she decides 
to resume it. By now being a middle-aged woman, she works with far younger 
colleagues. Among her earlier fellow-workers, she mets again only Siegfried, 
interpreter from English into German, who is an occasional lover of hers. Towards 
the end of the novel, we learn that Siegfried travels l ss and less and eventually 
marries, settles down and has a child. 
In order to obtain the annulment of her marriage, th  interpreter has undertaken 
a case with the Roman Sacra Rota. The case lasts many ye rs, after which she wins 
and obtains the annulment. She has various lovers but she does not remarry. She 
even carries on a platonic correspondence with an old colleague, Bertrand, who tries 
to kindle her feminine vanity with passionate love letters in French and Provencal. 
However, when the two finally meet, disappointment sues in the interpreter for she 
fails to find him as she would have expected on the basis of his letters, thus 
acknowledging the gap between his words and reality. 
Constantly travelling, the interpreter has two pieds-à-terre, a rented flat in 
Paris and a small cottage in Wiltshire. In the lastpages of the novel, we are presented 
with her decision to sell her English cottage and maintain only the French residence 
for her non-working periods. In addition, tired of travelling by plane, she buys a car 
and travels, revisiting some of the places linked to her past experiences, such as 
Nuremberg or Munich, finding them significantly altered. The novel ends with the 
interpreter going back to work and travelling again by plane between countries. 
I have utilised the term “plot” in commas for the novel presents no story line in 
the traditional sense, there exists no temporal linearity, no chain of events 
diachronically developing one after another. This non-linearity is determined by 
Brooke-Rose’s highly innovative narrative technique, i. . by her specific use of the 
present tense, by the constraints she adopts and by the mix of discourses that make 
up the novel. The entire text is in fact made up of different discourses intertwining 
with each other and giving no sense of the linear development of the story. Each 
discourse does not present a beginning and an end, but endlessly blends into the next, 
comes back and vanishes again throughout the text. Most of the narration takes place 
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without any comma intruding to “regulate” it, so tha  the reader is caught up in the 
flow of discourse and pauses their reading only when (and if) a full stop suspends it. 
After defining Between a “metastory, with metacharacters”, the author ironically and 
significantly states, “Between deals with (?), explores (?), represents (?), plays 
around with (?), makes variations on (?), expresses (?), communicates (?), is about 
(?), generates (?)” (Brooke-Rose 1991 6). The battery of question marks here could 
be viewed as an ironical reference to the most widely spread critical movements. 
Brooke-Rose seems to be dismissing any single theoretical approach to her literary 
work, from Positivism to poststructuralism, from Romanticism to Generative 
Grammar. It is almost as if she were stating that, whichever the critical procedure to 
analyse Between might be, the key insight of the novel is multiple and impossible to 
be found from one fixed point of view. 
The texts the protagonist is translating simultaneously during conferences, mix 
up with discourses from her private life, such as love letters, dialogues with her 
various lovers, small travel talks in different languages, or reminiscences and various 
thoughts that blend in her mind. The circumstances of her life are presented solely in 
the form of such different discourses. She is never pr sented as being at a precise 
time in a specific place, or as making something concrete and definite. What we read 
are her own perceptions of the world around her, inextricably mingled and confused 
with her memories and thoughts. For this peculiar re son we cannot talk of “plot” as 
meant in the traditional sense of a story linearly developing in time and space in 
conformity with a causal logic of events, nor can we identify the interpreter with the 
traditional notion of “protagonist”. I will therefore define the interpreter variously as 
“centre of consciousness”, “central consciousness” or else “perceiving 
consciousness”. Whenever I use the terms “protagonist” or “character”, these will not 
be meant as bearing conventional connotations. 
Inextricably linked to the peculiar mix of discourses the novel is made up of, is 
the “free-ranging” syntax. In fact, the construction f the discourses in Between is 
such that a sentence which starts in “one” place and time and concerns a specific 
issue, leads the reader to another point both in time, place and topic concerned. 
Some critics have read the peculiar structure of the work as an altogether lack 
of plot. For instance, Richard Martin refers to the recurrent phrase “no one does 
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anything at all” (B 474) to support his view that in the text there is “no plot worth 
speaking of  […] rather the novel confronts the reader with a series of repetitious 
monologues” (Martin 116). In my view, however, Between replaces the disrupted 
conventional linearity of its story-line with its repetitive structure. In the course of 
the text, events and discourses come back several times, slightly varied, giving the 
reader the possibility to “reconstruct” the basic plot of the novel. 
Between is entirely written in what we have already described as Scientific 
Present Tense, an impersonal, objective, single-visioned present tense. There is no 
“narrator” as traditionally conceived and there is no “addressee” the narrator refers 
to. The author puts herself inside the interpreter’s consciousness to represent 
objectively what she experiences, her “unreflective” awareness. In other words, 
everything around her – the people and the situations she encounters, the discourses 
she hears, and the thoughts which arise in her mind– s represented from the point of 
view of her unreflective consciousness. Her consciousness is “unreflective” in the 
sense that the interpreter does not stop and reflect on her thoughts or actions, that 
there is no narrator which filters narration through his/her own point of view, and 
that is why Brooke-Rose calls it “scientific speakerless” or else “objectified 
narratorless mode” (Brooke-Rose 2002b 58). The moments of mimesis are rendered 
in dialogues, interjections, and the interpreter’s peculiar unreflective “inner speech”. 
The effect of this technique on the reader is that ey can only “reconstruct” the 
consciousness’s experiences from what she observes around her and from the 
moments of direct mimesis. The narrative is speakerless in the sense that nothing but 
context occurs to show who is speaking: a “free dirct” discourse which shows no 
separate narrative voice from that of the character, but where the character is not 
narrating. 
Brooke-Rose’s text seems thus to enact Barthes’ idea of “The Death of the 
Author”, the practice for which, in a modern text, the author is removed and “the 
voice loses its origin, the author enters into his own death, writing begins” (Barthes 
1977 142). Between seems to embody the idea that “the whole of the enunciation is 
an empty process” (Barthes 1977 145), as there is obviously no narrator the reader is 
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aware of4. It is language itself which speaks, the “origin” of every voice is 
irrecoverable, writing becomes “the destruction of every voice, of every point of 
origin” (Barthes 1977 142), the very act of deliverng a discourse becomes the object 
of a modern text,  
writers today are attempting to […] transpose narrative from the purely constative plane […] to the 
performative plane, whereby the meaning of an utterance is the very act by which it is uttered […] 
part of contemporary literature is no longer descriptive, but transitive, striving to accomplish so pure a 
present in its language that the whole of the discourse is identified with the act of its delivery. (Barthes 
1977 114)  
 
I will now focus on the peculiar way the circumstances of the central 
consciousness’ life are presented in the form of purposefully heterogeneous 
discourses and furnish some examples of this practice. In the course of the novel we 
hear several voices and dialogues coming from the interpreter’s childhood, such as 
from when she played with other children in front of her house in Lyon, their game 
inevitably ending up into quarrels,  
- Vieille poire! 
- Crapaude! 
- Crétine! (B 437) 
 
More than once in the course of the novel the reader is presented with parts of 




-Mais bien sûr ma poupée. 
-Autant que moi j’t’aime ? 
-Plus. 
-Moi j’t’aime grand comme le ciel. 
-Eh bien moi aussi. (B 523) 
 
While providing the reader with the information that the novel’s central 
consciousness went for a period to school in Nazi Germany and she was homesick, 
we are directly presented with pastiche-sentences partly deriving from the history 
lessons the little girl attended at that period, “Der Fuehrer aber hat geschrieben that 
the gangling girl […] feels homesick long for was FRANKreich” (B 520). The same 
technique is used to inform us of her first kiss to a boy who was her cousin Helmut, 
                                                
4 However, Brooke-Rose does not share entirely the extreme “logic” of the death of the author. The 
“implied” or “encoded” author is a necessary narrative instance which “must” be present in the text, 
even if “invisible”. We will consider this issue inour sixth chapter and see how, if Between seems to 
perfectly embody the idea of the death of the author, Thru makes a significant step forward in that not 
only does it address that debate, but also enhances its speculations in its very fictional practice, 
reinstating the importance of the encoded author for the interpretation of a text.  
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son of her “Tante Frieda” (B 523), “I’ll marry you when I grow up. Says Helmut the 
young boy Baron […] kiss first time” (B 490). Again, the questioning she was 
submitted to by Nazi officers is directly offered throughout the text: “You must 
forgive these questions Fräulein but in view of your French upbringing we must 
make sure of your undivided loyalty” (B 489). The one obsessive question her 
various lovers ask her is repeated several times all through the novel, and we are told 
that she never answers this question; in this way the reader is informed that even 
though she has numerous lovers, she never reciprocates their feelings, 
don’t you love me even a little? The same question everywhere goes unanswered on crowded trains to 
Nürnberg for Urlaub or elsewhere in dark streets after cinemas in dim-lit restaurants canteens 
according to the partner. (B 529) 
 
An example which will help to show how all of the interpreter’s perceptive 
stimuli emerge from the text mingled together could be the passage where pieces of 
love letters in French from her ex-colleague get amalgamated with advertisement 
clichés, 
Votre déodorant. Choisissez-le sérieusement chez votre pharmacien. The letter gets folded down. Les 
questions que vous n’osez pas poser à votre gynécologue […] The letter gets unfolded. Oh mon 
amour, me donneriez-vous peut-être un signe? Je n’os  même plus y croire. Et pourtant jour et nuit je 
rêve je pense à vous, oh ma princesse lointaine. (B 541) 
 
The blend of discourses is further enhanced by the novel’s peculiar mix of 
languages. The centre of consciousness of Between can speak French, German and 
English. If the basic text is written in English, we often find sentences and pieces of 
discourses in the other two idioms. However, a wide range of other languages also 
combine in the novel, i.e. those of the various countries the interpreter travels 
through: Polish, modern Greek, Turkish, Italian, Spanish, Czechoslovak, Russian, 
Rumanian, all merge in the course of the narrative. Brooke-Rose explains that apart 
from the idioms the interpreter can speak, the other languages in the novel are meant 
to render the sense of disorientation of a traveller who cannot speak the language of 
the country he/she is in, 
it’s written in English, so the basic convention is English. The other languages are used to show that 
she doesn’t know every language in the world. They block the text […] Things like “exit” in Polish, 
people don’t necessarily recognize it. So I’m playing with disorientation, the disorientation of travel, 
we’ve all had it. (Friedman and Fuchs 84) 
 
Such a feeling of disorientation, rendered through a multitude and mixture of 
languages, is experienced both by the centre of consci usness in Between and by its 
reader. “She may be trilingual, but she doesn’t know everything, she has the same 
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disorientation that every traveller has” (Del Sapio Garbero 1991 90), says Christine 
Brooke-Rose about the interpreter, which is in factdepicted as existing suspended in 
a condition of “betweenness”, perpetually moving between countries, languages and 
frontiers. The wide range of languages in Between emerges from the circumstances 
in which the interpreter finds herself during her incessant travelling, such as for 
instance small travel-talks,  
- Au revoir, madame bon voyage, drum bun. 
- MulŃumesc padre, la revedere. 
- Excusez-moi madame, si vous désirez apprendre, il faut dire părinte. Padre non, părinte. Et 
pour grande politesse, cuvioase părinte. 
- Cuvioase? Cuvioase părinte? (B 480) 
 
Ready-made phrases from travel phrase-books appear all th ough the text,  
Bardzo piękne. Ah pani mόwi po polsku? No, no, really, only a few phrases, from a phrase-book. Nie, 
ale bardzo dobrze! What does that mean? Very well, v ry good. (B 539) 
 
Different languages originate also from the interprte ’s various attempts to 
communicate her needs, 
- […] nero metalico?  
-Madame?  
-Eau minérale. 
-Ah, nerό metálico! Nai. He shakes his head from side to side and exit. (B 534).  
 
Again, the variety of languages springs from the various placards to be found 
in hotels and congress-buildings or from the warning notices to be heard on planes, 
or else it flows from shops’ sign-boards,  
Eintritt, Sortie, Salita, Ausgang, Entrée, Fumatul oprit. No Smoking beyond this Point Kindly fasten 
your safety-belts […] Push Tirez Ziehen Pchnąć. (B 555) 
 
the left lane empty of traffic between the closed shops called MǍRUNłIŞURI, LACTO 
VEGETARIAN, ALIMENTE, TUTUNGERIE. (B 404) 
 
ELÖNYÖS! KÉNYELMES! BIZTONSÁGOS! (B 445) 
 
The use of different languages in Between shows Pound’s influence on Brooke-
Rose, which I have already considered in the first chapter. What Brooke-Rose 
derives from Pound is his use of different language to xpress different concepts, his 
idea that “It can’t be all in one language” (Brooke-Rose 1991 126). Since each 
language has a peculiar “identity” of its own, one specific language can be more apt 
than another to convey particular connotations of meaning. Pound’s use of many 
different languages in The Cantos – each employed at the service of diverse concepts 
or fields of knowledge – finds in Brooke-Rose an exemplary adept. In The Cantos, 
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for instance, French and Provencal are often used to tackle the themes of love and 
beauty, Italian is employed to express philosophic concepts, while political and 
social ideas are articulated in Chinese (Cf. Brooke-Rose 1991 126). Likewise, in 
Between, different languages are employed to talk about dissimilar experiences and 
fields of knowledge. French is mostly employed as the language of love and 
affection. It is the language of the interpreter’s childhood, the one she uses to 
communicate with her mother. The latter, nevertheless, switches to English in a 
peculiar circumstance and with a different attitude, i.e. when she greets her daughter 
who is leaving for Germany and urges her not to talk to strangers, 
maitenant que tu as quinze ans, I’ve packed all your prettiest dresses into a big trunk, and your 
German grammar […] Your train leaves tomorrow at eight […] don’t talk to any strange men, or in 
fact to anyone at all tu entends? (B 524) 
 
French, and in particular Provencal, are utilized by Bertrand to write love 
letters to the interpreter, whereas a philosophic concept such as “l’autentico dramma 
dell’agnosticismo” (B 441) is recurrently expressed in Italian, Rome being the place 
of abode of the Catholic Church, for which agnostici m is a “dramma”. 
Another kind of linguistic mixture to be found in Between is that of different 
layers of language: throughout the novel we find a wide range of technical discourses 
and jargons, linked to the different specialized fields of knowledge which are 
encountered during the various conferences, such as linguistics, anthropology, 
history, sociology and genetics. Problems such as the disarmament, the Chinese 
Cultural Revolution, the demilitarisation of Germany or the significance of literature 
in contemporary society are discussed. Each field of kn wledge involves a specialist 
jargon which the translator has to learn in advance i  order to fulfil her task. “Do you 
find the technical jargon hard to follow? […] archaeology, medicine, irrigation, 
economic-aid for the underdeveloped areas and so forth. Goodness, do you work it 
up in advance?” (B 468) asks a professor to the intrpreter. Specific language uses 
deriving from conferences on “Structures of power” (B 509-10), malnutrition in 
Europe (B 511), famine in the developing countries (B 570), a medical congress on 
the molecules of memory (B 517-9), an academic seminar on the relationship 
between “La Littérature et la Sémantique” (B 478), and many other meetings and 
conventions, are presented to the reader. To make an x mple we could cite a 
passage from a convention on the problem of malnutrition in Europe, 
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E allora the languages fraternise in Geneva where malnutrition occurs in Europe on a far larger scale 
that anyone has realised owing to the widespread devitalising of foods due to mass-processing, 
chemical fertilisers, sprays and additives as well as ignorance of diet with 48% having an average 
intake of nutrients well below the minimum level, itself varying from 30 mg. of vitamins daily 
recommended by the British Medical Association in Egland to 70 mg. recommended by the 
American Medical Association and 200 mg. by the Russian. (B 511) 
 
We have already observed how, in Out and Such, the use of a specific jargon 
bears a great poetical power and becomes one of Brooke-Rose’s most outstanding 
experimental features. Between further enhances the mix of languages as it also 
presents different systems of language, such as for instance the sign languages to be 
found at airports, in hotels and at congresses, or the street code. For instance, the 
word “toilet” in a foreign language is followed by the description of its international 
symbol,   
Sometimes German comes first then English then French with the language of the country Rumanian 
Russian Greek always first however such as Тoaleta unless ТОАΛΕΤHА or even ТОΥАΛΕΤΤА with 
care not to enter BărbaŃi when the door bears no skirted figurine of high-heeled shoe. (B 506) 
 
The reader who does not speak the language in question can, thanks to the 
description of the sign, distinguish between the ladies’ and the gentlemen’s toilets. In 
Between, the use of different languages and of “visual” systems of language function 
in the same way as the ideograms in Pound’s poetry. They establish a sudden, visual 
relationship between signifier and signified, the sign on the page and its related 
meaning. They create a language “made up of objects on he page” in a way which is 
different from the way alphabetical languages work. Visual symbols and unknown 
languages focus the readers’ attention on the external shape of the signifier, draw 
their interest to the material form of language: “the physical signifier is made more 
physical, the signified less important” (Friedman and Fuchs 84). This is, for instance, 
what happens when we find on the page such a description of a lift,  
Emerging from the Avernus made easy with escalators. They also go down. Saying ΠAPAKAΛΩ 
ANAMENETE, the button lighting up when pressed to call the lift, inside which incomprehensibly 
below 4 3 2 1 come blank white buttons with IΣOTEION and ΣTON and KIN∆YNOΣ in red meaning 
perhaps alarm? (B 446-7) 
 
The reader, unable to decipher the Cyrillic alphabet, directs his/her attention to 
the signifier itself, to its shape. The relationship between signifier and signified was 
at the centre of a vigorous critical debate. The Swiss linguist de Saussure had already 
seen how the linguistic sign is arbitrary and differential. It is arbitrary because the 
relation between signifier and signified is the result of a convention. It is differential 
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because the way we approach and understand a signifier does not depend on a 
“primary” relationship which exists between the two parts of the sign, but rather on 
the system on differences on which language is based. M aning is thus the product of 
the phonic and graphological difference which distinguishes each sign from the 
others, and it is based on convention. Derrida takes up de Saussure’s notion of the 
linguistic sign and brings it forward, adding to the phonetic differentiation of de 
Saussure the notion of différance. The linguistic system, for Derrida, is caught up in 
the chain of signifying references that produce an infinite deferral and referral of 
meaning. 
While Derrida sees that the concept of a one-way rel tionship between signifier 
and signified is an illusion generated by the metaphysical notion of “self-presence of 
the subject” (Derrida 1976 12), Barthes posits the play with the external shape of the 
signifier as the essential strategy enacted by the Text of bliss in order to continuously 
dismantle and reconstruct meaning. The Text of pleasure suspends meaning, because 
it suspends the signified value, as opposed to “an acute appreciation of the 
extravagance of the signifier”. The pleasure of the text, for Barthes, becomes “value 
shifted to the sumptuous rank of the signifier” (Barthes 1975 65). The written word 
on the page is valued for its extravagant form and its possibility of multiple 
connotations of meaning, away from the idea of its reference to one single and 
permanent signified.  
Stressing the role of the signifier in and for itself, Between playfully enters into 
this debate, while strengthening the traveller’s sense of disorientation and producing 
the same feeling in the reader. Hayman and Cohen explain how the initial tension in 
the reader’s mind, determined by the mixture of languages, is eventually dealt and 
resolved through laughter, thus following the modus operandi of humour, which is 
“based on a tension which is created in the mind [and] must be economically dealt 
with through laughter” (Hayman and Cohen 9). Brooke-Rose’s text achieves humour 
by means of its innumerable linguistic jokes, which are inextricably linked to the 
question of translation. In Between, humour is broadly based on connotations of 
meaning which “come off” in a language but would not in another. The functioning 
of one of these wordplays is explained by the interpreter herself, “Calorifère, as my 
mother used to say. She liked terrible puns […] elle disait: Qu’alor y faire?” (B 551). 
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Here the phrase “qu’alor y faire” (what are we goin to do?) becomes “calorifère” 
(central heating) if pronounced fast. Another of the many puns we find in Between is 
that of the protagonist perceiving, as a child, the word “Beaujolais” as “belle Jolaise” 
(B 523). Specific linguistic jokes such as these can learly be made only in one 
language, as their connotation of meaning would change if transposed into another 
language.  
The interpreter possesses a constantly ironical approach to language. For 
instance, when she reads a toilet notice saying “Bitte kein Handtuch benützen”, she 
mockingly asks “Ever at all?” (B 410). Again, she humours on language when she 
observes “a Dutch dog barking in Dutch” (B 411), or else she plays with the 
transcription of an American accent: “Mineral warrer? Do you mean nachral warrer? 
[…] you can have sora-warrer. On the rahks” (B 411). Another kind of linguistic 
joke to be found in Between is the mixing up of advertising language to describe 
everyday situations, eventually with the aim of banteri g on the fundamentally 
dramatic nature of some life’s experiences. For insta ce, in recalling the 
interrogations the interpreter and Siegfried were submitted to by the allied forces 
after the end of the war in order to get a certificate attesting their non-involvement 
with the Nazis – the so-called “denazification screening” (B 486) – Siegfried 
humorously labels the official document “Persil-Schein certificate denazifying us 
whiter than white” (B 473). The humour here results from the relation established 
between Siegfried’s phrase and the advertisement cliché for a famous cleaning 
powder, Persil. Interestingly, the pun works on a double level: on the one hand, they 
must obtain a “Persil certificate” which shows their “cleanliness” and non-
commitment to Nazism, on the other hand, the German term “Schein” (Certificate) is 
pronounced as the English verb “shine”, therefore playing further on the idea of 
cleanliness.  
The name of another well-known industrial cleaning product, “OMO”, is 
wittingly used by the protagonist as a reply (actual or imagined) to a shop assistant’s 
question “Madame désire?” (B 433). Even though “OMO” is the label of the washing 
powder, the interpreter’s answer humorously seems to imply her desire for a man. 
Linguistic puns address both the debate around the two parts of the linguistic sign 
and the dichotomy speech/writing, therefore recalling Derrida’s notion of writing and 
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différance, which we will extensively consider when analysing Thru. Moreover, the 
specific reference to OMO and Persil in Between strongly recalls Barthes’ analysis of 
the language of advertisement. In Mythologies, in fact, he refers to both cleaning 
powders (Cf. “Soap-powders and Detergents”, Barthes 1973 36-8). 
Brooke-Rose’s attitude towards language is as towards  material which can be 
funny at every moment and everywhere: in advertising, during congresses, or in 
private life, bearing the possibility of being played upon, hence the highly creative 
and entertaining linguistic humour of the novel. In Between, languages mingle, 
“fraternise behind their own façades finding each other exquisite” (B 449), sliding in 
the same sentence from one to another and from one technical jargon to the other. 
Like refrains, throughout the novel we find sentences repeated with slight variations 
referring to the amalgam of languages, such as, 
As if languages loved each other behind their own façades, despite alles was man denkt darüber davon 
dazu. As if words fraternised silently beneath the syntax, finding each other funny and delicious in a 
Misch-Masch of tender fornication, inside the bombed out hallowed structures and the rigid steel glass 
modern edifices of the brain. Du, do you love me? (B 447) 
 
Such sentences remind us of the Surrealist ideal of poetry made up of words 
making love, thus revealing the strong influence of P und’s poetry on Brooke-Rose. 
They also recall the “happy Babel” theorised by Barthes, for whom “The confusion 
of tongues is no longer a punishment, the subject gains access to bliss by the 
cohabitation of languages” (Barthes 1975 3-4). In co trast to the Babel of the Old 
Testament, which was negatively connoted (being the insignia of the creator’s rage 
against humanity’s sins), for Barthes the coexistence of languages in a modern text is 
no longer a negative feature. In the very first page of The Pleasure of the Text, 
Barthes encourages the reader to “Imagine someone […] who mixes every language, 
even those said to be incompatible; who silently accepts every charge of illogicality” 
(Barthes 1975 3). It is by means of the confusion of tongues that the subject gains 
bliss: “the pleasure is a sanctioned Babel” (Barthes 1975 4). 
Brooke-Rose exhibits an absolute mastery over the complexity of languages in 
Between. The very multiplicity of discourses and the “state of verbal anarchy, the 
condition under which languages ‘fraternize’” (Birch 73), become the novel’s vital 
attribute. Between explicitly refers to “the Tower of Babel” (B 511) and enacts the 
fraternization and fornication of languages throughout itself, as epitomized by such 
sentences as,  
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E allora the languages fraternise in a frenzy of fornication by airmail par avion via aerea Luftpost 
ΑΕΡΟΠΟΡΙΚΩΣ Uçak […] despite the Acqua Minerale battericamente pura Apǎ de Masǎ ΣΑΡΙΖΑ 
ΑΡΙΣΤΟΝ etc or SARIZA Eau de Table naturelle-curative […] Gerolsteiner Sprudel natürliches 
Mineralwasser. (B 542) 
 
If The Pleasure of the Text was originally published in 1973, i.e. five years 
after the appearance of Between, it is clear how Barthes’ main ideas had already been 
endorsed by the critic-novelist Brooke-Rose, achieving their own climax and 
ratification within the proper practice of a text. In Between, many are the hints at the 
bruise of the language Barthes talks about, such as when we read about the members 
of the congress who “burble” (B 403), or about the “ um of voices […] murmur of 
the talking” (B 427). Barthes also theorises the prsence, in a text of bliss, of the 
seam between the two “edges” of language, the conformist and the subversive ones. 
The two languages must coexist and the seam between th m must be made manifest 
in the pure materiality of language, in its lexicon, its syntax, its metrics. Using 
language in this way, a text would dismantle  
ideological structures, intellectual solidarities, the propriety of idioms, and even the sacred armature of 
syntax (subject/predicate): the text no longer has t e sentence for its model; often it is a powerful g sh 
of words, a ribbon of infra-language. Yet […] The dismantling of language is intersected by political 
assertion, is edged by the age-old culture of the signifier. (Barthes 1975 7-8) 
 
As we have seen, Between’s syntax is free-ranging, often literally constituing a 
powerful “gush of words” where language continuously dismantles and reconstructs 
itself, embodying Barthes’ idea of a “paradise of words […] continuous jubilation, 
the moment when by its very excess verbal pleasure chokes and reels into bliss” 
(Barthes 1975 8). In a text of bliss, “narrativity s dismantled yet the story is still 
readable” (Barthes 1975 9), and this is exactly what ppens in Between: 
notwithstanding the powerful irruption of words on the page, the text does not 
succumb to it, on the contrary it is constructed by means of it, by what constitutes its 
very “pleasure of performance” (Barthes 1975 9). The reader of Between is meant to 
enjoy its combination of languages, enacting an “aristocratic” reading, experiencing 
the bliss of the text “in the volume of the languages, in the uttering, not in the 
sequence of utterances” (Barthes 1975 13). It is inthe interstices between languages 
that the reader has to find their pleasure. The text of pleasure is not “linked to a 
comfortable practice of reading” (Barthes 1975 14), but it is rather a “text that 
imposes a state of loss, the text that discomforts (perhaps to the point of a certain 
boredom), unsettles the reader’s historical, cultura , psychological assumptions […] 
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brings to a crisis his relation with language” (Barthes 1975 14). In Between, it is 
language which speaks, pure and free-flowing, freed from the notion of author as 
source of meaning of the text. The text becomes the central object of itself. As 
Barthes explains, what is required in modern literature is,  
the relativization of the relations of writer, readr and observer (critic) […] against the traditional 
notion of the work […] there is now the requirement of a new object, obtained by the sliding or 
overturning of former categories. That object is the Text. (Barthes 1977 156) 
 
For Barthes, far from being an object that “can be computed” (Barthes 1977 
156), the text is to be considered as a process, “experienced only in an activity of 
production […] What constitutes the Text is […] its subversive force in respect of 
the old classifications […] the Text is that which goes to the limit of the rules of 
enunciation (rationality, readability, etc)” (Barthes 1977 157), “the text is 
multilingual” (Barthes 1974 120), and if the work “closes on a signified”, the “Text 
can be approached, experienced, in reaction to the sign” (Barthes 1977 158). The text 
is constituted by “the plurality of entrances, the opening of networks, the infinity of 
languages” (Barthes 1974 5). “To interpret a text is not to give t a […] meaning, but 
on the contrary to appreciate what plural constitutes it […] In this ideal text, the 
networks are many and interact, without any of them being able to surpass the rest; 
this text is a galaxy of signifiers, not a structure of signifieds” (Barthes 1974 5). It is 
therefore impossible to give an answer to the famous question “Who is speaking?” 
(Barthes 1974 41), an answer which would imply an absolute origin of the text, since 
the text is construed by the reader’s interpretation. The text does not deny meaning, 
rather it suspends it, “giving meaning its last closure: suspension” (Barthes 1974 
217). Barthes’ point is crucial to our interpretation of Between: the very title of the 
novel indicates this state of suspension in between any fixed notion of meaning. 
The state of suspension of meaning is crucially achieved also by the major 
narrative constraint Brooke-Rose adopts in Between, the lack of the verb to be. By 
omitting such a “stable” verb, the author achieves p culiar effects, both on the 
stylistic and on the mimetic levels. On the stylistic level, the avoidance of such a 
verb means that a different solution is offered to the reader every time that verb 
would have been automatically inserted. The new linguistic solution necessarily 
results more dynamic, active, and often metaphorical. The active substitutes of the 
verb to be become thus a way for the author to elude the obvious, the linguistic 
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cliché, to avoid the expected use of language. As regards the mimetic implication of 
this specific constraint, the omission of the verb to be links with the theme of 
constant movement, rendering the idea that the protagonist is never existing “here” in 
time and place, but always in between. The lipogram is thus inextricably linked to the 
protagonist’s existential status and entails important implications in terms of identity 
as related to the linguistic, philosophical, psychological and literary theories of the 
time. Constantly travelling and translating, the interpreter lacks any fixed identity. 
Although she exists as in between, always on the move, her condition is not to be 
read as a “search for identity”, but rather as an altogether lack or, as Brooke-Rose 
asserts, “loss of identity” (Del Sapio Garbero 1991 108). Constantly travelling, she 
has no set cultural and existential roots. She doesn t want or need an identity, as the 
very concept of identity is an illusion, identity, as traditionally conceived, does not 
exist. As Brooke-Rose reinstates, “Neither she nor others have one [identity]: we 
none of us have. Each of us is many; identity is wholly constructed and 
deconstructed by our world” (Brooke-Rose 2002b 44). The fact that all the 
interpreter’s thoughts, perceptions and memories ar presented unreflexively, that 
she never says I except in dialogue, strongly contributes to give th  idea of the 
interpreter’s existential condition, of her lack of identity. By depicting her character 
as experiencing this fundamental void, Between both originally inserts itself in the 
poststructuralist debate over fixed notions of truth – and therefore of identity as 
presence, truth and meaning – and addresses the psychoanalytic notion of subject.  
In 1967, Derrida’s three hinge works appeared simultaneously, addressing 
what he calls the metaphysics of presence as responsible for the organization of 
Western thought by means of binary oppositions, where one, positive term is always 
privileged over the other, negative one. What Derrida deconstructs is the 
phenomenological notion of an essential truth linked to the idea of a centered 
epistemological subject which can achieve a pure, transcendental and immanent 
knowledge of things and their meaning. The notion of fixed meaning is subverted as 
the concept of truth is shown to be an illusion which is “the history of truth” (Derrida 
1976 20). Derrida’s philosophical apparatus avails itself of Lacan’s notion of split 
subject, which is constituted with the child’s entra ce into the Symbolic Order, the 
order of the father, law and language. This radical and insoluble split is produced by 
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means of language, which comes from outside the child. Language does not arise 
from within the individual, “it is always out there in the world outside, lying in wait 
for the neonate. Language always ‘belongs’ to another person” (Mitchell and Rose 
5). If the subject is created by means of language and within language, which comes 
from outside the individual, it follows that the subject is created within a radical split. 
If the subject bears a gap between conscious and unconscious, Derrida concludes that 
meaning is never apparent, but lies in the gap, in the interstitial zone between the said 
and the non-said, the literal and the metaphorical, the evident and the hidden. 
Meaning does not depend on objective identity, but rather on interpretation. 
The interpreter’s living in between is depicted as a basic condition of her 
existence. She is made to experience a sense of b tweenness in each field of her life, 
on each level of her self. She vacillates, hesitates between different possible “ways of 
existing”. The perceiving consciousness of Between is presented as a self-divided, a 
fragmented self. She is a split subject in every respect of life’s experiences, as she 
acknowledges that “All ideas have equality before God” (B 426) and chooses to find 
her “unity” in a complete suspension of commitment to any notion of fixed idea.  
First of all it can be asserted that she is split be ween languages: as an 
interpreter, she is aware of the fact that tr nslation always implies a process of 
interpretation: when translating from one language into another, one has to carry out 
a complex operation of interpretation of meaning. Translation becomes, in Del Sapio 
Garbero’s words, “un’esperienza critica della soggettività” (Del Sapio Garbero 1990 
183), a critical experience of subjectivity. Brooke-Rose’s idea that different 
languages entail dissimilar ways of looking at reality and “understanding” 
(interpreting) it is evident as the text continuously emphasises diverse linguistic 
structures and focuses on the different perceptual effects they generate. For instance 
we read that “Wenn man thinks AUF Deutsch, wann manin Deutschland lives”, then 
“acquires alles a broken up quality” because of “the gestures and the actions all 
postponed while first die Dinge und die Personen kommen” (B 447). Not only does 
the syntax of a language build up our representation of the world but even the very 
sounds of the words we utter do so: “Bitte Pflanzen oder Pflanzenteiler zu 
deklarieren” (B 565) produces a different “mental impression” from its English 
equivalent, “Please declare if you have plants or parts of plants” (B 401).  
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Brooke-Rose is deeply interested in the idea of translation. In one of her critical 
essays about the translation of Pound’s Cantos into other languages, she analyses the 
difficulty of transposing one language’s syntax into another. Far from automatically 
transferring meaning from one language into another, translation requires in each and 
every case particular solutions linked to the specific structures of the languages in 
question (Cf. Brooke-Rose 1991 125-8). Another major difficulty in translating, 
continues Brooke-Rose, derives from the fact that most of the times words cannot be 
rendered by a “perfect” equivalent in another language. Translation always and 
inescapably acquires slightly different connotations (Cf. Brooke-Rose 1991 129). 
The subtending idea of Brooke-Rose’s linguistic practice is that language shapes 
reality, and that translation always entails a process of interpretation, in that the 
relationship between signifier and signified is never straightforward. The very 
concept of translation is dangerous in that it presupposes the presence of a 
transcendental signifier with a fixed meaning that c n be easily transposed into 
another language. 
Derrida’s deconstructionist theory extensively considers the question of 
translation, of the transposition of meaning from one language to another. The 
problem of what ranspires from translation is addressed by Derrida in relation o the 
terms “presence” (Cf. Derrida 1982a 33) and “representation” (Cf. Derrida 1982b 
302) as connected to Heidegger’s philosophy. His analyses are the more significant 
as he shows that the problem of translation starts from the very basic notions of the 
metaphysics of presence. The idea that there is a “semantic kernel” of the term which 
can be translated unproblematically from one language into another is a metaphysical 
assumption, implying the existence of a transcendental signifier. In reality, every 
signifier is caught in “the play of signifying references that constitute language” 
(Derrida 1976 7). Signification always refers to other signs, no sign refers only to 
itself. Meaning is located in multiplicity and caught in a process of infinite deferral, 
of never arriving at meaning itself. Once we realise that there exists no 
transcendental signifier, the idea of the infinite play with language arises, away from 
any notion of fixed meaning. In order “To think play radically […] the question of 
the meaning of being, the being of the entity and of the transcendental origin of the 
world […] must be patiently and rigorously worked through” (Derrida 1976 50). 
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The metaphysics of presence – originated from the idea of logos as related to 
self-presence of the being and to a reality based on eternal truths which language can 
express – must be subverted in order to show that in the place between the opposite 
terms of its binary oppositions arise the trace or arche-trace, constituted by the 
movement which produces différance, meaning as the difference out of the 
opposition between the elements: “The trace is […]  the absolute origin of the sense 
in general. Which amounts to saying once again thatere is no absolute origin of 
the sense in general. The trace is the différance which opens appearance […] and 
signification” (Derrida 1976 65).  
The daily working with different languages by the novel’s protagonist 
specifically determines her state of “betweenness” a  described above. As an 
interpreter, she comes to realise that language is d eply related to (if not determinant 
of) one’s individual perception of the world, and indeed what she regards as being 
the “reality” around her depends mostly on the language of the country she is in, 
buenos días, Morgen or Kalimera who knows, it all depends where the sleeping has occurred out of 
what dream shaken up with non merci nein danke no thank you. (B 396)  
 
She does not believe in a clear-cut correspondence between signifier and 
signified. A “pure” language does not seem to exist, a language which could be able 
to establish a sudden and “primary” relationship betwe n the two parts of a sign. The 
language we make use of is a human construct and, as such, it is imperfect, unable to 
explain a concept or a thing out of the whole system. As is stated in the text,  
if you look up the word happiness in the dictionary you will find that the apparent definition contains 
words which themselves need defining and so on ad infinitum which makes one very merry. Il n’y a 
jamais de sens propre au dictionnaire. (B 567) 
 
The interpreter has no faith in society’s capability for communication. The idea 
of language as ensuring a “real” understanding betwe n people is presented as an 
illusion. Le “problème de la communication” (B 409) is variously addressed 
throughout the novel and despite the global communication system, the protagonist 
feels that “words prevent any true EXCHANGE” (B 399) and that “no 
communication […] ever occurs” (B 421). The only exc ption to this, seems to be 
represented by “the code de la route” (B 567). In fact, when the interpreter buys a 
“small Renault” (B 566) and sets on a trip by car, she appreciates the fact that the 
street-code is immediately understood by everyone, being thus language where 
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signifier and signified amazingly coincide and which produces a direct 
“understanding” between people. If you want to let someone cross the street, you just 
need to “wave […] across with a courteous gesture” (B 567), or else if you get angry 
with someone, you can easily “shake the fist in a smooth swift silent language 
understood by everyone” (B 567). However, at times the text seems to ironically 
imply that, even in the case of the street-code, signifying system and reality often do 
not coincide, such as when the interpreter is travelling on a bus which overtakes a car 
despite the forbidding sign (B 404), or when a taxi-driver “drives the hired car 
regardless of white hands about to signal other cars ac oss” (B 430). At any rate, 
while driving, the interpreter feels as if in a protected area of language, where there is 
no physical contact with other people, no need to speak to them face to face, and 
where the danger of being misunderstood is much lower than in everyday spoken 
intercourse. In the “freedom of the road”, she feels as if well “protected in a glass 
and metal box so that no-one can get at you” (B 567).  
Disillusioned about the possibility of communication and understanding among 
people, the interpreter plays with the linguistic system and with her very disbelief, 
creating a playful “Mish-Mash of tender fornication” (B 447) out of her multilingual 
experience. In this connection, the sentence “Man de kt in Deutsch wann man in 
Deutschland lebt” (B 447) can be seen as readdressing W ttgenstein’s philosophy of 
language, but also playing with it, since it goes on, “Und since man spricht sehr little 
Deutsch […] man denkt in eine kind of erronish Deutsch das springt zu life feel 
besser than echt Deutsch” (B 447). The mixture of idi ms and the wordplays are thus 
a way of renewing language itself, of making it being born again. In this way, 
Brooke-Rose seems not only to address the debate on language, but also and most 
importantly to offer a positive, playful solution to its problems. Playing with 
language becomes a way of going beyond that debate, for languages love each other 
“behind their own façades, despite alles was man denkt darüber davon dazu”(B 447). 
Another major split in the interpreter is that betwen body and mind. Although 
her body is constantly compelled to travel in “simultaneous interpretation” (B 408), it 
participates in her job only passively. While working, the interpreter is portrayed as a 
kind of computerised transmitter, a quasi non-human being: “the eyes closed to 
watch the words” (B 482) which flow “into the ear through the earphones in French 
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and down at once out of the mouth into the mouthpiece n simultaneous German” (B 
399). The interpreter’s task is thus presented as amechanical brain-work, whereas 
her body is the mere vehicle of such a work. Her brain is the place where the 
conversion of one language into another automatically occurs, like a computer 
processor, and her body is the empty tool of such an operation, a “computer-case”. 
Her mouth, irremediably attached to the “mouthpiece”, s ems to be an instrument 
itself rather than a human organ. There seems to exist no more than a mechanical 
connection between body and mind. Everything happens in the brain, whereas the 
body is just passively submitted to the job. The body is indeed almost seen as being 
submitted to prostitution, used merely as a tool for earning one’s own living, “one 
does one’s job, to the best of one’s ability, simply as an instrument” (B 457). While 
working, the character’s body is described as being “  a suspension of ideas 
transmitted from one microphone to another at a speed of five centuries per minute 
because the things understood slip away together with the need to understand” (B 
470). Brooke-Rose affirms, “if you like, the body is always there […] but it’s all 
much more happening in the brain, ‘the distant brain way up…’ […] when you 
translate almost mechanically […] it is the brain at work whereas the body is 
practically at rest” (Del Sapio Garbero 1991 99). 
The same split body/mind is experienced in her private life: her body wakes up 
in different countries and her mind does not know at first what country she is in. The 
novel recurrently focuses on bottles of water variously labelled in different 
languages, as she usually realises in which country she has spent the night only by 
reading the label of the bottle on her hotel bedside table,  
The light pours through the slatted shutters […] San Pellegrino, Acqua litinica alcalina antiurica 
anticatarrale, Battericamente pura (B 424); 
MYHEPAΛHA BO∆A (B 441);  
The bottle of Eau du Kiém stands on the dressing table (B 463);  
Apǎ Mineralǎ. (B 480) 
 
When her room telephone rings, she answers according to the language she 
promptly checks on the label of the water bottle: “The telephone rings allo? Er, 
dígame? The bottle on the bedside table says Agua Mineral” (B 399).  
Not only does the interpreter experience a split betwe n body and mind, but 
also her mind is split in itself, or better suspended between ideas. Although she is 
constantly travelling between frontiers, languages, conferences and consequently 
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translating other people’s ideas and theories, she merely transmits them and never 
treasures any of her own: “ideas? We merely translate other people’s ideas […] si-
mul-ta-né-ment. No one requires us to have any of our own. We live between ideas, 
nicht wahr […]?” (B 413). Incessantly moving between ideas, she has realised that 
“all truths get institutionalised sooner or later and die” (B 453), and therefore that 
“nothing deserves a flow of rash enthusiasm” (B 426). The circumstances of her past 
life have crucially contributed to this peculiar attitude of hers, as she has come to 
acknowledge that every idea can be true or false according to the point of view being 
adopted. Still young, she is made to observe and experience last century’s main 
catastrophic event, World War II, from both of the opposite sides. At school in 
France she is taught that “l’Allemagne a renouvelé ses folles ambitions” (B 522), 
while in Germany she is told that “das deutsche Volk no longer has enough 
Lebensraum” (B 521). She observes on the one hand “pri e of conquest über alles”, 
and on the other “longing for the end” (B 488), “the old wooden houses” burning 
“like ideas” (B 488). On the basis of this experienc  she has become aware of the 
fact that “the history of devastation” can be reconstructed “from the enemy point of 
view” (B 487), that the enemy point of view itself depends on which side you find 
yourself on, and that one might be on one side or the o her not necessarily because of 
one’s own strong political and social beliefs. Joining “the Bund Deutscher Mädel at 
fifteen” (B 489) after her French upbringing, she mispronounces “Heil Hitler” into 
“Hell Hitler” (B 489), and when asked by a German officer “do you feel so 
impersonal Fraulein about the Vaterland?”, she replies (or imagines replying), “But 
where have all the fathers gone?” (B 490). Later on in her thoughts she insists: “das 
Vaterland die Heimat mother-country patrie according to the point of view” (B 527). 
Our interpreter is ironically described as a woman of “uncertain loyalties” (B 445). 
Different nations are obsessively present in her lif  and if there are “too many mother 
countries and fatherlands” (Bertacco 93), it is only for her to dismiss each national 
stereotype as an empty surface label, “The Gairmans they applause their speakers. 
The English they applause their speakers. The French say alone the French make 
intellectual contribution” (B 421), or as generalizing assertions, “But good Germans 
exist” (B 525). Used to the “presentation of opposite viewpoints on every aspect of 
an instant world” (B 498), she has realised that each side, each nation has its own 
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history. In contrast to a much younger colleague who “chatters happily […] 
belonging apparently to a different species altogether undamaged unconcerned […] 
unretarded by wars national prejudices bilingualism” (B 531-2), the events of the 
interpreter’s life have irremediably led her to mistru t any fixed belief. Perhaps 
sometimes she would like to “commit to one single id a”, to host ideals of her own, 
but she irremediably finds herself in a “suspension of judgment” (B 559). When she 
comes back to work after an unspecified period, she i  compared to her ex-colleagues 
who have now married: “Most of your old friends have left you know madame for 
higher things such as the masculine unmarked […] ambition change love desire 
marriage” (B 438). 
Another crucial cut in the interpreter’s life is produced by her lost belief in 
religious faith. Brought up as a Catholic, the Churc  has “more than anyone” (B 514) 
undermined her faith. The Catholic Church is described as an institution which 
possesses a pompous and sumptuous appearance, whereas the real faith of its 
believers does not correspond to such an inflated ostentation of magnificence: “the 
cross on the curlicued façade so much taller than te small church behind it” (B 483). 
After her divorce, she asks for the annulment of her marriage by the canon law and 
she goes through a legal suit which costs her a gret waste of effort, time and money. 
Indeed, she has to submit herself to long-lasting ad minute interrogations, since 
“The Holy Mother Church takes each case very seriously and leaves no stone 
unturned to find out the truth in the eyes of God” (B 459). Such inquisitions judge 
her personal choices, “So you decided in advance […] to divorce if it didn’t work, 
thus annulling the contract in the eyes of God?” (B 458), and rudely intrude upon her 
marriage intimacy, such as when the priest asks her about the contraceptive methods 
used by the couple, the answer made difficult by the necessary translation into 
Italian, 
[…] what methods did you use?  
- Comment? Ah. Hé bien mon père, d’abord une – je ne sais pas comment ça s’appelle en français. 
- Dites en allemand mon enfant, ou en anglais. 
- A sheath, at first, then a Dutch hat, er, cap. 
- Non capisco. 
- Vous voulez dire, madame, une capote anglaise? 
- Non mon père. Je crois que capote anglaise veut dire ce que les anglais appellent French Letter. 
- Una cosa di gomma ? 
- Si. 
- E l’altra cosa, più tardi ? 
- Je ne sais pas monsignor. 
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- Dessinez, s’il vous plaît. Ah si, si, la conosco. Va bene. Scusi, grazie tanto. (B 449) 
 
In this dialogue, the peculiar linguistic humour ofthe novel is fully 
appreciable. A privacy-invading question is turned into a play with language, and 
becomes a way to mock the way different countries label the same object: the French 
call it “capote anglaise”, and the English name it “French letter”. The conversation, 
moreover, strongly renders the feeling of being lost in translation.   
Notwithstanding such trivial inquiries and many other obstacles, the woman 
goes through the case for the annulment of her marriage. It will last seventeen years 
and pass through the Courts of Westminster, Augsbur and Rome, “all this for four 
years of marriage” (B 459). Siegfried repeatedly tries to convince her to give up the 
entire matter, and a proposal of marriage recurs several times in the course of the 
novel (probably it is Siegfried who proposes to her) but she invariably refuses to 
remarry,  
- […] So why don’t you marry me after all these years? 
- You know why. 
- Oh that. The Vicariato di Roma. I can’t think why you bother can you?  
- No. not any longer. But after all these years as you say one might as well see it through. (B 431-2) 
 
Interestingly, under other circumstances she will say that even if she no longer 
believes in the Church, she carries on the legal case as a “sort of blind protest at the 
lack of freedom to choose, for or against” (B 465). After three hearings, the arrival of 
the last verdict which finally proclaims the matrimony nullification as a 
“SENTENTIA DEFINITIVA” (B 570), is cast in a highly sarcastic light. “The Last 
Judgment” arrives together with “thirty printed pages of undoubted thoroughness” 
written in Latin, so as to criticise the backwardness of the Church and its superfluous 
scrupulousness for insignificant details which determine the “truth” of the matter. 
Indeed, the hints to the narrowness of the Church’s posture are many and insistent 
throughout the novel. We are even presented with a “Congress of Gnostics” (B 462) 
during which we are told,  
outside the Church no salvation which simply will not do and indeed the Church itself has now 
admitted its error in this respect as in so many others. History has proved them wrong again and again, 
even in religious matters they have quietly had to shift their ground many a time while yet 
proclaiming to guard the eternal verities against the morality of the age. […] look at the vital 
mysteries they have lost, by euphemising and narrowing them into convenient dogmas which even 
lose their convenience as times pass. (B 462-3) 
 
The protagonist is well aware of the mechanism by which the Church has 
changed its proclaimed “verities” in the course of history to try to be in line with the 
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changing society, yet not succeeding in its purposes. Moreover, even if such “truths” 
change as time passes, the institution keeps on defi ing them “eternal verities”.  
Strictly related to the interpreter’s split between ideas is her split between love 
and freedom: Brooke-Rose’s character appears to be divided between the desire to 
have sexual intercourse, and perhaps to love someone, and her beloved “freedom of 
the air” (B 471). Her attitude towards love and sex is ambiguous. She sometimes 
seems to feel lonely and to desire a male company. The novel’s recurrent focus on 
the emptiness of beds can be viewed as a metaphor for the solitude she experiences, 
for “the double bed feels huge empty” (B 400) and “o body occupies the empty 
space in the large bed” (B 410). She occasionally fntasises about a love relationship: 
“for one day the man will come and bring you out of this or that zone with a 
tremendous force and the intensity of a love lost or never gained such as for instance 
one idea that actually means something in the lightof that love” (B 402). At times, 
she even seems to strive for love: “Please do not throw into W.C. because on day 
the man will come and lift you out of your self-contai ment” (B 446). At the same 
time, however, we are clearly told that she has a deep-seated “terror of someone 
offering etwas anderes, not ordered” (B 414), and that she prefers being free: 
“freedom has its sudden attraction as the body floats in willing suspension of 
responsibility to anyone” (B 422). In this light, the terror she experiences at the idea 
of “someone offering etwas anderes, not ordered” could be interpreted as fear of 
someone offering love and commitment (which would imply responsibility), as 
opposed to occasional and free sexual intercourse. Th  novel’s persistent focus on 
hotel single rooms and beds being not so comfortable as double ones (Cf. B 433), 
could be therefore interpreted as her wish for a double bed to occupy alone: in a 
double bed she would benefit from more room for herself and her freedom, whereas 
the presence of a man would limit her space.  
If the interpreter’s attitude towards love and sex is ambiguous, dubious is the 
assertiveness of the many negative statements which construct the narrative, such as 
“No one comes in offering anything not ordered” (B 410). The use of this peculiar 
type of negation is a very important aspect of the text, since it bears linguistic, 
stylistic as well as philosophical implications. In li guistic and stylistic terms, a 
dubiously assertive negation plays on the reader’s expectations: what, at first, seems 
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to be an absolute negation, is in reality a dubious assertion. Brooke-Rose explores the 
possible effects of unusual linguistic structures and plays with the reader’s prospect, 
eluding the expected use of language. Even more intrestingly, these dubious 
sentences could be also read as “negative affirmations”, i.e. as double negations 
leading to an inversion of meaning and as such bearing peculiar philosophical 
implications. The act of negating twice in order to affirm/invert meaning can in fact 
be transposed to the ontological plane of the novel. A double negation leading to an 
inversion connotes the circular movement which subtends the whole text and which I 
will investigate later on in my analysis. 
The centre of consciousness of Between is therefore split between the idea of a 
union and her disillusion due to the failure of herprevious marriage: “for what? Just 
the need to belong and to obey? Look where that got us before” (B 465). She has 
gradually “Grow[n] away” (B 530) from each man she as encountered. Although 
she is no longer young – her “greying strand […] needing that glint of a tint” (B 
414), and her various lovers trying to convince her to “come into one world liebes, 
decide between loving and not loving, you have passed the age of adventure now, 
what thirty-four, forty-three?” (B 444-5), yet she r mains as if suspended between 
ideas and ideals, thinking that “nothing, rien, niente deserves a flow of desire love 
loyalty ambition marriage” (B 499). Many times throughout the text it is said that 
“The new lord mayor has promised to take up the challenge in getting you to commit 
yourself to a single idea” (B 457). The figure of the “new lord mayor” could be 
interpreted as representing each new lover of hers; the reference to them as “lord 
mayor[s]” would therefore shed sarcastic light on the fact that men exhibit a 
patronizing attitude towards the interpreter. The latter however resists any persuasion 
and chooses her freedom each time again, getting “bitten again with the old 
Wanderlust” (B 458). She knows that any commitment to one idea would cost her 
much, that any kind of enthusiasm would lead her again to disillusion. Even though 
she seems to have sexual intercourse with occasional lovers, she looks at them and 
their enthusiasm from an estranged point of view. She is disenchanted about the 
“vital lie” which is love,  
Most people need […] to love and to this end will […] persuade themselves that the vital lie contains 
sufficient simulation of desire to reintegrate him into totality […] imagination so totally at odds with 
any real situation. (B 555) 
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The interpreter of Between is represented as living in a society where ideals, 
commitment and enthusiasm necessarily lead to disillusion: one eventually pays 
heavily for them. Revealingly, one of the most frequ ntly repeated sentences 
throughout the novel is the question the Customs agents ask her,  
Please declare if you have plants or parts of plants with you such as love loyalty lust intellect belief of 
any kind or even simple enthusiasm for which you must pay duty to the Customs and Excise until you 
come to a standstill. (B 414) 
 
This question – which literally keeps haunting the interpreter – seems to be 
constituted in its first part by the real phrase asked to travellers at the Customs, and 
in its second part by the interpreter’s own bitter ironical consideration about society. 
The very society which has made her lose any belief in its ideals and which is 
constantly trying to make her commit again, is at the same time reminding her that 
any other commitment would cost her too much: she will have to pay duty for them 
until she comes to a “standstill”, i.e. until death. The “plants or parts of plants” 
inquired about by the Customs agents might be also interpreted as foetuses: the 
protagonist would be asked the same question so recurrently heard by childless 
women, a question which is directly stated when we read, “have you considered 
madame what the life entails between the enormous wings losing height […] have 
you any children?” (B 438-9). On another occasion, she is warned: “you must hurry, 
the clay-like sea will liquefy at any moment now and you will need your zemvest” (B 
533). However, she seems to continually postpone the decision of having a child: 
“l’altra cosa più tardi gets postponed by a magic wall of defence consisting of 
commissions congresses conferences” (B 542). When she finally obtains the 
annulment of her marriage, the cruel humour of the sentence “just in time for the 
menopause” (B 570) makes Judy Little assume that “the woman perhaps wanted a 
new marriage and even children” (Little 1995 73). 
An additional fragmentation experienced by the interpr ter’s self derives from 
her living in today’s changing society, a society which already points to globalization 
and the homogenisation of cultures. I agree with Bertacco when she observes that 
“Between offers a dystopian view of the world to come […] Globalization as 
imagined by Brooke-Rose in 1968 is seen as destructive of the subject’s uniqueness” 
(Bertacco 94). The situation in which the interprete  is made to exist is presented as a 
transitional period between the old order of things and a new world to come, as we 
 118 
read in the novel: “We live in an age of transition between one social order and 
another and we must effectuate that transition or die” (B 462). The protagonist of 
Between lacks faith in the conventional values of a society where every aspect of 
civilization is less substantial in reality than the way it publicly appears. Like that of 
the Church, the “façade” of a house is said to be “much taller than the small 
imagination behind it” (B 417), the “tall façades” of buildings have “small spirits 
behind them” (B 477), and words, especially lovers’ ones, enact “a circular dance so 
much taller that the small love behind it” (B 544). The central consciousness of 
Between is made to exist in a society where problems are endlessly discussed, but no 
real action is undertaken to solve them, where everyone talks but does not listen to 
the others, like in a “dumb show” (B 561): “The world talks and compiles statistics 
and does nothing except build more satellites more missiles ad infinitum yes, nothing 
but despair” (B 483). The experts do nothing but talk and even their talking is made 
to appear wrong, as wrong is the exponential calcultion about the multiplication of 
population presented at a congress,  
Populations multiply almost by geometrical progression gnädige Frau, in simple terms two times two 
equals four, times two equal eight, times eight equals sixteen und so weiter ad infinitum. (B 483) 
 
The correct sequence, presented elsewhere in the novel, should be “two times 
two equals four times two equals eight times two equals sixteen ad infinitum” (B 
504). However, despite the wrong calculation, the end result of the multiplication is 
right. This could be interpreted as an ironical refe nce to the forecasts made by 
experts about the future of the world and to their specialized jargon. Moreover, the 
discourse presents a grammatical mistake. The verb “equal” in the third person 
singular should be in fact “equals”: throughout theext there is a great amount of 
grammatical mistakes which reinforce the interpreter’s sense of being lost amongst 
people who speak different languages and not always properly. In this particular 
case, the error seems to reinforce her disbelief in specialized languages which claim 
to tell the truth, but which indeed make mistakes. Moreover, the novel seems to 
imply that, whichever the statistics and the forecasts about the future society might 
be, people remain indifferent to them: “Between the cold statistics and the stark bare 
facts of hunger lies an immense period called indifference” (B 475). The central 
character of Between is made to be living in a world where a “curtain […] divides the 
poorer from the richer” (B 474-5), “the ordinary from the better” (B 404), “the 
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starving from the affluent” (B 571), and where the power that controls society is 
unseen, just as in a plane a curtain divides the second from the first class (Cf. B 395). 
In a society which aims at achieving “the domestication of Chronos” (B 569), she 
prefers to live “anticlockwise” and wears no wristwa ch. Interestingly, whereas at the 
beginning of the novel, Siegfried wears no wristwatch either, towards the end of the 
text, after he sets down in Holland, marries and has a child, he takes up the habit of 
wearing a watch and proposes to present the interpret r with one, but she refuses. 
Siegfried thus finally accepts the conventional society’s values (marrying, having a 
child, setting in one place and living “clockwise”), while the protagonist continues to 
live in her condition of betweenness. She continues exi ting as if floating between 
spaces and times, such as when she travels between conti ents and the sky darkens 
“at the speed of sight” (B 537). Sometimes she keeps on gazing at the sun for hours, 
“the sun remains ahead from four o’clock to midnight never setting as the plane 
chases it across the clay Atlantic” (B 411), or shee s the sun high in the sky while 
travelling on the plane, even if before takeoff it was darkening (Cf. B 404, 538). 
The interpreter is represented as having been crucially influenced by such 
experiences as the Great War, her lost religious faith and the failure of her marriage. 
These occurrences have irremediably altered her attitude towards life. Remarkably, a 
parallel could be traced between her existential condition and what it is said during a 
“Medical Congress on the molecules of memory” (B 515). At the congress, one of 
the speakers maintains that peculiar circumstances in a person’s life could even act 
on the RNA code, eventually modifying its biological sequences and structure. In 
other words, “au niveau cérébral” (B 517) our reaction to life’s perceptive stimuli 
might be definitively affected by previous events. Later on the text hints at the fact 
that the protagonist’s approach towards life has been permanently altered by “the 
stimuli of environment, in other words, events” (B 571). Such a detail might 
corroborate the link between the theory expounded at the medical congress and the 
interpreter’s status. This concept interestingly relates to both Lacan’s 
psychoanalytical theory and Derrida’s notion of present. 
Lacan saw that the decentred subject continually projects its past trauma into 
the future as the only means of recognising itself. The past can be recuperated only 
by means of its projection into the future, in a movement where the subject is never 
 120 
in the present, but exists only in as much it continuously projects its past into the 
future. For Derrida, the so-called “present” is alwys already compromised by a 
trace, or a residue of a previous experience, that precludes us ever being in a self-
contained “now” moment. The experience of the “now”, “present-to-itself”, of 
“coinciding with oneself” is impossible (Derrida 1973 68). The metaphysical notion 
of self-presence which accords primacy to the “now” of temporal immediacy is 
shown to be an illusion. Meaning is always in process, becoming, an infinite 
dissemination of meaning. The significance of the past can only be appreciated from 
the future, but the future is itself caught in an analogous process of change. The 
future that Derrida refers to is not a future that will become present, but the future 
that makes all presence possible and impossible at the same time. There can be no 
presence-to-self, no self-contained identity, because the nature of our temporal 
existence implies the inaccessibility of the present moment. In the light of these 
theories, we realise how Between reveals precisely this movement or connection 
between past and future, where the present is for ever eluded. The interpreter lives in 
between: on the one hand, her memories and previous experiences continuously 
return to affect her split subjectivity, on the other hand, she is constantly travelling, 
i.e. perennially projected into a future that never comes. She is therefore irremediably 
seized between past and future, she exists in this very temporal gap.   
Having delineated the character’s peculiarities in terms of “loss” of identity, 
disbelief in ideas, and lack of faith in the values of society, it is essential to note how 
all this does not entail a negative attitude towards life: the interpr ter chooses to 
positively exploit his state of things,  precisely byplaying with her very sense of loss. 
She goes on living as if suspended between ideas as this implies no fixed 
commitment to anyone and anything. She is in fact depicted as if relentlessly floating 
between opposite poles: between “doing and not doing” (B 395), “sleeping and not 
sleeping” (B 398), “the dawn and the non-existent night” (B 404), “loving and not 
loving” (B 420), “the zest of youth and the enlightenment of the old age” (B 444), 
“man and God, liberty and redemption” (B 452), “one social order and another” (B 
462), “the dawn and the unrounding night” (B 474), “the cold statistics and the bare 
facts” (B 475), “existing as a woman and working as a man” (B 505), “belief and 
disbelief” (B 540), “total indifference and a mild desire to pick up the broken bits” 
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(B 553). In such a  state of suspension, she exists only and inasmuch she finds herself 
in between, committing herself neither to belief nor to disbelief. Any choice between 
two extremes would mean positing herself into or outside of the social order, it 
would imply commitment: choosing belief or disbelief would amount to the same 
thing, any choice would entrap her, but she is free only in between traps.  
The central consciousness of Between is an ambiguous figure, who “may stand 
[…] as one emblem of our ambiguous present, […] our postmodernity […] on the 
one hand, close to being submerged by the detritus of a civilisation whose broken-up 
quality she both registers and exemplifies […] on the other hand, playing with that 
very sense of loss” (Suleiman 126-7). The question “what difference does it make?” 
(B 432, 456, 464) recurs in fact throughout the novel like a refrain. For the 
interpreter there is no difference between the two alternatives of a choice. 
Interestingly, Judy Little views this character as being,  
in transit between her free floating postmodern condition and her residual commitment to a life that 
was not so “between.” […] she moves towards a greate  freedom from the ideologies that have cost 
her something. (Little 1995 72-3)  
 
The interpreter frees herself from the loyalties of her past, and “from the 
oppressive, possessive quality that can accompany dedication to a single idea” (Little 
1995 72). For Little, Brooke-Rose’s narrating instace is not a totally postmodern 
product: she is located between a commitment to some faith of a sort (she was 
previously committed to the idea of marriage) and postmodern disbelief. In this light, 
she could be viewed as embodying the passage between on  order and another or – in 
my own view – as choosing to be neither in one world nor in another. She lives 
simultaneously in a disintegration and multiplication of meaning. She is capable and 
willing to see things in different ways at the same time. She wittingly chooses and 
enjoys the “betweenness” of her life. In this connection, Coleridge’s famous sentence 
“willing suspension of disbelief” (Coleridge XIV 6), varied throughout the novel into 
“willing suspension of responsibility to anyone” (B422), and “willing suspension of 
loyalty to anyone” (B 461, 462), acquires salient connotations. The protagonist has a 
“ loyal disloyalty to any ‘one single idea’”, she is “loyal to her disloyalty”, “disloyal 
on principle” (Little 1995 73). However, I believe it important to specify that her 
attitude towards life does not precipitate her into i activity: she is not static, on the 
contrary, she is actively playing. Once more I am in agreement with Judy Little as 
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she asserts the interpreter does not represent “a postmodern consciousness adrift in 
meaninglessness […] she has fought hard for the costly meaninglessness, or 
betweenness of her life […] she is willing to suspend” belief and disbelief in a 
“playful if disorienting freedom” (Little 1995 73-4). In other words, the 
“meaninglessness” of her status does not bear negativ  connotations. Her existential 
condition does not embrace meaninglessness as such, b t rather concerns itself with 
the disruption of the illusion of stable meaning, of any notion of fixed meaning. She 
chooses her “playful if disorienting freedom” again d again throughout the novel 
till the end. Indeed, the novel begins and ends with the same image of the 
interpreter’s body floating between the enormous wings of the plane.  She does not 
try to go out of the situation of suspension she liv s in. She can exist only in the 
fragmentation of her “Is”. To support this view is Brooke-Rose’s comment on the 
interpreter’s fragmentation of identities: “she never brings them together and I don’t 
think she should […] I don’t think that one has to unify all these ‘Is’” (Del Sapio 
Garbero 1991 108-9). 
Etymologically, the word between, be-twēn, means “in the middle of two”, but 
as a combination of be and two, seems to connote the peculiar “doubling” of the 
character. Moreover, the term seems to reintegrate the verb to be into the novel, so as 
to say that, if the interpreter has no identity within the reality around her (she is never 
the subject of the verb to be), yet she finds her own identity in her betweenness. She 
can be only in between her very split. The novel’s central consciousness’s existential 
condition can be perfectly described by Barthes’ words: “the subject [of the text of 
bliss] is never anything but a ‘living contradiction’: a split subject, who 
simultaneously enjoys, through the text, the consistency of his selfhood and its 
collapse, its fall” (Barthes 1975 20-21). 
Brooke-Rose’s text addresses and subverts the ideologica  truths of our culture, 
showing how apparently opposite viewpoints amount to the same thing: ideology is 
an illusion. The use of specialist jargons in Between is significant in this connection, 
as they are used in relation to ideologies (each congress makes use of a specialized 
language, the Church speaks Latin). Specialized langu ge is thus seen as supporting 
the specific ideology it is used for. This concept links once more to Barthes, who 
describes ideologies as fictions supported by their specialized jargons: “Ideological 
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systems are fictions […] Every fiction is supported by a social jargon, a sociolect, 
with which it identifies” (Barthes 1975 27). For him, the subject must inhabit one of 
these jargons in order to keep “these spoken systems fro  disturbing or embarrassing 
[him/her]” (Barthes 1975 29). The text of bliss however tries to find another solution 
to the question of ideologies and their idioms: instead of inhabiting one of them, it 
overcomes the system, by putting itself outside of language as system, attacking the 
canonical structures of language and exploding the logic of the system,  
by a gradual labor of extenuation. First, the text liquidates all metalanguage, whereby it is text: no 
voice (Science, Cause, Institution) is behind what it is saying. Next, the text destroys utterly, to the 
point of contradiction, its own discursive category […] Lastly, the text can, if it wants, attack the 
canonical structures of language itself […]: lexicon (exuberant neologisms, portmanteau words, 
transliterations), syntax (no more logical cell, no m re sentence) […] a new philosophic state of the 
language-substance; this extraordinary state […] outside origin and outside communication, then 
becomes language, and not a language, whether disconnected, mimed, mocked. (Barthes 1975 30-31)  
 
This is exactly the procedure Between follows: it attacks the fixed structures of 
language by means of its free-ranging syntax, its mx of languages, its wordplays on 
the supposed correspondence signifier/signified, thus blurring any systematised 
structure of communication, mocking the power ideology behind them, dismantling 
and overcoming their fixed notions of meaning and truth. “What is overcome, split, 
is the moral unity that society demands of every human product” (Barthes 1975 31), 
the same moral unity which everybody tries to “test” in the interpreter, who pulls 
herself away, safe from the alienation of ideology, from its dominant power-
structure. She understands in fact that “The social struggle cannot be reduced to the 
struggle between two rival ideologies: it is the subversion of all ideology which is in 
question” (Barthes 1975 32-3). The text is paradoxical n that it goes “behind the 
limit of the doxa” (Barthes 1977 157-8), 
The Text […] practises the infinite deferment of the signified, is dilatory; its field is that of the 
signifier and the signifier must not be conceived of as ‘the first stage of meaning’, its material 
vestibule, but […] as its deferred action. Similarly, the infinity of the signifier refers not to some idea 
of the ineffable […] but to that of a playing […] realized […] according to a serial movement of 
disconnections, overlappings, variations. (Barthes 1977 158) 
 
The Text is irreducibly plural because of “the plurality of its weave of 
signifiers”. It is “not a co-existence of meanings but a passage, an overcrossing […] 
an explosion, a dissemination” (Barthes 1977 159). If specialized jargon supports 
power ideology, it follows that one must learn its language to enter its system. The 
character of Between seems to free herself from ideological enslavement by learning 
a multiplicity of jargons at the same time, but inhabiting none of them. She is free to 
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enter and exit the systems of the jargons she speak at her own pleasure. She is free 
from their needed obedience. She can get in and come ut of different orders 
whenever she wants, she is in a privileged position and does not have to be 
subservient to one order, for if one has got more than one master, none of them will 
be absolute. In this way, she succeeds in freeing herself from their hold. 
One of the means of ideological subversion which Barthes postulates and 
Brooke-Rose enacts in Between is repetition. The former says that while “all official 
institutions of language are repeating machines” (Barthes 1975 40), yet, a way of 
opposing the language of the institutions is repetition, for “to repeat excessively is to 
enter into loss, into the zero of the signified” (Barthes 1975 41). If the ideological 
stereotype is “the word repeated without any magic” (Barthes 1975 42), “The distrust 
of the stereotype […] is a principle of absolute instability which respects nothing (no 
content, no choice)” (Barthes 1975 43). Furthermore, for Barthes, in order to subvert 
structure, language must start subverting its fixed “unit”, the sentence. The 
completed sentence “is hierarchical: it implies subjections, subordinations, internal 
reactions” (Barthes 1975 49). In order to explode its hierarchy, the sentence must 
remain open, infinite, incomplete,  
any completed utterance runs the risk of being ideological. In fact, it is the power of completion whic  
defines sentence mastery and marks […] the agents of the Sentence. […] The pleasure of the sentence 
is to a high degree cultural. The artifact created by rhetors, grammarians, linguists, teachers, writers, 
parents – this artifact is mimicked in a more or less ludic manner; we are playing with an exceptional 
object, whose paradox has been articulated by linguists: immutably structured and yet infinitely 
renewable: something like chess. (Barthes 1975 50-51) 
 
Like the language of Between, which has no fixed meaning, the interpreter 
refuses to accept any established notion of truth. She is unnamed, for to be named 
would imply accepting the logic of naming which subtends language and its structure 
of power. This choice on Brooke-Rose’s part bears multiple considerations, both 
related to the interpreter’s lack of identity and to her womanliness. In the first 
respect, we can recall what Barthes says about a chara ter and its proper name. He 
sees that a character is made up of semes which traverse a proper name and settle 
upon it, giving the character a body, proper signifeds, a biographical time and space, 
a meaning and a purpose (Cf. Barthes 1974 67-8). Inversely, the character who has 
no name becomes a “figure”, “has no chronological or biographical standing” 
(Barthes 1974 68), refuses to be fixed meaning, signified. When we restore a proper 
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name to a discourse, says Barthes, we act “in accordance with the economic nature of 
the Name” (Barthes 1974 94-5). The text, as theorisd by Barthes, undoes 
nomination, for the lack of the proper name challenges the “relationship between 
sign and sum” which is constituted when a name is given to the character. In 
Barthes’ view, the maintained lack of a name in a text engenders subversion, for it 
“creates a serious deflation of the realistic illuson”. In the modern novel, “What is 
obsolescent […] what can no longer be written is the Proper Name” (Barthes 1974 
95). 
As for the implications the character’s lack of name entails in terms of her 




A language made up of scraps: 
a negative travel against negation 
Having analysed the several splits of Between’s central consciousness, and the 
way she chooses to find her existential status in her betweenness, in a suspension of 
choice in every fundamental respect of existence as conceived by our culture, I will 
now consider the most significant cut in the interpr ter’s existence, i.e. the one 
deriving not only from her being a woman and existing in a “masculine-dominated” 
(B 507) society, but also from her being a woman interpreter and working with a 
masculine language, a language which is made to serve the interests of that society.  
The interpreter’s womanliness is in fact no incidental detail. The already 
mentioned block experienced by Brooke-Rose during the first draft of the work 
derived mainly from the fact that its central character was not firstly conceived as a 
woman. As the author explains, since her previous novel’s main character was a 
man, she had begun to write the novel instinctively depicting a male point of view. 
However, when the author resumed her work, she realised that turning the character 
into a woman would perfectly suit the role of the interpreter, for “simultaneous 
interpretation is a passive activity, that of transl ting the ideas of others but giving 
voice to none of one’s own, and therefore a feminine experience” (Brooke-Rose 
1991 7). This plays on the view that a masculine society has about women, “This 
idea that a translator merely transmits other people’s ideas […] is a sort of cliché 
about women. It’s the view that a masculine world has and has had for many 
centuries about women” (Del Sapio Garbero 1991 99). Language is a male 
“prerogative”: when a woman speaks, she speaks under men’s conditioning. Like an 
interpreter, a woman is seen as “just interpreting the ideas of other people and never 
has any ideas of her own” (Tredell 32). Interestingly, as Brooke-Rose elucidates, 
even ancient female oracles were “taken over, very ea ly, by male gods, that is to say 
reduced to priestesses of Zeus, Apollo, etc., speaking in their names” (Brooke-Rose 
1991 241). 
The interpreter of Between is aware of the fundamentally masculine nature of 
the society she lives and works in, a society which claims to give equal rights to 
women and men, but where in reality alone-standing women experience a very 
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difficult situation, for although they are apparently given the possibility to 
emancipate themselves, they still have to fight hard for their choices. We have 
moreover to consider that during the sixties, when the novel appeared, it was still not 
much tolerated that a woman could work as a man. Revealingly enough, the 
interpreter is said to be “existing as a woman and working as a man” (B 505). 
The interpreter’s working with language is inextricably related to the condition 
of lack of identity and split she experiences. In an essay dedicated to Julia Kristeva, 
Barthes sustains that working with language means to pu  oneself in a position of 
immediate strangeness towards it (Cf. Barthes 1988 180). The interpreter of Between 
is in fact a stranger to language because of her work, but she is even more estranged 
from language as a woman, since – as Irigaray maintains – the logos is “phallocratic” 
and the society we live in is “phallogocentric” rather than logocentric. To be a female 
interpreter thus means to be twice an interpreter: as a worker who is expected to 
decode messages from one language into another, and as a woman who, in everyday 
life, has to interpret a “masculine-dominated” world and language. 
For Irigaray, women cannot place their identity within the boundaries of a 
language that submits them to its rules and reserve for them only marginal places. In 
this connection, throughout Brooke-Rose’s novel, there recurs an obsessive reference 
to the location of the bathroom door (on the plane, i  hotel lobbies or rooms) which 
is almost always on the left, “in fondo a sinistra” (B 435), “immer geradeaus dann 
links” (B 445), “au fond à gauche” (B 467), as if to represent the marginal position of 
women in a masculine world, even within language and by means of language since, 
in a conventionally gendered linguistic practice, men’s toilet is to be found always on 
the “right right”, whereas women’s toilet is situated on the “wrong left”. In addition, 
The interpreter is unnamed and no personal pronoun refers to her, for she cannot be 
“represented” by means of a language subservient to masculine ideology. The 
interpreter’s womanliness is dissociated from the language she works with. Hence 
her working bodily posture, which exemplifies her slf-closure: her eyes closed, her 
ankles crossed, her hands joined on her lap, and “the two thumbs pressing towards 
the body the fingers touching away from it forming a roof with a squat diamond 
space between”. Such a position “closes the circuit […] so that you are self-
contained […] and no-one can get at you” (B 444). Her body thus refuses to 
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participate in a masculine pact of communication and closes in itself when forced to 
be its vehicle. Hers is a dismembered body: the airplane safety-belt almost becomes a 
chastity belt which imprisons it; the sheets of hotel beds are viewed as a quasi 
sudarium which envelops a wounded, or more likely dead body ( ead because 
deprived of its own femininity in order to find a place in language). This subtraction 
is suggested by the several mentions to the linguistic marked/unmarked dichotomy, 
where the nature of the opposition between the gramm tical genders is permeated 
with metaphorical overtones, implying that the feminine is always viewed as 
deriving from the masculine. As Brooke-Rose herself explains, “Lacan argues that 
totalization, or the construction of a whole, is alw ys based on exclusions and is 
therefore always on the masculine side in his division tout/pas tout (whole/non 
whole), the pas tout being on the feminine side” (Brooke-Rose 1991 179). By means 
of language, society is structured on the opposition masculine/feminine and the latter 
is viewed only as the former’s own “appendix”. The masculine is posed as the basis 
of any social system, be it linguistic or sexual. Moreover, when a man tells the 
interpreter, “ich lieb’dich, mich reizt deine schöne Gestalt” (B 416), the term 
“Gestalt”, which he uses to express his love to the woman, reinforces the allusion to 
Freud’s and Lacan’s theories, where the term expresses the lost unity of the subject 
which subtends its relationship with the other sex. 
We have already discussed the interpreter’s lack of identity. Throughout the 
novel, the terms absence or Abwesenheit are recurrent. The “Abwesenheit” the 
interpreter is made to experience could be read as the absence of a man but also as 
the absence from her own gender, which she has to renounce owing to her working 
with a masculine language. However, the protagonist’s perception constantly focuses 
on images and shapes which suggest her femininity. Her womanliness is never 
directly stated in the novel, but only alluded to by means of a series of images such 
as a medal “between her breasts” (B 421), the hinting shape of “the rectangles of 
agriculture” (B 439, 447, 448) she observes from the plane, or the description of a 
razor-blade package or advertising card, 
On the left of the broad yellow arrow that points down from corner to corner of the square card the 
razor-blade, printed in green, has a white narrow slit dented with short vertical bars and two small 
circles on either side of the diamond-shape in the centre. On the other side two pink lips slightly 
separated echo the white and dented slit in the gren azor-blade. Pour le démaquillage et pour le 
rasoir. (B 506)  
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We are told that the square card is divided by a “yellow arrow diagonal from 
corner to corner”, and that a razor-blade is printed on one side of it, whereas “two 
pink lips slightly separated” are on the other. Small di mond shapes, bars and circles 
also appear on the card. It is evident that the razor-blade can be used by both men 
and women, but the image on the card clearly alludes to the masculine/feminine 
dyad, while the diagonal arrow which divides the square card summons up the bar 
which separates the opposite terms of the dyad. Between’s constant allusion to 
“feminine” shapes could represent the interpreter’s struggle to surpass the status of 
sexual indeterminacy in which she is cast by means of language. Her attention to 
such shapes would be therefore a way of letting her body remember its femininity. In 
addition, allusions to the interpreter’s auto-erotic practice are abundant in the novel, 
such as when she touches her body during the night,  
With the left hand fingering the medal of St. Christopher between the breasts just when the brown 
stops and the white begins, touching a little brushstroke size over the skin soft still between the breasts 
and round under the right cupping it caressing it jus a little on the nipple that swells under the fingers 
brushstroke size. (B 536) 
 
By means of her auto-erotic practice and her attemps to remind her body of its 
femininity, the interpreter seems to gain a peculiar self-referentiality. She acquires 
for herself the masculine role and reaches a peculiar balance between the suffered 
absence from her sex and the chosen absence of the man. This interpretation is 
corroborated by sentences which allude to the balance between absence and precence 
she comes to reach. For instance, she is said to have achieved a “particular context of 
perfect proportion between presence and absence that signifies eine Abwesenheit die 
bedeutet” (B 570).  
As I have already considered in the previous chapter, th  interpreter wittingly 
exploits the situation she experiences in order to free herself from the grip of the 
society she lives in. As I will show, she enacts a imilar strategy in relation to the 
language she is submitted to. By means of her highly original linguistic solutions, in 
fact, she succeeds in finding patterns capable of expressing her own identity.  
It is extremely interesting to consider the interprte ’s linguistic solution in 
light of Irigaray’s theories on feminine identity and language. Such theories were 
beginning to acquire relevance during the sixties, yet all of Irigaray’s hinge-works 
were still to be published at the moment Between was released. My aim is not to pair 
tout court Between with Irigaray’s écriture feminine, but rather to show how Brooke-
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Rose’s text already addresses such problems as Irigaray was to later analyse, thus 
literally forerunning those theories in a very peculiar way. Moreover, addressing 
those issues in the very fictional practice of her novel, Brooke-Rose’s work can be 
considered as attaining the status of original “critical fiction” or “fictional criticism”, 
anticipating or running counter to the innovative th ories of Irigaray.  
This Sex Which Is Not One was published as made up of different texts the 
author wrote over a span of time, none of which had already been released at the time 
Brooke-Rose published Between. Irigaray’s reinterpreted Alice, in This Sex Which is 
Not One, has eyes “that recognize the right side, the wrong side, and the other side: 
the blur of deformation […]  a loss of identity […] And she’s the only one who seems 
to know who Alice is” (Irigaray 10). These words could perfectly describe the status 
of the central character in Between: she is experiencing a loss of identity as she 
comes to realise that there is neither wrong nor right side because she understands 
the mechanism by which society operates. She seems to be the only one certain about 
her “identity”, which is a loss, but a wanted, enjoyed loss, whereas all the people 
around her try to define her but cannot pin her down, as she is not.  
Like Alice, the character of Between is represented as frozen, transfixed, by the 
plane of male representations: their discourses, thir praises, their love are endlessly 
repeated throughout the novel and reinforce her sense of existing in a loss of identity. 
She is not because she escapes assuming the identity that they would like to give her 
“according to their needs or desires” (Irigaray 17): “He says marry me my sweet and 
take me as you find me” (B 425). Ideas are continuously tried to be trusted upon her, 
“ideas […] why can’t you commit yourself wholly to one of them?” (B 426). 
Irigaray tells us that “woman is never the attribute of the verb to be” (Irigaray. 
148), as feminine identity cannot be expressed without being caught in the masculine 
system of representation, and that a woman can haveno proper name, for to be 
named would mean to be reduced to the economy of masculine power. In this 
connection, Brooke-Rose’s avoidance of the verb to e throughout the novel acquires 
the significance of avoiding being “pinned down” by the masculine logic of naming 
and meaning. In the same way, the lack of a proper name in the character of Between 
seems to refer to the fact that she avoids putting herself under a male protective 
custody. Many are the instances of “commitment proposals” made to the interpreter 
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throughout the novel, such as “So why don’t you marry me after all these years?” (B 
431); “come live with me and adorn my gracious Regency London house with your 
charming French accent”(B 414); “As I really love you I want to make you my wife. 
Do you agree?” (B 431). The interpreter, however, always avoids replying and never 
accepts “the protective custody of the name of Mister X” (Irigaray 21-2). 
As Irigaray explains, in a civilization where the con ept of female sexuality is 
based on masculine parameters, where phallomorphism is privileged and where the 
one sexual organ, the “one of form, […] of the proper name, […] of the proper 
meaning” (Irigaray 26) is considered the universal signifier, the female sexual organ 
is nothing but a “non-sex”, a “lack” or “atrophy”, an absence. Between addresses 
directly this masculine logic and calls into question the linguistic convention which 
lies at its basis, 
Et comme l’a si bien dit Saussure, la langue peut s contener de l’opposition de quelque chose avec 
rien. The marked term on the one hand, say, the feminine, grande, the unmarked on the other, say, the 
masculine, grand. Mais notez bien que le non-marqué peut deriver du marqué par retranchement, by 
subtraction, par une absence qui signifie. Je répète, une absence qui signifie eine Abwesenheit die 
simultaneously etwas bedeutet. (B 426) 
 
The initial literal repetition of Saussure’s linguistic dyad, however, is here 
rehandled and reversed: the unmarked (masculine) ca also be said to derive from the 
marked (feminine) by subtraction, thus ironically subverting the masculine 
dichotomy tout/pas tout. Similarly, the “Abwesenheit die etwas bedeutet, etwas 
anderes als bestellt” (B 442), could be interpreted as the absence of love or sexual 
intercourse, which depends on men offering the woman something different from 
what she wishes, something which does not correspond to her pleasure, to what she 
“has ordered”. Love, as men conceive it, is not what she wishes for, because the 
masculine conception of love does not match hers, or rather does not even take 
account of hers, being only based on their own egoistic needs. The difference 
between woman’s and man’s pleasure is evident in the following sexual scene,  
Man works with hands light brush-stroke size over th  rectangles of agriculture bearing plants or parts 
of plants forest blobs metallic lakes thin with lines man feels as an abstract study in seduction man 
performs with the precision of the mouthpiece eyes voice hands over limbs that find each other 
delicious on a creaking bed somewhere along the Romantische Strasse in a Mish-Mash of swift 
fornication between a hallowed structure and the rigid virginal edifice crashing down the runway with 
a scream of jets and strong tension of brakes […] guided by some other distant brain in a glass booth 
and small white frogs with yellow discs for eyes and a splash of blood until it comes to a standstill du, 
do you love me, du? (B 447-8) 
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The male activity is here described as an egoistic pra tice. The reiteration of 
the term “man” – “man works”, “man feels”, “man performs”, “until it comes to a 
standstill” – seems to put the accent on the fact the sexual intercourse is conducted 
by the man and only inertly experienced by the woman, reduced to a mere passive 
receptacle for his desire. To this ironically adds the man’s final question, “do you 
love me?”, to which the interpreter does not reply.  
As Irigaray explains in her essay “Women on the Market”, in Western culture 
women are treated as commodities. The economic, social and cultural order is 
founded on woman’s exploitation and circulation as an exchange value amongst 
men. She does not partake in such an economy but as an alienated object of 
consumption: her body is divided “into two irreconcilable ‘bodies’: her ‘natural’ 
body and her socially valued, exchangeable body” (Irigaray 180). In Between, the 
interpreter’s body/mind split and the fact that she is reduced to a passive, 
“neutralised transmitter” (B 414) for men’s discourses, seems precisely to illustrate 
Irigaray’s point. Moreover, countless are in Between the occasions of the 
presentation of woman and her body as objects or commodities which can serve 
men’s needs and desires, as demonstrated by a man referring to the interpreter in 
these terms, 
Bright girl, she translates beautifully don’t you think? Says the boss. Meaning in his greying English 
way come live with me and adorn my gracious Regency London house with your charming French 
accent not to mention cuisine your German super-Aryan litheness. (B 414) 
 
Numerous are also the hints at the fact that a woman needs a man’s 
“protection” to exist in this world. “I have taken her under my wing” (B 429), says a 
man about another young female translator. Similarly, a marriage proposal made to 
the interpreter reveals the logic of appropriation which subtends men’s discourse. 
This logic is exposed for the proposal is humorously presented as the subtext of a 
phrase book (i.e. a ready-made, static discourse), 
the phrase book says listen to this under Marriage Proposal: As I really love you I want to make you 
my wife. Do you agree? Have you an opinion for the marriage? Did you want to test by means of 
engagement? Do you want to create our own home? Do you like children? Saith the book, the phrase-
book saith. (B 431) 
 
In order for the female body to retain its exchange value – elucidates Irigaray –
there must be “at least two men to make an exchange” (Irigaray 181). The notion of 
two men “contending” the same woman is presented in Between as Siegfried recalls 
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earlier times, when another man married the woman (the central character) he loved: 
“I witnessed […] the snatching away of meine Liebe under my very nose thinking all 
right then he will hurt her and I’ll bide my time” (B 473). 
Irigaray explains how women are only allocated marginal and limited positions 
in society. Women can be mothers, virgins or prostitutes, there are no other social 
roles for women outside of these highly stereotyped tropes. Under such a 
perspective, the proper name represents the monopoly f power of the man – either 
the father or another man – who owns the woman. The character of Between bears no 
definite value as she is neither a mother, nor a wife any longer. Her father 
disappeared when she was a child and never speaks in the novel, and even though we 
are told that she brings her father’s surname, this is never uttered and non-utterance 
clearly equals to non-existence in a world where significance and reality are 
instituted by and through language. She is neither a virgin nor a prostitute: the 
virginal images and references refer to her “denied” sexuality rather than to her 
factual virginity. She evades, escapes, anyone who wants to “own” her, thus refusing 
and avoiding being a use value among men.  
Woman’s desire involves, for Irigaray, a different economy, one which is not 
single or linear, her pleasure takes place in the touch within herself, as she touches 
herself continuously. Woman “is neither one nor two […] She resists all adequate 
definition” (Irigaray 26), and that is why her words are often deemed as illogical, 
contradictory from the perspective of stable reason, “inaudible for whoever listens 
with ready-made grids, with a fully elaborated code in hand” (Irigaray 29). In order 
to understand women’s language, for Irigaray, one should listen outside of the 
dominant logic. In fact, in Between woman’s desire may seem to be absent at a first 
reading, yet it can be discovered at a more attentiv  reading in the multiple and 
allusive sexual shapes of oval windows or small rectangular windows “with rounded 
corners” (B 402), of “rectangles of agriculture brush-stroke size” (B 398), or in the 
diamond shapes that recur all through the narrative, as for instance when we read that 
the headboard of one of the hotel beds she sleeps in is “patterned in horizontal flat 
diamond shapes” (410), or else when we read: “beyond the small rectangular window 
and still on behind the eyelids closed, open, closed, open” (B 406), where the 
opening and closing could be read as an allusion to the opening and closing of the 
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female sexual organ, which touches itself continually. These images seem to allude 
to the interpreter’s auto-erotic practice, by means of which she can recuperate her 
own, otherwise denied, pleasure.  
If the economy of female pleasure is different from the masculine linear one, 
then the economy of the text also differs from thatof a conventional work, conceived 
as a linear development of meaning in time and space. As already seen in the 
previous chapter, in fact, Between disrupts any pattern of “well-constructed” 
discourse as intended in the traditional way. It is not a text to be read with a “fully 
elaborated code in hand”, but it rather challenges any logical “ready-made grid” and 
stable code. The text is open to multiple interpretations. Like Irigaray’s concept of 
pleasure, Between involves a different economy which I would call a different 
economy of reading pleasure.  
Inquiring whether this diversity of female desire and language should be read 
as “shards, scattered remnants of a violated sexuality? A sexuality denied?” (Irigaray 
30), Irigaray wonders whether woman will “not be left with the impossible 
alternative between a defensive virginity, fiercely turned upon itself, and a body open 
to penetration that no longer knows, in this ‘hole’ that constitutes its sex, the pleasure 
of its own touch” (Irigaray 24). In Between, the references to a violated and/or denied 
sexuality are countless, such as those to the empty beds which lie “empty and tightly 
made” (B 420), or the sickening image of men as “stones [who] talk and walk and 
make semblance of love have fun until they come to a standstill” (B 426), or else the 
reference to the male “hallowed structure like a minaret piercing the Milky Way and 
hats geschmeckt?” (B 452), the description of the man who “works with hands eyes 
mouth hallowed structure into the rigid steel glass ve sel of conception” (B 450), or 
the hint at being “aghast at the death of more thane five senses to the shaking dry 
male sobs until they come to a sickening standstill” (B 554), up to the point the 
interpreter’s body is seen like a virginal one, described variously as a “rigid virginal 
edifice” (B 448), or as a “frail skeletal nun in a glass case. Heilige Munditia. Patronin 
der alleinstehenden Frauen” (B 490), or else as the “Corpus Sanctae Munditiae 
Martyris” (B 567). When she occupies a double bedroom by herself, the absence of 
the “masculine unmarked” is hinted at by means of the “eiderdown untumbled puffed 
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out virgin-bellied […] from which only angels and ministers of grace take off” (B 
461). 
In her essay “Psychoanalytic Theory: Another Look”, Irigaray opposes Freud’s 
conception of the penis envy, which brings the woman to desire a child as a 
compensation, a “gap-filling” value (Cf. Irigaray 34-67). In line with Irigaray’s 
critique, the character in Between demonstrates having pulled herself out of the 
masculine economy. Instead of trying to fill in her existential gap with a child, she 
lives in that very gap – she lives in between – and refuses to fill it as society 
recommends. In this light, the several references to plants and parts of plants in the 
question asked at the Customs and Excise, “have you anything to declare any plants 
or parts of plants growing inside you” (B 413), can be read as enquiries about any 
children the character might have. The same question is repeated in different 
languages, “Bitte Pflanzen oder Pflanzenteiler zu deklarieren” (B 565), so as to 
demonstrate that even if the language changes, the question remains the same, that 
every language is subservient to the same system. So eone suggests her that hysteria 
could be stopped “at once with the vessel of conception […] as a recommended 
alternative for relaxation” (B 417), but she translates this as “come live with me and 
grace my London house with your elegant cosmopolitan w ys” (B 417).  
If, for Lacan, sexual identity is constituted by and through language, for 
Irigaray this language is man’s discourse and women ar  excluded from it. Their 
“exclusion is internal to an order” (Irigaray 88), an order where the question whether 
a female language is possible “is not even raised” (Irigaray 90), since if it was raised, 
it would disrupt the logic of masculine discourse. The “plants or parts of plants” the 
interpreter is enquired about could also be seen as the discourses of power which 
could be breeding inside her body, “stifling your st ength with their octopus legs 
undetachable for the vacuum they form […] in a death kiss” (B 537). The plants are 
the ideas society needs women to bear in order to enforce its power on them. Such 
ideas, produced by means of language, are stranger to women, do not belong to them, 
and therefore generate a “vacuum” in them as they ar  dispossessed of their selves.  
Irigaray poses herself against the Lacanian conception of sexuality as linked to 
language. According to Lacan, she explains, it is to be assumed that women have no 
unconscious, as their unconscious is constituted through the masculine language, is 
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something that men have given them. Therefore, “psychoanalysing a woman, 
amounts […] for a man, to reappropriating for himself the unconscious he has lent 
her” (Irigaray 94). This mastering procedure can be witnessed through men’s 
discourses throughout Brooke-Rose’s novel, such as for instance in the fragments of 
the audiences the interpreter attends at the “Vicariatus Urbis” in Rome in order to 
obtain the annulment of her marriage,  
- So you decided in advance madame, to divorce if it didn’t work, thus annulling the contract in the 
eyes of God? 
- Plus ou moins. 
- My child you must use words more precisely. Did you or did you not? 
- Oui mon père. (B 458) 
 
The church representative tries to find out whether she had decided in advance 
to divorce in case her marriage did not work. He calls her “My child” and urges her 
(“you must”) to use language “more precisely” (!). The possesive adjective and the 
modal verb clearly represent an attempt to patronize her person (and her language) 
through language. The character’s answer is apparently subservient – “Oui mon 
père” – and could be viewed as an ironical/critical hint at the submission of women 
to men, primarily through language. Yet, it is a perfect example of the mimicking 
process we will consider below. The process of psychoanalysing/mastering a woman 
is also evident in Between as a German officer scrupulously interrogates the 
interpreter in order to “make sure of [her] undivided loyalty” to the Reich (B 489). 
Men are continually seen as they try to “discover” truths and reasons in the 
interpreter, as they try to understand her by way of their own logic. However, her 
logic lies outside of their economy, it is not a “logic” as they conceive it. 
As Irigaray explains, getting a woman to speak is to reduce her to man and 
make her exist as a womb, “the unconscious womb of man’s language” (Irigaray 94). 
At this juncture, all the womb-related images in Between acquire salient implications. 
The interpreter is seen as a passive receptacle which receives and incorporates the 
discourse/meaning men instil into her, a “cavern womb belly vessel ship temple 
sepulchre or holy grail with the same confusional sliding from active to passive from 
swallower to swallowed from container to contained” (B 542), or else “a sack, a 
basket, a container cavern womb belly vase vehicle ship” (B 510). This passive 
womanoid-receptacle would thus receive all meaning from outside and reproduce it, 
without knowing anything about itself, being a function of men without existing in 
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itself. This idea is reinforced by the description f the translator’s cabin and 
equipment: the glass booth is again a metaphor for the womb, but it is a glass, cold 
one. The translator merely receives the ideas from the outside and incorporates them 
“obediently” into her. We see how what man does is making the woman speak as he 
wants. A man’s relation to a woman is a relation to himself, the “narcissistic pleasure 
that the master, believing himself to be unique, confuses with that of the One” 
(Irigaray 103), a relation where the language of love is the discourse of man speaking 
love to himself. The love letters and postcards she receives at various times and 
which she describes as “a circular dance so much smaller than the small love behind” 
(B 544), are an attempt on man’s part to reappropriate woman to his own discourse. 
On a postcard from Venice, for instance, the sender defines himself “un vieil ami qui 
vous admire toujours, qui n’oublie pas la gentildonna ‘che fa tremar dì claritate l’âre’ 
[…] signed BC” (B 475). Here the object of the letter is not the addressee (the 
woman) but the addresser (the man), as he practically talks of himself and to himself, 
to the point of taking for granted his name and signin  with his initials. This 
signature gives way to the following ironic comment o  the character’s part: “BC.? 
Or could it represent H.C.? H.O. or even E.C.? F.S? S.O.?” (B 475-6). That scrabble 
on the postcard could signify anything, any name, and indeed it is not even a 
question of deciphering the name, for it is always the same “man’s discourse”, re-
enacted in the same old way. The initials “BC” could be standing for “Before 
Christ”, so as to ironically suggest mam’s discourse’s old features. This 
interpretation seems to be reinforced by the quotation from Cavalcanti,5 emblem of 
the long-established tradition of masculine love discourse. As for the relationship 
between language and love, we read: “love lost or never gained lying forgotten under 
layers of civilization thickening sensibilities such as for instance a language that 
actually means something in the light of that love or vice versa” (B 501). As 
language is subservient to the dominant ideology, it can only express love as men 
perceive it. Expressing a feminine love is impossible n the light of that language and 
vice versa: neither a feminine love nor a feminine language can find place in this 
civilization.  
                                                
5 “Chi è questa che vèn, ch’ogn’om la mira/che fa tremar di chiaritate l’âre” (Cavalcanti 8). 
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For Irigaray, articulating the question of woman is not a question of replacing 
the order of things with another one which would in the end represent another power 
discourse not dissimilar from the former one. What is needed “is to disconcert […] 
representation according to exclusively ‘masculine’ parameters […] not a matter of 
toppling that order so as to replace it […] but of disrupting and modifying it, starting 
from an ‘outside’ that is exempt, in part, from phallocratic law” (Irigaray 68). In 
Between, the several statements about the fact that “nothig, rien, niente deserves a 
flow of rash desire love loyalty ambition” (B 499), along with the question “what 
difference does it make?”, which is constantly repeated throughout the novel, could 
be interpreted in this connection. The character of Between, used to the “presentation 
of opposite viewpoints on every aspect of an instant world” (B 498), understands that 
every discourse amounts to the same speech of power, and aims not at replacing that 
discourse (any discourse of/on truth implies/reproduces the same mechanism of 
power) with a new one, but rather at exposing its logic, while taking herself out of its 
mechanism. As Irigaray theorised, it is the discourse of mastery that women need to 
challenge, disrupt and subvert, revealing, 
the conditions under which it is produced […] the architectonics of its theatre […] its geometric 
organization […] its actors […] their dialogues […] the mirror, most often hidden, that allows the 
logos, the subject, to reduplicate itself, to reflect itself by itself. (Irigaray 74-5) 
 
The dynamics of power must remain hidden and uninterpreted to hold their 
control. In order to be revealed and to shake their functioning, “they have to be re-
enacted [showing] how the system is put together, how the specular economy works” 
(Irigaray 75). Between seems to perfectly follow the steps of Irigaray’s subverting 
strategy, laying bare the mechanism of  the production of power, revealing: 
“ the conditions under which it is produced” 
Which is first of all a mechanism of control of ideas and “loyalties”, as 
exemplified by the question the character is constantly asked at the Customs and 
Excise. At the airport, “concrete men [in a] concrete building […] search every 
suitcase not for liquor jewels drugs but ideas, in dangerous print” (B 439). The 
mechanism of control of ideas is one which repeatedly tries to make her commit to 
fixed beliefs. It is a discourse that wants her to decide between one idea or the other, 
for in between lies disorder, chaos, which society is afraid of, cannot tolerate, as it 
threatens its order, its basis: “come off it, come down into one world und so weiter 
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weiter gehen, immer geradehaus dann links” (B 445). The interpreter is “bombarded” 
by different discourses which tell her what to do, which pretend to tell her something 
about herself. Even the horoscope is part of all the discourses that try to impose fixed 
meaning on her, in a predictive, oracular future tense, “La lune vous rende 
particulièrement sensible. Vous vous sentirez obstiné , prêts à mal interpreter les 
intentions des autres” (B 425). The same “Bitte Pflanzen oder Pflanzenteiler zu 
deklarieren” (B 565) which we have already considere  above, could be viewed as a 
request to produce social or ideological “roots”. 
“the architectonics of its theatre” 
The illusory organization of society is laid bare and the social structure based 
on the use of language is presented in pretentious terms as the attendants to the 
conferences are introduced as at the theatre: “Ladies and gentlemen” (B 424), or 
“Now ladies and gentlemen” (B 510), or again “the Lord Mayor speaks […] bidding 
everyone welcome […] to this ancient city” (B 402), where the “ancient city” might 
be viewed as referring to the old structure of power.  
“its geometric organization” 
Numerous are the geometric images throughout the nov l: ubiquitous are for 
instance the “tall rectangular tombstones” (B 426, 429) and we are even told that 
“stones do talk […] into microphones” (B 416), so as to make clear that stones are 
men, defined by their phallic form (Stonehenge), but else defined as “tombstones”: 
they are old and static. Occasionally we find the description of some young woman 
“who shapes her words with gestures that weave circles round him” (B 403), a 
woman conforming to masculine discourse, flattering a man with her words, 
conforming to his wishes as she is, “weaving circles” with her words, reproducing 
the female geometric “counterpart” of the rectangular shape. A circular form is a 
hollow container, in other words what men want women to be. The interpreter seems 
to warn the young woman by saying “do not waive circles round him […] that wrap 
up la Vérité” (B 407).  
“its actors”  
Whereas female names are almost completely absent from Between, the novel 
is overflowing with male names, exasperatingly frequ nt and ironically inflated into 
approximated terms: “Signor Ingegnere Giovanni-Battista di Qualcosa or Comrade 
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Pan Bogumil Somethingski” (B 418), “Father Brendan O’Carawayseed or such some 
name” (B 397), “the Lord Mayor” (B 402), “professor William Something” (B 467), 
“Flight Lieutenant This and Captain That” (B 492), “Prince Boris de Czarevitch or 
Somesuchovitch Directorovitch” (B 438). Men’s ranks and social standings are cast 
into an highly ironical light by the novel’s central consciousness, who exaggerates 
their names so as to present them as fake “puppets” or actors of a theatre with 
pompous, empty names.  
“their dialogues”  
The mechanism of Truth, of “the true state of things” (B 407), is constructed by 
men at congresses and conferences, within a world organized by round tables and 
ruled according to their discourses. Everybody talks nd talks endlessly but does not 
listen to what other participants say, each speaker waiting “impatiently for his turn to 
read an interminable paper that has nothing to do with anything said before, you 
know, each one more concerned with output than intake” (B 422). That is why she 
says that “words prevent any true EXCHANGE” (B 399). It is their words that 
prevent any true exchange, “with all ingredients hitorical philosophical and social 
determining the involution of this our civilization” (B 441). “All ideas have equality 
before God he will say […] his words flowing into the ear through earphones in 
France and down at once out of the mouth in to the attached mouthpiece in 
simultaneous German” (B 398). Their dialogues are repo ted as they engage 
themselves in the making of truth, in the making of the world: “Mesdames messieurs 
vous allez écouter aujourd’hui pluiseurs discours by eminent specialists on methods 
of increasing the output of edible protein” (B 474), or “As for the under-developed 
areas, we shall organize discussions to find out how best we could help those 
countries” (B 428). We understand how it is always nd only through “discussions”, 
i.e. dominant ideology, language serving the master discourse, that the world gets 
organized according to men’s needs and desires. The nov l is disseminated with 
“plusieurs discourse by eminent specialists” which claim to define universal truths. 
As Irigaray puts it, the “phallic economy […] goes hand in hand with the economy of 
truth” (Irigaray 100). Brooke-Rose alludes variously to such an economy as “The 
true history” (B 469), or as “the vital lie” (B 555), sustained by language as its 
“divine principle” (B 555). We read about the “fragile truths and lost mysteries that 
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surround us in this our masculine-dominated civilization” (B 510), “under layers and 
layers of vital lies” (B 507). 
“the mirror that allows the subject to reflect itself by itself” 
The flat mirror, as elucidated by Irigaray, is the one that the masculine subject 
uses in language for his self-reflection. In it, woman appears only “as the inverted 
other of the masculine subject […] or again as lack” (Irigaray 129). In order for 
feminine desire to emerge, for Irigaray, this flat mirror and its functioning must be 
revealed and turned upside down, becoming a “concave mirror” which disturbs the 
staging of representation according to masculine parameters. In Between, the mirror 
and its specular deceiving mechanism are openly referred to when we read that the 
“man talks to the mirrored reflection of the lady and the lady talks to the mirrored 
reflection of the man. Seen from the profile they do not proffer anger dissatisfaction 
and polite attempt to please at each other at all but only at the mirror” (B 466), or 
else when the text presents us with a mirror revealing “the reflection staring up at the 
reflection of the invisible man behind the reflection and back at the reflection” (B 
507). This “specularization” does not correspond to woman’s desire, which can be 
rediscovered only if she does not reduce herself to one, as society imposes her to do, 
which is exactly what the character in Between is doing, avoiding to “come down 
into one world”, evading any set idea, definition or belief and enjoying her own 
multiplicity.  
The initial step for thwarting the discursive mechanism of power is, for 
Irigaray, mimicry, which implies reproducing the part that history has always 
assigned to woman: by assuming that role intentionally, women start converting their 
subordination into an affirmation. Woman should “resubmit herself […] to ‘ideas,’ in 
particular to ideas about herself, that are elaborated in/by a masculine logic, but so as 
to make ‘visible,’ by an effect of playful repetition, what was supposed to remain 
invisible” (Irigaray 76). As Irigaray explains, “the mimetic role […] presupposes that 
one […] can copy anything at all, anyone at all, can receive all impressions, without 
appropriating them to oneself” (Irigaray 151)6. This is precisely what the interpreter 
of Between does: she copies and translates all the discourses she receives, without 
                                                
6 In chapter five we will see how the concept of transl tion is readdressed in highly original terms, in 
that repetition is always a reappropriation of discourse for the purposes of exploding signification into 
multiplicity. 
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ever appropriating them for herself. The discourse that subtends most of Brooke-
Rose’s novel is made up of scraps of discourses replicating “masculine parameters”, 
where proper meaning and universal truths are affirmed and dispensed. A recurring 
instance is that of the “divine principle descending to matter” (B 424), where the 
divine principle is the word, language, used to state truths at the numberless 
conferences she is working in. The discourse of mastery which claims to institute 
Meaning and Order is automatically repeated and therefore exposed by the 
interpreter of Between. Mechanical repetition does not entail acceptance, on the 
contrary, through it, woman frees herself from the hold of the father’s law that wants 
her to accept his word. Experiencing a typical feminine status, she finds the way to 
release herself from it. Far from entering into “active” fight against male ideology – 
as that would mean playing their game – she apparently and “obediently” mimics the 
feminine role historically assigned to women. She becomes a “word reproducing 
machine”: although “rhetoric flows into the ear” (B399), her “self” remains outside 
of that mechanism precisely because she is mimicking it. When asked about her 
commitment to any idea, for example, she replies, “Ideas? We merely translate other 
people’s ideas […] No one requires us to have any of our own” (B 413). In this 
connection, even the “glass booth” she is in when tra slating and her closed bodily 
posture can be seen as her shelter from the attack of that discourse. Similarly, when 
she attends the meeting for the petition of her wedding annulment, she apparently 
takes in the discourse of mastery submissively, but in fact she is mimicking it. Her 
hands are laid on the table-cloth in the same position as when she translates, and 
under the table she crosses her ankles so as to close the circuit (Cf. B 343). The 
discourse she is mimicking cannot get at her. She defiantly remains outside of it. 
Irigaray defines feminine writing as a practice where very dichotomy breaks, 
where no truth is ever posited (Cf. Irigaray 79-80). If the syntax of masculine 
language is a means of masculine self-representatio, a “feminine syntax” would do 
away with subject or object, would not privilege th one of form, proper meaning or 
proper name, it “would preclude any distinction of identities, any establishment of 
ownership, thus any form of appropriation” (Irigaray 134). Feminine writing would 
never be fixed but always fluid, its main characteris ic being simultaneity, so as to 
resist and explode any established idea and concept: a “different mode of the 
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‘syntactic,’ in language and in the body” (Irigaray 147) which would involve an 
other economy of meaning. Its syntax would be “deciphered in the gestural codes of 
women’s bodies. But, since their gestures are often paralyzed, or part of the 
masquerade, […] they are often difficult to ‘read’. Except for what resists or subsists 
‘beyond’. In suffering, but also in women’s laughter” (Irigaray 134). 
Irigaray’s focus on both suffering and laughter is crucial to our reading of 
Brooke-Rose’s novel. We have already seen how Between’s narrative rejects the 
“artificial constraints of time and space” (Irigaray 217), how its language disrupts 
any notion of syntactical consequentiality, how its syntax blurs the distinction 
between subject and object, not privileging the one, but rather exposing the logic of 
the proper meaning and parodying that of the proper name. Its central character 
refuses to be “owned” by any truth or person claiming to represent the truth and does 
not appropriate any stable meaning for herself. Her body is often seen as paralyzed 
(suffering), it is used only as a mechanic tool to convey the discourse of power, but 
the act of repeating implies mimicry, thus becoming the masquerade of femininity 
through which she resists beyond that discourse. However, the interpreter also and 
crucially resists beyond that discourse by means of humour. She resists in the play of 
language, in laughter. By means of linguistic humour, she attains her freedom, her 
“non-existence” within that system, or else her beloved existence beyond it. Humour 
becomes one of the fundamental ways to escape the schemes of power-ideology.  
Irigaray explains that when the basis of the construction of discourse comes to 
daylight, the discourse - a flat and rigid surface - gets “unrounded” and “relativized” 
by the light. In Between, we find several images of rigid surfaces whose corners are 
“rounded” by the light. We read for instance that “the dawn has quite unrounded the 
corners of the cupboard made of teak” (B 397). The wooden corners get unrounded 
by the dawn – exposure to light relativizes the rigid male structures/surfaces. 
Moreover, throughout the novel, the many references to the “dusty demolition” of 
crumbling façades – those big and seemingly stable f çades of society which conceal 
a much smaller reality (Cf. B 453) – reinforce the id a of the subversion of power 
ideologies and structures. 
Feminine writing, for Irigaray, would reject closure, involving repetition and 
consequently a different temporality, thus retraversing differently the dyads of our 
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culture (Cf. Irigaray 154). The narrative of Between subverts the binary dichotomies 
on which our society is based: “Wejście/Wyjście. What difference does it make? 
In/out, up/down, container and contained. To go in you have to go out, up, down and 
vice versa” (B 432). Addressing the Western culture system of dyads, the text hints 
at the fact that the supremacy granted to one term over its opposite in a relation of 
positive/negative just depends on the point of view adopted, and that both terms are 
in fact complementary: each one depends on the other, none of them is superior to 
the other.  
Irigaray explains that one of the historically and “scientifically supported” 
dyads of our culture is the one of solids/fluids. In respect to sexual difference, this 
dyad reflects the same dynamic of specularization explained above: fluids are in a 
relation of lack to the solids. Science and history have always privileged solids over 
fluids. Language maintains a “complicity of long standing between rationality and a 
mechanics of solids alone” (Irigaray 107). The resistance that fluids brings on solids, 
continues Irigaray, is not addressed by science as fluids present certain properties 
which resist being incorporated in the master logic of solids and which, if given 
proper recognition, would jam its theoretical machine. Pure mathematics has 
analyzed fluids only in terms of “spring-points […] whirlwind points, which have 
only approximate relation to reality. Leaving some remainder. Up to infinity: the 
center of this ‘movements’ corresponding to zero supposes in them an infinite speed, 
which is physically unacceptable” (Irigaray 109). In Between, fluid surfaces like seas 
or lakes are perceived as solid or semi-solid from the airplane window, as we read 
for instance of “the clay Atlantic you could cut with a knife” (B 411), or about the 
forest that “blobs metallic lakes” (B 398), or else that “the sea looks solid earth or 
clay you could cut through with a blunt knife pick up in handful moulds perhaps into 
a moon marine mother of death birth menstruation or fea  of something else not 
ordered” (B 401). The fact that in all these images the fluids are seemingly solid 
seems to suggest that logic and rationality try to reduce liquids to the economy of 
solids, to explain them as solids. What is more, th infinite speed Irigaray comments 
on is presented in Between through the image of the plane, which “flies immobile at 
eight hundred and thirty kilometres an hour” (B 395) and which determines the 
interpreter’s “lost senses of locality” (B 397). It is a soaring yet immobile speed as 
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perception does not notice it. Irigaray also talks about the necessity to “escape from a 
dominant scopic economy […] in an economy of flow” (Irigaray 148), and I read the 
images of the plane and the blurred visual perceptions from its height as an 
avoidance of the “scopic” as opposed to the flow of things.  
Woman, for Irigaray, does not speak as a subject which is always identical to 
itself. She speaks “fluid”, as two, and her discourse resists static interpretation. In her 
language,  
sound is propagated in her at an astonishing rate […] Which results in one of two things: either the 
impact of signification never comes […] or else it comes […] only in an inverted form […] the small 
variations in the rapidity of sound then run the risk of deforming and blurring language at every 
instant […] Woman never speaks the same way. (Irigaray 112) 
 
In Between the mixture of discourses and the high-speed rate at which their 
sound proliferates result in signification coming in an inverted form: meaning is 
diffused, fast-paced and forever changing, so that the messages transmitted result in 
the emptiness of a lost sense of locality. Expressed in the vortex of void, such 
messages become null. Language is blurred, blunt, fluid, not fixed, and this is also 
due to the different speeds of discourses. Some paragraphs or pages read very fast 
and the reader’s head almost spins together with the narrative and its lost sense of 
locality, whereas some others make the reader pause nd even stop, slowing down 
the narrative rhythm, introducing a different cadence and therefore discontinuing it. 
Such are for instance the narrative passages beginnin  with “Sometimes however”. 
Punctuation is basic in the making of the novel tempo: most of narration takes place 
without any comma or other punctuation mark intruding to “regulate” it, so that the 
reader is caught up in the flow of discourses and pauses (but not necessarily) only 
when (and if) a full stop suspends them. In most caes, even when we are presented 
with parts of discourses that “slow down” the rhythm, punctuation does not 
intervene, so that although we read “however”, we do not pause after it. In other 
cases the reading pace is overtly played upon, as for instance when – after a really 
“fast” paragraph – we read,  
I. I luoghi. Slowly now. The places: La Francia, la Germania, e soprattutto la Britannia, la dolce 
Inghilterra dai prati prati? (B 435) 
 
Here we can clearly see how the pace is being slowed down by the numeration 
at the beginning of the paragraphs (which of course will be lost by the next 
paragraph), by punctuation (full stops, semi-colon, commas and question marks, so 
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that in one sentence we find more punctuation marks than in whole pages), and by 
the languages which render the sense of loss (in places, times and languages) of 
travel. 
Although Between, as shown above, perfectly enacts the feminine writing 
Irigaray theorised and can be therefore read as a feminist text, Brooke-Rose’s attitude 
towards the gender issue transcends feminism and Between does not embody 
Irigaray’s recourse to a uniquely feminine language. 
It is clear that the author provides a strong critique of the masculine society and 
language which surround the interpreter, yet she is not advocating an exclusively 
feminine mode of writing. Feminist theorists such as Cixous, Wittig or Irigaray, 
insisted on the biological aspects of women as the basis of their identity. They 
emphasised women’s fundamental difference from men and regarded écriture 
feminine as exclusively pertaining to biologically female beings. They believed 
woman’s body to be the site of feminine writing. Brooke-Rose believes that “it is the 
feminine element in humankind that creates art” (Brooke-Rose 1986 195), yet, 
contrarily to the feminist extremist attitude, she does believe that this creative 
element can be present in women as well as in men,  
The radical feminists are very much against the androgynous-great-mind stance which was Virginia 
Woolf’s. I am rather for it. Clearly any great mind or indeed any human being has a great deal of 
feminine and masculine in him, and all male writers have always had a lot of feminine in them. (Del 
Sapio Garbero 1991 101) 
 
In line with feminist theory, Brooke-Rose opposes Lacan’s masculine notion of 
feminine identity, based on the binarism tout/pas tout, presence/absence, where 
woman always stands on the lacking, weak side of the dyad. However, she also 
opposes the feminist stand which considers womanliness as an essential aspect of 
women’s biological status, a status rooted in the pre-Oedipal phase, before the 
repression caused by the entrance of the subject into he order of society. Between, in 
fact, deconstructs the notion of identity – both masculine and feminine – by 
demonstrating how identity is a linguistic construc. Identity is constructed by and 
through language: feminine identity does not exist as such, but only as the result of 
the masculine manipulation of language. The idea that identity is entirely a product 
of language is primarily exemplified by the fact that it is through language that the 
masculine society the interpreter inhabits tries to exercise and perpetuate its power 
on women. In this way, Between shows that, as de Beauvoir said, “One is not born, 
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but rather becomes, a woman” (de Beauvoir 8). As already seen, in fact, the novel 
shows that the dichotomy marked/unmarked can be easily reversed by means of 
language: the masculine grand can be also said to derive from the feminine grande 
by subtraction. Identity, as we conceive it, does not exist. It is only a product of 
language, as demonstrated throughout the novel by the in erpreter’s attitude towards 
the society which tries to thrust fixed signification upon her by means of its totalising 
use of language.  
In this light, Brooke-Rose’s narrative practice amazingly anticipates Kristeva’s 
deconstruction of sexual identity which was to spread on the critical scene in 1974. 
For Kristeva, the dichotomy between masculine and feminine is metaphysical. 
Woman as such does not exist, except as a construct of our patriarchal symbolic 
order. 
If, as the novel implies, everything is constructed by and through language, it 
follows that the subject can free itself from the grip of the masculine (sclerotic, 
static) use of language by means of language. This is perfectly demonstrated by the 
interpreter of Between: the way she employs language becomes a way to oppse the 
masculine logic which subtends society and to freely njoy her own existential status, 
her own lack of identity. Between thus describes the totalizing logic of power of our
society and shows the way a human being runs the risk of being trapped within it. 
Opposing this state of things, the interpreter, who happens to be a woman because 
women are those who suffer most from the present state of things, succeeds in 
rejecting totalization and escapes the masculine logic f the society she inhabits.  
One peculiar way in which Brooke-Rose could be defined as a “feminist” 
writer, therefore, is offered by her particular conern with the place the feminine 
creative element has in language. In Between the interpreter strives to extract a sort 
of “minor” language from the predominant patriarchal one. She succeeds in building 
up her own subversive language by means of her multilingualism. She rehandles the 
static power structure of signification by means of a pastiche of different languages, 
finding in between the dominant discourses a way of recuperating her linguistic 
creativity. Aware of the fundamentally totalizing logic of la langue, she tries to find 
a personal solution in order to free herself from it by means of it. Revealingly, 
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throughout the text we are presented with the Saussurean distinction between langue 
and parole,  
La langue […] consists of le langage moins la Parole, une institution sociale, un système de valeurs 
which escapes from all premeditation since the individual cannot create it or modify it. La parole on 
the other hand consists of an individual act of selection and actualisation. (B 561) 
 
We are also explained that there exists “a vast disproportion between la langue, 
a finite systems of rules, and the actual words or peech which vary infinitely” (B 
562). The central character in Between tries to put her own parole, her own 
individual act of selection and actualisation into practice. In contrast to the rational 
and linear masculine structure of language privileged by our patriarchal culture, the 
language of Between is blurring, ever-changing, renewing itself at each and every 
sentence. Irigaray perceives female language as constantly in the process of weaving 
itself, as a language which “isn’t formed of a single thread, a single strand or 
pattern”, but which “comes from everywhere at once” (Irigaray 209), and which 
incessantly embraces words and casts them off to avid becoming fixed, 
immobilized. Immobilized are the stones of Stonehenge whose logic the interpreter 
in Between exposes. Immobilization means death, since it implies submission to the 
fixed structure of  la langue as opposed to the ever-changing flow of la parole. 
In her essay “Polylogue”, Kristeva discusses the possibilities for women to re-
define themselves with respect to paternal language: feminine identity is not to be 
found within the bounds of traditional logos, which is a masculine prerogative; 
women have to gain their own identity in the “polylgue”, in a multiplicity of 
signifiers, in a multiple, heterogeneous language which could be able to reactivate 
the lost territories of femininity (Cf. Kristeva 1980b). In Between, Brooke-Rose 
constructs a language made up of the scraps of discourses wrenched from other 
people’s language: the protagonist’s own feminine language is to be found in the 
interstices of the patriarchal language. From the crisis of the latter, the interpreter 
tries to pull out new linguistic creativity. The pattern of language she strives to find 
is one made up of continual interruptions of her consciousness: her thoughts 
continually double back upon themselves and weave ptterns of memories together 
with currently happening events. 
The idea of the interstices of language recalls the Derridean concept of writing 
as différance, as well as Kristeva’s notion of poetic language, a language where the 
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Semiotic continuously breaches into the Symbolic and brings about subversion and 
instability. It is also easy to see how the concepts of dialogism and re-writing, which 
were to be at the centre of the feminist debate from the seventies onward, are here 
already addressed and wittingly enacted. As already explained, however, I have 
decided not to explore lengthily the implications of Between in relation to Derrida’s 
deconstruction and Kristeva’s poetic language, dialogism and intertextuality. 
Although Between already puts itself in line with such theories, I will extensively 
consider them in relation to Thru, where they are fully enacted and developed and 
where Brooke-Rose’s experimentation reaches its highest ratification.  
In Between, the interpreter’s peculiar use of language becomes a way of 
discovering the infinite range of possibilities hidden in language, a way of bringing 
into actualisation the creative (feminine) power of language, in contrast to the 
masculine operation of making the “divine principle of words descending into 
matter” (B 555). Throughout the novel, many discourses come back slightly varied 
and in different contexts, acquiring each time new nuances of meaning, so as to 
demonstrate the infinite possibilities of actualisation of la langue into la parole. The 
potentiality becomes act. The interpreter’s multilingualism acquires a fundamental 
importance to think her position towards language. H r own parole is in fact made 
up of the peculiar linguistic pastiche already considered. She finds her language 
between the volume of languages and between the interstices of the dominant 
masculine language, by means of bits and pieces left out from the discourses of other 
people. 
The central character’s adventure becomes an heroic exploration of the 
possibilities that language offers, by means of its gaps, to recreate a new language 
out of the old one. Such an exploration is made into the abysses of language, which 
the interpreter descends as a crucial experience of her subjectivity, an experience 
which seems to be strictly associated with her being a woman, with a feminine 
principle of circularity and descent, as opposed to a masculine principle of linearity 
and ascension. Her descent is viewed as being made “anticlockwise” and with a 
“spiral” movement (Cf. B 544), as opposed to a straight masculine motion and to the 
linear development of meaning in masculine language. The myth of depth bears 
feminine connotations par excellence and the text constantly stresses the “descending 
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aspect of depth, night, femininity” (B 502-503) in relation to the interpreter’s 
exploration of language. Between thus seems to counter masculine religious and 
mythological systems with feminine ones. 
However, at a deeper look, the novel opposes the dichotomy 
masculine/feminine. Rather than exclusively feminine, in fact, the interpreter’s 
exploration of language bears mythological and anthropological androgynous 
associations. The androgynous value of the mythology Between employs supports 
Brooke-Rose’s deconstruction of the male/female binarism touched upon above and 
exemplifies the author’s conception of creativity in humankind. 
 The peculiar journey into the depth of language shembarks on is in fact 
denoted by many references to androgynous divinities: “Most lunar and vegetation 
divinities have a double sexuality, Artemis,7 Attis,8 Adonis,9 Dionysos” (B 504)10. 
These four divinities bear many resemblances to each other. First and most 
importantly, they participate in the same fusion of femininity and masculinity or, to 
say it better, the same sort of lack of a definite gender. Artemis remains in fact 
chaste. She does not “share” her gender, and bears m sculine connotations in her 
attributes as a warrior. Attis emasculates himself. Adonis represents the feminoid 
man par excellence, and Dionysus shows feminine connotations as well: he was 
dressed with woman’s clothes and the processions made in his honour were 
                                                
7 Daughter of Zeus and Leto (the night), Artemis is the personified moon, as opposed to her brother 
Apollo, personification of the sun. She is imagined as the purest of the virgins, protector of chaste 
women. Equipped with bow and arrows, Artemis scours woods and mountains during the night and 
confronts enemies without fear (Cf. Cinti 39-40). 
8 Also called Ati, he is a handsome youth, loved by Cybele, the Goddess of fecundity, mother of all 
the gods and procreator of everything. Cybele designated Attis as her priest on condition that he 
would preserve his chastity. Unfortunately, Attis infringed his oath and Cybele, enraged, expelled him 
from her service. Attis repented and evirated himself. Cybele, moved by his act, turned him into a 
pine-tree. The ancient populations identified Attis with plants or trees which do not bear any fruit or 
seed. He moreover symbolises the cycle of death and rebirth of nature through the seasons (Cf. 
Ronchetti 117-8). 
9 Adonis was entrusted to Persephone by Aphrodite, with the task of bringing him up. Later on, 
Persephone, fond of Adonis’ beauty, did not want to give him back to Aphrodite. Zeus decided the 
case between the two goddesses: Adonis would spend alternatively four months of the year with each 
of the two and the remaining four months wherever he wanted. However, Adonis always spent eight 
months with Aphrodite and four months with Persephone. Adonis thus represents the seasonal cycle 
of the year, the nature which renews itself in spring (Cf. Cordié 16). 
10 Dionysus was son of Zeus and the mortal Semele. His mother died before he was born and Zeus 
took him out of Semele’s womb and put him into his leg. When the baby was born, he was given a 
name that means “twice born”. Hera, Zeus’ wife, wanted to kill him as he was the proof of Zeus’ 
adulterine relationship. Dionysus was given Atamante and Ino, who dressed him with feminine 
clothes to hide him from Hera. Later on in his lifeh  descended to Hades in order to save his mother’s 
life. He succeeded in his undertaking and then ascended to the sky (Cf. Cordié 167-72). 
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constituted mostly by women. Artemis and Attis represent also sexual infertility. In 
addition, Attis and Adonis both possess great beauty nd epitomize, together with 
Dionysus, the cycle of death and rebirth: life out of death. Adonis and Dionysus were 
born in fact out of their respective mothers’ peculiar death. Dionysus was born twice, 
as his name signifies. He exemplifies the motif of life out of death, for he descends 
alive into the reign of death in order to save a ded person, succeeding in his venture 
and ascending to the sky. Once more, Attis, Adonis a d Dionysus have in common 
their close relationship with nature, with the fecundity of the earth. Both Attis and 
Adonis embody the eternal cycle of the seasons. Attis was loved by Cybele, and 
Dionysus encountered her during his wandering and was initiated to her cult. Adonis 
was born from an incestuous relationship and Dionysus was the fruit of an adulterine 
love. Adonis was not born a God, but he was deified. Dionysus had a mortal mother 
but, after his many adventures, he ascended to the sky as a real God.  
The resemblances these four deities bear are extremely interesting in that they 
draw attention to their correspondences with the int rpreter in Between. The latter is 
in fact often presented as an androgynous creature. Sometimes the text hints at her 
sexual intercourses with a man, but we have already seen how she seems to be rather 
“unconcerned” with them. She almost appears to be willingly ignoring carnal 
attraction for the opposite sex. The text even state  that she is “undamaged by a 
miracle between the sheets” (B 493), and inversely r fers continuously to her auto-
erotic practice. On some occasions, her androgynous ature is overtly addressed, 
such as when we read,  
Between existing as a woman and working as a man […] sits an androgynous douce inoubliable dame 
desolate at the death of hope faith charity to any rib torn from her chest any small foreign body out f 
entrails for the forming of a language that actually means something in the light of that death. (B 505) 
 
Turning upside down the myth of the creation of Eve out of Adam’s rib, here 
the rib is “torn from her chest” to create a new language, a language that could be apt 
to express her femininity, away from the masculine language. 
The myth of androgyny, the presence of both sexes in one creature symbolises 
the initial state of wholeness in nature, a state which can generate life and renewal. 
The reference to androgyny could be thus read as the aspiration to a principle of 
totality, an initial situation of wholeness, a mythical coexistence of opposites, which 
would cast off any binary opposition between masculine and feminine. We have 
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already noticed how Between seems to invert the dichotomy tout/pas tout by showing 
how the masculine term “grand” can be interpreted as deriving from the feminine 
“grande” by subtraction. In light of this, it is clear how the feminine “grande” 
represents a primary greatness, a totality which contains in it masculine and 
feminine. 
In such a situation, absence and presence would be contained in the same 
creature, a creature which would be simultaneously “container” and “contained”, 
“swallower” and “swallowed”, 
La source […] breeds plants or parts of plants within t e cavern womb belly vessel ship temple 
sepulchre or holy grail with the same confusional sliding from active to passive from swallower to 
swallowed from container to contained that we find i  all the myths of depth night descent. (B 542)  
 
The symbol of the womb is persistent throughout thenovel and strictly 
associated with the tropes of depth and birth, with the circular and descending 
movement which can be seen as a descensus and uterum/inferos. Images symbolising 
the womb in Between are those of the vase, the cavern, the temple, the ship or the 
sepulchre within which the interpreter is contained, “the stones contain the temple, 
cavern, sepulchre which contains one alleinstehende Frau […] a miniature temple 
you know” (B 565). However, not only is the interpreter “contained” into these 
‘wombs’, but also she is a “container” herself, “In/out, up/down, container and 
contained” (B 432), she is closed in herself, swallowed within herself. The most 
insistent image related to the womb is that of the plane: the body of the plane is 
compared to a whale and the interpreter is caught, like Jonah, inside its womb (B 
395, 398, 420, 452, 575), in an liminal, intestinal existential “betweenness” of life 
and death. The body of the plane is also variously described as a “giant centipede” (B 
395, 398, 414, 502), a “ship” (B 406) or an unspecifi d “animal” (B 400). Even the 
bus the interpreter travels on while in Greece is de cribed as a “vibrant animal” (B 
401). As Mircea Eliade explains, the episode of Jonah can be related to several 
initiatory rites enacted in many archaic societies and based on the penetration of the 
subject into the womb of a marine monster, of an anim l, of the primordial Great 
Mother (Mother Earth), into a cavern or else into a vase. The subject is submitted to 
a figurative death and remains within this emblematic womb for a specified period, 
depending on the tradition of the folk in question. The permanence within the womb 
– the regressus ad uterum – is considered to engender renewal: the person comes out 
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of it after having been regenerated (Cf. Eliade 1974 78-81). Hence we can suppose 
that the sitting position the interpreter usually acquires symbolises the foetal position, 
the image of birth par excellence, but also of death and rebirth. As Eliade explains, 
the practice of burying the dead into urns in a foetal position, in order to facilitate 
their rebirth into afterlife, is an archaic tradition which is still shared by many 
populations (Cf. Eliade 1974 86). We read in fact of he character being “inside the 
whale perhaps where the body lies in the foetus position” (B 537). The gestation in 
the womb brings to the initiated new life out of a death experience: from death comes 
rebirth (Cf. Eliade 1976 251-254). This reinforces our understanding of the 
interpreter’s journey as a voyage into the abysses of death which she embarks on in 
order to gain new life. Death also bears the connotations of wisdom, since the dead 
are traditionally thought of as omniscient and aware of the future (Cf. Eliade 1976 
257-8). In this light, the interpreter’s new languae could be viewed as a new 
acquired wisdom, a new ability of the mind. 
The experience of the regressus ad uterum is ambivalent: to go back to the 
womb necessarily implies one’s own death. The experience of entering again the 
uterus is thus related to or identified with the d scensus ad inferos: descending into 
hell and confronting infernal monsters means to be submitted to an initiatory trial. 
The myth of the descensus ad inferos i  central to many different cultures and 
involves the rescue of someone or something: Orpheus d scends to Hades in order to 
rescue Eurydice; Jesus descends to Earth in order to r scue Adam and, consequently, 
to save humanity; the Indian shamans descend to hell to give new life to the souls of 
sick people; in Polynesia, northern America and central Asia the same myth of a hero 
who descends to hell in order to recover his dead wife’s soul is to be found. Although 
within each culture this allegory can acquire slightly different connotations, in each 
and every case the descensus ad inferos i  carried on to redeem a soul, it be one’s 
own wife’s soul, a sick person’s soul or the soul of the whole humanity. What these 
myths share is their saving pattern: one dies and is reborn in order to recover 
someone/something (Cf. Eliade 1980 146-7), therefore t  acquire something new. 
The interpreter is described as “Emerging from the Av rnus” (B 446), i.e. from 
death, and can also be said as ascending to the sky in her innumerable travels by 
plane and seeing the God sun “fusing”, confounding itself with the night. She thus 
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embodies the movement of an eternal cycle of death and life, of rebirth out of death. 
Like Dionysus, she constantly wanders and descends the abysses of death to gain 
new life. The motif of the descensus ad uterus/inferos connotes the interpreter’s 
peculiar experience within language. She embarks on a travel into the depth of 
language’s interstices to bring to life a new parole, a new actualization of la langue 
into la parole. The concept of travel, basic to the novel, entails language as a 
continuous journey and research. Between in fact exemplifies Barthes’ theory of a 
new kind of narrative journey: if in a classic, realist narrative the plot is based on a 
precise sequence of events, a journey in which one departs, travels, arrives and stays, 
in the modern text the sequence and the corollary of action is destroyed, like a 
journey without origin or telos. The text is for Barthes “that space where no langu ge 
has a hold over any other, where languages circulate”, it is therefore “off-centred, 
without closure” (Barthes 1977 159). Between is an open text, in that its syntax is 
open and its language is open to multiple interpretations, always escaping fixed 
signification. The open movement of the text supports and subtends the interpreter’s 
journey.  
The text does not close on itself, for a movement of departure, travel and 
arrival would imply an end, a telos as the final meaning of the journey. As Barthes 
puts it,  
To depart / to travel / to arrive / to stay: the journey is saturated. To end, to fill, to join, to unify – one 
might say that this is the basic requirement of the readerly […] as if the readerly abhors a vacuum. 
What would be the narrative of a journey in which it was said that one stays somewhere without 
having arrived, that one travels without having departed - in which it was never said that, having 
departed, one arrives or fails to arrive? Such a narrative would be a scandal, the extenuation, by 
hemorrhage, of readerliness. (Barthes 1974 105) 
 
In fact Between is devoid of a conventionally delineated plot, disrupting any 
logic of beginning, middle and end. The most frequently recurring scene is that of the 
plane on its way from one country to another: the traveller does move but she seems 
to exist in suspension between immobility and disorientation. The plane continues to 
travel throughout the novel at “a speed of total immobility” (B 406). The plane en 
route becomes the metaphor of the textual open circularity. 
The travel the interpreter sets out on is circular, and its symbol – subsumed by 
the circular movement of the text – is the cosmic serpent or Uroboros. The term 
Uroboros derives from the Greek and means “devouring its tail”. It is usually 
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described as a circle, a snake, or a dragon devouring its own tail. It thus symbolises 
the eternal process of life and death. The ambiguity the Uroboros embodies derives 
from its absolute autonomy, its self-referentiality, which becomes the symbol of the 
“all-in-all”, the totality of existence, the infinite and cyclic nature of the cosmos. In 
Between, the Uroboros represents the death which is evoked in order to be avoided, a 
circuit which pertains to the principle of inversion by double negation, as explained 
in the text, 
The eternal cycle of l’ourobouros, the snake eating its own tail indefinitely, not merely as a ring of 
flesh but expressing the material dialectic of death and life, life and death, death out of life, life out of 
death in an endless inversion. (B 505) 
 
The “inversion” generated by the Uroboros seems to be exemplified, at the 
novel’s syntactical level, by the inversion of meaning produced by the peculiar 
double negations in affirmative sentences already discussed. 
The theme of renewal and regeneration as linked to the figure of the cosmic 
serpent is detectable in other reminders the text does, such as the one to the mythical 
figure of Python and its enemy Apollo, read in what seems to be the discourse of a 
travel brochure,  
The visitor’s attention turns immediately to the sanctuary of Apollo […] beneath which the famous 
oracle used to sit and utter cryptic prophecies […]on serious matters like war, alliances, births and
marriages. Finally, a little higher up stands the Theatre […] and beyond the Sanctuary lies the 
Stadium, where the Pythic Games took place to celebrat  Apollo’s victory over Python, the legendary 
monster. (B 430) 
 
In Greek Mythology, Python is the earth-dragon of Delphi. Represented as a 
female serpent, she is the chthonic enemy of Apollo, and is also associated with the 
myth of the cosmic serpent. 
The Uroboros is the symbol of the Great Mother, the primordial archetype of 
femininity, represented by mythology as being androgyn us. Moreover, we are told 
that “the myth of the androgynous divinity, present verywhere, does not until later 
cults of the masculine god, express the idea of the Father transcendent but rather that 
of the feminoid son” (B 504). 
The all-encompassing notion of travel Between presents, seems to be strictly 
linked to the medal of St. Christopher the interpreter wears between her breasts. St. 
Christopher is depicted as a saint with a dog’s head by the Christian tradition of the 
seventeenth century. In his figure, two myths converge. On the one hand, he is 
associated with Cerberus, the many-headed dog guarding the entrance of the reign of 
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death, whose task is that of preventing the living from entering Hades and the dead 
from exiting it. On the other hand, he is identified with a giant creature with a dog’s 
head, eater of men, as the text clarifies, 
Je fais allusion au Saint Christophe cynocéphale, dating from the 17th century, and represented with a 
dog’s head. Two myths converge here, that of the man-eating giant with the head of a dog and that of 
the passers of souls, Cerberus. (B 503) 
 
St Christopher is the symbol of the voyage the interpreter makes, a voyage into 
the abysses of death (of language), which is undertak n in order to subvert the 
meaning of that death. The interpreter’s aim in Between is that of rescuing the living 
practice of language. Her endeavour involves the danger of being definitively killed, 
as we realise from the following words referred to her, “inside the whale, who 
knows, three hours, three days or maybe hell” (B 395). Consequently, the interpreter 
makes her voyage accompanied by her Saint Christopher’s medal, which guarantees 
her protection against death and permits her to enter and exit the reign of death, 
Here the Christ carried by death inverts the meaning of death […] accompanying mortals in their 
perilous journey, et qui devient symbole de l’in-ti-m -té dans le voyage, as well as protector and 
talisman against death itself, especially violent death. The mythical imagination invokes death against 
death in a characteristic double negation. Le Christo-phoros porte le Christ. (B 503)  
 
That made by the interpreter of Between is thus a negative travel against 
negation, the negation of language, according to the principle of double denial 
leading to an affirmation, like the myth of the Uroboros, a circle of death and rebirth. 
The death of language is evoked in order to be lived and subverted.  
This peculiar kind of travel which can be subsumed throughout the novel 
generates the narrative tempo and spatiality: the sructure of the novel is itself 
circular – as we have seen it starts and ends with the same sentence, only slightly 
varied. It is an open circular, i.e. spiral movement of time and space, and at the same 
time a descending movement, again both in space (the descensus ad inferos/uterum) 
and time (the memory of her past life). This peculiar t me and space representation is 
rendered also by means of her travelling by plane: sh  travels as if suspended, once 
again, in time and space: the sun often remains in the sky for the whole length of the 
journey and seems to never set, or inversely the night descends soon even if when the 
plane took off it was still plain daylight.  
The travel and the movement it entails can be thus con idered as one of the key 
insights into the text: the interpreter in Between exposes to risk her own life, i.e. her 
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place in language, in order to gain a new life/language. She embarks in such a travel 
to prevent the death of communication and regain the long lost faith in the practice of 
language. This is of course to be achieved by means of language. 
From what has been said, it should be clear how, far from merely embodying the 
écriture feminine as theorised by Irigaray, Brooke-Rose offers an alternative to the 
attitude of radical feminists who strive to affirm woman’s essential difference from 
man. The author believes in fact that “specificity in creation is an individual, not a 
sexual, racial or class phenomenon” (Brooke-Rose 1991 234). Contrarily to feminist 
theorists who try to overturn the categories male/female, she seems to be more 
concerned with the deconstruction of the gender dichotomy and with a 
reequilibration of the polarities man/woman. 
Between exemplifies de Beauvoir’s fundamental claim that “One is not born, 
but rather becomes, a woman” (de Beauvoir 8), for it shows how identity is a 
construct generated by language and as such, it can be subverted by and through 
language. The novel shows that, by and through langu ge, the subject can acquire 
patterns capable of expressing itself. The interpreter of Between, rather than 
affirming her own femininity, aims at freeing herself from the binaristic logic of the 
language which surrounds her. She aims at affirming her own freedom and creativity.  
“[A]ghast at the death of love or maybe merely of language” (B 442), the central 
consciousness of Between succeeds in acquiring – through her linguistic subversive 
creativity – patterns capable of expressing her own“identity”.  
If the sclerotic use of language subtends the structu es of power and entraps the 
creative, feminine element of humankind, the always new and humorous use of la 
parole becomes the path which can free us from the hold of a masculine, totalizing 
logic, and enable us to express our creativity. Between shows how the infinite 
possibilities of actualization of la langue into la parole counter the rigid and static 
(and therefore life-threatening) use of the linguistic ystem. In this way, Brooke-Rose 
finds a positive exit to the debate on language as related to gender and identity, 
subverting the masculine/feminine dichotomy and reaffirming, recuperating 
(rescuing) the importance of the creative aspect of language. 
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Chapter 4 
Thru a very subtly planned chaos: 
a very special sort of unreadable book 
An obscure work, addressed solely to a restricted circle of academics, “a book 
for the initiate” (Berressem 128), “an elaborate joke written by a narratologist for 
narratologists” (Turner 1990b 19). This is mostly the way criticism has tended to 
catalogue Christine Brooke-Rose’s Thru. Even when praise has occurred and some 
of the work’s salient features have been highlighted and appreciated, critics have 
considered it only as a specialist text, analysing it only in terms of the critical 
theories it addresses and therefore taking for granted that the novel’s fruition is the 
sole property of the reader who is interested in such theories. Such widespread 
judgment has gained Brooke-Rose the reputation of being a “difficult” writer and has 
hindered the appreciation of her work by the general, non-academic public. 
Although Thru is without shade of doubt a demanding text, a stunningly 
postmodernist work which Brooke-Rose – referring to McHale’s definition of 
postmodernism as challenging the ontological status of reality (Cf. McHale 1987 9-
10) – defines as “my most daring ontologically unstable text” (Brooke-Rose 2002b 
63), I believe that it must not necessarily be seen as a book for the “field-
knowledger”, but rather it can be appreciated by a much larger audience of readers 
than it has enjoyed so far. 
Certainly Thru has been written from a very knowing standpoint and its non-
professional reader is confronted with what can be se n as an “obscure jargon”, yet 
even supposing the reader be not competent about the poststructuralist debate the text 
addresses, Brooke-Rose’s narrative, which aims first of all at enjoyment on the 
reader’s part, is open to multiple and different levels of readings and layers of 
interpretation. It can therefore be appreciated by the prepared academic, by the 
amateur of specific knowledge, as well as by the reader who happens to be 
unacquainted with it. Brooke-Rose employs different “technical” jargons in most of 
her novels, and this does not imply she is literate in their related disciplines or that 
her reader must be acquainted with their technical terms in order to appreciate them. 
Pointing out that “no one person can know everything” (Turner 1990b 24), Brooke-
Rose postulates curiosity as the basis of literature, 
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Pound once said “you can’t have literature without c riosity”, and I think it’s true. One shouldn’t be 
put off if one isn’t a scientist. Pound wasn’t a Greek or Chinese scholar, but he was curious. (Turner  
1990b 24) 
 
On non-specialist readers, Thru can have the effect of stimulating them to 
broaden their knowledge on the theories it targets, or of leading them to think over a 
number of issues, such as love and its castrating aspect, while amusing them with the 
“incomprehensible” technical discourse rendered in humorous and metaphorical 
terms. The specialized jargon the novel presents is u ed as a metaphor for the events 
presented and the relationships between the characters. However, the reader does not 
necessarily have to be aware of the theoretical theories of the time to enjoy the novel. 
For instance, one does not necessarily have to be aware of Lacan’s concepts of 
castration and mirror to see that love can be “castrating”, or to understand how 
looking into a mirror can entail the process of looking at one’s own identity, going 
through it. 
The fact that the text is deemed unapproachable is ind cative of the dormant 
receptivity of the modern reading public, which the author herself defines “the 
inability – the unwillingness really – to read” (Turner 1990b 24-5). A good novel, 
one which is worth reading and re-reading, “the art of writing something that will be 
read twice” (Connolly 19), is not necessarily a simple read, but surely it is enriching.  
Thru’s reception has also shown how critics themselves w re not ready to see it 
as a “not-necessarily-demanding” text, to realise how different levels of reading 
could be appreciated by different kinds of readers, and that in any case Thru was able 
to pay back its reader’s effort, and so again with d fferent “degrees” of reward. My 
aim is thus not only to contribute to the academic criticism of Brooke-Rose’s novel, 
but also to passionately call for a re-evaluation of its too much emphasised 
“obscurity”. 
Certainly when it comes to an academic reading of Thru, what should be 
stressed is its importance as an emblematic text which simultaneously addresses the 
manifold implications the contemporary critical theori s brought to light. However, 
what has been overlooked while calling the attention on the “difficulty” of Thru, is 
that not only does it engage with the theories of structuralism and poststructuralism, 
but also and most importantly tries to p sitively overcome the tension generated by 
them. Joining the author’s two vocations, the novelist and the literary critic, Thru is 
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in fact the novel in which Brooke-Rose tries to surmount the pressure she felt 
between the literary theories she taught and her novelistic practice after arriving in 
France, “I needed to write this book, because I had gone to France in 1968 and been 
plunged in all that very new theory and there I almost split apart […] I needed to 
write this novel to bring the two ‘MEs’ together again” (Turner 1990b 19). Another 
elucidation made by Brooke-Rose on Thru significantly states, 
I’d gone to Paris, I was plunged into structuralism and post-structuralism, I had to teach it and so on, 
and it blocked me completely, I couldn’t write for several years. Then I wrote Thru […] it’s the most 
Postmodernist of my books, it really is the most self-reflexive. That cured me, it resolved the tensio 
in a way […] but I don’t think it did me any good: I got this reputation as a difficult writer from then. 
(Tredell 32-3) 
 
Thru is a novel that explores the threatened capabilities and potentialities of the 
novel, a piece of fiction which investigates the fictionality of narrative in order to 
find an exit to the all-surrounding contemporary criti al debate. In this light, Brooke-
Rose’s novel embodies a positive countertendency within postmodernist fiction. 
The main source of anxiety related to the practice of creative writing which 
Brooke-Rose sets out to solve originates from the crisis, experienced by the 
contemporary society to an extremely large extent, of language as a representational 
tool. The notion of language as having a direct connection with reality, therefore 
imitating or mirroring it, and the very perception of a world existing prior to 
language, are the target of a rich and tormented debate. As the author explains, 
“never before have the mean-making means at our disposal […] appeared so 
inadequate, not only to cope with the enormity of the problems we continue to create 
[…] but simply to explain the world” (Brooke-Rose 1981 4-6). The poststructuralist 
questioning of language and its ontological status s a means of representation and a 
channel for a direct relation to reality is at the very centre of the theories and counter-
theories of such figures as Wittgenstein, Derrida and Lacan among others. The 
impossibility of representation is postulated together with (linked to and dependent 
on) the failure of language to gain access to reality. Postmodernism challenges not 
only our epistemological capacity, but also the very ontological status of the world 
that should constitute the object of our knowledge: language, and therefore literature, 
in the post-Saussurean debate have no connection to reality, they are unable to reflect 
and convey it, let alone the question of a reality which exists prior to the act of 
discourse. Lacanian psychoanalysis has introduced th  notion of reality as an 
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absence: reality is not a thing-in-itself, but rather an absence replaced by language: 
unable to convey reality, language stands for its very absence. 
A second source of tension Thru sets out to solve is represented by the debate 
over the death of the author and by the widespread flat characterisation which 
threatens the ontological status of fictional characters.  
Damian Grant links Thru’s “narrative anxiety” (Grant 9) to the sentence “but 
the emperor is naked” (T 602), and to the many references to the fairy tale of the 
naked emperor to be found throughout the novel (Cf.T 673,681, 735). Paralleling 
this tale with the textual dynamics of Thru, Grant compares the clothes to stories, to 
the implied author’s need to narrate in order to live. For him, the exclamation “the 
emperor is naked!” brings about the collapse of the w ole fictional edifice and leaves 
its foundations exposed, hence the text’s “narrative anxiety”. 
My aim will be that of demonstrating how, far from presenting narrative 
anxiety as a means to itself, the dialectic enacted in Thru aims at playfully, positively 
subverting this very anxiety and recuperating the joy of fictionality, its endless play, 
away from the negativism the crisis of narration had f llen into. For the positive, 
playful way in which the text overcomes the tension between theory and practice 
generated by the poststructuralist debate, I believ the work can be considered as 
representing a countertendency within postmodernism, an exit to postmodernism and 
a reaffirmation of the fictional play.  
In her recent work on postmodernism, Patricia Waugh has argued that for all its 
apparent undermining of grand narratives, postmodernism has become a grand 
narrative itself, trying to subsume all experimentation in its own terms and seemingly 
denying all alternatives to itself. In other words, rather than being an alternative 
pathway in itself, it has become a mainstream, a virus which infects with scepticism 
every field it comes in contact with (Cf. Waugh 1992 12). As I will show, Brooke-
Rose’s novel represents in this light a positive exception, an enabling alternative to 
the scepticism of the postmodernist “generative machine” (Connor 16). 
Thru is an emblematic text where the issues at stake at the time get addressed, 
performed and surpassed in the very fictionality of the text. Thru not only possesses 
the capability to “catapult” its readers in the midst of the contemporary cultural 
milieu, to make them breath that very socio-cultura atmosphere, but also to take the 
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debate out of its “dry” academic discourse. It is a text which performs the debate 
while being at the same time its object. It is a novel which, through the very practice 
of fiction (object of the debate), enacts that dispute and overcomes its tensions. As 
opposed to an incessant and “creativity-threatening” theoretical debate, Brooke-Rose 
does something of the utmost importance in Thru: she makes fiction out of that 
debate’s theories, recasting the importance of the very “fictionality” of fiction and 
the fact that it should be enjoyed first of all. 
The academic approaching the novel has to take into consideration a myriad of 
different themes and issues which reveal themselves throughout the text and are 
inextricably linked with one another and with its narrative technique. Their 
presentation and analysis will therefore become a ncessary violence to the text, the 
“ripping apart” of the text which Genette sees as unavoidable because of the 
necessity of looking “successively at elements of definition whose actual functioning 
is simultaneous” (Genette 1980 215). Nevertheless, I hope to convey, by means of 
my analytic splitting of the text and beyond it, the originality and high value of Thru. 
In this chapter, after touching on Brooke-Rose’s choi e of the novel’s title, I 
will describe the basic situation it presents and show the impossibility to ascertain 
any central, filtering consciousness in its narrative. I will then proceed in my study 
by focusing exhaustively on the novel’s highly innovative narrative technique(s). 
This might appear as a merely descriptive enumeration of technical features, yet my 
choice has been suggested by two motivations. 
The first one is the fact that the same Brooke-Rose – as already observed in our 
initial chapter – has often lamented the scarce attntion given to her narrative 
technique by criticism, which has always tended to analyse her text only in terms of 
its content. As the author makes clear, a primary and thorough analysis of its form 
will automatically lead to a better understanding of its content (Cf. Brooke-Rose 
2002b 15). In this light, even the title of the novel acquires an important implication, 
one which is basic to the analysis of the work. The term in fact – an American 
version of the British through – seems to put the accent on its own shape, hinting a  
the fact that the reader’s access to the textual content must pass through its form: 
Thru the form, the content. 
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The second reason is that the organization of a consequential discourse which 
would concurrently present narrative technique and theoretical issues is 
impracticable. In fact, all the technical features of the text are inextricably and 
simultaneously linked to numerous critical concepts, so that considering the many 
issues tackled while describing Thru’s narrative technique would inevitably result 
bewildering to the reader.  
I will then – in the following two chapters – interpret the theoretical 
implications of Thru’s textual features and trace Brooke-Rose’s countertendency in 
relation to the sources of anxiety pointed out above. In the fifth chapter, I will 
examine the issue of language and representation and illustrate the textual 
temporality and spatiality availing myself of such ritical theories as Bahktin’s 
dialogism, Kristeva’s poetic language and intertextuali y, and Derrida’s Text, trace 
and architrace. In the sixth chapter, I will evaluate Thru in light of the relation which 
it postulates among the author, the reader and the text, illustrating how Barthes’ 
notion of the death of the author is played upon and surpassed, while Lacan’s and 
Kristeva’s concepts of mirror and castration are developed. 
Thru establishes a connection with the three preceding novels by means of its 
title, a prepositional and monosyllabic one like Out, Such and Between, denoting a 
topological position which is a multi-complex metaphor for the nature and movement 
of the text and its relation to itself as well as to the author, characters/narrators and 
reader. As it will emerge in the course of our study, the idea of Thru is polysemic, 
and the mirror image and its reflection have plentiful implications in the text, apart 
from the most obvious one of recalling Lewis Carroll’s Through the Looking Glass. 
However, it needs be said that, while working at the novel, Brooke-Rose 
decided to change its title into Texttermination to mark its difference from the others. 
Unfortunately, she could not do so because William Burroughs had just published his 
Exterminator! (1974). She therefore had to go back to the previous title (Cf. Hayman 
and Cohen 5). The fact that she would have preferred to call the novel 
Texttermination, however, is indicative of the great leap forward she accomplishes 
within and through this text in respect to her previous works.  
As already observed for Between, the reader of Thru faces the lack of a 
conventionally-delineated plot. The “basic situation” the text presents can 
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nevertheless reconstructed by the reader. It takes place in a seminar class of creative 
writing in a university, probably in America. The tacher of the class is Armel 
Santores, whereas Larissa Toren – Armel’s ex wife – is a teacher as well but in 
another, unsituated university. The students’ creativ  writing homework is presented 
in the text together with their class discussions, while the relationship between Armel 
and Larissa – their break-up and their respective affairs with two alternative dramatis 
personae, Veronica Masters and Stavro Laretino – is delineated through their 
dialogues and letters. Various themes can be detected throughout the novel, such as 
language, love, teaching problems, politics, memory, history and others. However, 
the text is most emblematic for its narrative technique. 
If basic circumstances can be “reconstructed” by the reader of Thru, it is clear 
from the very beginning that they cannot be outlined from the perspective of a single, 
justifying consciousness. The realistic, omniscient a d omnipresent narrator to be 
found in more traditional fiction is here fragmented into a multiplicity of voices and 
roles. All the discourses and thoughts continuously mingle and confuse with each 
other in the text, resulting in none of the “paper-characters” being taken as its most 
identifiable narrative instance. The characters are indeed urged to “Go forth and 
multiply the voices until you reach the undeicidable” (T 637)11. The notion of 
undecidability presented here obviously raises critical issues which will be treated 
extensively in chapter six.  
The narrative of Thru is still the paradoxical, speakerless, Scientific Present 
Tense observed in the three preceding novels. Brooke-Rose “puts herself” inside a 
consciousness to represent in a detached, objective way, what it hears or sees around 
itself and to present, again objectively, its discourses. We have already noticed in 
Between how the central character was more a “central consci u ness” than a 
character in the conventional sense of the term. Nevertheless, such a justifying figure 
was there for the reader to be recognised. In Thru, the experimentalism with the 
figure of the character touches a different height: t e single, almost obsessive 
consciousness of Between leaves the place to a multitude of narrative instaces – the 
“characters/narrators of the moment” – among which the reader is unable to 
recognise a single “justifying consciousness” through which the events are filtered. 
                                                
11 For the wrong spelling of the term “undecidable” se footnote 14,  page 224. 
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Narration continually shifts the viewpoints, sliding swiftly from one consciousness to 
the other, giving no means to recognise this shift but – retroactively – the context. 
Indeed, only after reading an entire paragraph can the reader hypothesise on whom 
has been speaking, while at other times it seems to be utterly impossible to recognise 
the momentary voice. The initial effect on the reader is disorientation, almost 
dizziness, at not being capable of recognising where the “voice” comes from time to 
time. At the very beginning of the novel, an “anonymous text” (Brooke-Rose 2002b 
64) describes facts: a car, eyes staring at their reflection in the driving mirror, 
disembodied voices – which we then conjecture belong t  a man and a girl – leave 
the place to bits of texts and speeches which the reader gradually tries to recognise. 
Hence the question “who speaks?”, which is not only the famous Barthesian 
question, but also the Lacanian question “qui parle?”, which appears on the very first 
page of the novel and is then repeatedly asked, in English, French and Italian. 
A first possible narrator could be a “collective one”: the students of the seminar 
class, whose task is to invent stories, paradoxically transforming the narrative pieces 
they elaborate in a text of which they are themselves both protagonists and narrators. 
In fact, if initially the teacher seems to be in charge of the class and we see the 
students obediently submitting their creative pieces for correction, as the text goes 
further, the students increasingly seem to be “writing” the teachers, inventing 
imaginative alternative identities for them. The whole class should then be 
composing a text in which Larissa and Armel appear both as characters and narrators 
– an hypothesis reinforced by one of the students saying “After all it’s our text, isn’t 
it? For us only” (T 653). 
We could otherwise assume that Armel is writing a novel and Larissa is a 
character in Armel’s novel. However, we are told that Larissa is writing a novel as 
well: is she writing the novel we read? Is she inventing Armel in her novel? Is she 
inventing herself? Is she inventing the class inventing herself? 
Larissa Toren’s and Armel Santores’ names are anagrms of each other, 
“except for ME in hers and I in his” (T 647). The missing letters could be there to 
represent their incompatibility and inevitable break up, as Larissa seems to hint when 
telling Armel, “Why ask what went wrong? You can make up answers such as you 
didn’t find your ME in me or you kept it nor did I find my I in you but kept it” (T 
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631). For Grant the two forms of the first personal pronoun – I and me – are the 
epitomes of the narrative anxiety of the text, in that the two characters’ names share 
anagrammatically the phrase “narrate loss” (Grant 11-12). In my view, the subject 
pronoun I and the object pronoun me could be seen as the interchangeability of doer 
and receiver of action, while none of them is the central consciousness of the novel 
which “filters” the narration for us. Moreover, none of them is a second or third 
person pronoun – you/him/her – clearly hinting at the lack of external objectification 
in the novel: it is an ever shifting internal point of view. 
It is then a mutual invention and the reader becomes th  more confused when, 
with a clear reference to Joyce, Armel tells Larissa: “and perhaps it was after all I 
who invented you though you would not admit this. Certainly you invented me and 
withdrew, indifferent, paring your fingernails” (T 604-5). All the characters/narrators 
are authorising and de-authorising each other, deconstructing each other’s texts: 
“You are the sentence I write I am the paragraph, generating each other cutting off 
each other’s word” (T 723), is Stavro’s cogent reflection upon mutual creation and 
destruction. 
There is a scene in which Larissa is interrupted while working at her text by a 
man from Timbuctoo she does not know, a certain Armel, a friend of friends’ who 
happens to be a writer. We wonder at first who thisman is, since we were already 
told that Armel and Larissa were married. We could assume that this Armel is the 
same man who will later be her husband, this scene being thus a flashback, a 
reminiscence of their first meeting, i.e. a first degree narrative of Armel and Larissa, 
authors. But it might well be otherwise: the scene could be an invention of the 
collective students’ narrative, or else Larissa could be writing her text and 
reinventing Armel, her ex husband, in this way. Signif cantly enough, at this 
juncture, Larissa is caught looking through a judas-eye before opening the door to 
Armel (T 638). This could be a means of emphasising Larissa’s role as a narrator, as 
the one who uses her “point of view” to look at thesubject of her narration, as well 
as ironically alluding to Jude, who may thus stand for the narrator’s unreliability, 
called indeed “the trait-or master of the moment” (T 638). Armel thus not only 
changes status as object and subject of narration (is he the same from Timbuctoo? 
Although Larissa’s husband is once said to be black, this suggestion is later rejected), 
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but his identities also acquire different degrees of fictionality. He is seen as inventing 
Larissa, as being invented by Larissa, and as being a character in the master’s 
narrative. The text ironically and playfully states that coincidences “do happen 
despite the critics” (T 645). 
Every possible assumption on “who speaks” is establi hed only to be revealed 
and overturned. As Brooke-Rose reveals, “The moment I create something I then 
decreate it. I break the fictional illusion” (Del Sapio Garbero 1991 92). Each 
character seems to struggle against the other to take hold of the narrative, to impose 
each time different reinventions of the story, as is also suggested by the references 
which cast Jacques le Fataliste as one of the innumerable subtexts of Brooke-Rose’s 
novel. 
Diderot’s Master and his servant are indeed among the numerous narrators of 
Thru. Three times during the novel – significantly at thebeginning, in the middle ad 
at the end of it – the master converses with his servant/master/alter ego about the 
composition of a text which appears to be his own, significantly proclaiming, 
“Jacques. I am going to break all the commandments” (T 647). Although Larissa and 
Armel appear at times to be characters of the Master’s t xt, the latter declares, “this 
woman Larissa has […] usurped my place as narrator” (T 645). Larissa could be the 
narrator of the narrative the master is writing, therefore his invention/object, but she 
could be also inventing the master. As in Diderot’s story, Jacques subverts the 
conventional roles of master and servant, becoming in turn his master’s master, as 
appears from a dialogue between him and his Master,  
Thanks to the men from Timbuctoo it is clear that Lrissa is producing a text. But which text? It looks 
mightily as if she were producing this one and not,as previously appeared, Armel, or Armel disguised 
as narrator or the narrator I disguised as Armel. That’s not very clear. 
No it isn’t. 
Of course she may be producing a different text.  
She may indeed, master. 
That’s not very clear either. 
Perhaps not. 
But you see what follows from that? 
Not quite yet master.  
It means that the narrator I transformed into Larissa am no longer your master but your mistress.  
Master! I find that most offensive. I know that we quarrelled at the inn, but I made you agree 
afterwards that all our quarrels were due to our not accepting the fact that although you were pleased 
to call yourself and I was pleased to call you the master, I am in fact yours. (T 644) 
 
Larissa, the master, and Jacques are interchangeable n rrators, in a play where 
the servant(s) or object(s) in turn become the master(s) or subject(s) and vice versa. 
 169 
The concepts of subject and object, narrated and narrator, “container and contained” 
slide into one another. Accordingly, it is stated that “the notions of subject and object 
correspond only to a place in the narrative proposition and not to a difference in 
nature” (T 647).  
The result is a “patchwork plot”, constructed through the scraps of stories and 
discourses of all the personae which in turn invent a d get invented/reinvented 
amidst hypotheses and hints. It is never clear “who is who”, “who plays who”, who 
is narrating/inventing and who is being narrated/invented: the ever-shifting narrators-
characters are in turn presented as narrating subjects and narrated objects of the 
narrative. A never ending negotiating process, illuminatingly presented by means of 
a “clockwise” table, 
unless Armel inventing Larissa 
or  Larissa            ″        Armel 
″    Armel             ″        Veronica 
″    Veronica         ″        Armel 
″    Armel              ″        Larissa 
″    Larissa            ″         Marco (or is it Oscar?) 
″    Marco (?)        ″        Larissa 
″   Larissa             ″         Armel                                (T 586) 
 
Soon after, the table is not only presented in reverse, “anticlockwise”, but also 
ended with a question mark, so as to signify that te process can be practically 
endless and unpredictable. 
The hypotheses on who invents whom could go on ad infinitum and indeed, 
whoever is inventing or getting invented in the novel seems to be itself a fictional 
character in Thru. In a text where no self is posited in the traditional sense of the 
term, narration consists of a flux of utterances coming from different, unidentifiable 
sources. The voices of the various discourses are heaped one upon another, in a 
continuous process of construction and destruction of the fictional illusion, which 
results in all the momentary narrators finally rendring each other unreliable. 
Such a continuous and purposeful shift of focalization shakes the whole logic 
of narrative representation. The variations in point of view, called by Genette 
“changes in focalization” or “alterations”, were abhorred by post-Jamesian criticism 
that obliged the text to be steadily consistent in following the principle of 
focalization adopted. Against this norm or “rule”, Genette refers to the alterations of 
the focalizing point and asks, “why could this course not be absolute freedom and 
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inconsistency?” (Genette 1980 195). Brooke-Rose seem  to have taken up this 
question and gone further so as to make a resolutely constant and deliberate 
transgression of the rule, the rule itself. Indeed one of the teachers in the text tells the 
students, “Do you follow the principle? the principle being that you do not follow the 
principle” (T 622, 699). 
Before considering the linguistic aspects of Thru, let us examine its most 
“apparent” textual characteristics. The novel in fact playfully performs its own 
textuality by stressing the materiality of a text which may be counted as visual 
literature, a text which far from presenting pictures as conventional illustrations, 
“itself becomes the meaningful picture” (Maack 132). It is in fact interspersed with 
typographical tricks which play with the readers’ visual capacity and draw their 
attention to the spatiality of the text. This “arrangement of non fictional text forms” 
(Maack 133), far from being mere materiality, becomes fiction itself. The typography 
of Thru visually represents the situation or the “object of he moment”: the stress on 
the textual surface is a way of playing on and enhancing the content of the text. Its 
situations and objects attain a multi-meaningful status by means of their material 
shape. 
Timetables break up the layout of the page, showing the reader in a more 
immediate way the organization of the subjects at the university (T 599), reinventing 
them with a sexual twist to enhance one of the subtending themes of the text (T 668), 
or comparing thirteenth and twentieth century institutions of knowledge (T 679-80). 
In this last case, the text seems to imply that although the syllabus of cultural 
institutions gets reformed as time passes, under the appearance of renewal hides the 
same, old human nature. In fact, there is a direct lationship of correspondence 
between the subjects studied in the thirteenth century and those studied in the 
twentieth century, and we are told that the institutions of learning are “all […] a 
conspicuous consumption of knowledge nobody wants” (T 682-3). 
 One of the tables is disposed centrally across two pages (T 682-3), cutting the 
four paragraphs above and below it and determining their sequence: the top left 
paragraph links logically with the top right one, and the bottom left paragraph 
follows in the bottom right one. There are many other peculiar graphic shapes, such 
as the wheel representing “the dance of the twenty-seven veils” (T 663), or 
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rectangles and triangles which are patterns throught the novel and are drawn both 
with lines or with the disposition of words on the page. What seems to be concrete 
poetry is in fact widely employed in Thru: the arrangement of words for instance 
gives life to a chain of circles which mime the dancing hoops seen through the 
driving-mirror, “bouncing in out of through and through each other […] as if juggled 
by a mad magician” (T 582), a metaphoric image for the play of fictional illusion, 
 (T 618) 
 
A Curriculum vitae (T 616-7) is directly presented when the faculty meeting is 
considering an application for a post. Mirror writing (T 599, 609, 669), i.e. writing 
from right to left, is inserted in the text and, apart from playing on our visual 
capability, reminds us of the mirror theme. Reversed, upside-down writing (T 605), 
musical notations (T 619), some elements of Boolean algebra (T 699), years inserted 
into rectangles during a class, so as to mime the teacher writing a date on the 
blackboard and drawing a rectangle around it for emphasis (T 608), Chinese 
ideograms which seem to represent two legs (T 675, 30) or the irrelevance of a 
man’s love oath (T 702), empty or giant parentheses (T 607, 600), crossed text (T 
598), pages to be read across and down because of their vertical and diagonal 
sections, are all present in Thru, including an excerpt from a rhetoric manual dating 
1574, 
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   (T 601) 
Among the many typographical arrangements we also find the shape of a 
linguistic tree rendered in the form of concrete potry,  
       (T 615) 
 
Many of the columns with binary oppositions or linguistic trees seem to recall 
structural principles of order and, according to Maack, they are “based on the attempt 
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to find an order derived from structuralism and generative grammar” (Maack 134). It 
is not by chance therefore, that the above figure presents at its basis the word 
“order”. For Grant, the tree-like verbal icons “are meant to suggest lamp posts seen 
through the rear-view mirror of a car” (Grant 12). In my view, this image seems to 
represent a university amphitheatrically-shaped room, where a faculty meeting is 
being held, miming therefore the confusion of voices of the many participants during 
the meeting, each expressing their ideas while the president calls for “order”, thus at 
the same time providing the reader with information on what is being said and 
describing the arrangement of the room without recurring to a conventional 
description. 
The typographical jokes seem sometimes to have the purpose of teasing the 
characters, such as when a group of revolutionary students interrupts a lesson and 
tries to convince everybody to join the political fight by criticising literature as “the 
servant of the bourgeoisie” (T 670). The slogan of the subversive students is inserted 
at the end of the discussion between the two groups, yet an ironic light is cast on the 
situation as the motto is put in musical terms, 
Agitato ma non troppo 
       The bour-geois i-dyll is o-o-o-ver   
            pp<f<ff                                                 (T 672) 
 
Brooke-Rose’s attitude towards the two parts of the linguistic sign is first of all 
playful: she approaches language as a material which is from the one hand graphic, 
as if it was touchable, from the other also playable with, funny: the long-questioned 
relation between signifier and signified furnishes the possibility for verbal creativity. 
Humour – basic to the author’s narrative practice – is enacted in Thru primarily 
by means of a vast range of wordplays which subvert th  linear relationship between 
signifier and signified and show how much is contaied in a single word. The text 
delights in punning, exploiting the relationship betw en the semantic and the 
phonological values of words, inventing new terms and/or assembling/disconnecting 
already existing ones. For example, “amphitheatre” becomes “amphibiantheatre” (T 
634), while the onomatopoetic value of words is stressed through their form, as in 
“wrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrruNg” (T 589). Most of the puns in Thru operate in the sexual field 
and emphasise the sexual relationships between Larissa and Armel, Larissa and 
 174 
Stavro, Armel and Veronica. Already in the first pages, a sexual scene is described 
by means of both horizontal writing and acrostics, so that during a dialogue between 
a man and a woman we read their thoughts: “expected gesture well I want her cunt”, 
“mmmmm”, “yes Exite me”, “I’m coming”, “Go on”, “boy aRe you big” (T 588-9). 
Sexual insults do not lack in the text, as for insta ce “Nigger bastard” (T 624), 
“Jewish slut” (T 624), or “CUNT” (T 589) also rewritten as “cant” (T 619), both an 
allusion to the sexual term and to Kant’s philosophy. According to the already 
predominant erotic perspective of the novel, “textuali y” intersects with 
“Sex(t)uality” (T 590, 691), “heterosexuality” becomes “heterotextuality” (T 680), 
intertextuality develops into “intersexuality” (T 657) or into the “sea of 
infratextuality […] of flute-playing phallusies” (T 684), the text gains the status of 
“texture of self-love” (T 681), ecstasy becomes “textasy” (T 665), “discourse” turns 
out to be “disc-hoarse” (T 679), figures of speech are converted into “fig-years of 
speech” (T 686), and catastrophe is “castratrophy” (T 715). The days of the week 
acquire new names: “Sceneday, Mouthday, Toolsday, Wombsday, Circe’s Day, 
Aphrodite’s Day, Sated day” (T 668). The fictional “mise-en-abîme is [..] 
orgyanised” (T 665) rather than organised, and the writer has to cope with a “breast-
selling reality” (T 703).  
Linguistic jokes in Thru are wide-ranging, from anagrams, such as Larissa and 
Armel’s names, or the fact that Larissa uses a nearan gram of her name to represent 
herself: “I’m rotten through and through you know, my name is Toren” (T 713), to 
acrostics and portmanteau words, from word-ladders to the coinage of new terms. 
These features are to be found throughout the text and are often simultaneously 
present in the same paragraph, sentence or word, thus increasing the reading 
prospect. In the first twenty-one pages (T 579-599), the reader can detect in acrostics 
the hidden thought patterns of the character’s mind we are in: if speech is given 
horizontally on the page, thought is decipherable in vertical writing, through the 
initial letter of each line. Thus the text becomes an acrostic and the thought pattern 
we read is a peculiar kind of acronym. In the page reported below, we read Ruth 
(another female character) telling Armel about a dream she has had, while in vertical 
Armel is thinking “What is Larissa doing now or Veronica?”, 
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 (T 587) 
 
Thought patterns, of which many other salient examples are presented in Thru 
(Cf. T 581, 584, 588, 589), are rendered either in acrostics or in bold type. They 
represent a highly original way of introducing metadiegetic discourse in the text. 
Sometimes it is not solely the initial letter of each line which creates new meaning, 
but also the intersection of the letters which can be either at the beginning or in the 
middle of a word, so that we have a mix of acrostics and mesostics (T 597). 
A palindrome is to be found in the phrase “ROMA AMOR”, which the same 
text says must be “spelt backwards of course” (T 730), where the two words together 
are a palindrome, whereas each word taken in itself i  a bi-frontal palindrome. A 
peculiar, diagonal, palindromic cross is also the word “(t)ex(i)t” (T 690), the 
important implications of which we will later analyse. 
When a nursery rhyme is rewritten lispingly (T 585), it becomes utterly 
humorous as its subject is no less than Thoth, the god of writing. In the sentence 
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“each problem a preamble to a promble” (T 688), metathesis and alliteration mix 
together to generate laughter. 
Another feature of linguistic creativity is represent d by portmanteau words 
such as “rétro viseur” (T 579) or “tale-bearer” (T 580). The terms 
“goldicondeologists” (T 593) and “goldicondeology” (T 736) are newly created 
portmanteau words to render the concept of the “the golden icon ideology”, a 
concept which seems to be related to the psychological transfer of desire from the 
subject to the object, the term thus indicating a golden icon, something to be 
venerated as the object of desire. The word “tonguetabl s” (T 593) ironically recalls 
the tables of the commandments because immediately followed by a sentence in 
biblical style, “Thou shalt eat thy prisoner” (T 593). The term “Camouflashback” (T 
620) is made up of the junction between flashback and camouflage, a “flashback 
more or less well camouflaged” (T 620). The word “foot men” (T 593) is a calque 
which refers to the expression “le lacquais de la bourgeoisie” (Cf. Brooke-Rose 
2002b 94). The verb “ringturn up” (T 630) and many other terms are new 
portmanteau words which contribute to present the narrative events ironically. 
Indeed, all these terms generate metaphorical meaning w thin the context they are 
inserted, as for instance the expression “mommagirlwife” (T 731), used to convey 
the idea of the stereotyped woman that men look for, a woman who could substitute 
the mother figure but who would be at the same timea s xually appealing lover and 
a caring wife. Slang transcription of words is also present, as in “kinduv” (T 626) and 
many other instances. The pattern of the word ladder inv nted by Lewis Carroll is in 
Thru originally enhanced as it can be read both horizontally and vertically, 
intersecting with acrostics/mesostics which multiply its possible readings (T 599, 
741), as well as with mirror writing and with a typography that mimes the ladder (T 
741).  
The language of Thru possesses the ability to avoid the expected and to renew 
itself at every sentence with a myriad of linguistic devices. It is a language that 
incessantly destroys and constructs meaning in order to create something new away 
from its conventional use, through language and out of language. One salient feature 
by means of which Thru avoids, or better destroys the expected is its peculiar 
doubting language. The play on the smallest unity of the syntactical chain, on the 
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syntagmatic axis, is overtly announced at the beginning of the novel with the formula 
“SIN TAG MA TRICKS” (T 581). Thru’s language enacts the process of 
concurrently constructing and destroying meaning, of “Giving and taking away at the 
same time” (Hayman and Cohen 19). This is attained by means of unusual doubting 
affirmations and negations, of sentences which affirm while denying or deny while 
affirming, continuously recasting their own meaning to uncertainty. 
This peculiar characteristic of Thru clearly shows Pound’s influence on 
Brooke-Rose. In A Structural Analysis of Pound’s Usura Canto, Brooke-Rose 
describes the mesmerizing use of negation and affirmat on in Pound: statements can 
be distinguished into grammatical negative and positive, as well as in evaluative 
pejorative or non-pejorative. She explains that Pound plays with such statements so 
that the evaluative-pejorative one can be expressed in positive grammatical terms and 
the evaluative-non pejorative one, in negative gramm tical terms (Cf. Brooke-Rose 
1976 12-16). The author employs the same strategy in Thru, enhancing it with the 
simultaneous employment of other linguistic features which add to the indeterminacy 
of its language. 
If sentences can affirm, negate or doubt more or less the thing in question, if 
“one can tell more or tell less what one tells […] narrative information, has its 
degrees” (Genette 1980 161-2), in Thru, rather than by means of stock grammatical 
negation and affirmation, different “degrees” of affirmation and negation are used to 
provide unconfirmed information. Conjunctions, adverbs, adjectives, nouns, verbs 
and question marks all contribute to this effect. The connectives and, if, or, but, are 
mostly used to undermine the safe state of preceding assertions. For example, on the 
very first page of the text, an answer is given to the question “who speaks?” (“le rétro 
viseur”), but the second page starts with “or”, which automatically puts into doubt 
what has just been said and points to alternative answers. It follows a paragraph of 
questions into questions, the last sentence of which is a grammatical affirmation but 
also a question, its last word and the question mark being displaced on the page, 
or the vizir looming grey eminence behind the consultan listener how  
many times leaning a little to the right to peer into how many  
rectangles a thousand and one in which there is a                 flaw? (T 580) 
 
Below we read “but […] whatever […] and who ever” (T 580), which casts 
further relative light on the question. The central role of but is highlighted on another 
 178 
occasions by presenting it in bold capitals, and placing it centrally at the beginning of 
the page (Cf. T 582). Another extensively used conjunction is unless, which 
systematically throws hesitation on what has been just presented as happening (Cf. T 
618). The adverbs perhaps, however and yet are employed for the same purpose and 
are often connected to conjunctions, other adverbs or verbs which add to their 
dubitative function, as for instance in “and perhaps” (T 604), in “So far however” (T 
664), or in “They however seem” (T 614). However is extensively employed at the 
beginning of a paragraph to put into doubt what has been described in the preceding 
one (Cf. T 715). The adverb meanwhile – widely used to start paragraphs and change 
focus – seems to suspend the time of narration, to elude it, thus concurring strongly 
to the narrative tempo of the text, while participating of the question “who speaks”, 
since it is impossible to state who utters it. The preposition despite and the 
conjunctions or, because, and of, are used all together in the same sentence many 
times throughout the text to simultaneously hypothesise and doubt, as in the 
sentence, “A second pair of eyes hidden higher up the brow would have its uses 
despite psychic invisibility or because of” (T 583). In this last instance, the 
conditional verb sheds further reservation on the veritable status of the statement, 
whereas in another example – “These things do matter despite psychic invisibility or 
because of” (T 592) – a stock affirmation leads to the preposition despite which 
appear to challenge the logical connection of the main statement, which is then 
doubtingly reinstated as a possibility by or because of. 
The language of Thru possesses the power to multiply its meanings by 
indicating neither their truth nor their falsehood. We are constantly presented with 
opposite evaluations of the same subject or with different descriptions of the same 
person or situation. Thru concurrently furnishes double possibilities, such as when 
we read “undipped or even gently dipped” (T 582), or else that “The moving finger 
[…] maintains the truth (of the falsehood) in a pregnant plenitude” (T 692). On the 
reciprocal invention of the characters it is said, 
Armel could invent Marco or is it  
Tariel and vice versa but due to the double standard 
in practice would not stoop or merely would not have the curi- 
osity. Clearly Marco does not invent Veronica nor she even 
utter Marco (or is it Stavro?) […]  
     On the other hand the hypotheses could have been …. (T 586) 
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The expressions “would not”, “or merely would not”, and “on the other hand” 
simultaneously put forward possibilities and deny them. The text is extensively 
constructed with sentences where an affirmation is doubted, as for instance when we 
read, “Only these lower eyes […] can see, presumably, the upper eyes” (T 605), the 
adverb presumably upturning the security of the main phrase. Or again when the 
declaration “Surely she should be concerned” (T 609) is followed by a question 
which makes crumble what surely has just constructed. The process of giving and 
taking away at the same time functions within short sentences as well as entire 
paragraphs,  
in any case the mistress of the moment should be  
changed, and no doubt will be in another moment thoug  per 
haps she could meanwhile be called, Ruth, for mixed reasons  
of phonemic contiguity. (T 595) 
 
The position of the negation in the syntactical chain is something to play on to 
generate different nuances of meaning, to deny altern ively the verb, object, subject, 
adverb or adjective. An infinite play of language which can be observed when we 
read, “this is (not) no mystery/this is (not) my mystery/this is (not) no hystery/this is 
(not) my hystery/this is my story”, all of which is followed by “of the Eye” (T 584), 
which alludes to Bataille’s famous work but is also a play of the phonemic equality 
of eye and I. 
As Brooke-Rose stresses again when she declares, “I’ve always tried to avoid 
the expected word” (Brooke-Rose 2002b 154), she incssantly tries to attain a 
specific choice of language away from the “expected” modes of communication. 
This not only contributes to the “unfamiliarity” of her language and destabilizes the 
“automatism” which much language suffers from – where a certain context 
automatically calls for a specific word – but also and most importantly produces 
linguistic humour, as it evades the rule of logical prospect and generates surprise and 
laughter.  
Juxtaposition and repetition are other basic inventi  resources used by the 
author to engender surprising metaphorical meaning a d generate humour. By 
juxtaposing separate words or sentences, a link is created between them and a new, 
unexpected and metaphorical implication is generated. In this way, Brooke-Rose lays 
bare the power of language of being funny and unpredictable, of generating hilarity 
and surprising results. In Thru, Larissa is brought to comment on the unpredictable 
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possibilities that words bear when she warns Stavro, “Be careful of words […] they 
are lures and have unexpected results” (T 699). Examples of juxtaposition of words 
in the text are innumerable, as for instance when during a sexual scene we read of the 
character’s “sexual humour secreted unsecretly” (T 588), where the verb to “secrete” 
is put side by side to the adverb “unsecretly” to create a sense of contrast within the 
alliteration of the words. The play on words sharing the same root is reinforced in the 
question “(but what does the omitter omit?)” (T 691), where even the brackets 
contribute to the joke, miming the omission. The expr ssion “the cherub 
revolutionary” (T 612) – used to describe one of the students in the class – is another 
example of the surprising effect of words, since th two terms “cherub” and 
“revolutionary” clash with each other, a cherub being an angel and not generally a 
revolutionary, perhaps suggesting that the person in question possesses typical 
angelic traits. The expectation of words normally calling for one another is eluded 
when we read “once upon a spacetime” (T 662) instead of the classical and 
“automatic” “once upon a time”, or when between the Latin words “ad infinitum” we 
find an uncommon term, “ad neurotic infinitum” (T 631), or again when the expected 
“my love” becomes “Larissa my loathing” (T 631). The possible different meanings 
of a single word are played on when we read about the farce of “faculty meetings 
where faculties never meet” (614), or else in the following example,  
it’s a motet for a prepared piano. 
Ha! Sul piano umano? 
Oh, Salvo! 
Piano, piano. (608) 
 
The effect of juxtaposition is further enhanced by repetition. When a word or 
sentence previously used comes back in a different co ext, adjacent to a different 
sentence or slightly varied, it suddenly gives life to something new, once more 
demonstrating the unforeseen and entertaining effect language can have. Already in 
A Grammar of Metaphor (1958), Brooke-Roses analyzes the endless possibilities of 
metaphor in language and later on she asserts, “I saw that […] language is capable of 
far more subtle ways of metaphoric expression than t e stock grammatical ways. 
You can do a lot with subliminal structures and repetition […]. You use the same 
phrase in a new context and embedded in that new context it acquires a completely 
different meaning” (Hayman and Cohen 3).  
 181 
The practice of repetition and juxtaposition clearly demonstrates Pound’s 
influence on Brooke-Rose. In the manner of Pound’s poetry, Thru employs 
juxtaposition of words and/or sentences to generate metaphorical meaning. Not only 
is a sentence embedded within a specific context “a form of metaphor” (Turner 
1990b 22), but also – when repeated in a different situation – it will inevitably 
remind the reader of its previous semantic perspective, hus enriching its own 
metaphorical connotations. Some examples from the text will help us better 
appreciate the effect of repetition. For instance, in the context of a sexually alluding 
dialogue in a car, a man and a woman look for a parking space and their conversation 
on how to manoeuvre the car into it – from the spot which is “too small”, all the way 
to “You’ll have to take her out and start again” (T590) – becomes sexually 
metaphorical because of the context. Later on, the phrases “you’ll have to back into 
it” (T 603) and “you have to take her out and start again” (T 605) come back in the 
context of a class discussion and assume different meanings, but inevitably remind 
the reader of their earlier context. 
Similarly, the Lacanian object of desire is referred to many times throughout 
the text, assuming in different contexts diverse connotations of meaning in the sexual 
(T 595), love/marriage (T 660), and narrative technique (T 603) fields. In yet another 
example, the class is asked to vote for or against the narrator’s presence in the 
narrative and we read, “Those for. Those against. Abstention. Refusal of vote” (T 
604). The same formula comes back slightly varied in the context of a quarrel 
between Armel and Larissa and acquires a completely different meaning: Larissa is 
crying and Armel does not offer his love to her, hence we read, “Abstention. Refusal 
of votive offering” (T 625). The sentence comes back once more to signify the man’s 
fear and consequent refusal of love: “Those which? Those for. Those against. 
Abstinence is good for you. Refusal of the goddess by Eurilochus” (T 632). 
Likewise, during an aggressive lovers’ dialogue, Larissa tells Armel “Oh go fuck 
yourself”, to which it is ironically replied with abiblical misquotation, “The fall was 
into language” (T 655). The same sentence then recurs when talking about the debate 
on the absence and presence of signifiers in language (T 675), so as to say that 
language is a structure you can fall in, as well as after Stavro has asked Larissa to 
marry him, so that it acquires a different nuance, p rhaps alluding at the fact that 
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Stavro has gone too far with words, “falling” into the sentence “please please marry 
me” (T 699).  
Taking up Genette’s theory, we can see how the technical feature of repetition, 
considered in terms of narrative temporality, determines the “narrative frequency”, 
i.e. the relations of frequency between the narrative and the diegesis (Cf. Genette 
113). However, as Genette explains, repetition is always the same yet different: if a 
“statement […] can be repeated one or more times in the same text”, the identity of 
the repetitions is an abstraction, “materially […] none of the occurrences is 
completely identical to the others” (Genette 1980 114), “the identity of […] multiple 
occurrences is debatable: “the sun” that “rises” every morning is not exactly the same 
from one day to another” (Genette 1980 113). In Thru this concept seems to be 
played upon as repetition is never the same, but always slightly varied. The same 
sentences, stylistically varied or embedded in different contexts, multiply their 
connotations of meaning. Moreover, the same discoures are repeated by different 
characters, so that the points of view of the utterances change and therefore, once 
again, their connotations. Thru seems thus to be one of those modern texts which for 
Genette, “are based on narrative’s capacity for repetition” (Genette 1980 115). In 
respect to repetition, Genette explains that a narrative can be “singulative” (1N=1S), 
“anaphoric” (nN=nS), “repeating” (nN=1S), or “iterative” (1N=nS) (Cf. Genette 113-
14). In Thru, these different modes are all present and mixed up with each other: 
repeated scenes and sentences occur all through the text, but their variations and/or 
their dissimilar contexts determine each time their uniqueness. We can have 
singulative scenes inserted within repeated paragraphs, iterative scenes within 
singulative passages, or else – to link this point w th what said above circa the use of 
a specifically indefinite language – a doubting adverb is used as an iterative 
beginning to precede a singulative scene. We could also say that we have iterative 
stories each time the same thematic is addressed (th  stories are different, but the 
narrative is the same). For instance every time the text considers love and sexual 
relationships between man and woman, it is always the castration complex which lies 
at the basis of the dynamic and determines it. 
Thru achieves the always unexpected in that the new and sud en relations of 
meaning instituted by its peculiar use of language become metaphorical. As the 
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author explains, “I’ve always been fascinated by the fusions effected through 
metaphor and this can be done in many subterranean ways” (Turner 1990b 27). 
Most importantly, repetition and juxtaposition are used to fuse together the 
different critical jargons the text is extensively made up of. In fact, the stories 
narrated in Thru, the relationships between the characters and the various issues the 
novel tackles are presented by means of a mixture of specialized discourses which 
has already been observed in the three preceding novels. However, in Thru this 
technique assumes emblematic significance in that the ext is made up of discourses 
coming mainly from the French critical debate of the ime: literary theories make up 
a fictional text. 
Barthes, Lacan, Derrida, Kristeva, Greimas, Irigaray, Propp, Jakobson and 
Bakhtin are some of the critics whose theories are addressed, “dismantled” and 
“reconstructed” in metaphorical directions. What Brooke-Rose calls the “jargon and 
discourse that human beings invent to protect theirdiscipline and to keep the outsider 
out” (Tredell 32), becomes metaphorical if used within a specific framework and 
interpreted literally. Critical discourses get juxtaposed and repeated in different 
contexts in order to let their original meaning acquire new connotations and their 
“jargonesque obscurity” (Brooke-Rose 2002b 2) renew. In this connection, the 
author reveals: “I needed to send up the structuralist j rgon, also to use it as poetry, 
to use the very jargon of narratology as a metaphor, in a way, to deconstruct it” 
(Friedman and Fuchs 88). 
All the critical theories presented in Thru are integral part of the events its 
characters seem to experience, they blend together to build up the narrative in a 
humorous way. Brooke-Rose’s deep awareness of linguistics and literary theory 
becomes something to play with, a game, something to poke fun at. 
For instance, the famous Barthesian question “Who speaks?” is repeatedly 
asked in the text in order to highlight and play on the impossibility to distinguish a 
point of view which orientates narration. Similarly, the Lacanian dialectic of desire is 
repeatedly used in the text to tackle the sex and love themes and delineate the 
relationships among the characters. Again, Barthes’ d ath of the author blends with 
the Lacanian narcissistic subject and seems to recalls Eco’s criticism as we read, “the 
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narrator has disappeared into a pool of lethal self-love with Echo echoing on” (T 
689). 
After Larissa receives a marriage proposal by Stavro, the Lacanian dialectic 
subject/object mingles with Greimas’ semiotic square – where contrary concepts are 
both opposed and equivalent to each other in a direct logic of interrelation – as a way 
of expanding on the latent modality of desire in a love relationship,  
the dialectic of desire that gravitationally pulls you towards the centre of attention she enjoys as from
the start an object of central loss […] will you stay with me always always please will you marry me. 
[…] the introduction, into the superficial grammar, of wanting as a modality, permits the construction 
of modal utterances with two actants united in a proposition, the axis of desire then authorizing a 
semenic interpretation of them as virtual performer subject and an object instituted as value. Adam 
wants an apple Adam wants to be good. Such an acquisition, by the subject of the object, seems to 
occur as a reflex action, which is only a particular c se of a much more general structure well known 
as the diagram of communication represented in its canonic form as an M and a Y of crossed limbs 
with diagonals from the I to the object 
 
 (T 694-5) 
 
It is clear how critical theory becomes a way of developing the narrative. In 
another example of this practice, a quotation from Bakhtin is used by Larissa to 
oppose Armel’s denigration of Stavro,  
You have no right to reify him into the voiceless object of an intellect that delimits him. A human 
being lives to the end on his lack of definition, he always has the last word. 
Read Bakhtine! Of course he’ll have the last word which will be a cowardly silence. (T 711) 
 
In another scene, six people sit by an open fire in a cottage and chat. Larissa’s 
perceptions are described by recurring to linguistics erms as she “watches, bored, 
the imperceptible shrug of scorn functioning like the bar between signifier and 
signified for ever eluded” (T 649). Again, during a cl ss debate one of the students 
gets angry and starts criticising the organization of the academic syllabus in very 
violent terms, to which the teacher reinstates,  
You are turning this place into a carnival. Well I have no objection it’s a mode of perception as 
Bakhtine has shown, but you should then be aware tht carnival has its own structure at every level all 
taboos suspended all hierarchy reversed and certain very specific ineluctible processes I forebear to 
mention. (T 635) 
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Jakobson’s diagram of communication is both printed on the page and 
variously addressed in different contexts. The teach r for example warns the 
students,  
                                                                           …  we mustn’t  
confuse the levels of discourse. My function here is not to narrate  
but to teach, or shall we say I am not a function of your narrative, 
and we are using a metalanguage, so: […]  
 
  (T 628-9) 
 
The arrow pointing at the metalinguistic code while suggesting “YOU ARE 
HERE”, makes clear that the discourse of Thru is self-reflexive, it is metadiscourse, a 
discourse on discourse, on linguistics, literary theory and narrative practice. Soon 
after we read in fact, “There should be placards saying: Danger You are now entering 
the Metalinguistic Zone” (T 629). 
Linguistic jokes humorously address the critical debat  as well: the acronym 
“R.E.M.” which initially stands for Rapid Eye Movement (T 596), later comes to 
signify the relationship between Recipient, Emitter and Message: “unrapid eyes 
movements tampering the Message between Emitter and Recipient so that EMR→ 
REM (REM)” (T 610-1). Likewise, the critical concept of “fallacy” is humorously 
played upon as it becomes “pathetic fallacy” (T 595), “bathetic fallacy” (T 626), 
“parent synthetic phallacy”(T 632) or else “bathetic phallucy” (T 653). Similarly, the 
concept of “porte-récit” (Todorov 1977) is ironically mistranslated as “tale-b arer” (a 
linguistic calque of the word “spokesman”) and explained while mixed with the 
Lacanian Other, 
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a tale-bearer, whose life also depends on his narration generated by the surplus value left over from 
the previous tale and itself generating the next. Read Todorov les homes-récits on this. Each I leads 
into another I, unless I into O for Other interruption with a point of information? (T 618) 
 
Metalanguage, in Thru, is firmly lodged within the fictional world, as “it 
occurs as the professional discourse to […] universty lecturers in narratology” 
(McHale 1995 200). Literary theory becomes a way of expanding on the textual 
themes. Narratology becomes itself a story to be narrated. It becomes narration 
through its language used as a metaphor. As Minetti points out, for Brooke-Rose 
there could be no separation between language and metalanguage, practice and 
theory, language as object and language as “judging means” (Minetti 87-8). 
Language as object is necessarily self-reflexive. The text both reflects on and puts 
into practice the narrative issues it talks about, all with a humorous attitude: creating 
fiction while discussing the various issues related to fictionality.  
As Barthes explains, “the discourse on the Text should itself be nothing other 
than text, research, textual activity […] The theory f the Text can coincide only 
with a practice of writing” (Barthes 1977 164). The text refers to itself, concentrating 
on its own strategies and elements. The textual practice of self-reflexivity is indeed 
introduced by the very first image of the novel: “Through the driving-mirror four 
eyes stare back” (T 579), two of them are real, the other two are generated by an 
optical illusion. As Berressem explains, this double reflection “occurs when the 
frontal as well as the rear plane of a tick mirror both send back a reflection” 
(Berressem 133). The condition of a gaze looking at itself and receiving back its own 
stare exemplifies the process of the text reflecting itself, whereby the formula “A text 
is a text is a text” (T 635), which can stand  for b th the self-referential nature of the 
novel and its intertextuality.  
What the mirror sends back is a double effect of reality: four eyes instead of 
two, and since we are immediately told that two eyes are fictitious, “eXact replicas” 
of the other two, we feel our perception, our confidence in realistic representation is 
being undermined: the work of fiction refers to its own illusion, we are embarking on 
a voyage into a fictive universe. As Brooke-Rose elucidates, Thru “is not about the 
writing of fiction […] it’s about the fictionality of fiction: the fact that these 
characters are just letters on a page” (Hayman and Cohen 4). The idea of staring at 
the rear-mirror symbolises the idea of looking at the illusion of narration, of literary 
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creation. In this way, the text playfully inscribes it elf into the debate over language 
and representation, over the “reality” language can represent. The fictional illusion is 
emphasised, constantly built up and destroyed, the voices of the discourses are 
placed one upon another, disintegrating each other, rendering each other unreliable, 
constantly creating and breaking up the fictional illus on. 
Another implication of the process of looking at the mirror is “the paradox […] 
of a look directed forwards but that perceives what is behind” (Maack 133). This 
initiates the practice of intertextuality, the movement of the text mirroring both itself 
and what is behind, i.e. other texts. Language becom s the subject which mirrors 
itself (self-referentiality) but which is also related to its previous literary uses. 
Thru addressed the whole textual tradition and locates its lf in its chain, which 
goes from Cervantes to Rabelais, from The Bible to Beckett, from e. e. cummings to 
David the psalmist, from Scheherazade to I Promessi Sposi, from Sterne’s Tristram 
Shandy to Diderot’s Jacques, T. S. Eliot, Dante, Shakespeare, E. M. Forster, Wallace 
Stevens and so on. The oral tradition of lullabies, popular songs and sayings are also 
present in the text as part of the intertext Thru stems from and refers to. 
Literary echoes and quotations – spread all over th novel – are employed by 
the characters in their conversations to express their feelings or comment on the 
situations presented. References are often structured as an endless regressus ad 
infinitum: “Within each text is another text, within each myth another myth” (T 608), 
like a “show within the show” (T 587), like “doors opening on doors, mirrors on 
mirrors in an eternal game of vinciperdi” (T 716). The process can be summarized in 
the pseudo-formula, “F(bo(lo(bo(lo(books)oks)oks)oks) ks)n” (T 684), reinstated as 
“Books within books, looks within looks, looks within books, books within looks” (T 
678), or in the principle of “Once upon a time laid out in rectangles into which you 
enter as into a room saying once upon a time” (T 605), a play on the classical 
beginning of a fairy tale which infinitely leads ont  other tales.  
Thru is constructed through texts and subtexts, since “No text just comes out ex 
nihilo, it always comes out of other texts” (Tredell 34). Each book is in 
communication with all preceding books, each book looks back, like in a rear-mirror, 
for its predecessors, it must confront its antecedents, as a book is the result of the 
history of culture and narration and cannot elude what came before. To look back is 
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absolutely necessary to go forward, just like looking back in the rear-mirror of the 
car is essential to drive safely. In Thru indeed, we read that the “text within the text 
[…] generates another text” (T 631), and that the new solution generated is “a text 
which in effect is a dialogue with all preceding texts” (T 621). 
Like Barthes’ “inter-text”, Thru embodies “the impossibility of living outside 
the infinite text” (Barthes 1975 36), referring to other texts ad infinitum, in a never-
ending movement of circular intertextuality, and becoming “a multi-dimensional 
space in which a variety of writings, none of them original, blend and clash […] a 
tissue of quotations drawn from the innumerable centres of culture” (Barthes 1977 
146). In a text where one of the characters states “w ’ve used almost everything from 
Phaedrus to Freud” (T 653), a lover’s request of staying for the night is preceded by a 
mix of discourses taken from Genette, Barthes, Jakobson and Diderot, 
within the grammar of that narrative the roles can be interchanged and textasy multiplied until 
punctually at a fixed hour all the forged orgy ceases. For the deep structure of I am your slave is 
undoubtedly you will be mine and yet there is no transformational rule in any grammar which 
explicitly effects this since it is written up there that all deletions, reflexivisations dative movements 
object-raisings and other transformations be recoverabl  so that here it is merely a question of 
conjugality which comes under the lexicon and the morphophonemic rules as for example in please 
don’t go Armel it’s so nice having breakfast together. (T 665)  
 
Another salient example of such a mix of discourses i  to be found when we 
read, “Che vuoi? […] Votre demande is not an askable question. Veuillez appeller 
ultérieurement. Freud Freud why persecutest thou/me” (T 675). Lacan’s question is 
here followed by the typical answer of a busy telephone line, as well as by a biblical 
quotation. The question Christ asks Saul (Saul 27:7, 26:14) is now directed to Freud. 
The bar between “thou” and “me” recalls the Saussurean distinction between 
signifier/signified, as well as the Lacanian one between subject/object. Elsewhere, 
the characters’ names become the cause for an excursus on the meaning and role of 
proper names in literature. The passage touches on Barthes and Propp and ends up 
with a direct question to Jacques the fatalist,  
I should have stuck to pronouns as in late twentieth century texts which refuse biographies since a 
name must have a civic status […] That’s the rule. Written up there. In the grammar of narrative. Like 
attributes–states, properties and statuses. Iterativ  s opposed to actions. But any agent can enter into 
relationship with any predicate […] no need to talk like Propp et al of hero villain lawbearer these ar
predicates. The agent is not the one who can accomplish this or that action but the one who can 
become subject of a predicate […] So there have to be proper names after all, Jacques, Jacques why 
are you asleep? (T 647) 
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In a similar way, the dialectic of desire becomes the opic of discussion 
between Jacques and his master (Cf. T 595). Another time, Barthes’ death of the 
author is readdressed and mixed with the mistranslation of Todorov’s porte-récit and 
a quotation from Lewis Carroll’s Queen of Hearts: “There’s no more private property 
in writing, the author is dead, the spokesman, the porte-parole, the tale-bearer, off 
with his head” (T 607). 
If, as Maack explains, “the innovators […] refer explicitly to the literary 
tradition and carry on an intense dialogue between t xts” (Maack 130), Thru can be 
said to represent a step forward in this light, in hat while inscribing itself in the chain 
of intertextuality through endless allusions and quotations from other books, it never 
fails to renew them in its own way, to magisterially blend and repeat them in 
different contexts and/or order to let them gain new meaning: a new text, a new 
solution is created out of the old pre-existing ones. 
Moreover, most of the quotations in the text are not explicitly acknowledged. 
The process of “quoting without quotation marks” is posited by Barthes as one of the 
characteristic features of a plural text. In this way, the novel “subverts the opposition 
between true and false”, for if it fails to attribute quotations, it “flouts all respect for 
origin, paternity, propriety, [and] destroys the voice which could give the text its 
(‘organic’) unity” (Barthes 1974 44). Writing “has no other origin than language 
itself, language which ceaselessly calls into question all origins” (Barthes 1977 146). 
Thru becomes a “network” (Barthes 1977 161) of irretraceable quotations as “the 
citations which go to make up a text are anonymous, untraceable, and yet already 
read” (Barthes 1977 160).  
However, all the “sources” of Thru are humorously and concurrently declared 
towards the end of the novel. In fact, in the few last but one pages, all the dramatis 
personae mentioned or hinted at in the course of the novel are grouped together in a 
long list which awards them “degrees of presence” in alphabetical order, from Adam 
to Barthes, from Circe to Eros, Derrida, Genette, Greimas, God, Irigaray, Kristeva, 
Milton, the Phallusman, Propp, de Saussure, Scheherezade, the Text itself and the 
Textivores, Thanatos, Queen Victoria and poor Yorick, to mention but a few. The 
listing is put together by the students after a class nd the personages are given 
marks, “degrees of presence”, on the basis of the incidence of their presence in the 
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novel, so for instance Socrates receives a β- nd the overhead projector (used by the 
teacher in class) a γ-. This is an exemplary ending for such a text: an inventory of 
“sem(id)iotic irrecoverable narrators” (T 737) almost presented as actors on a casting 
list. Significantly, when Brooke-Rose is asked whether she agrees to call Thru “a 
kind of proto-novel”, the author replies,  
For Thru, certainly. It is consciously intertextual and there are lots of quotations that people haven’t 
picked up. At the end, I have this phony index. No-one’s understood that, but it’s actually a list of 
every author I quote in the book, but without page-ref rences […] and so authors are given alpha 
minuses and beta pluses and so on. I had to ask certain permissions when they were alive – everyone 
laughed […] So it’s a joke […] but it’s also an index. If anyone wants to chase up every time I quote 
something, it’s all there. (Tredell 34) 
 
The question of the varying degrees of presence hinted at many times 
throughout the text and playfully addressed here not o ly creates a pun, since the 
term “degree” means both “level” and “academic degre ”, but also ironically alludes 
to Genette’s theory on the posture of the narrator who can be either present or absent 
from the story. As he points out, “Absence is absolute, but presence has degrees” 
(Genette 1980 245). This linguistic joke also exemplifies the “untranslatability” of 
certain words and structures, since it would not make sense if translated into another 
language. 
 What we gather from the reference to Genette is that the narrators of Thru are 
not absent, it is rather their degree of presence which shifts constantly according to 
the subversive principle considered above (“the principle being that you do not 
follow the principle”). 
The same “non-principle” seems to have been adopted in structuring the 
different and always reversible narrative levels of Thru. In fact, if metalepsis is 
conventionally carried on by the narrating, introducing a story within another story 
by means of discourse, in Thru this process is perpetually transgressed: not onlydo 
its continuous metalepses occur without any formal narrating instance introducing 
them, but also and most importantly they become one f the textual structuring 
principles. Its characters appear in different stories – each of them is in turn narrator 
and narrated – and the hierarchy of narrative levels co lapses in absolute reversibility.  
It is significant to note how three of the main subtexts of Thru, namely the 
Thousand and One Nights, Tristram Shandy and Jacques le Fataliste, are 
metadiegetic narratives par excellance. If in the Thousand and One Nights each story 
 191 
stands at a higher narrative level than the preceding one, up to the point of a fifth 
degree narration,12 Thru develops this technique and blurs it ad infinitum, constantly 
transgressing and mixing the narrative levels to the point that it is impossible to 
distinguish them. The transgression of levels – which for Genette represents a 
challenge to the boundary of the narrating, an overstepping of the border between 
two worlds, “in defiance of verisimilitude”, a trespassing of the “sacred frontier 
between […] the world in which one tells [and] the world of which one tells” 
(Genette 1980 236) – goes in Thru beyond the infringing of frontiers: the borders 
between the levels are completely abolished. 
To complicate this situation further is the rigorous se of the present tense, 
owing to which the time of story and that of narrating coincide: the narrating is the 
here and now of the story. The nature of instantaneous narrative at all levels 
precludes any precise determination of the narrative instance: all the metadiegetic 
levels are put on the same time-plateau. The storie ar  embedded into other stories 
without in a sense ever transgressing their only level. All the stories seem to exist “at 
the same level, simply by digression, without any shift in the narrating instance” 
(Genette 1980 214). Stories within stories multiply ad infinitum the levels of 
narration, yet everything is “reduced” to one plateau: a single, immense narrative. It 
needs be said, however, that the continuous and purposeful transgression of levels is 
itself systematically overdetermined and, if it were not so, it would be almost 
impossible to follow the endless practice of stories within stories and transgressions 
of narrators from one level to the others. 
In the following chapters, we will consider the several theoretical implications 
to which Brooke-Rose’s narrative technique is inextricably linked. In the interim, I 
hope I have succeeded in comprehensively describing Thru’s highly innovative 
narrative practice, as well as in conveying the idea of how the author’s attitude 
towards language is both serious and humorous. Being a critic and a writer, her deep 
understanding of how language functions is employed to inscribe her text into the 
critical debate of the time, but by means of linguistic humour. 
                                                
12 As Todorov explains in the case of the story of the bloody chest, “Scheherazade tells that Jaafer 
tells that the tailor tells that the barber tells that his brother tells that… The last story is a story  the 
fifth degree” (Todorov 71).  
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The text’s graphical display, its collage of wordplays, juxtapositions, 
repetitions, different jargons metaphorically employed and its peculiarly doubting 
syntax, have the effect of disorienting the reader, who moves through an apparently 
randomly chaotic text, where everything is continually built up and dismantled only 
by means of language(s). 
However, the large number of different “compositional-stylistic unities” 
(Bakhtin 262) which the novel mixes together and which shape both its textual form 
(its “textuality” or printed materiality), and its content (its issues and themes), 
eventually determine its strength and dynamism, its narrative originality. The 
apparently labyrinthical chaos of Thru ultimately possesses its own coherence. The 
text achieves an immensely complex harmony which constitutes its unity. Thru is in 
fact, as it defines itself, “a very subtly planned chaos” (T 592). 
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Chapter 5 
Narrative anxiety subverted: rehandling the signifiers into a 
delicious discourse to find an exit Thru the text 
Having examined Thru’s peculiar narrative technique(s), we will now consider 
it in light of the critical debate of the time, thus showing how Brooke-Rose not only 
addresses, but also develops many of its speculations in her fictional practice. 
Thru’s mixture of discourses – which come both from the critical debate of the 
time and from the entire corpus of preceding literary production – enacts that 
“dialogization” of heteroglossia which for Bakhtin s the fundamental distinctive 
feature of the novel. In Brooke-Rose’s text in fact, different languages lose their 
specificity of closed systems and, merging together, they get deformed, giving shape 
to a dialogue of languages. Stretching across theories, Thru plays on their mixture 
and their “dialogue” which results in interdisciplinary and parodying discourse, a 
“collage” which aims at subverting those very discourses it is made of. The novel 
thus presents dialogization as parody, “verbal masquerade” (Bakhtin 275), as a 
polemical tool toward the “linguistic unity” of the “official language”. 
However, for Bakhtin the language of the novel is social and a different order 
from poetry: the novelist welcomes heteroglossia in his work, he “does not purge 
words of intentions and tones that are alien to him, he does not destroy the seeds of 
social heteroglossia embedded in words” (Bakhtin 299), whereas the poet possesses 
complete hegemony over the language he uses and subordinates it to his specific 
purposes, stripping “the word[s] of other’s intentio s”, making them lose “their link 
with concrete intentional levels of language and […] with specific contexts” (Bakhtin 
297). 
In this light, Brooke-Rose’s narrative practice not only parallels, but also 
develops Bakhtin’s theory, as it seems to simultaneously retain the quality of 
welcoming heteroglossia and surpassing it, exploding heteroglossia towards poetical 
directions. Brooke-Rose adopts in fact what the text itself defines as a 
“transformational approach” (T 714) towards its blend of discourses, in that while 
employing endless allusions and quotations from the li erary debate and from other 
fictional texts for the construction of the narrative, she never fails to renew them, 
magisterially distorting and blending discourses and references by means of 
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juxtaposition and repetition in order to let new, metaphorical relations of meaning 
emerge among them. 
Using the distinction between deep and surface structu e, we could say that in 
the case of such a literal use of specific jargons, the surface structure is that of the 
critical theory, whereas the metaphor is created at the level of the deep structure. 
This practice once again reminds us of Pound’s dynamic subliminal structures, where 
the metaphor is created at the level of the deep structure, whilst the surface structure 
is not metaphoric. Brooke-Rose thus succeeds in creating the same tension which she 
admires in Pound’s poetry.  
 As already observed, Thru plays on the context of utterance to shape 
multiplicity of meaning. For Bakhtin, each specific word bears connotations which 
influence the context of discourse, whereas the context has influence on the utterance 
as it “can refract, add to, or, in some cases, even subtract from the amount and kind 
of meaning the utterance may be said to have when it is conceived only as a 
systematic manifestation independent of context” (Bakhtin xx). Brooke-Rose’s work 
further develops Bakhtin’s theory, as the text plays on unusual contexts to “add” or 
“refract” meaning to specific utterances in ironical and multi-meaningful directions. 
The same word or sentence, repeated in a different co ext, acquires altered 
connotations of meaning, while different sentences replacing each other in the same 
context affect the meaning of the context and suddenly institute new semantic 
prospects. The repeated idea of “texts within texts” and “boxes within boxes”, apart 
from referring to the practice of intertextuality, can be seen as an endless 
“discovering” or “creation” of new meanings from other ones.  
It is both the “system of a unitary language” (Bakhtin 269), the language “as 
ideologically saturated, language as a world view” (Bakhtin 271) and the centrifugal 
forces of stratification, the different socio-ideological languages which Thru 
rehandles, “alter[ing] the signifiers into a delirious discourse” (T 711) and subverting 
the struggle of heteroglossia. It is the very idea of the “immense plurality of 
experience” (Bakhtin xx) which Brooke-Rose develops to extremes by playing with 
disparate discourses and reshaping them continuously.  
Bakhtin defines “hybridisation” as a “mixture of two social languages within 
the limits of a single utterance, an encounter […] between two different linguistic 
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consciousnesses, separated from one another by an epoch, by social differentiation or 
by some other factor” (Bakhtin 358). Thru multiplies ad infinitum the dialogic 
orientation of words and brings hybridisation to extr me consequences. In Thru, a 
great variety of different discourses merge together: innumerable intertextual 
reminders from disparate epochs and cultures are inextr cably mixed together, as 
well as with different languages, puns, and newly-created words. This peculiar mix, 
gives life to a “collage narrative”, where each discourse loses its specificity (the 
significance it possessed in its text of origin) to acquire new connotations of 
meaning. Aware of the fact that “language has been completely taken over, shot 
through with intentions and accents” (Bakhtin 293), Brooke-Rose seems to adopt a 
force strategy to take over heteroglossia: through the complete blend of discourses 
and through the continuous choice of the multi-directed word, all the socially and 
culturally charged discourses Thru makes use of get remoulded within the fictional 
tissue and offer the possibility of discovering at each reading a range of new 
interpretations and combinations. Thru’s dialogization proliferates ceaselessly and 
explodes the seeds of heteroglossia, as different languages lose their specificity and 
develop into metaphor, giving life to a text where language becomes individual and 
attains the status of poetry. While outrunning Bakhtin’s speculations, Thru’s poetical 
charge already points towards Kristeva’s innovative heories.  
In conceiving her theory Kristeva starts from Lacan, for whom the unconscious 
– “structured like a language” – holds what has been repressed from consciousness 
and therefore linguistic gaps are the manifestation of the unconscious psychic life 
and the “discourse in an analytic session is valuable only in so far as it stumbles or is 
interrupted” (Lacan 1989 299), revealing the realm of Imaginary which conscious 
psychic life normally suppresses in order not to fall into schizophrenia. Kristeva, 
however, displaces Lacan’s notions of Imaginary andSymbolic into the Semiotic – 
the bodily drives and their articulation as they are discharged in signification and 
give life to non-referential meaning – and the Symbolic – society, culture, the 
grammar and structure of signification which produce referential meaning – and 
surpasses Lacan in that she conceives the Semiotic and the Symbolic as two 
inseparable modalities of signification, both necessary and constitutive of the 
signifying process, thus seeing that the transgression of the symbolic does not 
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necessarily entail schizophrenia. The semiotic continually makes itself manifest in 
language as a breach into the symbolic: such an irrupt on of the instinctual, that 
which precedes meaning and signification, into the realm of the symbolic, such a 
“drive heterogeneity” is all-encompassing in fantasies as well as in poetic language. 
Poetic language is thus a “plural, heterogeneous, and contradictory process of 
signification” (Kristeva 1984 88), one which encompasses both structure and 
transgression, and where the first is continually challenged by the second.  
In this light, the language of Thru, with its linguistic jokes and inventions, 
dreams (Cf. T 722), slips of the tongue, and continuous interruptions, can be seen as 
the expression of the gaps of the unconscious and therefore – in Kristeva’s terms – as 
a breaching of the semiotic into the symbolic. In the same line, if Kristeva explains 
that “All poetic ‘distortions’ of the signifying chain and the structure of signification 
may be considered in this light: they yield under the attack of […] those drives that 
the thetic phase was not able to sublate” (Kristeva 1984 49), in Thru the sudden 
changes of discourse, the interruptions, and the sentences leading from one “place” 
to another without any apparent logical consequentiality, can be all seen as the 
movement of an unconscious discourse. The poetical value of Brooke-Rose’s novel 
derives not only from its syntax which disrupts thelogic of discourse and from its 
wordplays which stress the signifier and its multiplic ty of connotations, but also 
from its different jargons which get reworked through juxtaposition and repetition 
and acquire metaphorical meaning. The poetical charge of Thru’s multiple fusion of 
discourses is underlined by one the teachers on various occasions, 
you’ve done linguistics haven’t you no well you must every poet must it’s wildly poetic, the binary 
polarity in any field phonic or semic […] white versus black or white versus non-white. But that’s 
logic it’s as old as Socrates it comes in the Protag r s. (T 661) 
 
No of course I am not a structuralist I never have be n I merely played with it besides one has to pass
through it to understand modern linguistics. Generative grammar’s the thing it’s the grammar of the 
universe and it’s wildly poetic why they have rules called it-deletion and psych-movement subject-
raising and object-raising and head-noun-chopping can you imagine the object of central loss being 
raised read Hegel on Aufhebung it becomes wildly funny. (T 662-3) 
 
 In addition, the non-verbal signifying systems the novel presents can be said to 
be entirely constructed on the semiotic modality: both the graphical arrangements 
and the musical notation – together with the musical rhythm determined by lullabies 
and popular songs – can be seen as a pure semiotic presence inscribed in the text. 
The language of Thru exemplifies the poetic language Kristeva theorised as in it the 
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semiotic continually irrupts into the symbolic and counters it, giving life to “a 
signifying practice which, although produced in language, is only intelligible through 
it” (Kristeva 1984 15), a practice which counters formalist structures and attests to 
the limits of ideological constructs for the interpretation of the text. The accent put 
by Kristeva on the term through, which she emphasises in italics, reveals another 
connotation of meaning of the novel’s title: languae can only be understood through 
it, with a sort of transversal movement which exceeds any formalist analysis. There 
is always something which goes beyond interpretation and can be only “felt” through 
poetic language. 
Poetic language transgresses the symbolic, the order and the law of society. In 
it, “the positing of the symbolic […] finds itself subverted”, in that it “attacks not 
only denotation (the positing of the object) but meaning (the positing of the 
enunciating subject) as well” (Kristeva 1984 57, 58). Such a use of language shows 
that the hierarchical relationship between signifier and signified is an abstraction. 
Unity is subverted and multiple meanings arise, from two onwards. Any procedure 
based on a systematic axiom of definition, unity, identity, zero-one sequence, true-
false opposition, cannot formalize poetic language nd experiences a crisis when 
facing it. Poetic language can be grasped only by entering its zero-two logic, where 
the one of dogmatic definition and the law is subverted. In this way, the poetic word 
exceeds the discourse of institutionalized culture, shakes the border between “true” 
and “false”, undermines meaning, it is “polyvalent a d multi-determined” (Kristeva 
1980a 65), it breaks through the logic of grammar and semantic and in challenging 
the official linguistic logic, it challenges the structure of society. The text itself 
indeed stresses the significance and role of the pun, defining it as “free, anarchic, a 
powerful instrument to explode the civilization of the sign and all its stable, 
reassuring definitions, to open up its static, monstrous logic of expectation into a 
different dialectic with the reader” (T 607). 
Poetic language does not permit identification with one single meaning, it 
always escapes the definition of one unique truth and offers multiple connotations 
and interpretative possibilities: truth does not exist, the paradigm of language jumps 
from zero to two, “the notion of definition, determination, the sign ‘=’ and the very 
concept of sign, which presupposes a vertical (hierarchical) division between 
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signifier and signified, cannot be applied to poetic language – by definition an 
infinity of pairings and combinations” (Kristeva 1980a 69). Kristeva relates this 
notion to Saussure’s “poetic paragram” (qtd. in Kristeva 1980a 69), the anagrams 
which link directly zero to two, jumping over the one of unity and definition, which 
is revealing in light of Brooke-Rose’s use of anagrams in Thru. 
The dialogical language of the novel becomes, in Barthes’ words, a writing 
which “ceaselessly posits meaning to evaporate it, carrying out a systematic 
exemption of meaning [and which], by refusing to assign a ‘secret’, an ultimate 
meaning to the text (and to the world as text), liberates what may be called an anti-
theological activity, an activity that is truly revolutionary since to refuse to fix 
meaning is, in the end, to refuse God and his hypostase  – reason, science, law” 
(Barthes 1977 147). In this way, Brooke-Rose’s work challenges and subverts – in 
line with Derrida’s deconstruction – the supposed transparent relation of meaning 
and thing represented between signifier and signified, i.e. the metaphysical notion of 
being as “self-presence of the subject” (Derrida 1976 12), for which meaning is 
instituted once and for all. In “the play of signifying references that constitute 
language” (Derrida 1976 7), meaning is endlessly deferr d in time and differed in 
space, never present. Language bears no ultimate meaning since, as Thru reinstates: 
“reality […] merely seeks to appear true […] the signifier of signifiers beneath which 
the truth escapes” (T 727). For Derrida, each sign always refers to other signs ad 
infinitum, in a process where no ultimate referent or foundation can be established: 
the deferral of meaning ensures that meaning, escaping any individual attempt at 
control, can never be definitively present. Meaning is ultimately undecidable and the 
absence of the transcendental signifier permits an infi ite play: “one must think of 
writing as a game within language” (Derrida 1976 50). In Thru, to offer multiple 
meanings are first of all aporias such as paradox, ambiguity and contradiction. By 
means of its own indeterminacy, the language of Thru breaks down the logic of the 
sign and produces a proliferation, a dissemination of meaning: each discourse offers 
innumerable reading prospects: meaning is always (t least) double, interpretation is 
at the basis of understanding. 
Permitting an infinity of interpretations and combination and therefore 
exceeding unity, Brooke-Rose’s use of language perfectly illustrates Kristeva’s 
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declaration that “There is no limit to what can be said in the text” (Kristeva 1984 
209). Thru becomes a dialogic, revolutionary, polyphonic novel where discourse 
reads itself, enters into dialogue with itself and “constructs itself through a process of 
destructive genesis”, a text where “two texts meet, contradict, and relativize each 
other” (Kristeva 1980a 77, 78), thus subverting binarism, destroying the order of the 
law, the 0-1 logic (the Aristotelian logic of the excluded middle on which the 
binarism of Western society is based), God, the authority, the univocal and dogmatic 
structure of society. It is a parodying, carnivalesque text, whose references to the 
chansons des troubadours, to anecdotes and popular tales, become significant 
intertextual reminders which concur to put Thru in line with the tradition of carnival. 
In fact, as Kristeva explains, carnivalesque structures persist in our days as a 
substratum of the official culture, in popular narratives, “in folk games as well as in 
Medieval theater and prose” (Kristeva 1980a 78). 
Carnival discourse is not a relativizing practice where “everything goes”, but 
follows a law which displaces the zero-one logic. It operates within this disrupting 
logic and evades the rule of monological structures. Transgression does not act 
without a law, but rather it acts outside the monolithic zero-one law and gives itself a 
law other: “Dialogism is not ‘freedom to say everything,’ it is a dramatic ‘banter’ 
[…] an other imperative than that of 0 […] a transgression giving itself a law” 
(Kristeva 1980a 71). In this light, Larissa’s already cited statement – “the principle 
being that you do not follow the principle” (T 622, 699) – acquires salient 
connotations.  
In the “polyphonic novel”, the word becomes “ambivalent”, in that it both 
retains the connotations of meaning it already had an  assumes new ones: it is “a 
word with two significations […] the result of a joining of two systems” (Kristeva 
1980a 73). Such a word, far from being merely imitated, is repeated with 
relativization of meaning and becomes either re-appropriation (the writer uses it for 
his own discourse in context), parody (the new signification the word acquires is 
opposite to its old one), or modification (the other meaning of the word modifies the 
discourse). This is exactly what happens in Thru when the text repeats and blends 
discourses together, making them both echo their original signification and acquire 
new metaphorical and (most often) humorous connotations. 
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In this light, Thru becomes also a text which produces bliss, i.e. one “where 
the death of language is glimpsed” (Barthes 1975 6), where the canonical and 
subversive edges of language coexist, as what bestows eroticism on the text is neither 
traditional culture nor its annihilation, but rather “the seam between them, the fault, 
the flaw” (Barthes 1975 7). 
The moment of the text as signifying practice coincides with the very “moment 
of the struggle exploding the subject” (Kristeva 1984 211). The experience of the 
text “dissolves the subject’s compactness and self-pr sence” (Kristeva 1984 203) as 
it puts the subject in conflict with the object “rep sented”. The subject of this 
practice experiences rejection, heterogeneous contradic ion: an infinite, dialectical 
movement arises within the pulverized subject on trial, “what takes place is the 
struggle with the strictly subjective thesis, with the One, as well as with all […] 
systematicities” (Kristeva 1984 204). The very moment of struggle is the moment of 
renewal of the subject, which produces “the ‘appearance’ of this ‘new’ object”: “At 
the place of this struggle, the ‘appearance’ does not exist; its ‘moment’ is ‘fiction,’ or 
even ‘laughter’” (Kristeva 1984 204). 
This is a crucial point for our analysis: the stress on the terms fiction and 
laughter makes us understand in yet a different light the “fictionality of fiction” and 
the humour which Brooke-Rose has always stressed when talking about her 
narrative. Fiction and laughter set out the moment of heterogeneous contradiction, by 
means of which the subject is brought to renew itself in the practice of a text. “In this 
moment […] the subject breaks through his unifying enclosure and, through a leap 
(laughter? fiction?), passes into the process of social change that moves through him” 
(Kristeva 1984 205).  
The subject and the object are reconstituted anew by a movement of drive 
rejection against contradiction, which ends up with the dismissal of all stasis. The 
moment of rejection produces revolution, revolutionary discourse, and corresponds 
to the death drive and therefore jouissance: “the text […] constitutes […] jouissance 
through language” (Kristeva 1984 210). 
Brooke-Rose’s novel is thus “a practice that pulverizes unity […] a process that 
posits and displaces theses” (Kristeva 1984 208), the experience of which results in a 
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struggle which dissolves the bond between subject and society, creating the 
conditions for renewal.  
The renewal of the subject, Kristeva explains, is also dependent on the lack of 
personified transference. This implied absence prevents the discourse from becoming 
(in contrast to analytic discourse) the site where the subject identifies itself with a 
focal point: “To hamper transference, the text’s analysis must produce the certainty 
that the analyst’s place is empty, that ‘he’ is dead, and that rejection can only attack 
signifying structures” (Kristeva 1984 209). The lack of transference relation “allows 
the text to operate in a much wider signifying field than it otherwise would, and to 
carry out much more radical subversions, which, far from stopping at desire, involve 
the subject’s very jouissance” (Kristeva 1984 209). In Thru, the famous question 
“Who Speaks?” and the many references to the dead author (which we will consider 
at length in the following chapter),  clearly indicate the absence of the analysand, so 
that the empty place of the author hampers transferenc  and puts the subject on trial, 
starting the movement of contradiction which will bring renewal and allowing the 
text to become the site of this process. 
The dialogical nature of Thru concurrently calls into question the concept of 
intertextuality. In this connection, the essay “Word, Dialogue, and Novel” (1969) is 
formative in understanding the way Brooke-Rose appro riates Kristeva’s theses and 
elaborates them in her text. Kristeva starts here from the definition of “word” and 
“dialogism”. Rather than retaining fixed, pre-determined meaning, a literary word is 
“an intersection of textual surfaces” (Kristeva 1980a 65), the result of a dialogue 
between writing subject, addressee and the cultural context it refers to: “The word’s 
status is thus defined horizontally (the word in the text belongs to both writing 
subject and addressee) as well as vertically (the word in the text is oriented toward an 
anterior or synchronic literary corpus” (Kristeva 1980a 66). The word becomes the 
centre of dialogism and inter-textuality: “dialogism identifies writing as […] 
intertextuality” (Kristeva 1980a 68). 
A dialogic novel is intertextual in that the text inserts itself into the chain of 
“exterior” texts and the chain of texts is inserted within the text. Writing is “a reading 
of the anterior literary corpus and the text […] an bsorption of and a reply to 
another text” (Kristeva 1980a 69). If “any text is constructed as a mosaic of 
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quotations; any text is the absorption and transformation of another” (Kristeva 1980a 
65), then its understanding must pass through the understanding of its intertextual 
relationships, its constant dialogue with the preceding literary corpus it refers to and 
stems from, in an ethic of both affirmation and negation. 
Intertextuality as a subversive strategy becomes in fact the very structuring 
principle of Thru. It is subversive in that it opens up a dialogue between the 
discourses of the critical debate of the time and the present text, reshaping those 
theories into metaphor. It becomes however the more subversive as it inserts those 
discourses into the wider chain of the entire culture and its fictional production. In 
point of fact, the endless network of quotations, the texts and subtexts Thru is made 
up of are both the “real” critical texts of narratology and the fictional texts of 
literature.  
By referring simultaneously to the preceding fictional texts and to the 
contemporary corpus of critical theories, Thru becomes the centre of dialogism and 
intertextuality, inscribing itself at the intersection of two axes: horizontally it belongs 
to writing subject and addressee and refers to a specific cultural context, vertically, it 
refers to the whole amount of preceding literary works (Cf. Kristeva 1980 65). As a 
dialogic text, its discourse involves the totality of relationships between the 
individual, the unconscious and culture, in a movement of confrontation and 
appropriation which becomes destruction and construction, “productive violence” 
(Kristeva 1984 16), both revolution and jouissance. 
What is more, blending together preceding fictional texts and contemporary 
theoretical (real) texts, and inserting the whole amount of their discourses into the 
broader “text” of our culture, Thru perfectly illustrates Derrida’s concept that “There 
is nothing outside of the text” (Derrida 1976 158), that everything is text, that the 
“text” is what is broadly inscribed within culture and society, what is both outside 
and inside of the text as traditionally conceived. This very notion is indeed taken up 
in Thru and re-worked into several instances: we read of “a text like the human body 
or society” (T 685), “a text like love and three beautiful illegitimate children” (T 
660), or again “a text like the world or the human body that merely engenders itself 
in to writing” (T 592-3). The entire culture becomes a text, a liminal space between 
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the binary oppositions which produces endless prolife ation of meaning and possible 
interpretations.  
Clearly stating that “anyone has a right to subvert any text with any other” (T 
643), and positing “textuality as subversion of society” (T 670), Thru sets about 
“lighting up the commonplaces from the other place to generate a text” (T 722), 
laying bare the system of binary oppositions which supersedes our culture: “white 
versus non-white […] it’s as old as Socrates” (T 661), “the war between man and 
woman, day and night, the city and the tomb” (T 678), “the potion and the holy grail 
the pen and the paper” (T 687). In sexual relationships, binary oppositions show the 
double standard: female adultery is “non-prescribed”, whereas male adultery is “non-
forbidden” (T 661), “the double standard is rampant everywhere one is amazed” (T 
636). By showing the underlying binarism at the heart of each of these “stories”, and 
by presenting critical theories as stories themselves, their status of illusion is laid 
bare. If everything is text, everything is a fiction, a trope which can be subverted to 
show the basic illusion which generates it: love, family, history, society, politics, 
religion, literary and psychological theories are all “stories” to be narrated, life is 
made up of stories, “narration is life”. 
The process of juxtaposition – which T ru utilizes as one of its basic methods 
to let metaphorical meaning emerge – assumes a basic role in light of Derrida’s 
theory which posits it as the second step of its deconstructive approach. If each text 
bears in itself other texts ad infinitum, by means of juxtaposition, Thru lays bare the 
text within the text and produces subversion, accomplishing the deconstructive 
process and becoming a “blue lacuna of learning and unlearning a text within a text” 
(T 585). 
A perfect illustration of the fusion of real and fictive texts is the peculiar 




Wallace Stevens John Dryden Umberto Eco Daniel Defoe Sigmund Freud Moses Ezra Pound Wallace 
Stevens T.S. Eliot (or Guido Cavalacanti) Dante Alighieri Alexander Pope William Shakespeare 
Saroja Chaitwantee S. Eliot Snoopy Hegel Ali Nourennin and the occidental discourse of Westerns. 
**retroprogradiens  
The retrovizor 1001 Nights Ezra Pound Lewis Carroll Robert Burns Lewis Carroll Robert Graves 
Louis Hjelmslev Ali Nourennin Paul Stradiver oh her Georges Bataille William Shakespeare Jacques 
Derrida A.J. Greimas Noam Chomsky Plato Ezra Pound the voters Ruth Veronica his reflection 
Diderot Roland Barthes Edward Fitzgerald Francis Bacon Sophocles W.K. Wimsatt Robert Greene 
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Daniel Defoe Moses Wallace Stevens Sigmund Freud Wallace Stevens the folk Barbra Streisand Jesus 
Christ Frank Kermode Jacques Lacan Denis Diderot the institution Ezra Pound the chairman of the 
hour Jeremy Roland Barthes Francis Bacon Jeremy Armel Tzvetan Todorov e.e. cummings the short 
plump demagogue Bertrans de Born James Joyce Wayne C. Booth Homer Roman Jakobson Julia 
Kristeva Ali Nourennin at al W.B Yeats Northrup Frye Umberto Eco John Cage Jane Austen a 
Victorian old maid Julia Kristeva Dr. Santores the Institution Saroja Chaitwantee Traditional Wisdom 
Gertrude Stein William Shakespeare Peter Brandt Christopher Isherwood Ali Nourennin Anton 
Chekov the chairman of the hour hagiography Armel? The lanky henchman Julian Claire Olivier the 
chairman of the hour Charles at al Homo Scholasticu Lawrence Sterne Choto Rustaveli Scheherezade 
Tzvetan Todorov the Student Body Karl Marx Plato Tristram Shandy Alessandro Manzoni thus 
meeting up with the occidental discourse of the Western. (T 622-3) 
 
This peculiar inventory also presents characters from Thru (Ali Nourennin, 
Saroja Chaitwantee, Dr. Santores), thus strengthening the link between preceding 
(fictional and “real”) texts and people and the present work. 
Another case in point is constituted by Larissa being presented as a “dompna 
soisebuda”, made up of the parts of different women. The dance of the seven veils 
becomes the dance of her twenty-seven selves,  
composed of femme-reine, femme-enfant femme-fatale, gr y eminence Cleopatra’s nose Musset’s 
Muse a bit of Heloise old and new the charming scatterbrain Georges Sand Mme de Merteuil George 
Eliot Antigone Elizabeth Barrett Browning Elinour of Aquitaine Mrs. Pankhurst Circe Julia Kristeva 
Joan Baez Penelope Virginia Woolf Helen of Troy la princesse lointaine Scheherezade Pallas Athene 
la belle indifférente the man with the blue guitar 
The dance of the twenty-seven veils […] 
(T 662-3) 
 
Larissa is a fictional character made up of parts of both “real” and fictive 
personae. The binarism fiction/reality is played upon and shown to be only a 
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construct: the relationship between the inner reality of the text and the outer, “real” 
(if we must use that term) world it refers to, is blurred. 
With an apparently contradictory dynamics, Thru seems to dismantle the idea 
of fiction as representation of an “outer world reality”, to negate representation – 
“this being a text, not an imitation of life” (T 657) – focusing the attention of both 
the reader and the characters on the process which s apes the chimera of writing, on 
the linguistic and narratological aspects of the novel, endlessly referring to the 
“optical illusion” it creates, to the fact that its characters are only paper inventions. 
At the same time however, it shows how the supposed authenticity of the “real” 
withdraws behind layers of narration, how reality is an illusion and “everything is 
text”. The notion of a “real” level outside the narrative game is undermined. The text 
utterly denies the prospect of discerning between “internal” and “external” reality, 
also by means of the continuous and purposeful shifts of focalization which shake the 
whole logic of narrative representation. The hierarchy of narrative levels collapses in 
absolute reversibility, suggesting that there might be no reality apart from the text 
(“there is nothing outside of the text”). 
In this way, Thru carries out the deconstructive approach as conceived by 
Derrida throughout itself and by means of itself. Deconstruction cannot merely 
reverse an existing metaphysical opposition, but it must also accomplish the second 
step of its strategy, the contamination and corruption of the same opposition. Brooke-
Rose’s text in fact enacts an absolute blurring which subverts the real/fictional 
dichotomy with the aim of reaffirming its second term, but in a different light. 
Indeed, if we consider the correlation between the narrative levels, we see that 
no apparent link is postulated between the stories, enacting what Genette calls 
“structural” relationship between diegesis and metadi gesis (Genette 1980 233). As a 
result, what assumes the utmost importance is the narrating act; the metadiegetic is 
not important in that it fulfils a specific function (explanation, contrast, analogy or 
distraction), but in that it is a way of bringing forth narration: “it is the act of 
narrating itself that fulfils the function of the diegesis, independently of the 
metadiegetic content” (Genette 1980 233). This is also illuminatingly revealed by 
Larissa addressing narration in these terms, “I know, it’s a flop. As this one, and the 
next, redundant but necessary for qualcosa to continue. Narration is life and I am 
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Scheherezade” (T 711). As for Scheherezade, narrating in Thru becomes a way of 
escaping death: the only thing which matters is to continue inventing stories in a way 
that keeps the reader’s pleasure and curiosity alive.  
Along these lines, Brooke-Rose’s work recasts the importance of the narrative 
act per se: narration is what matters, narration is life, an immense fictional act in 
which everything and everyone participates. The tension created in the reader by this 
continuous process of construction and destruction is solved by recasting the 
fictionality of it all, “You are mad, all of you. You’re talking about all these people 
as if they really existed” (T 732). Again, as Armel says, “That surely is the trouble, 
we do not exist. But by all means let’s go on pretending we do” (T 631). If we are 
unable to distinguish what is “true” from what is “false”, it is because we are not 
meant to, because it is all “just” narration, narration being neither true nor false, but 
“simply” narration. The subversion of the opposition truth/falsehood, real/imitation is 
performed in order to reiterate the importance of the fictionality of fiction because, 
although – as Brooke-Rose has her characters say – “it’s only a semiotic castle […] 
we are the text we do not exist […] we are a pack of lies” (T 733), “narration is 
[nonetheless] life”.  
Going further in the process of deconstruction of fixed meaning, Thru 
thoroughly carries out the subversion of the concept of the book as retaining eternal 
verities by challenging its very basis, i.e. the ida of a centered subject who has 
authority over the book and endows it with absolute signification, a transcendental 
signifier who is the absolute origin of meaning. The question of origin is a 
fundamental one that links Christian tradition, metaphysics, modern linguistics and 
psychoanalysis, and which was at the centre of the cultural debate of the time. 
Psychoanalysis hypothesised an initial state of unity, from which a split followed, 
inaugurating the entrance of the subject into the social/symbolic. Both Lacan and 
Kristeva posited in fact the “origin” of the split subject in relation to its primal 
trauma. Such theories – in line with Christian religion and traditional metaphysics – 
presupposed a primal happiness followed by the fall into sin. If Derrida counters this 
logic by showing that arche-writing is always already present and absent, Brooke-
Rose’s text playfully addresses the notion of origin as an essential step of its 
deconstructive strategy. 
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In Thru, several ironical misquotations of the Christian Bible seem to allude to 
the contemporary debate over the origin of the psychoanalytic subject. The sentence 
“In the beginning was the parting shot” (T 613) forinstance – a rewriting of the 
phrase “In the beginning was the Word” (Genesis 1:1) – seems to be linking at once 
all the faces of the debate over the question of origin and recast the whole dispute in 
irony, probably alluding to the fictionality of all these discourses, but surely 
relativizing them all at once in the reaffirmation f the play of fictionality. “The Fall 
was into language” is another misquotation (Cf. Genesis 3: 1-24) which again seems 
to readdress simultaneously Lacan’s, Kristeva’s and Derrida’s ideas, here even more 
humorously, as the sentence follows a proper “fall” into language: “go fuck yourself” 
(T 655). Again, the biblical “go forth and multiply” (T 625) is used to refer to the 
multiplication of I-narrators in the text as well as to its sexual perspective. Similarly, 
the sentence “it is more difficult for a phallus-man to enter the I of a woman than for 
the treasurer of signifiers to enter the paradiso terrestre” (T 595), is both a 
misquotation (Matthew 19:24, and Mark 10: 25) and a play on the idea of a primal 
state of happiness in paradise reworked with a sexual twist to allude to the 
impossibility of understanding between the sexes, whereas the sentence “Adam 
wants an apple” (T 633) is a reminder of both Generative Grammar and the original 
sin committed in paradise, which caused The Fall (into language). Even the dogma of 
Christ’s incarnation is wittingly treated as we read, “did Christ have an Oedipus 
complex?” (T 723). With this last example, Brooke-Rose clearly teases both 
Christian religion and psychoanalysis. As Patricia W ugh explains, in the sixties, 
psychoanalysis seemed to be “able to provide for this world what religion had 
provided in the past: a means of charting and making safe its unknown terrain in 
existential and universal terms”. Appropriated by the therapy movement, 
“psychoanalysis seemed the new fundamentalist religion of the individualistic West” 
(Waugh 1995 67). Brooke-Rose targets therefore boththe text of religion and that of 
psychoanalysis which tends to replace it.  
The use of biblical language and tones (Cf. also T 593, 675) obviously 
inscribes religion – a “text” like any other – within the all-encompassing intertextual 
chain. The destruction of the book (and The Bible is in our culture “The Book” par 
excellence) is a necessary violence which “denudes the surface of the text” (Derrida 
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1976 18), the place of difference which can only be articulated by virtue of the 
opposition of inside and outside: at the place of difference, arche-writing arises as a 
deconstructive difference/différance which characterises the text as opposed to the 
idea of book embodying everlasting truths. 
For the Western world, eternal truth is generated by the logos and present in 
speech but only imitated by writing: spoken words are symbols of mental experience, 
whereas written words are deemed to be symbols of symbols, representative of 
speech, producing a double of the object in question, s  that the written signifier is 
considered to have “no constitutive meaning” (Derrida 1976 11). Derrida shows that 
this concept is a trope, an illusion, that there is no original truth present in the logos 
to which writing is subordinate, no a priori sense that writing transcribes, since 
writing is the very “condition of the epistémè” (Derrida 1976 27). Once the 
predominance of speech over writing has been inverted, a new notion of writing, 
“originary writing” or “arche-writing”, can arise as the place of difference, a liminal 
space between and within them.  
Thru overtly addresses the idea that speech has always been privileged over 
writing as “present to itself”, opposed to the “non-self-presence” (Derrida 1976 8, 
17) of writing. We read for instance that “words imply the absence of things” (T 725, 
728), or else that “a text […] inevitably produce a double of the thing re-presented, 
the double being nothing, a non-being which nevertheless is added to the thing” (T 
721). At the same time, however, the text subverts the speaking/writing dichotomy, 
endlessly distorting it to demonstrate that there is no primacy between its two 
“opposites”. The Derridean deconstructive practice is thoroughly enacted in Thru, as  
also demonstrated by the fact that the terms trace and architrace appear already in 
the novel’s first pages (Cf. T 584). Disguised as acrostics, they are overdetermined 
by means of bold capitals: the already observed textual process of “giving and taking 
away” both reveals and hides one of the main threads of the text.  
The reader of Thru is seemingly presented with both oral discourses and
explicitly written pieces which “interrupt” the flow of talk. Speaking is acted by 
means of dialogues, interjections, class discussion, as well as by means of popular, 
oral narratives inserted in the text (folktales, lullabies, idioms). Writing is given in 
letters, lists (of participants to the various class discussions and of characters), in the 
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extra-authorial literary texts reported within the main text, in the students’ homework 
and in the handwritten teacher’s comments to them. The speaking/writing binarism is 
revealed to be as old as the Western civilization: “Take Homer for instance through 
to the civilization of the sign with its dualistic binary structure and its vertical 
hierarchy” (T 610). The dichotomy is endlessly blurred as written pieces could be 
also interpreted as oral and vice versa. The pieces of homework and the comments to 
them in fact could be there as both oral and written narrative: they could be 
interpreted as being read aloud during the lesson, or as being presented to the reader 
in their written form, or again they could reflect the objective consciousness of the 
momentary narrator, who looks at the written page and (but not necessarily) reads it 
to the class. Inversely, the discourses which we believe as oral, could be written as 
well, being part of the very novel Armel, Larissa or the students are writing.  
The boundary between written and spoken is also abolished by means of terms 
which presuppose both the written vehicle and the speaking subject in order to be 
appreciated. This is the case of onomatopoeic words  puns: although necessarily 
presented by means of writing, they presuppose the act of speaking. Writing and 
speaking are shown to be interdependent, form and co tent are both stressed. A 
further “level” of interaction between writing and speaking is suggested when the 
master seems to be dictating his text to Jacques, “To begin with, I mean, sorry scrub 
that” (T 644): dictation simultaneously entails and i terrelates the acts of speaking 
and writing. 
If oral and written discourses engage in an endless play which subverts their 
distinction, a never-ending blurring which ultimately results in undecidability, the 
text seems to imply that to grant one term priority over the other is neither possible 
nor productive. Indeed, the idea of an originary writing which lies at the place of 
difference between writing and speaking is introduced in the very first page of the 
novel as we read,  
Who Speaks? 
 
le rétro                                        viseur                       (some                             languages 
      more                                     visible than                 others)     
                                                                                                                            (T 579) 
                                                       
“Rétroviseur” is the French term for “rear-mirror”. However, the words “rétro” 
and “viseur” appear separated on the page, so that if we only hear them, we think of 
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the rear-mirror, but as we see them, the two words’ re pective connotations interact 
with each other and produce new meanings. The terms co e respectively from the 
Latin “rĕtro” – back, indicating a backward movement or a backward position – and 
“v īsus” – past participle of the verb “vidēre”, to see. In English, “retro” is both an 
adjective referring to things of the past and a prefix used to form adjectives and 
nouns which indicate that something goes back or backw rds, whereas “visor” 
indicates either the part of a helmet/cap which protects the eyes, or the screen inside 
the car which can be turned down to protect the driver’s eyes from light reflection, 
i.e. something quite different from a mirror, used to help the eyes see rather than to 
shade them. Thus, “le rétro viseur” acquires the meaning of someone (the “vizir” 
present in the text?) or something who looks back or from the back. The term seems 
therefore to address the dichotomy speaking/writing  the same way as the 
Derridean différance: recurrence to the written word is basic to its understanding. 
The reference to Derrida is made stronger by the use of the French term.  
Apart from this, the new meaning of rear-mirror as “someone looking back or 
being looked at from the back” introduces the Lacanian notion of a subject 
incenssantly looking back in order to project itself into the future, as well as the 
concept of gaze, which is subject and object at thesame time. The 
Barthesian/Lacanian question “who speaks?” is another cross-reference to the French 
critical debate. The idea that some languages are “more visible than others”, apart 
from reminding us again of the French différance (which must be visible in order to 
be grasped), draws attention to another subtending i ea of Brooke-Rose’s fictional 
practice, one which we have already seen in relation to Between. This is the concept 
that “It can’t be all in one language”, and that one language necessarily expresses 
something differently than another. The fact that a single paragraph calls into 
question all these implications can help us better appreciate the way the text 
simultaneously addresses and inextricably mingles all the issues it tackles. 
I will here hazard a further interpretation of the passage: the French “le rétro 
viseur” is countered by the English “(some languages more visible than others)” put 
within parenthesis: not only French is a “more visible” language because the word 
“viseur” (as opposed to mirror) – entailing the Latin root of the verb vidēre – 
establishes an immediate connection with the act of seeing, but also because the 
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contemporary French literary practice caused more sensation and clamour than the 
English counterpart. In this light, the allusion could be ironical of the state of things 
in the literary environment of the time. 
If Thru subverts the dichotomy speaking/writing, it also goes further along the 
deconstructive process in that it blurs the distinctio  among other different 
“performative acts” such as thinking, reading, looking at, and singing. These acts, all 
represented in the text when not mimetically enacted, are difficult to distinguish from 
one another. 
The process of thinking is present in characters’ thought, detectable in vertical 
through the horizontality of the speech. The mix of speech and thought patterns aims 
at rendering their simultaneity through a means that is by its very constitution unable 
to do so. The two processes which go on at the same time, one evident, the other 
much less, make the reader feel as if they were reading the characters’ mind. Their 
unusual disposition could be also said to “mime” the horizontality of the speech act 
(propagating by means of sound waves in the air) and the verticality of thought 
(happening in the mind of the individual and therefo  reflecting a vertical pattern). 
The act of thinking, a basic tool for reading capacity, is also mimed on the page with 
the portrayal of a “space for words” in the style of c mics, which can also be 
interpreted as a space for the reader to stop and thi k, and indeed the reader is forced 
to pause and make sense of this picture,  
(T 596) 
 
The act of reading and its process of “deciphering” are addressed throughout 
the novel. We read the written pieces which are probably being read aloud in the text 
(reading within reading). We decipher anagrams, acrostics, graphical patterns, 
musical notes, we interpret drawings as well as words, so that the act of 
reading/interpreting is itself one of the key subjects/objects of the text. 
Features appealing to the reader’s visual capacity are obviously timetables, 
indexes, lists, handwriting, onomatopoetic spelling of words, graphical texts, 
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symbols such as the triangle (which both symbolises th  eye and reminds us of the 
road sign indicating danger), drawings (the dance of the twenty-seven veils and the 
arrow pointing at it, the “space for thought” or for “filling the air” in the comics 
style). All these features demand a visual understanding on the reader’s part. The 
dance of the twenty-seven veils entails both the act of looking at and performing a 
visual deed: the text literally performs the dance by means of a dancing wheel drawn 
on the page, whereas the names of twenty-seven dancing characters appear on each 
of its spokes. The reader looks at the wheel before reading what is on its spokes – a 
more immediate understanding of content is achieved through form. These visual, 
textual characteristics draw the reader away from the idea they have of narrative as a 
horizontally developing medium and play on the notion of deep/surface meaning: if 
we are used to reading a text’s meaning plunging into the horizontality of the words 
arranged on the page (deciphering characters, letters on a page), here we have the 
surface image which is meaningful for its external shape and which is not always 
horizontal on the page. What is this if not playing with the notions of form/content, 
deep/surface, speaking/writing/thinking/looking/reading processes? 
The act of singing is performed by means of the lullabies and popular songs 
reported on the page. Such features play on their sound value to blur the distinction 
of levels in the text: while reading them, the readr is almost brought to sing them in 
their mind. Moreover, popular songs and lullabies – traditional oral folk narratives – 
seem to address the question of the distinction between oral and written tradition as 
well as the division of literary genres – not only are they a text within a text, or a 
discourse within a discourse, but also a genre within a genre.  
In Thru, the reversibility of levels is developed to extremes. Narration 
“expands”, so as not only to include the oral and the written form, but also to mime 
on the page the acts of dancing and singing and to include the process of thinking as 
a basic pattern in and to the text. The reader sees th  dance before he reads it, “hears” 
the songs, reads stories and is forced to stop and decipher all these acts. The effect of 
such an all-encompassing activity on the reader is bewilderment, a feeling of 
destabilization at the crumbling of the firm barries of more conventional fiction. 
However, if the text is not dismissed at this initial sense of puzzlement, its reader will 
 213 
inevitably re-consider the idea of the novel as a genre, and come to appreciate all the 
more such a ground-breaking work. 
Such a mixture of levels of expression, together with the arrangement of the 
material patterns on the page, crucially affects both the space and the tempo of the 
narrative. The mere horizontality of the text collapses, and with it the idea of a 
consistently-paced narrative. Clearly, even conventional narratives slow or accelerate 
their pace to induce various feelings in the reader, y t here we are on a completely 
different ground: the narrative rhythm, the reading and the interpretation of the text 
are strongly and ineluctably affected by its collage of techniques. 
In fact, if arche-trace, the place of difference between the opposite terms 
real/fictional and speaking/writing indelibly affects the textual dynamics of 
signification, it also interrelates with Lacan’s theories to determine the novel’s 
temporal and spatial development. 
As already said, the movement introduced in the opening of the novel (four 
eyes staring back through the rear-mirror of a car), is that of someone who can look 
ahead only by looking back and vice versa. This movement simultaneously addresses 
the Lacanian notion of gaze and the Derridean idea of memory as trace. 
In literary terms, the concept of gaze is significant of the relationship amongst 
the objects/subjects of narration, reflecting their power-structures in terms of 
symmetry or asymmetry. In Thru, we are offered a great variety of gazes (those of 
the many characters/narrators of the moment), yet what is most important is their 
direction: each gaze, be it individual or collective, intra-diegetic or extra-diegetic, is 
always and repeatedly coming back upon the person doi g the gaze, being “sent 
back” on them. Each character is forever looking back t the other: the gazes 
multiply and continually recede further back in terms of narrative levels. The 
narrative itself is gazing at its characters gazing at each other and they are all gazing 
at the reader, who stares back.  
This forever-coming-back gaze is what Lacan theoriss as constitutive of the 
subject’s narcissistic relation to itself. In the mirror stage, the baby gazes at the 
mirror and sees itself as unified subject, ideal ego. This initiates the dialectic between 
the ideal-ego and the ego-ideal, between the idealized mage of oneself and the 
imaginary gaze of another on oneself. Once the subject enters its own split and the 
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symbolic order, culture and language, that narcissistic deal image is maintained in 
the imaginary order and can be filled in by anyone that the subject sets up – in what 
is ultimately a narcissistic relationship – as a mirror for itself. Its own gaze coming 
back upon itself continually reminds the subject of the lack at the heart of the 
symbolic order. 
The Lacanian doubly split subject, constantly facing its own lack, is introduced 
at the very beginning of Thru with the rear-mirror image: it is a subject seized 
between its own image which comes from behind but is projected forwards. Lacan’s 
decentered subject continuously projects its past into the future as the only means of 
recognising itself. The trauma of the subject is projected into the future and can be 
recuperated only by means of this future projection, .e. obliquely: “The Trauma, in 
so far as it has a repressing action, intervenes after the fact (après coup), 
nachträglich” (Lacan 1988 191). The trauma of the barred subject is thus an 
“unspecularizable” event which can be accessed only from a rear-view perspective. 
The split subject experiences a temporal loop as it can recuperate its own past only 
by projecting it into the future: “a retroversion effect by which the subject becomes 
at each stage what he was before and announces himself –he will have been– only in 
the future perfect tense” (Lacan 1989 306). This phenomenon describes an 
ambiguous temporality where past and future are invrted – the past coming after the 
future and the future before the past – and affect ea h other.  
This belatedness subtends and creates the tempo of Bro ke-Rose’s novel: a 
circular and self-reflexive narrative caught up in a forever “gazing-back movement”: 
characters gazing back at each other, text gazing back at itself and at other texts, 
language gazing back at itself. 
In Thru, language gazes back at itself in that, apart from being metalanguage, it 
is “circular”. In fact, if for Lacan meaning is retoactive in relation to the signifying 
chain, in that “the sentence completes its signification only with its last term, each 
term being anticipated in the construction of the others, and, inversely, sealing their 
meaning by its retroactive effect” (Lacan 1989 303), Brooke-Rose takes up Lacan’s 
functioning of the signifying chain and plays with it by inverting the notions of 
langue and parole,  
although from the point of view of la parole the end of the sentence commands its first words, we 
should adopt the point of view of la langue in which the beginning of the sentence commands the end, 
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thus opening the whole network of possibilities in which we can then construct our sequences of 
functions. (T 627) 
 
The point of view adopted in the text is clearly that of la parole, which opens 
up the whole network of possibilities of actualizaton of la langue. The openness of 
la parole is opposed to the closure of la langue and of the completed signifying 
chain. In Thru, in fact, sentences do not end, but rather slide into one another, 
generating an open narrative which offsets closure. Th  open network of possibilities 
of expressions and connotations of la parole counters fixed meaning. Moreover, the 
above quotation seems to imply that in Thru, discourse is caught up within a 
retrospective phenomenon, as its past continuously returns to affect its future and the 
future retroactively determines the past (intertextuali y). Thru is thus a circular, open 
space which by means of its endless mirroring offsets the sclerotic use of language. 
As Berressem puts it, “what Roland Barthes calls the ‘vast hermeneutical sentence’ 
can never be closed” (Berressem 106). 
The narrative movement of belatedness which subtends the temporality of Thru 
perfectly embodies Derrida’s notion of memory as trace and calls into question his 
concept of present. Together with trace and arche-trace, memory is indeed 
enumerated by the author among the themes of the nov l (Cf. Brooke-Rose 2002b 
65). 
Derrida takes up the psychoanalytic concept of Nachträglichkeit, the belated 
return of trauma, to describe the effect of deferral and différance and demonstrate 
that Freud (and Lacan) already potentially presents memory and its movement as 
trace, i.e. “origin” of meaning. Derrida shows that for Freud, the printed trace which 
is left on the human psyche following the impact of a certain event (a trauma), and 
which also depends on the frequency of that event or impression, on its repetition, 
functions as arche-trace. The memory-trace, generated by trauma and repetition, 
reconstructs meaning through deferral which is memorial, commemorative of the 
trace. It inscribes itself in the economy of life and death in relation to a trauma 
through its movement of deferral: life protects itself against death only through an 
economy of death, through repetition and deferral (Cf. Derrida 1978 253)13. The 
psyche, like a Mystic Writing Pad, records an infinite amount of material while 
                                                
13 It is important to bear in mind that “life” is not taken to be as “life present-to-itself”, but as trace and 
différance. In this sense life is death, a “non-origin which is originary” (Derrida 2001 255).  
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always remaining “intact”. We do not apprehend the world directly, but only 
retrospectively: our sense of that which is beyond ourselves is the product of 
previous memories, previous writings. Freud’s writing pad is thus a model for the 
trace and arche-writing, for the way in which we can only experience the world, as it 
were, after the fact, that is, through the traces of previous experiences. The 
conclusion is that arche-writing is memory and memory is arche-writing. It follows 
that the operation of signification as sheer perceptual presence, absolute, pure, is a 
metaphysical presupposition. Self-presence as such is impossible: what constitutes 
what we call “present” is the connection between past and future, i.e. the movement 
of repetition of the past, and the movement of the present itself as a possibility of 
future repetition. Repetition becomes the trace, th différance which deconstructs a 
notion of closed off present-to-itself and for itself, a movement strictly linked to the 
intertextual theme: literature is a text where everything comes back again and again 
to generate new life out of the old, create a new text out of its intertextual reminders. 
The present is both a return, and the possibility of a return, of repetition. Presence is 
only possible by means of the différance, the trace, the operation of signification 
which endlessly links past and future. Signification does not depend on presence as 
origin (the author, the speaker, meaning), it is independent from the absence, because 
arche-writing is at work at the “origin” of sense. Meaning is never simply present, 
but always already engaged in the movement of the trace. The so-called “present”, or 
“now”, is always already compromised by a trace, a residue of a previous experience 
that precludes the subject ever being in a self-contained “now”: coinciding with 
oneself as immediate spontaneity is impossible. There can be no presence-to-self 
because the nature of our temporal existence implies its elusion, because meaning is 
always in a process of becoming. The significance of the past can only be 
appreciated from the future, but the future is itself caught in a similar process of 
change were it ever able to become present. The future that Derrida refers to is thus 
not a future that will become present, but the future that makes all presence possible 
and impossible at the same time. The living present – lebendige Gegenwart – as “the 
universal and absolute form of transcendental experience” (Derrida 1976 62), as the 
objective, external tempo of science, is an illusion. The same Larissa warns Armel 
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“The present tense does not exist” (T 630). The present is replaced by the notion of 
time deferred: everything is always to come, meaning continually slips away.  
In this light, both the loop between past and future of the discourse in Thru and 
its movement of repetition perfectly reproduce the functioning of memory as trace, 
arche-writing. The temporal loop is further highligted by the fact that Larissa seems 
to foresee some of the novel’s scenes, in a curious game where past an future 
overlap, 
Larissa would say well tell me all and how did you two meet closing the manuscript in which she’d 
been inventing the whole episode before she knew it would turn out that way that happens you know 
and the whole dialogue in advance. (T 731) 
 
The stress on the ambiguous temporality of the text s ems a way to stimulate 
the readers’ attentiveness and their wish to look fr clues which refer to the 
consequential development of events. Yet, Thru continually frustrates “the reader’s 
vulgar desire to know what happens next” (T 732) since, if the “now” is precisely 
what is for ever eluded, if there is no present, there cannot possibly be a “next” 
which consequentially develops from it.  
In Thru in fact, “anachronies” (Genette 1980 35) – temporal discordances 
between the order of events and the order of narration – are not retraceable because 
the chronological order is utterly transgressed, impossible to reconstruct. At the same 
time, “anisochronies” – the dynamics between “story time” and “narrative time” 
which determine the rhythm of the narrative – are distorted as the text does not 
furnish precise divisions of paragraphs/parts/chapters, but only varied spatial breaks 
on the page. The use of a “doubting language” as considered above strongly 
contributes to shape the temporal indeterminacy of Thru, blurring the 
“determination” and “specification” in time of an event, i.e. the “the diachronic 
limits” and the “rhythm of recurrence” of an event (Cf. Genette 127-8). If we think of 
“meanwhile” as one of the most frequently used adverbs to change focus at the 
beginning of a paragraph, we realise how everything seems to be inscribed within the 
same ambiguous temporal plateau. A circular tempo, with no beginning and no end, 
shaped by the present tense and by the intertextual, repetitive theme which links past 
and future and “reduces” everything to one single, immense narration. 
Similarly to its temporal development, the narrative spatiality of Thru is 
circular, or better chiastic. The term “chiasm” deriv s from the Greek “χίασµα”, 
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“crossing”, where the first letter (chi) is shaped like an X. Chiastic patterns are 
present throughout the novel, both as drawings and through the recurrence of the 
letter X (with the endlessly repeated words “Text” and “Exit”, where the X is often 
printed in bold types), to the point where a chiasmic shape is reproduced by means of 
words on the page and at its centre we find the word “chiasmus”, 
sitting beside                                                                                           hiding behind 
                                                          a chiasmus 
 
                                                                   beneath 
                                                          lying  
                                                                   above  
 
                                                            some sheik 
 
hiding behind                                                                                      sitting beside. (T 672) 
 
This symmetric/concentric structure recalls Greimas’ semiotic square and 
indeed, as already seen, Thru addresses the latter directly, positing “opposite” terms 
in a direct logic of correlation and denoting them with the Greimasian “d1/d2” (T 
634), as well as with the I and O of the Lacanian dialectic of desire,  
           (T 695) 
 
The play of la parole as opposed to la langue generates a chiastic space in the 
narrative discourse. The actualization of la parole implies that every discourse 
coming back is never the same: “every chasm opens into another chasm into which it 
is possible to fall as into a void” (T 687). Repetitions in Thru are “the same but 
different”, slightly varied in content and/or contex , as repetition is not the mere 
return to and of the same, but rather the production of difference within the same, a 
generative act. It is a continual referral, rather than reference, to other traces. The 
repetitive and deferring movement of memory constitutes the present as an infinite 
stratification and rearrangement of signs of memory (Cf. Derrida 1978 258). As 
Derrida explains, “our psychic mechanism has come into being by a process of 
stratification […] of memory traces […] subjected from time to time to a 
rearrangement” (Derrida 1976 259).  
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Repetition thus shapes both the temporality and the spatiality of the text, 
inscribing it into a spiral development of space and time. The chiastic movement 
becomes in fact that of a spiral, recalling Giambattista Vico’s repetitive movement of 
history and being closely connected to intertextuality nd memory: the past returns to 
affect the present, everything comes back but is different at the same time.  
The recursivity rule on which intertextuality is based is both “exemplified by 
the innumerable repetitions slightly varied” (Maack 135) and explained throughout 
the text by means of such sentences as “Within eachtexture is another texture within 
each myth another myth each signifier signifying another” (T 688), or else by means 
of paragraphs as the following one, 
Texts within texts […] Francesca reading about Lancelot and Guinevere, who must have read about 
Tristan and Iseult […] as told by Socrates to Phaedrus as related by Plato […] This structure is 
generated by recursivity rules […] In theory the recursivity rule can be applied infinitely but there is a 
limit imposed by the human memory of both recipient a d emitter, a limit which demonstrates the 
difference between grammaticality and acceptability. (T 677-678) 
 
Although the point of arrival seems to coincide with the point of departure, in a 
spiral what comes back is different, as the structure is circular, but not closed. Thru 
thus embodies Barthes’ notion of the plural text which replaces its closed circuit with 
an open and dialectic structure, thus challenging ay interpretative reduction, any 
arbitrary imposition of meaning. For Barthes, to the question “What are you thinking 
about?”, the text “wilier than all those who try to escape by answering: about 
nothing, does not reply, giving meaning its last closure: suspension” (Barthes 1974 
217).  
Another feature which strongly concurs to determine the narrative temporality 
of Brooke-Rose’s novel is its peculiar typographical display. Although it is 
necessarily true that the narrative text “has no other emporality than what it borrows 
[…] from its own reading” (Genette 1980 34), in Thru the idea of the time needed for 
reading (for going through the text) is clearly being played upon. The reader in fact 
necessarily needs to slow down in order to decipher t  various visual patterns the 
novel presents. 
What is more, Thru’s typographical arrangements subvert the linearity 
literature is constrained by and offer “a kind of global and synchronic look – or at 
least a look whose direction is no longer determined by the sequence of images” 
(Genette 1980 34). 
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Reading is no longer linear, horizontal, no longer d pendent on past, present 
and future, but inscribed into a sort of global simultaneity which involves a different 
perception of narrative time and space. If Kristeva theorises a form of literature “that 
will perhaps arrive at a form of thought similar to that of painting: the transmission 
of essence through form” (Kristeva 1980a 89), this is exactly what Brooke-Rose’s 
text achieves through its visual display.  
Graphic experiments are clearly not new in literature. Sterne’s Tristram Shandy 
– significantly one of the main subtexts of Thru – already makes use of typographical 
tricks. However, the visual display of Thru bears peculiar implications as related to 
the concept of arche-writing. Derrida considered in fact “phonetic writing” – the 
consecutive and irreversible unfolding of meaning i space – to be “the cornerstone 
of all metaphysics of presence” (Derrida 2001 272-3). He consequently conjectured 
the end of linear writing and the beginning of a new mode of writing and reading: 
“What is thought today cannot be written according to the line and the book”, we 
must learn to read “what wrote itself between the lin s […] according to a different 
organization of space” (Derrida 1976 87, 86).  
Thru’s graphical forms can be thus interpreted as revealing that arche-writing 
is at work in the text. They are a writing which does “not reduce the voice to itself” 
(Derrida 1976 90) and bears a “double value – ideographic and phonetic” (Derrida 
1976 89): a representation of both thing and sound. The non-phonetic elements make 
writing necessary to signification and therefore subvert the phonocentrism of 
Western thought. Such elements are primarily present in the unconscious language of 
dreams, whose “mise en scène” (Derrida 2001 261) is to be interpreted as a 
“displacement similar to an original form of writing […] a model of writing 
irreducible to speech, which would include […] pictographic, ideogrammatic, and 
phonetic elements” (Derrida 2001 262). The “psychical writing” Derrida talks about 
cannot be deciphered once and for all according to a fixed code, since it works “with 
a mass of elements which have been codified in the course of an individual or 
collective history” (Derrida 2001 262), and since, away from the logic of binarism, 
dreams accept contradiction. Psychical writing can therefore only be interpreted. The 
same content can acquire different meanings for diverse people and in dissimilar 
contexts:  “The dreamer invents his own grammar” (Derrida 2001 262). It is not a 
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case that Brooke-Rose inserts in Thru Chinese ideograms (already used by Pound for 
the same reason), as they function in a similar wayto dream symbols: they bear 
several meanings and their interpretation depends o their context. In addition, the 
terms “Mise en scène” and “mise-en-abime” – persistently used by Freud and 
Derrida – are significantly employed several times, thus strengthening the reference 
to Derrida’s theory. 
The text furnishes no final message which completes th  narrative, but remains 
open and in this connection we appreciate the presenc , throughout the text, of the 
open quadrangular shape, once again linked to Derrida’s deconstruction of unity and 
closure. Derrida explains that the binary, opposite terms can be neither reduced to 
unity, nor re-inscribed into a third term. The trinitarian horizon of the onto-theology 
must be destroyed, the triangle opened on a fourth side, re-inscribed into a open 
square, the deconstructive square, constituted throug  the operations of reversal and 
displacement (Cf. Derrida 1981 24). The rectangular shapes in Thru can be therefore 
seen as representing its deconstructive, open proliferation of meaning. 
Writing becomes a “breaching” through repetition which opens a path in time 
and space and is characterised by reversibility (Cf. Derrida 1978 268). Reversibility 
is for Derrida the very “origin” of meaning (always already there) as it is to be found 
in the genetic DNA and RNA codes. The “first” form of writing, the first grammé 
which enacts an endless movement of deferral/differing is the genes. The concept of 
reversibility is presented in Thru by means of palindromes and enacted through the 
continuous shift of narrative levels – which once again generates the openness of the 
text and counters any attempt to endow the text with a stable, hierarchical meaning. 
The circular, or better spiral movement of Thru and its openness are 
significantly represented at the end of the novel. Its last page in fact, presents the 
“same” situation to be found at its beginning: four eyes staring back through a rear-
view mirror: involved in an open spiral process, the ext has completed a full circle 
(it has added another circle to the spiral of intertextuality) and has come to a point 
which is both equal and different from its starting one. The difference (and the 
openness of the spiral) is highlighted by the very last image of the text, a palindromic 
cross which offers an “exit thru the text” and which we will later better analyse.  
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Thru’s language and narrative features, determining the temporal and spatial 
“development” of the text, seem thus to recast the importance of writing as “origin” 
of meaning, an origin which founds human existence but which is both present and 
absent at the same time, therefore countering the notions of transcendental signifier 
and eternal verity and showing how proliferation of meaning and undecidability lie at 
the very basis of existence. 
From all that has been considered, Brooke-Rose’s countertendency in relation 
to the crisis of language and representation clearly emerges. Thru is on the one hand 
a fully postmodern work which stems from the tensio f the debate over the 
ontological status of reality and its connection to language. A “text of radical 
ontological hesitation” (McHale 1995 200), whose ida of “loss” of language as a 
means of representing reality is reinstated by the author as she says “there is in 
everything I write, perhaps, a kind of pessimism under eath” (Turner 1990b 25). On 
the other hand, however, Thru makes use of postmodernist critical concepts and – 
mixing and rehandling them – succeeds in subverting he negativism of much 
postmodern fiction into a playful reaffirmation of the fictional play and its language.  
As already observed, with an apparently contradictory dynamics – 
contradiction being the primary tactic through which the text multiplies meanings 
and interpretations – Thru both dismantles the idea of fiction as representing reality 
and denies the prospect of discerning between “internal” and “external” reality. The 
“real” level outside the narrative game is undermined together with the notion of 
fiction as representing that reality.  
If, on the one hand, it is stated that “mimesis inev tably produces a double of 
the thing, the double being nothing a non being which [is] however resembling, 
never absolutely true” (T 684), on the other hand, it is impossible to separate what is 
“true” from what is “false” as the once steady border between reality and 
representation collapses: reality becomes fiction and vice versa.  
The subversion of the real/fictional dichotomy in not enacted as a means to 
itself, but rather as a way to reaffirm the second term in a thoroughly playfully and 
positive way, as if the text continually asked and replied «reality vs. invention? there 
is no such a struggle, reality is invention and invention is reality … narration is life». 
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By endlessly blurring the distinction between real and fictional and by 
exposing the foundations of the fictional edifice – “but the emperor is naked” (T 602) 
– by making the realistic conception of fiction collapse, the importance of fictionality 
per se is reinstated. 
With a parallel movement, Thru seem to reinstate the representational role of 
language through the notion of arche-writing which determines the temporal and 
spatial development of the text. Challenging and subverting the concept of fixed 
meaning and self-presence is a way of recuperating the value of language as 
representing “reality”. Let us explain better: the crisis of reality’s ontological status 
has generated the crisis of language as unable to rpresent “reality”. However, the 
crisis of representation does not depend on language, but rather on the Western world 
cultural trope of a stable and fixed meaning which language can express. Once the 
idea of an established meaning that language transcribe  is deconstructed, language 
can recuperate its “representative” role, even if what it represents is ontologically 
unstable and meaning is never fixed once and for all, but always undecidable.  
In contrast to the supposed crisis of representation, in which language and 
reality are incommensurate, Thru’s subversive strategy circumvents this dilemma. It 
directs the reader’s attention to language as “surface reality”, pure materiality and 
visible display. In a moment when language is considered unable to represent 
“reality”, the play on the external shape of the linguistic sign becomes a way to 
recuperate the “joy” of language by insisting on its materiality. In this way, Thru 
highlights the way in which fiction and reality are mutually bound up in language, in 
a “visible”, and therefore “real” way. 
The text reiterates its own reality as language: fiction is real in that it is made 
up of language. Everything articulated in language ttains the status of reality,  
what is the epistemological status of, say, a Structu alist diagram such as the rectangle of contraries 
and contradictions from elementary logic […] used by Greimas […]? As a representation of a 
narrative structure, it is a fiction […] As a rectangle on a page it is an object, a visual fact. (Brooke-
Rose 2002b 55) 
 
Language is real and it is the only means to “pick up” reality, even if this 
reality is ontologically unstable. In fact, as the author has one of her characters in the 
novel say, “Language is all we have to apprehend reality, if we must use that term” 
(T 642). Although the level of the real world is ont logically unstable, language is 
the only means we possess to express it, even if to express that same instability and 
 224 
the lack of our existence. Thru becomes thus a fiction about the fictionality of fiction, 
but also about the “reality” of fiction and language, a way of recuperating the “faith” 
in language and fiction in the face of reality’s ontological instability. 
Not only is language real, but also and necessarily referential. One of the basic 
concepts in Brooke-Rose’s fictional practice is indee  the notion of language’s 
referential status. As Paul de Man explains, “It would be quite foolish to assume that 
one can lightheartedly move away from the constraint of referential meaning” (de 
Man 201). Brooke-Rose reinstates this view: “I can understand the reaction against 
the mimetic novel, that language isn’t just a transparent window on the world […] 
and so there was this movement towards the signifiant, the actual text, textuality, but 
language is itself representative and you cannot do without this representative 
function” (Brooke-Rose 2002b 41). This does not imply a simple, naïve “mimesis” in 
the style of the nineteenth century realistic and “unproblematic” representation of the 
world, but it rather means that, in an era of reality’s ontological crisis, language 
remains referential even if the status of its referents is floating, unstable. Explaining 
the link between language and the “reality” of representation, Brooke-Rose says,  
I’m often called antirealist, and since I use realist situations to play with them and produce other 
discourse, in that sense it’s true. But language is r ferential, and every sentence we utter is intended to 
be realistic in this more absolute sense […] So, I’m more of an anti-Realist, with a capital R. Thus 
every sentence in Thru represents a reality, however imagined, however destabilized, as we all are. 
(Brooke-Rose 2002b 65) 
 
Further clarifying this point, the author declares, “I am not antirealist, if by 
realism one means representation, and I do not think that a writer can be 
antirepresentation” (Brooke-Rose 2002b 41).  
If language is reality and if the reality it refers to is ontologically unstable, 
Brooke-Rose tries to recover the lost faith in langua e’s possibilities and she does so 
primarily through humour and linguistic creativity. If the text is performed entirely 
by language and through language, the author tries to push it to its borders, to twist 
language so as to pass its frontiers, to see how far it c n go, rehandling it in playful 
creation. Language, her primary “artist material”, is reality, a reality which can be 
played upon. Humour, ever-present in Brooke-Rose’s narrative, becomes a way of 
recuperating the lost faith in the possibilities of language. 
When – referring to the anagrammatic turn of Thru into “hurt” – Del Sapio 
Garbero asks Brooke-Rose whether language is employed in her novels to cover up 
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anguish or despair, the author interestingly replies recalling a scene from it where 
Armel accuses Larissa of “escaping” into language, “there are moments when you 
touch on the very essence of things and then brrt! You escape, you run away into 
language” (T 640). Larissa significantly argues, “You mean that when I touch on the 
essence of things […] it’s not by means of language? […] aren’t you playing with 
words too, doesn’t everyone?” (T 640-41). The author reveals that the event 
described did actually happen to her and that she wrote it verbatim immediately after 
it occurred. In this prospect, the episode is important as it represents both a self-
attack and a self-defence of Brooke-Rose’s text, an answer to those who might 
accuse her of using language as a means of “running away” from reality. Larissa’s 
reply, Brooke-Rose explains, “even if it’s a defenc, it’s not covering up because the 
suffering is there and the seriousness is there”. Sriousness and humour are two 
inseparable faces of language, both “present all the time” (Del Sapio Garbero 1991 
105, 104). 
Indeed, if Armel pronounces himself against Larissa’s novel as “it’s not funny, 
[…] it is one long cry of anguish” (T 640), Larissa reinstates, “But isn’t the only 
thing to do with a long cry of anguish to amuse oneself?” (T 641). 
Rather than an escape, humour represents a powerful coping mechanism. The 
eternal game of language is a way to cope with the lack that lies at the hearth of the 
reality it represents, to subvert it into a positive play, as the same text explains: “It is 
the pain […] and pain […] has to be lived through, and you could cover pages and 
maybe you do, rehandling the signifiers into acceptabili y and even amusement so 
that at last it vanishes like delight” (T 690). Playing with language, the “obstinate 
humor in the face of despair” (Hayman and Cohen 14), far from being mere escape 
from, is for the author a way to face reality and problems, overcoming the nihilistic 
aspects of the contemporary critical debate and inscribing her novelistic practice 
beyond them.  
Inextricably related to all this is the poetical value of the language of Thru, 
which we have already considered in light of Kristeva’s theories. Thru is in fact a 
polyphonic novel which, far from being merely parodic, is rather tragic, dramatic, 
“murderous, cynical, and revolutionary in the sense of dialectical transformation”. 
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The poetic language of the text reveals the semiotic as negativity continuously 
breaching into the symbolic and transgressing it. 
The semiotic however – a “return of instinctual functioning within the 
symbolic” (Kristeva 1984 69) – does not annihilate th  symbolic, it is not pure 
negation, it is transgression and negation which results in modified reaffirmation. As 
Kristeva explains, the “explosion of the semiotic in the symbolic is far from a 
negation of negation”, it is rather “a transgression of position, a reversed reactivation 
of the contradiction that instituted this very position” (Kristeva 1984 69). The 
symbolic is not annulled (schizophrenia), it is transgressed and reactivated on the 
inverted ladder of its open coexistence with the semiotic: laughter becomes “murder 
and revolution” (Antonin Artaud, qtd. in Kristeva 1980a 80), a death which brings 
new life,  
“art” takes on murder and moves through it. It assumes murder insofar as artistic practice considers 
death the inner boundary of the signifying process. Crossing that boundary is precisely what 
constitutes “art.” In other words, it is as if death becomes interiorized by the subject of such a practice; 
in order to function, he must make himself the bearer of death […] In returning, through the event of 
death, toward that which produces its break; in exporting semiotic motility across the border on which 
the symbolic is established, the artist sketches out a kind of second birth. Subject to death but also to 
rebirth. (Kristeva 1984 70) 
 
The “deluge of the signifier” (Kristeva 1984 79) inundates the symbolic and 
dissolves it, thus becoming “the flow of jouissance into language” and through 
language. By means of poetic language, “joiussance works its way into the social and 
symbolic” (Kristeva 1984 80). In other words, poetic language lets jouissance come 
through the symbolic and into language. The functio of poetic language is thus “to 
introduce through the symbolic that which works on, moves through, and threatens it 
[…] the ultimate means of its transformation or subversion, the precondition for its 
survival and revolution” (Kristeva 1984 81). 
If Kristeva says that “literature moves beyond madness and realism in a leap 
that maintains both ‘delirium’ and ‘logic’” (Kristeva 1984 82), Thru is said to be a 
discourse where “mouths into mouths […] rehandle th signifiers into a delicious 
discourse” (T 722). Negativity becomes “the liquefying and dissolving agent that 
does not destroy but rather reactivates new organizations and, in that sense, affirms” 
(Kristeva 1984 109). 
Interestingly, Brooke-Rose hypothesises that the only possible solution to the 
degradation of characters and the renewal of fiction lies in the use of language, the 
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only hope for their regeneration consists perhaps in “ tarting again, ex almost nihilo. 
So that narrative can again, as it once did, aspire to the condition of poetry” (Brooke-
Rose 1986 194). In this connection, the very language that builds up the text and 
even the title Brooke-Rose initially wanted to give the novel – Texttermination – 
stand for the possibility of a death and a rebirth of narrative practice. 
If Thru is, on the one hand, a fully postmodernist work which deals with the 
problems of representation and subjectivity through “their negation or engulfment in 
discursive practices” (Rimmon-Kenan 1996 4), it is on the other hand an attempt to 
rescue the possibilities of fiction and language through verbal inventiveness. The 
novel subverts the “pessimistic” notion of representation and goes beyond its 
destabilization, gaining an exit from the debate: an exit through itself. It is a 
workshop text which playfully aims at re-engaging the act of narration with the idea 
of language and representation. It is in the light of such a positive play that Brooke-
Rose’s work represents, in my view, a countertendency within postmodernism. 
Thru enacts a never-ending play with language, which on the one hand 
generates ontological instability, yet on the other produces an immense plurality of 
“signification” and aims at recuperating the lost faith in language as the only tool we 
possess to express “reality”, as well as linguistic humour as a way to cope with 
pessimism in life and language. The creative possibilities of language are thus a way 
to deal with problems, as Brooke-Rose states, “What I want to show is the 
extraordinary richness of language in the face of our problems big and small” 
(Turner 1990b 27). The text thus becomes a way of facing the crisis of language and 
representation, and indeed Thru defines itself “A self-evident defence-mechanism 
against threat of extermination” (T 637). 
Thru’s fundamental questioning of representation and subjectivity implies 
deconstruction but also and most importantly playful “construction” of the text itself, 
a positive creation. Through the incessant play of signifiers, through language s its 
“only means”, the text is being questioned and reass rted, destroyed and recreated 
again and again. Brooke-Rose deconstructs, negates fiction, or better double-negates 
it, in order to recuperate its very notion.  
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We witness a procedure already observed in Between: the endorsement of crisis 
in order to overcome it. If in the case of Between the crisis and death is that of 
language as linked to identity, in this case is that of language as linked to fiction. 
The double movement toward construction and deconstruction of meaning in 
Thru makes us realise that “The pressure toward meaning and the pressure toward its 
undoing can never cancel each other out” (de Man 161). The continual textual 
process of creation and demolition of signification s not a means to itself, but rather, 
in Barthes’ words, a “subtle subversion” which evades the binarism 
destruction/construction and “seeks some other term: a third term, which is not, 
however, a synthesizing term but an eccentric, extraordinary term” (Barthes 1975 
55). A new text between the binarism construction/destruction arises, hence Brooke-
Rose’s assertion, “I’m not destroying the text […] I’m creating a new one” (Hayman 
and Cohen 4). 
Thru has been defined a “journey into a universe of discourse” (Berressem 
104). Its multi-metaphorical title seems to indicate both a space which can be entered 
into and exited from. The work becomes an access, a opening path, a passageway to 
the text, but also an outlet, a way out of the crisis and into the text, an exit into the 
mirror and from it. Indeed, as already observed, the terms text and exit are a basic 
pattern throughout the novel. They combine together to form a peculiar palindromic 
cross – “(t)ex(i)t” (T 690) – and offer, in its very last page an “exit thru [the] text”,  
       (T 742) 
 
Thru presents an exit to the much suffered debate over the ontological status of 
language, an exit which can only be through itself and into itself. The way out of the 
pessimistic notion of language is offered through language itself and its incessant, 
delirious play of signifiers which offers countless interpretative possibilities and 
counters closure. 
It is easy to see now how the main “paratext” of the novel – its title – is subject 
to the same proliferation of meaning which the whole text embodies: from the 
“looking back and through” of the mirror, with its inference in terms of 
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psychoanalytic practice (Lacan’s subject which can look forward only by looking 
back), to its intertextual implications (reflecting other texts through itself), to the idea 
of “seeing through the text” and its metalinguistic function, or the process of going 
through it which seems to be also a suggestion in terms of active reading practice. 
The term thru could also allude to the fact that a text is made up of language and 
must be computed through language, as well as at the fact that the recuperation of the 
joy for/of language must pass through language. 
In light of what has been considered above, the repatedly asked question “who 
speaks?” seems to find a distinct answer. In fact, if we asked “who is the character 
whose point of view orients the narrative perspective?” (Genette 1980 186), we will 
have to say that in Thru focalization is blurred and for ever shifting. Since the 
narrating instance reflects the consciousnesses’ perce tions but unreflectively, the 
characters are strictly and objectively limited to their focal position. What Genette 
calls an absolute “internal focalization […] where the central character is limited 
absolutely to – and strictly inferred from – his focal position alone” (Genette 1980 
193), is further developed by Brooke-Rose in that she multiplies the characters and 
passes from one focal point to another without the reader being able to distinguish 
between them (if not by means of the context or by means of information which is 
mostly disclosed afterwards). In Thru, the focalization of the narrative shifts 
continuously, generating an infinite blurring which results in a reaffirmation of the 
fictional illusion as fictional. However, the absolutely internal focalization seems to 
be that of discourse itself, which reflects, again objectively, the discourse on and 
within itself. So that the point of view which seems to orient the whole narrative 
perspective would be language’s, discourse’s: narration itself seems to speak and 
reflect on its own textual procedures,  
let alone all that stuff about scene and summary point f view and the narrator explicit implicit 
privileged unprivileged reliable unreliable etc., true of course but quite simply non-pertinent, 
impertinent in fact since point of view is discourse and what matter is → are the innumerable and ever 
escaping levels of Utterance by the I who is not the I who says I. (T 630-1) 
 
If any trace of narrator disappears, the main, subtending narrator becomes 
narration itself: discourse is both the “narrating I” and the “narrated I” (Genette 1980 
252), the point of view is that of la parole. Thru seems “to reach that point where 
only language acts, ‘performs’” (Barthes 1977 143), thus embodying Flaubert’s idea 
of “un livre sur rien”, the ideal book which holds up through pure force of style and 
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structure. The same author declares, “my characters emerge out of language […] I 
think it was Yeats who spoke about poetry coming out of a mouthful of air” (Turner 
1990b 26). 
In a text where “it is impossible to attribute an origin, a point of view, to the 
statement”, where “any reference is impossible”, “the discourse, or better, the 
language, speaks: nothing more” (Barthes 1974 41). 
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Chapter 6 
The Author is dead: 
long live the author, the reader and the characters 
If Thru solves the tension over the status of language as linked to reality by 
means of what has been considered above, another major source of anxiety generated 
by the literary debate of the time the text addresses i  the question of the death of the 
author and the ontological status of fictional characters.  
The dispute mimesis vs. narration – between Narrative Mode (“telling”, 
authorial guidance in NS, narrative sentences) and Speech Mode (“showing”, speech 
or thought by characters) – already addressed by Plato in his Republic, renewed at 
the beginning of the twentieth century, producing a intense debate from the sixties 
all the way through the seventies and the eighties. The focus shifted from the 
author’s intention (Jakobson’s Sender, emotive functio ) to the reader’s 
interpretation (Receiver, conative function) via the text itself (Message, poetic 
function). “Telling” and “showing” became respectively “the Ormazd and the 
Ahriman of novelistic aestetics” (Genette 1980 163), leading to the rejection of the 
author’s presence in the text. The conventional concept of author who shows the 
events from his/her own perspective and mediates th narration collapsed. Clearly, it 
had become impossible to think of a modern work where the author intervened 
personally (Manzoni-type) to give his viewpoint on the events or characters, let alone 
morally judging them. 
In her essay “The Vanishing Author” (1961), Brooke-Rose commented on the 
“invisibility” of the author in the modern novel. In the same year, the same issue was 
extensively tackled by Booth, who coined the term “ideal reader” (Booth 1961). 
However, Barthes’s declaration of the death of the author (1968) was very much 
acclaimed as representing a turning point in the development of the dispute. The 
author was utterly dismissed from the text and the reader was given supreme power 
over it, later variously labelled as “super reader” (Riffaterre 1971), or “implied 
reader” (Iser 1974). 
The old conventional author had vanished from the modern text for obvious 
reasons, but what went “overlooked” in the course of the dispute was the basic 
distinction between death and invisibility, and the even more basic distinction 
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between real, actual author (the one in flesh and blood) and implied, encoded author 
(the narrating instance). The initial “invisibility” became total disregard for the 
implied, encoded author, which is the indispensable narrative construct of a text. The 
dispute around the concepts of mimesis and narration was brought to extreme 
conclusions: many critics “forgot” that “mimesis” means “making one forget that it 
is the narrator telling” (Genette 1980 166), as opposed to a total absence of the 
narrating instance. 
In other words, the dispute went “a little too far” in the extreme situation of 
complete authority of the reader over the text. Thebasic end-result was that “if the 
reader’s reading is supreme, anything goes, from pluralistic chaos […] through five 
different possible reactions all the way to complete skepticism: there is no truth, all is 
relative, individual” (Brooke-Rose 2002b 30). 
Brooke-Rose’s stance is indeed to be found along a more “balanced” access 
road to the text. Opting for what she defines “a safe buffer state called The Text as 
Object, an apparently autonomous unit that encodes both its author (implied), or 
addresser, and its reader (implied), or addressee” (Brooke-Rose 1980 120), she 
distinguishes between the “real” and the “implied” author/reader, which she labels 
respectively “actual” and “encoded”. She then tries to re-balance the reader’s power 
explaining that “The implied reader is pure theory” (Brooke-Rose 2002b 18), and 
that the individual reading should not be confused with the text, “we literary people 
find it difficult not to confuse “our” reading, enriched with those of others, with the 
text” (Brooke-Rose 1980 121). 
Although the author’s intentions are not to be taken as the main path leading to 
the text, and although “the author doesn’t begin to exist without the reader” (Brooke-
Rose 2002b 29), Brooke-Rose dismisses the death of e author and stresses the 
difference between death and invisibility. At the same time, she recasts the concept 
of “implied reader” in a different light. She explains that if the reader’s interpretation 
must be valued, it is nevertheless fundamental that the reader be prepared to read 
attentively: the communicative functions which Jakobs n posits between Sender and 
Receiver – Context, Message, Contact, and Code (Cf. Jakobson 1967) – cannot be 
overlooked by the reader who interprets a text. In a text as safe buffer state, 
elucidates Brooke-Rose, the encoded author determines the encoded reader by means 
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of the structures encoded in the text. The encoded rea er is not the actual reader, no 
less than the encoded author is the actual author, but the structures encoded in the 
text contribute to determine the way the actual reader is brought to feel about it. Far 
from meaning that readers can read whatever they want into the text, their analysis 
and interpretation must necessarily start from the text as object (Cf. Brooke-Rose 
2002b 28-31). Referring to Barthes’ five narrative codes (Cf. S/Z 18-20), Brooke-
Rose explains how they can be either overdetermined, underdetermined or 
nondetermined, producing as an effect the way the reader is encoded in the text: as 
“hypo-critical” in the case of overdetermination, as “hypercritical” in the opposite 
case (Brooke-Rose 1980 131, 134). However, a balance between under and over 
determination of codes is necessary for the narrative “ o retain its hold over us, its 
peculiar mixture of recognition-pleasure and mystery” (Brooke-Rose 1980 131). 
In order to understand what kind of encoded reader Brooke-Rose’s text 
postulates, it is thus necessary to consider the way over and underdetermination of 
codes functions in it. In Thru, the balance between over and underdetermination – 
between “giving” and “taking away” – functions first of all within the same code. 
The hermeneutic code for instance is both over and underdetermined: clues to the 
enigmas posited are clearly given in the text, but each clue is punctually recast into 
doubt, blurred by means of its peculiar doubting language. Moreover, the 
information which the text seems at one point to be clearly giving is later on 
represented by means of slightly varied repetitions, which instead of expanding on it, 
produce further blur. The apparent overdeterminatio results in confusion and 
underdetermination, so that we talk of “overdetermined enigma[s] unresolved” 
(Brooke-Rose 1980 142). The text clearly raises questions that demand explication, 
but promptly frustrates the revelation of truth by giving “no reference or too many” 
(T 678). The end-result is that “overdetermination functions, paradoxically, as 
underdetermination” (Brooke-Rose 1980 135) and the hermeneutic gap is left open. 
The same counterbalance of over and underdetermination is to be found in the 
proairetic code. If, on the one hand, the constant ransgression of diegetic levels 
underdetermines the code, on the other hand, the fictionality of the whole narrative 
edifice is overtly stated and therefore overdetermined. This provides the minimum 
balance the reader needs to hold onto the narrative and produces metatextual tension. 
 234 
The semantic, symbolic and cultural codes are interrelated to each other, again 
in a movement of over and underdetermination. If the semantic and the symbolic are 
overdetermined by means of the use of language as a creative tool, always capable to 
give life to different or unexpected connotations of meaning, they are also 
underdetermined by the endless process of destruction of meaning which follows 
construction. The cultural code is linked to the use of quotations and specialized 
discourse. However, if the references to extra literary theories and knowledge is 
posited, it is also reworked into poetry: the object of discourse is primarily language 
and its construction/destruction power, rather than t ose theories. 
The skilful equilibrium of over and under-determinat on in Thru gives life to an 
intricate structure which at first produces dizziness in the reader: the text gives and 
holds back at the same time. The anagrams presented in he text are an exemplary 
illustration of its balance between over and underdetermination. Anagrams must be 
hidden to be such, but also hinted at to de discovered, hence the function of bold 
capitals, which make curiosity arise in the readers and stimulate their participation. 
The reader of Thru is not overencoded as hypocrite (must not be insulted in his 
intelligence), but also not highly underencoded (he will withdraw or read whatever 
he wants in the text): the novel calls for his interpretation. Despite the initial 
confusion, the apparently non-structured balance turns out to be perfectly 
equilibrated and mostly engaging, intriguing.  
When we read, “All access forbidden except for Prepa d Consumers with 
special permits from the Authorities” (T 629), we realise that Thru is a book “to be 
entered into”, in the sense that the reader loses his traditional external position and is 
called to participate actively in the “making” of textuality, for only “from the inside”, 
only “by experiencing it […] a full understanding of the fictional process can be 
gained” (Grant 15). Brooke-Rose’s reader has to be a “prepared consumer”. In Thru, 
not only is complicity with the reader sought, as theorised by Barthes, but also the 
reader’s convention of trusting the narrator, of relying on him/her, is played upon. 
One of the principles of the novel is in fact that of “never allowing the stock response 
to materialize in fact. The moment the reader feels s cure, you just make him think 
again” (Hayman and Cohen 8). Indeed, while teasingly suggesting “work it out for 
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yourself it’s not very deep” (T 595), the text also warns, “The reader has to be 
prepared for the undeicidable” (T 608)14. 
Thru thus is a dialogical, ambiguous work where over and u derdetermination 
perfectly balance each other and produce tension in the reader’s mind. In this way, 
the text points primarily in the direction of an answer, it anticipates, provokes an 
answer. As Bakhtin saw, in a dialogic novel “the word is at the same time determined 
by that which has not yet been said but which is needed and in fact anticipated” 
(Bakhtin 280). If it is the intentionality of the speaker which differentiates and 
stratifies language, it is the consciousness of the list ner, its response, which is its 
“activating principle” (Bakhtin 282). Brooke-Rose’s text counts on an active, 
responsive understanding which “establishes a series of complex interrelationships 
[…] with the word and enriches it with new elements” (Bakhtin 282), bringing forth 
the possible connotations of meaning. Jakobson’s phatic and conative functions are 
both present: establishing the contact and acting on the receiver is what the narrator 
(narration) aims at, opening up a dialogue with the reader. 
However, Brooke-Rose adventures further in the lineof the game between 
author and reader, in that it is their very relationship to be simultaneously over and 
underdetermined, thus inscribing her multi-complex work into the debate over reader 
and author fallacies in a highly original way, and contributing to clarify concepts 
which had become misleading in literary criticism.  
On the one hand, in fact, Thru seems to implement Barthes’s idea that “the 
author is dead: his civil status, his biographical person have disappeared; 
dispossessed, they no longer exercise over his work the formidable paternity” 
(Barthes 1975 27). The text kills the author, recalling Lewis Carroll’s Queen of 
hearts’ words: “There is no more private property in writing, the author is dead, the 
spokesman, the porte-parole, the tale bearer, off with his head […] the text slowly 
forms itself” (T 607). Defining itself “the text that kills the head that brought it forth” 
(T 685), the novel mimes the death of the author and to a certain extent the technique 
of the modernist author who looks at narration from a distance and does not intrude 
                                                
14 The wrong spelling of the term “undecidable” – both here and on page 637 – seems a further way of 
stimulating the readers’ ability to read, as well as of playing with their expectations. Indeed, there a  
many examples of misspelling throughout the text, another one of which is “mannikin” or 
“mannikins” (T 702, 685). 
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into the story: whoever invents the characters seem in fact to withdraw, “indifferent, 
paring [his/her] fingernails” (T 604-5). Indeed, further developing the modernist 
technique – where the author disappears to let his c aracters express their 
perceptions reflexively – Thru reproduces events and characters’ perceptions 
unreflexively, as if the text only reported things as just being there. The author is 
invisible in the narrative in the sense that “there is no consciousness that these 
various discourses are being filtered through” (Haym n and Cohen 8). Mimesis, 
therefore, or better the mimesis of mimesis, is total because of the apparent absence 
of a narrator and because of the scientific present t se, which renders utmost 
immediacy.  
On the other hand, however, Thru paradoxically subverts the much contested 
diegesis/mimesis dichotomy as it continuously alludes to its own fictionality. 
Moreover, not only is the very absence of an author umorously presented and 
constantly played upon by means of countless allusions to its death, but also and 
most importantly the (implied) author which disappears from the nature of things (it 
is absent in the sense that it does not intervene to judge or explain), is ambiguously 
reinstated in the text by means of several references to a mysterious figure which 
continually appears and disappears, a “mad magician” (T 582) who creates the 
fictional illusion, a “black magician who fantastically juggles luminous hoops in the 
retro-rectangular” (T 582) mirror, variously disguised as a “white white rabbit”, “a 
jack-in-the-box”, which regularly turns up and hides again, 
                  My love is like a white white rabbit  
                                                                                                 late  
down the hatch  
                                                   out of sight 
                                                   dead                                               (safe) 
earthhole though  
                    il court il court le furet 
and which way did he go? 
thattaway 
hey follow that car 
                    you should have seen the one that got                          away  
                                                           that always gets                 away  
                                                                                                 safe  




the grey eminence the retro-vizir beyond the in/con sultan 
Hearer of deep structures below the performance.  (T 581) 
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Like Alice’s “white white rabbit”, the fictional illusion flees “down the hatch 
out of sight”. The “late” rabbit is parenthetically “(safe)” and we are told we “should 
have seen the one that got away that always gets away safe”. The rabbit in fact 
reappears a few pages later from the hat of a “short and fat […] magician” (T 587). 
Throughout the text, we are constantly reminded of the fact that the fictive illusion is 
created under “the expert guidance of the lanky henc minence grise in smoked 
glasses” (T 672), “the vizir looming grey eminence behind the consultan listener” (T 
580).  
These mysterious figures which are intermittently gimpsed at through the 
narration seem to play on Barthes’ statement that “The writer is always on the blind 
spot of systems, adrift; he is the joker in the pack,  mana, a zero degree, the dummy 
in the bridge game: necessary to the meaning (the battle), but himself deprived of 
fixed meaning” (Barthes 1975 35). If Barthes saw that “lost in the mist of a text (not 
behind it, like a deus ex machina) there is always the other, the author” (Barthes 
1975 27), in Thru these figures continuously appear from behind as the juggling 
hoops of the fictional illusion do.  
By means of these enigmatic figures, the novel seem to hint at its encoded 
author who, although invisible, it is nevertheless present and must be present if 
narration is there. Even if the author does not speak directly, it appears in disguise to 
let the reader catch a glimpse of its presence behind narration. It is the showman of a 
puppet-theatre who controls the scene without being seen, the “poor Yorik / […] 
dead / Safe” (T 725), “the short plump demagogue [who] having carefully prepared 
the agenda for the manoeuvring of the meeting sit quietly clothed in democracy” (T 
602). Thru’s “very subtly planned chaos” (T 592) is thus supervised and manoeuvred 
by the encoded author.  
In the midst of the debate over the supposed death of the author, Thru 
mockingly enacts its death, recasting the whole dispute in ironical light and 
recuperating its role as necessary narrative construct. Far from being dead, the author 
is engaging in a play of hide and seek with the reader, clearly explaining that 
“Whoever speaks is hiding behind a discourse that is not theirs” (T 677).  
The text is evidently not only seeking active participation of the reader, but 
inscribing this into an ethic of playfulness, playing a cat-and-mouse game with her 
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reader, an “eternal game of vinciperdi” (T 675), clear y postulating this relationship 
(“you should have seen the one who always gets away safe”) and mocking the reader 
directly: “Qui parle avec un noyau dans la bouche? You’re taking a long time have I 
given you food for thought?” (T 723). 
As Genette explains, “the narrative discourse […] depends absolutely on that 
action of telling […] Without a narrating act, therefore, there is no statement” 
(Genette 1980 26). If the narrative action which produces the statement must be 
there, even if invisible, in Thru, the reason for this invisibility is overtly address d. 
As the text makes clear, although “once upon a time […] the author had supreme 
authority” (T 605), today’s situation is completely different,  
the community assumes both roles, emitting and receiving a discourse it addresses to itself , indeed, 
the community is the discourse, existing by, through and for its myth, not before or after […] you see 
not narrator for the reasons just given. The element of manipulation however should not be too 
visible, for it destroys the fictive illusion, making the recipient over-aware of a technique at work thus 
losing eye-contact. (T 606) 
 
In order for the fictional illusion not to vanish, t e magician must operate at the 
reader’s back and the latter, who can look at the “luminous coloured hoops” (T 622) 
he juggles only through the rear-view mirror, cannot turn his/her head without the 
former vanishing: “Don’t look back Orpheus don’t look back” (T 669). 
If every narration presupposes a narrating instance which, however invisible, is 
not dead, Barthes’ concept of the death of the author is ironically addressed during a 
class debate by the teacher and one of the students,  
But what about the clarity of the message? 
You read what you want into it. 
I see. And what do you read? 
It’s not for me to say, I wrote it. 
But the reader is the writer and the writer the reader. (T 608)  
 
In contrast to the contemporary tendency to dispossess the author of its 
authority and to give the reader supreme power overth  text, the question of the 
death of the author is humorously recast. If the reader is the writer, it follows that the 
writer is the reader and therefore can read what he wants into the text: a paradoxical, 
unsustainable situation. The reader must participate ac ively in the text, “The Text 
[…] asks of the reader a practical collaboration” (Barthes 1977 163), but not in the 
sense that he/she is its supreme interpreter, while t e author is not to be taken into 
consideration, but rather in that there should be a al nce between the two fallacies, 
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which are both important for narration and literary criticism. In this light, the 
following excerpt acquires significant connotations,  
E se non è vero, if it has all been dreamt up by the markster of the moment you can always drop into a 
lacuna, entering a busy beehive through a little hol  where you execute a secret ballet with a show of 
legs and a quiver of wings for a swarm of honeyvorous impulses that palp oscult measure and imitate 
the message sucking the performer dry with no memory of the fact that the message has been 
transmitted from […] a fat queen bhi, quivering now and again in apathy from fear of being 
 
unthroned 
                                                                     undroned?                                                       (T 674) 
 
The text compares itself to a beehive where the reader has to interpret the 
“message” of the author, the “queen bhi”,15 entangling the secrets of narration and 
enjoying the show that the author has put on for him/ er, with the danger of “sucking 
the performer dry”, of forgetting “the fact that the message has been transmitted from 
[…] a fat queen bhi”, i.e. of not taking into account the emitter of the message, its 
encoded author, who is thus afraid (“quivering”) of being disregarded (“unthroned”) 
by the reader, his/her message remaining unexpressed/unuttered (“undroned”). Thru 
thus postulates both a critical, encoded reader and an encoded author, both of them 
being not the ones living in a “real” world outside the text, but mere effects of the 
play of writing, critical constructs necessary to the narrative economy and which 
therefore cannot be abstracted from when interpreting a text. 
The author/reader dialectic is postulated in Thru as an exchange based on effort 
on the reader’s part who gains a reward in measure of his endeavour, “Literature is 
an object of exchange […] as to the internal principles of exchange with what the 
receptor is prepared to give and take, not just in money but in effort and reward” (T 
628). Inversely, on the reader’s effort depends the very life of the encoded author and 
narration. If the encoded author is the necessary nrative instance of fictionality – 
the one who must be living if narrating but also must narrate in order to live – his 
life primarily depends on the reader. This concept is perfectly expressed by the 
sentence, “Narration is life and I am Scheherezade” (T 711). Brooke-Rose has 
always been fascinated by this peculiar figure, As she comes back to it in other 
novels, among which Textermination. Scheherezade is both the archetype of the 
narrator and a fictional character, “whose very life is to narrate and whose narration 
                                                
15 The presence of the author could also be hinted at by the fact the comments to the creative writing 
homework is in Brooke-Rose’s own handwriting. Moreov r, the “bhi” of the “queen bhi” could also 
stand for the initial letter of the author’s surname.  
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gives her life, with every new character in the same situation, not a character but a 
tale-bearer, whose life also depends on his narration” (T 618). As a narrator, 
Scheherezade is “under perpetual sentence” (T 581) of death. To say it in Barth’s 
humorous terms, her “problem” is “to publish or perish” (Barth 1967 33). She is 
always caught up between the difficulties which narration implies and the threat of 
execution in case her story will not result interesting enough to her listener. Like 
Scheherezade, the encoded author will not live unless his/her narrative is appreciated.  
Once again the threat of death – here of the author as critical construct – is 
evoked and enacted in order to be avoided.  
Apart from recasting the roles of author and reader and the importance of 
narrative life, the movement of hide and seek which the implied author of Thru 
enacts seems to address once again Derrida’s theory, deconstructing the dichotomy 
presence/absence and the notion of origin which lies at its basis.  
The notion of writing, trace, grammè, disrupts the notion of author as 
transcendental signifier of a text: language withdraws from the subject and 
signification functions independently. Origin is a tr ce, already there and for ever 
eluded, deferring and differing. Yet the “responsibility” of écriture is reinstated by 
Derrida as trace which produces the movement of signification, “Even before it is 
linked to incision, engraving, drawing, or the letter, […] the concept of the graphie 
[…] implies the framework of the instituted trace, as the possibility common to all 
systems of signification” (Derrida 1976 46). Écritue is the ability to differentiate and 
defer. 
Brooke-Rose enacts this dialectic and marks the presence of the author, its 
presence as “trace” (both origin and nonorigin) of the text and the responsibility of 
writing. The binarism author/reader is not subverted in the sense that the author 
regains full power over the narrative as opposed to the reader, but in the sense that it 
is in between these two terms that liesthe text as trace of both the author and reader.  
If the system of speech as presence which dominates our culture “has produced 
the idea of the world, the idea of world-origin, that arises from the difference 
between the worldly and the non-worldly, the outside and the inside” (Derrida 1976 
8), Thru mimes the deconstructive strategy and subverts the dichotomy 
absence/presence. The endless shifting movement of meaning which writing entails 
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is mimed to the extreme (overenacted, overdetermined) by means of the continual 
allusion to the mysterious figure of the author (the fictional illusion) which 
constantly hides and reappears in disguise from a different corner. Arche-trace is 
something which is but cannot be pinned down once and for all, it remains in 
indeterminacy, in proliferation of meaning. Origin is always already inscribed in the 
text and yet displaced, non-recognisable. There is no outside origin of the text, as 
determined presence, everything is inscribed within and outside it: everything begins 
in différance, with its differing and deferring actions. The author, like meaning, like 
“the eternal presence and absence of signifiers that c racterizes the practice of 
language” (T 675) is always already there yet absent. It is a trace, a différance. The 
author is both present and absent from the narrative. 
As Derrida explains, writing is the name of two absences, “the absence of the 
signatory […] and the absence of the referent” (Derrida 1976 40-1). The present 
tense in Thru inscribes in itself the absence of the presence-to-self. With its 
“scientific” use, Brooke-Rose aims at restoring theauthority of écriture, and the 
trace, the authority of the author, its authenticity and responsibility, the authority of 
the “author” as absence which generates meaning and the absence of the reader 
which interprets it. Brooke-Rose writing in Thru is mostly in speech form but 
without implying the superiority of the speech form, the importance of the “real 
presence”. Against “the supposed superiority of speech (because of its ‘real 
presence’)”, Brooke-Rose effort is directed “to restore the authority or “scientific” 
(narratorless) neutrality of narrative écriture”, to provide both “that breathy orality 
and the ‘trace,’ the ‘authority’ of the author, the authenticity of the source, the 
responsibility of écriture” (Brooke-Rose 2002b 158). Thru reinstates the “self-
presence in the breath” (Derrida 1976 26) of the spaker, but not the importance of 
the speech form over writing. 
The novel subverts the speech/writing binarism: the “voice” is shown to be no 
real presence (deconstruction of the metaphysics of presence), the narrative is 
narratorless, yet Barthes’ grain of the voice is present: a writing which is not speech, 
but rather a “mixture of timbre and language”, a “writing aloud [which] is not 
phonological but phonetic […] the language lined with flesh […] the grain of the 
throat, the patina of consonants, the voluptuousness of vowels, a whole carnal 
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stereophony”, a writing which succeeds in “shifting the signified a great distance” 
(Barthes 1975 66-67).  
Writing becomes “the relation between life and death, between present and 
representation […] writing is the stage of history and the play of the world”. 
Representation is “death […] But it is bound to life and to the living present which it 
repeats originarily” (Derrida 2001 287, 286). 
The tension of the debate around the author/reader is postulated, performed and 
resolved through the textual ethics of playfulness. As theorised by Barthes, “the text 
itself plays” (Barthes 1977 162). Its game aims first of all at recuperating the joy of 
reading/writing, the importance of narration, offering an exit to the debate which 
menaces it. Brooke-Rose herself stresses the importance of enjoying literature 
without being entrapped into a “rigidly held theory” which threatens to kill its play, 
explaining that the reader should approach the text with enthusiasm,  
enthusing about a necessarily chameleon text and transmitting that enthusiasm without killing the 
chameleon through summary, ideology, a rigidly held theory, or imposition of abstract structures that 
have only a limited relevance to any text, using […] this or that theory if it can enhance 
understanding, but above all, genuine enjoyment, insight, imagination, a “gift outright” of ourselves, 
and the compliment of careful reading. (Brooke-Rose 2002b 35) 
 
Let us now consider the role of the characters/narrators in Thru, what their 
status implies in terms of the concept of identity and their relation with the author, 
the reader and the same text. 
For compound reasons the round, flesh-and-blood chara ters – the ones who 
retained a strong mimetic power on the reader and with which the reader identified –. 
have disappeared from the modern novel.  
Among the causes which have contributed to make chara ters lose their 
mimetic illusion is that the novelistic genre has lo t its representational task together 
with the crumbling of bourgeois society – which thenovel was born to depict (Cf. 
Watt 2001). At the same time, comics, the media, computer games and popular 
genres have gained new relevance, strongly contributing to the predominant flat 
characterisation. Another major cause of this situation is that the horror of wars and 
the savagery of reality have outdone imagination, s that mimesis has become unable 
to cope with reality and has become silent in front of i . (Cf. Brooke-Rose 1986 193).  
Finally, the crisis of language and representation has revealed characters to be 
only “verbal structures”, mere letters, verbal constructs made up through codes of 
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representation, the convergence of selected semes upon a proper name (Cf. Barthes 
1974 67-8), so that the illusion they once generated “now lies in pieces at our feet, 
like a disassembled toy, together with the novel as we commonly understand that 
term” (Brooke-Rose 1986 186-7). 
If the “Fictional Character has died, or become flat, as had deus ex machina” 
(Brooke-Rose 1986 193), and if readers have lost the illusion once created by 
characters, have stopped identifying with them, what we need – comments Brooke-
Rose – is a “deep-down regeneration in the novel and, therefore, as ine qua non, of 
character in the novel” (Brooke-Rose 1986 196). 
In Thru, Brooke-Rose seems not only to face this problem directly, but also to 
try to solve such a degrading situation, offering her characters the “deep-down 
regeneration” she postulates as essential to the renewal of the novelistic genre.  
The characters of Thru are shown to be conscious of the present state of things. 
They are fully aware of being merely “words on a page” and know that one of the 
reasons why they cannot be conventionally rounded characters is that “The bour-
geois i-dyll is o-o-o-ver” (T 672). Armel seems even to steal the author’s own words: 
if Brooke-Rose explains that “rounded individuation has become an addition, like the 
ornaments of traditional rhetoric [and] At best the characters are poems in 
themselves” (Brooke-Rose 1986 192), Armel tells Larissa, “we were a poem not a 
couple” (T 654). 
If characters have been shown to be only “verbal constructs”, Larissa is said to 
be “a well established structure that presupposes a void a fall into a delirious 
discourse watched indifferently through fingernails paring” (T 695). Similarly, if 
Brooke-Rose explains that “Identity […] is a fiction, made of language, and, like all 
good fictions, is open-ended and slightly unreal” (Brooke-Rose 2002b 60), in Thru 
identity is humorously shown to be a fictional construct as many times the text plays 
on the notion of portrait to show how a portrait cannot possibly capture an identity 
which does not exist. For instance, an academic candid te’s curriculum vitae is 
presented in the novel: his name is “Homo Scholasticu ” (T 616), he was born in the 
middle of the 4th millennium B.C., educated in Memphis, Babylon, Hao, Rome, 
Athens, Iona and finally at the “New World University”. He has been teaching many 
disciplines, among which Rhetoric in Syracuse (where Rhetoric was born), creative 
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telling in Baghdad (where the story of Scheherezade t k s place), nail-paring in 
Dublin (Joyce), and Dialectics in Athens. However– reinstates the text – such a 
portrait “captures nothing”, being only an “exact replicas of all such replicas” (T 
617-8). Apart from being an ironical comment to theacademic recruitment system, 
such a curriculum seems to show how identity is only made up of “words on a page”. 
Similarly, the text parallels two portraits of Armel, one made by Veronica and the 
other created by Armel himself (T 591): the great difference between the two 
descriptions seems to signify that identity only corresponds to one’s own perception 
and not to the “reality” of things. These portraits are followed by the “Portrait of the 
portrait by Jacques le Fataliste” and by the “Portrait of the portrait by Roland 
Barthes”, after which Jacques reinstates – with a direct quotation from Diderot – that 
such portraits “ressemblent si peu, que, si par hazard on vient à rencontrer les 
originaux, on ne les reconnait pas” (T 591).  
The continuous metalepses of Thru make its characters continually shift 
identities into undecidability. The discourses which multiply around each character 
show that identity itself is a fiction invented by each of them for the other, in an 
endless movement of interpretation. If the deconstructive strategy that Derrida 
hypothesises is a strategy for reading texts, what we have in Thru is a continuous 
miming of this process as every character reads the others as texts and is read in turn 
by them. In this way, the novel subverts the notion of fixed identity as linked to the 
idea of a universal and essential truth as origin of meaning. Its characters bear in 
themselves their self-decentering, the deconstruction of their own identity.  
The process of destruction of the notion of fixed identity however is not a 
means to itself. As we have already observed, initial subversion is enacted in order to 
achieve – on an inverse ladder – new life. Brooke-Rose’s characters in fact, 
challenging any coercive imposition of fixed identity, overcome their dependence on 
the system of preset meaning. Once the notion of fixed meaning is challenged, the 
idea of conventionally depicted rounded characters which are the bearers of 
universal, eternal meaning is shown to be no longer a feasible one. If readers are 
made aware of the fact that “everything is text” and that identity and fixed meaning 
are only tropes, and if they accept the open proliferation of meaning which lies at the 
basis of existence, they will necessarily reconsider th ir notion of the “reality” a 
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character stands for. They will recognise that characters can no longer embody 
eternal verities, since the very concept of eternal verity is a misleading one.  
But the process of renewal of the characters in Thru does not stop here. They 
also achieve new life by means of the dialectic which is postulated at the basis of 
their mutual relationships and which is generated by the Lacanian dialectic of desire 
which conceives a lack at the heart of the ego and  narcissistic bond between 
subject/object. If psychoanalysis has revealed the lack at the heart of human 
existence, a way of renewing the characters in the novel is precisely to make them 
aware of this lack, to show how desire subtends their relationships, so that they 
embody the condition of the modern human being. 
What is even more significant, the Lacanian dialectic of desire also engenders 
the relationship between characters, author, reader nd text. In other words, all the 
instances which literature entails – author, reader, characters and text – are made to 
enter into a complex bond of interdependence with one another, at the basis of which 
is the mirror stage and castration, the impossibility of fulfilment of desire and the 
concept of language as mirror and absence. 
For Lacan, the object of desire is constituted for the child in the very moment it 
is lost, in the moment the perceived unity of the mirror stage vanishes with the 
entrance of the subject into the symbolic. If desire exists only because of this initial 
loss, any object of desire from this moment on willbe such only in as much it stands 
for this loss. The Lacanian subject is thus “a being that can only conceptualise itself 
when it is mirrored back to itself from the position f another’s desire” (Mitchell and 
Rose 5-6). Desire, generated by the castration complex, is the desire of a “lack in the 
Other”, therefore essentially unattainable, an infinite deferral, for ever eluded. 
At the heart of desire is therefore a méconnaissance of fullness: it is lack that 
ensures desire. However, because the objet petit a, the object of our desire, is 
ultimately nothing but a screen for our own narcissistic projections, to come too 
close to it threatens to give us the experience of the Lacanian Gaze, the realisation 
that behind our desire is nothing but our lack: the materiality of the Real staring back 
at us. The lack at the heart of desire simultaneously allows desire to persist and 
continually recalls us the threat of the Real.  
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In Thru, the relationships delineated between the characters of opposite sexes 
continually reflect the lack at the heart of the subject/object and are governed by the 
castration complex. The novel takes up Lacan’s theory many times, explaining how 
“in the dialectic of desire, the subject is subverted and the object is from the start an 
object of central loss” (T 594), and describing the m chanism of the “axis of desire” 
(T 700). For instance, in the context of Stavro’s lve declaration to Larissa we read,  
The unmarked term, scaring, scarring you with his zero, forming you to his pygmalion desire that 
realises retrospectively that it has worked at something infinitely beyond itself since the diagonal 
contradictory of the dialectical reply to I want to take you over must necessarily be I want to overtak  
you whatever the deep structure. How long O Freud how long? (T 681) 
 
The desire of appropriation of the loved-object by the lover-subject is also 
reinstated later on as we read that Stavro’s words “I want to look after you” only 
mean “I want to take you over” (T 701). What Larissa – shown to be aware of the 
process which generates desire – significantly replies is: “With all your goodly words 
you me endow […] But if you distance yourself you see only the mannikin 
ensconced still in his mother’s lap like an open grave a circular O” (T 702)16. Larissa 
will later explain that Stavro is unconsciously “knocking at the other place both his 
and mine without even realizing it” (T 711), “He’s aiming at someone else through 
me though he doesn’t know it” (T 712).  
Similarly, when Stavro proposes to Larissa, his words reveal his desire to attain 
his “unity” by possessing a woman, “my life’s a mess, but with you, I know, I just 
know it will all come right” (T 703). Soon after, Larissa meets Armel-ex-husband 
who tries to win her back and together they discuss Stavro: Larissa says she knows 
he is only affected by castration and Armel defines Larissa “a toy he [Stavro] will 
discard as soon as given” (T 708, 709). However, Armel punctually declares “I want 
to save you” (T 709), thus showing he is caught up in the same egotistic mechanism 
of appropriation.  
If for Lacan castration “means that jouissance must be refused, so that it can be 
reached on the inverted ladder […] of the Law of desire” (Lacan 1989 324), the 
desire for conquest in man is shown to be an attempt to solve his castration complex, 
                                                
16 This concept also recalls Genette as he explains that “ he view I have of a picture depends for 
precision on the distance separating me from it” (Genette 1980 162). The same idea of distancing 
oneself to better see the whole picture is repeated o her times throughout the text in reference to 
literature and narrative illusion. Here the idea seems to hint at the fact that love, like fiction, is based 
on illusion: if you look at the fiction from too near, you do not see its illusion, but if you distance 
yourself enough, you can clearly distinguish it.  
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his incompleteness, “the Don Juan myth – the symbolic structure of which has long 
been analysed as that of castration, that of a man rked with the sign of 
incompleteness” (T 636). 
The characters of Thru exist in a mutual relationship of interdependence 
generated by castration, as is exemplified by the continual process of reciprocal 
invention we have observed above. Indeed, Larissa and Armel are said to be invented 
respectively by their “binary” man and woman (Cf. T 659, 669), and when Armel 
calls Larissa “castrating bitch”, she charges him in turn, “you’re destroying me, my 
image of myself I mean, as, reflected, by you” (T 654). Again, when the two argue, 
the well-known Lacanian question “Che vuoi?” jumps back from one to the other,  
But what do you want? 
Ah! Che vuoi? (654) 
 
One of them also significantly states, “we can’t eat ch other without 
becoming each other can we. Let the phallos perceive its aim” (T 661), and when 
Larissa declares to love Armel’s head, he replies “O Salome do you want it on a 
platter then?” (T 661). Love is castrating, it entails the process of killing each other, 
as each one wants to appropriate the other for oneself, as Lacan illuminatingly 
explains, “I love you, but, because inexplicably I love in you s mething more than / 
You – the object petit a – I mutilate you” (Lacan 199  263). 
Each possible narrator of Thru “does not exist except as reinvestment itself 
perpetually reinvesting S into O the Other Place and o the object of desire o1 2 on” 
(T 689). Each narrator is perpetually reinvesting his Subject into the Other (Autre) 
and into the object of desire (autre, object petit a) which multiplies ad infinitum. 
What the text presents and enacts is a radical and mutual usurpation of selves, since 
the dialectic of desire brings about the wish to appro riate the other for oneself (Cf. 
Lacan 1989 307-8). The mutual enslavement which occurs at all levels is a struggle 
of prestige of which the stake is life itself. 
The theme of castration, in Thru, is inextricably connected to language and its 
use. As Brooke-Rose elucidates, “The moment we utter a sentence, we’re leaving out 
a lot. […] We’re doing a découpage of reality” (Hayman and Cohen 11). The idea 
the novel seems to put forward is precisely that of language as castration of reality, 
together with the idea of castration in human relationships. To speak is to 
limit/omit/castrate reality, for when we speak we automatically take some bits of 
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reality and leave out others. The same happens in human relationships: we castrate 
the Other by means of language. When the characters of Thru invent each other, they 
are castrating each other: Brooke-Rose’s characters ar  paper Is, but also paper eyes, 
“papyrus eye[s]” (T 584). Apart from playing on Barthes’ declaration that “the I 
which writes the text […] is never more than a paper-I” (Barthes 1977 161), Thru’s 
paper Is are reduced to passive receptacles for the projection of each other’s 
fantasies. They demonstrate that the desire for the mastery of the look is continually 
undercut by a certain castration at the heart of the locus/narrative: the fictional 
“reality” is an illusion created by a double mirroring movement. Castration of one’s 
self in human relationships and castration of reality in language are interdependent, 
as interdependent are Armel and Larissa by means both of their relationship and of 
language – their anagrammatic names. 
The mirroring movement acts in human relations by means of language. In the 
text, the characters are mutually dependent on eachother because language acts as a 
mirror. They establish a specular relationship with each other by means of language. 
When they speak, language sends them back their own image and desire. Desire, 
however, cannot be spoken, and the novel jokingly addresses this impossibility as we 
read “your demand cannot reach its destination” (T 685) or else “Votre demande is 
not an askable question” (T 675). Thru applies the notions of desire and lack to 
discourse and narration when we read that “eyelessnes  is not a provisional state but 
a structure, a blind spot in your own youdipeon discourse and discourse only occurs 
insofar as there is a lack of (in) sight” (T 675). Discourse can occur only insofar as 
there is lack of sight which generates the fictional illusion; a fictional structure 
entails “eyelessness” – lack of sight – which is constituent of the illusion. In fiction 
in fact, “intensity of illusion is what matters to whoever is operating through a flaw 
in the glass” (T 698), and the awareness of this illu ion generates disillusionment,  
if you come too close to any icon […] you will see only the texture and the knife strokes […] If 
however you distance yourself […] you see merely an oval with a blob off-centre which […] splits 
into dancing hoops […] juggled by an invisible magician. (T 687-8) 
 
Aware of this mechanism, Thru overenacts it and generates illusion through its 
own subversion, by clearly addressing and endlessly referring to the “optical 
illusion” (T 697) it breeds. Furthermore, “eyelessne s” can be read as I lessness, lack 
of I, the lack the humanistic notion of ego as a unitary subject. Language is a 
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structure which reveals this lack, the empty space beyond. Indeed in the novel the 
“fall” into language and the empty space beyond it is mimed also by means of the 
peculiar sentence structure, where each discourse incessantly leads to another till it 
collapses into the void. Larissa is shown to perceive this emptiness as she stat s, 
“Sometimes however you vanish into a linguistic edifice you have erected” (T 703): 
language’s structures can crumble to reveal the absence of the I. When Armel 
maintains to use language directly, Larissa replies that this is only “an old illusion” 
(T 641). In fact, the coordination of the subject’s di course, for Lacan, occurs in a 
mechanic of transfer to and from the locus of the Other. If “it is from the Other that 
the subject receives even the message that he emits” (Lacan 1989 305), in Thru it is 
always the Other who seems to speak. The letter O – varying into A for Autre – is a 
basic pattern throughout the text, present in Greimas’ semiotic square and even 
mimetically presented by means of the juggling hoops f the fictional illusion: “S 
represent the subject of discourse and O the Other place and o the object of desire o1 
o2 on” (T 669). Humorously combining Lacan’s and Barthes’ theoretical implications, 
the text asks, “Who speaks? The Other Author” (T 705). From the Other, the subject 
receives the image of itself and its own discourse.  
For Lacan, “the I as signifier […] designates the subject […] speaking […] but 
it does not signify it” (Lacan 1989 298). Therefore, the subject I is a “function” of 
the signifier: “this subject, who thinks he can accede to himself by designating 
himself in the statement, is no more than […] an object” (Lacan 1989 315) and “It is 
this object that cannot be grasped in the mirror that e specular image lends its 
clothes” (Lacan 1989 316). In Thru, discourse comes irremediably from the locus of 
the other, all the relationships postulated in the text are specularizable, in a dialectic 
which subverts the binarism subject/object. I and O, Me and You, become the same 
thing, “Each I leads into another I, unless I into O for Other” (T 618). Each one’s life 
depends on the other, the master and the slave positions become interchangeable, as 
Jacques the fatalist puts in plain words: “although you were pleased to call yourself 
and I was pleased to call you the master, I am in fact yours” (T 644), “For the deep 
structure of I am your slave is undoubtedly you will be mine” (T 665). Each 
character mirrors itself in the other by means of language and Armel perfectly 
explains this point, 
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All discourse is the return of a discourse by the Other, without whom I am not, but to whom I am 
more attached than to myself, I say I but I mean everyone, all of us, nor can I proceed to the 
identification of that I except through the medium of language. (T 642-3). 
 
Brooke-Rose elucidates this process by saying, “I suppose it’s what Lacan calls 
l’autre […] the whole thing about language is a mirror” (Hayman and Cohen 17). If 
“the whole thing about language is a mirror”, the same dialectic observed among the 
characters of the novel exists between them and the reader. The characters are in fact 
said to establish a specular relationship with the reader as the reader interprets them 
on the basis on his/her own subjectivity,  
the hero slips out of the text, establishing a specular relationship with the reader and away from the 
author in an eternal mechanism between the reader’s mand and the author’s gift of the character 
[…] castration is at the basis of this enjoyment. (T 658-9) 
 
What generates the reader’s enjoyment is castration: we, as readers, are 
generated by the dialectic of desire. This is exemplified by Greimas’ semiotic square 
rehandled with “I” and “O” as its binary opposites: at the crossing of its bars, there is 
another O and an arrow indicates “YOU ARE HERE” (T 695). We are at the very 
centre of that dialectic, we are mutually dependent o  the text and its narrative 
instances; we too are a narrative instance, integral part of the game. The reader of 
Thru is in fact described as “a cannibalistic survivor [which] dips into pieces of 
master/mistress dying or half dead” (T 677). 
The same process of mirroring oneself into the Other by means of language 
takes place between the author and the reader. The aut or partakes in the dialectic of 
desire as he is said to be imbued with narcissistic love, 
the line of twenty-seven and a half black mannikins occurs in order to generate […] the matter upon 
which you write your narcissistic love the virgin page you soil in which you sow your seed […] the 
clay on which you scar the zero marks of masterhood by definition doomed to fail in that it 
masterhoods the eyes from the iotaboo. (T 685) 
 
The author dirties the blank page with his/her words, planting his/her seed in it, 
shaping it like clay and marking it with his/her own mark, which is zero since the 
author is the barred subject, the lacking other. Masterhood of the Other is doomed to 
fail because it understands/controls/ has control over the I subjects (the characters) 
from the I taboo.  
When Hayman and Cohen ask Brooke-Rose whether her novels “shape” her 
reader, whether the reader is in the text, she answers, 
Absolutely. He has to be, if he is reading the text at all. He is bound to be in the text. Any text 
addresses someone, any message […] it’s addressed to someone, even if you are talking to yourself 
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[…] it hovers between tu and je and that is the same person. An I think that the reader is that, it’s a 
je/tu. (Hayman and Cohen 17) 
 
The reader is a je/tu because the act of using language entails the process of 
mirroring oneself into it: literature becomes a mirror of oneself, as the interpretative 
process exemplifies. The predominant erotic perspective of Thru is thus inscribed 
into the higher context of the erotic of the narrative act itself and the same text 
partakes in the dialectic of desire with the author, the characters and the reader: if by 
means of the text they are constituted as subjects, the text comes into being only by 
means of them, they mirror themselves into the text and the latter sends them back 
their own specular image. 
The castrating and mirroring process which desire and l nguage entail thus 
reaches the level of the whole text: characters, author and reader are all 
interdependent because of the discourse they share, in a movement of endless 
specularization and projection of desire.  
Desire and castration permeate the narrative at all its evels: the text, the 
fictional illusion, the characters or narrators of the moment, the reader and the author 
are all reciprocally involved in the same dialectic of mutual dependence, in a process 
where each mirrors the other through language. A play where subject and object are 
interchangeable and impossible to distinguish, where the power dichotomy between 
them is blurred. They all share the narrative, acquiring a new status, a new life, in a 
play where what counts is narrative itself, the active fictional play, a game to which 
they all contribute. In this way, the text addresses and playfully rehandles Lacan’s 
much discussed psychoanalytic theories, reshaping them for its own purpose, i.e. the 
creation of its own narrativity. 
Brooke-Rose’s novel however, while positing castration as its founding 
modality, nevertheless stretches forwards in a non-masculine conception of the 
subject which once again points to the innovative theories of Kristeva. Published one 
year after Revolution in Poetic Language, Thru puts into practice the very theory 
Kristeva speculated on. It is to me astonishing how, if Kristeva’s work was 
immediately recognised as one of the most important theoretical breakthroughs of the 
time, Thru was not acknowledged for the way its fictional practice links to Kristeva’s 
thought, outstandingly embodying the very narrative solution posited in Revolution 
in Poetic Language. 
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Brooke-Rose’s text playfully inscribes itself within the dispute which 
originated from the Lacanian dichotomy between masculine/feminine as respectively 
totalizing/non-totalizing, tout/pas-tout aspects. Lacan’s conception – accused by 
feminist theorists of phallocentrism/phallogocentrism – gave life to a great debate17 
which tried to balance the question and explain “how men and women in their 
psychosexuality are equal but different” (Mitchell and Rose 8). 
In Thru, the idea of the marked/unmarked term of masculine/feminine is 
rejected as man and woman are both equally subjects and objects of desire, thus 
subverting the binary opposition of masculine tout/female pas-tout: “The notions of 
subject and object do not correspond to a difference i  nature but to a place in the 
proposition uniting for instance two lovers” (T 703). 
Subject and object are shown to be interchangeable firstly by means of the 
endless mutual invention of the characters, each constituting and being constituted in 
turn by the other: “Whoever you invented invented you too” (T 631). 
As already seen, Kristeva surpasses Lacan in that she conceives the Semiotic 
and the Symbolic as both necessary and constitutive of the signifying process, a the 
same time postulating an equality between the sexes and seeing that the transgression 
of the symbolic does not necessarily entails schizophrenia.  
Indeed, surpassing Lacan, it is Kristeva’s concept of writing and what it 
implies in terms of the relationship between author, characters and reader, which 
Thru seems to enact. Writing is seen by Kristeva as a “trace of a dialogue with 
oneself (with another), as a writer’s distance from hi self, as a splitting of the writer 
into subject of enunciation and subject of utterance” (writer/character) (Kristeva 
1980a 74). The very act of narrating institutes a rel tion to another, implies and 
addresses another, so that narration can be seen as “a dialogue between the subject of 
narration (S) and the addressee (A)” (Kristeva 1980a 74). The addressee, the other, 
the reading subject, is itself a double entity, both signifier in relation to the text and 
signified in relation to the subject of narration, “a dyad (A1 and A2) whose two terms, 
communicating with each other, constitute a code system” (Kristeva 1980a 74). The 
subject of narration (S) drawn into this relationship becomes a code mediated by the 
character as subject of utterance. S, including himself in the system of narration, is 
                                                
17 See for instance Ernest Jones, “Early Female Sexuality”, IJPA xvi, 1935: 263-273, and Melanie 
Klein, “Early Stages of the Oedipus Complex”, IJPA ix, 1928: 167-180.  
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thus transformed into “neither nothingness nor anybod , but the possibility of 
permutation from S to A […] He becomes an anonymity, an absence, a blank space, 
thus permitting the structure to exist as such” (Kristeva 1980a 74). The author is 
hence situated as a zero out of which the character is born, and the characte  is both 
subject and addressee, representing and represented. 
Such is the complex relationship which is determined between subject of 
enunciation, addressee and subject of utterance,  
On the basis of this anonymity, this zero where the author is situated, the he/she of the character is 
born. At a later stage, it will become a proper name […] subject and addressee. It is the addressee, th 
other, exteriority […] who transforms the subject into an author. That is, who has the S pass through 
this zero-stage of negation, of exclusion, constituted by the author. (Kristeva 1980a 75) 
 
To support the relationship between Kristeva’s theory and the practice of Thru, 
it is the reiteration of Kristeva’s discourse into Brooke-Rose’s text, where the above 
discourse is repeated and re-appropriated as a “revelation” of the correspondence of 
author/character/reader. 
After the already described scene in which Larissa i  interrupted by Armel 
while writing her novel, Thru presents a conversation between Jacques the fatalist 
and his master. They discuss the problem raised by the episode which has just 
occurred: Larissa has been presented as author of the text and has also acquired a 
husband and a surname. Talking about such “textual problems that tie us in knots” (T 
646) but which are meant to be disentangled, the master explains,  
That’s the whole point, you see, out of the zero where the author is situated, both excluded and 
included, the third person is generated, pure signifier of the subject’s experience. Later this third 
person acquires a proper name, figure of this paradox, one out of zero, name out of anonymity, 
visualisation of the fantasy into a signifier that c n be looked at, seen. You should read Kristeva that’s 
what she says. Though we mustn’t forget that in the grammar of narrative the proper name coincides 
with the agent. In this way the construction of a ch racter has to pass through a death, necessary to the
structuring of the subject as subject of utterance, and for his insertion into the circuit of signifiers, I 
mean the narration. It is therefore the recipient, you Jacques, or anyone, the other, who transforms the 
subject into author, making him pass through this zero-stage, this negation, this exclusion which is the 
author. I am in fact dead, Jacques. (T 647) 
 
Far from being a mere repetition, imitation, in Thru Kristeva’s words are 
repeated/transformed/re-appropriated, thus maintaini g on the one hand their original 
meaning, and acquiring on the other a playful tone, i scribed as they are within the 
discourse between Jacques the fatalist and his Master, who declares to be dead but is 
indeed talking.  
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After such an explanation it is said “Everything is becoming clear at last. God! 
No! Yes! Quick, pen and paper” (T 647), and the anagrams of Armel and Larissa’s 
names are clearly revealed, thus exemplifying the exchange between writing subject 
and addressee. Larissa (who was writing a text) and Armel (a character in it) become 
both subject and object of enunciation, their anagrammatic names disclose the 
specular relationship between writing subject and characters.  
At the same time, the character becomes subject of utterance only at the cost a 
split, of its own death, by means of which it is inerted in the narrative as signifier. It 
is the Other, the reader, who constitutes the subject as such. Without the reader (the 
other), the character (the subject) would not be such. The same happens to the author 
who, in order to be constituted as such, must pass through his own death, the zero 
stage, by means of the other. Characters are indeed “marked with zeroist authorship” 
(T 681). This recalls the Lacanian theory of subject, for which the subject’s 
constitution inaugurates its split (it brings about its death as unified subject-author). 
The subject enters the order of language but becomes a mere signifier and needs the 
other in order to be. It is therefore the other who renders the Other subject, making 
him pass through a negation which is a radical split. The subject needs the other in 
order to be and vice versa, in a mutual relationship of need where each of the term 
looks for what it lacks in the other, without findig it, but receiving back only a 
reflection of its own lack. In Thru, at the basis of this dialectic is the narcissistic 
stance of the author. The text in fact alludes many times to a narcissistic “implied 
author who is in love with himself” (T 674). In Lacn’s theory, the subject looks at 
the object – the Other – in search for what he lacks, but receives back only his own 
lack: the narcissistic narrator looks at himself in the mirror through the text, but the 
text is the object petit a which sends back the image to the narcissistic author. The 
author looks at the text and the text looks back at the author. The same happens 
between reader and author, as Brooke-Rose explains, “The reader is someone 
imaginary in my head […] it is not the reader out there who is going to read the 
book. I think the reader is me, as I write” (Hayman and Cohen 16). If the object of 
desire is the Other, the subject seeks his desire in the other: the text, the author, the 
characters and the reader all seek for their desire in the other. The process of 
specularization is infinite and is brought into life through language. Language is life 
 255 
for the narrative, but language brings about castration. Hence the text’s dialectic of 
desire: desire is never attainable, always deferring, summoning up again Derrida’s 
infinite deferral of meaning.  
The movement between subject and object thus postulates the identity between 
writer and reader and the text as their dialogue. In other words, S, the subject of 
narration (author) exists in a specular relationship w th both himself and A, the 
addressee. S is reduced to anonymity (as writer) because it is mediated by a third 
person, the character. The writer passes through his own death to give life to the 
character, the proper name, which on the one hand tr sforms the S into author (who 
passes through his own death) and from the other becom s both Sr – subject of 
enunciation – and Sd – subject of utterance.  
To go further into our analysis, the very relationship between Sr and Sd mirrors 
and reconstitutes the relationship between S and A, their dialogue. As Kristeva 
reinstates,  
The subject of utterance is both representative of the subject of enunciation and represented as object 
of the subject of enunciation. It is therefore commutable with the writer’s anonymity. A character (a 
personality) is constituted by this generation of a double entity starting from zero. The subject of 
utterance is “dialogical,” both S and A are disguised within it. (Kristeva 1980a 76) 
 
The difference between subject and object is utterly abolished, the distinction 
between signifier and signified is played on and elud d in the very relationship 
between author and reader, reflected in and by means of the characters. The same 
text indeed presents Larissa’s actions as “functioning like the bar between signifier 
and signified for ever eluded played out elsewhere yet ineluctably played out right 
here” (T 649).  
The signifiers of a dialogical text are themselves dialogical, narration becomes 
a dialogical medium/space where addresser and addressee, Sr and Sd, are in turn both 
signifier and signified, “a permutation of two signifiers” (Kristeva 1980a 76). 
In the subversive and rebellious structure of carnival, the distinction between 
subject and object of the action is blurred: each instance is both actor and spectator, 
losing the sense of individuality, passing “through the zero point of carnivalesque 
activity and split[ting] into a subject of the spectacle and object of the game” 
(Kristeva 1980a 78) 
In light of the dialogism between S and A – both read rs and writers of the 
narrative – in Thru the subject of utterance coincides with both the subject of 
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enunciation and the addressee. Sd = Sr = A in an endless mirroring of one into the 
other and oneself, the mirroring that the very practice of language entails. In my 
view, Brooke-Rose goes even further in the line of Kristeva’s theorisation, in that her 
very text becomes in its relationship with S, Sr, Sd and A, both subject and object of 
discourse, and it is constructed as both the object and the subject of the intertextual 
relationships. As Kristeva explains, it is “only through certain narrative structures 
that this dialogue – this hold on the sign as double, this ambivalence of writing – is 
exteriorized in the actual organization of poetic dscourse on the level of textual, 
literary occurrence” (Kristeva 1980a 76). In Thru the dialogical matrix is 
exteriorized, mimed to the extreme, clearly addressed and overdetermined on the one 
hand, blurred on the other and resolved in a reaffirmation of pure fictionality. In this 
sense, the work can be read as “fictional criticism” or “critical fiction”, in that it both 
mimes and reflects the debate over language and literature of the time.  
Thru puts into practice the logic of dialogism and subverts binarism, thus 
becoming a revolutionary text. A text which produces dizziness and resistance in the 
reader, but which ultimately seems to aim at a reequilibration of polarities. The novel 
thus embodies Kristeva’s idea that “More than binarism, dialogism may well become 
the basis of our time’s intellectual structure” (Kristeva 1980a 85-6). The idea of the 
reequilibration of polarities which Thru already puts forward would be stressed, 
years later, by Brooke-Rose in her essay “The Dissolution of Character in the 
Novel”. She would explain that, although “equilibrium is supposed”, the metaphysics 
of presence which subtends our culture has always privileged one term over its 
opposite (presence/absence, speech/writing, male/female etc.). The inversion of the 
polarities is a practice which “produces dizziness and fear (and resistance)”, but 
whose ultimate effect can be an enriching and creative reequilibration of binaries 
(Brooke-Rose 1986 195). 
The characters of Thru (and their/our narrative) gain new life by means of their 
peculiar use of language which renews itself at each and every word and which – as 
already explained – incessantly creates and destroys meaning, generating humour 
and poetry. They achieve a new level of expression, and therefore existence, through 
their use of language. If Grant reads the continuous process of construction and 
destruction which Thru presents as a fight of each character/narrator against each 
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other, as an “ontological struggle” (Grant 12) over authority, my aim is to show that 
this “radical usurpation of another’s existential self” (Grant 14) is for the text a 
means to positively attain a new dialectic author-reader-characters. If struggle must 
be, I would rather see it as a narrato(onto)logical struggle against the sources of 
anxiety which threaten to kill narration. It is correct to say that Thru is a text that 
“progressively destroys itself as it is read” (Hayman and Cohen 3). However, while 
destroying itself, it paradoxically and playfully asserts and constructs itself as text, 
one that gives author, fictional characters and reaers, a new degree of freedom and 
life by means of a dialectic of death and life involved with each other which 
generates new life, 
A good point, and the subject of our present analysis […] The author has lost authority many times in 
the history of narrative, when one type has consumed its lf, the element of manipulation becoming too 
visible thus destroying the fictive illusion, and no-one has yet come along to renew it, usually, as here, 
reconstructing it by perpetual destruction, generating a text which in effect is a dialogue with all 
preceding texts, a death and a birth dialectically involved with one another, but this is another 
problem.  (T 621) 
 
After having clearly explained its textual strategy, the text “cheats” again and 
declares “this is another problem”. In fact, this is not “another problem”, but the 
tactic through which the novel builds up its narrative and attains new life. If “every 
discourse […] implies the absence of things as desire implies the absence of its 
object” (T 681), if words refer to the absence of things and desire refers to the 
absence of its object which is unrecoverable, yet ev n so and because of this, words 
are the only way we have to narrate and therefore t live, thus generating “a 
discourse in which it is death that sustains existence” (Lacan 1989 300). Far from 
stopping at “destruction”, Brooke-Rose creates, generates a new text, a text which is 
a “death and birth involved in a dialectic to the death with one another” (T 699). 
“Our object revolution is very much present, and desired” says one of the 
students, to whom another one replies, “It can’t be both that’s a polarity” (T 725). 
Indeed it is both, as Thru subverts polarities and renders its revolution both present 
and desired. Revolution becomes the textual defence mechanism against the narrative 
anxiety derived from the dead alley literature seemd to have entered into, “E se non 
è vero it is well founded like all defence mechanisms” (T 614). 
Narrative anxiety is subverted into a positive play in which the writer willingly 
exposes the foundations of her edifice not in order for it to crumble as a means in 
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itself, but as a means to another end, i.e. the reaffirmation of the fictional play. 
Narrative, fiction, is given new life by stressing its own fictionality and ludique 
ethics. The pessimism brought about by the debate over author/reader and the 
ontological status of language is offered an exit through the text itself and 
playfulness, linguistic humour, creative narrative and language. Language and fiction 
come back to life: the exit from the debate into the text has to pass necessarily 
through the text. It is as if the text said, dialoguing with itself about the importance 
of the fictionality of narration and its threat of death,  
- Hey, amidst all this chaos, what is the most important thing? 
- Narration, as it is life itself. 
- So, let’s save narration! Let’s take it out of this mayhem of concepts and sterile dispute. 
- Yes, but how? 
- Through narration. 
And so did narration exit the death of narration, through itself.  
 
Thru is a text that necessarily makes its reader thoroughly reconsider the 
notions of language and fictionality. It is “a grammar of narrative” (Reyes 55), a 
revolutionary work which makes the reader experience heterogeneous contradiction 
in order to bring about renewal in the subject and in the creative fictional practice. Its 
creative revolution aims at a re-engagement with the seemingly lost passion for 
realist (not Realist) fiction and with the gift of an imaginative but also prepared 
critical analysis. 
Thru is a “very subtly planned chaos” (T 592). It is a text which “displays the 
full Postmodernist repertoire of destabilizing strategies, including self-contradiction” 
(McHale 1995 200). It is a text where “Instability of status and reversibility of levels 
infects […] every narratological category we normally rely on for novelistic 
coherence and legibility” (McHale 1995 200). Thru, however, engenders 
destabilization and deconstruction only in order to achieve, on an inverse ladder, the 
possibility of renewal and regeneration of both writing and reading practices. The 
destabilizing chaos of Brooke-Rose’s novel ultimately r affirms the importance of 




After Thru: Brooke-Rose’s novels from Amalgamemnon 
onwards 
This section will examine Brooke-Rose’s fictional output after Thru by way of 
providing a more comprehensive account of her career but also, most specifically, of 
better supporting my choice of concentrating my dissertation specifically on the 
author’s first tetralogy, and particularly on Between and Thru. In fact, although 
literary theories find echo in all of Brooke-Rose’s novels, their presence in Brooke-
Rose’s novels from Amalgamemnon onwards is not so pervasive as in Between and 
Thru. Moreover, Between anticipates critical theories which were still to gain 
importance on the theoretical scene of the time, while Thru foreruns a certain 
criticism which was to be moved to the theories it addresses only decades later. For 
these reasons, it is only Between and Thru which, in my view, can be regarded as an 
example of “critical fiction” or “fictional criticism”.  
After the appearance of Thru, Brooke-Rose did not publish fiction for nine 
years. In 1984, Amalgamemnon inaugurated her second tetralogy, also defined as the 
“Intercom Quartet” (Birch 113). The novel distinguishes itself from the works 
collected in the Omnibus edition for the clear attempt, on Brooke-Rose’s part, 
towards more readability, probably because of the negative treatment Thru had 
received for its difficulty. In fact, the author abandons here the numerous and forever 
shifting narrators of Thru, and goes back to a single consciousness through which 
everything is filtered. Moreover, her main character posits herself as the subject of 
the enunciation through the use of the subject pronoun I, and acquires both a name 
and a surname. Although the difficulty of Thru is in this way abandoned, 
Amalgamemnon also presents, as we will see, a strong play with the dubious 
ontology of its characters and increasingly blurs the borders between narrative levels. 
 The point of view adopted in the novel is still the internal one of the first four 
experimental works: the author puts herself inside the consciousness of the character 
and represents her perceptions objectively. The tense used is no longer the present 
tense: the author explores a different linguistic constraint and employs almost 
uniquely non-constative, non-realised tenses, i.e. th  future, the conditional, the 
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imperative and the subjunctive, with only a few exceptions which see the present 
employed in direct speech. 
The central character of the novel is Mira Enketei, a professor of classics who 
is probably going to be made redundant in a time whn t e humanities have become 
obsolete. The external events she perceives are inextricably mixed with her thoughts, 
memories, and imagination. Her consciousness mingles external and internal inputs, 
giving life to a series of stories within stories, which Mira seems to create in 
particular during the nights when, unable to sleep, she leaves her bed to listen to her 
radio and read passages from Herodotus. The radio programmes and Herodotus’ 
Histories are indeed the starting point for her imaginative flights. They “activate”, or 
better “trigger” her imagination, which then assembles extracts from radio talk-
shows, news, advertisements, and quiz-games together with the classical passages 
she reads, with bits of her past life, various thoughts and memories, and with other 
fragments of her classical knowledge. Amalgamating all this, Mira continuously 
gives life to various stories and tales. All the dialogues, events, situations and people 
presented (friends, students, lovers, relatives) appe r in fact to be entirely created out 
of her mind, and Mira “enters” into her characters’ consciousnesses just as Brooke-
Rose does with her. 
The characters Mira creates are given names of Latin and Greek origin (mostly 
names of stars) in accordance to the salient traits of heir personality. For instance, 
Cygnus the constellation, becomes in Mira’s imaginatio  a teacher of semiotics 
because of the Latin homophony of Cygnus and Signum, as well as the French one of 
Cygne and Signe. The same teacher is later called Professor Swann (Cf. A 78, 108). 
Similarly, Orion becomes a political dissident for his analogy with the mythical 
hunter (Cf. A 54-55), whilst Thuban, the name of a st r in the constellation of the 
Dragon, which is connoted by aggressiveness, becomes the name of one of Mira’s 
students who keeps on harassing and criticising her (Cf. A 6-7). The same student 
will later become the dragon of a fairy-tale Mira invents (Cf. A 92). In the same way, 
Andromeda, who was punished by Poseidon and saved by Perseus, becomes a 
woman who is constantly dependent on men , variously cal ed “Anne de Rommeda”, 
“Anna Crusis” (i.e. anacrusis), “Anna Coluthon” (i.e. anacoluthon), and “Anna 
Biosis” (i.e. anabiosis) (A 32, 34, 43, 59). 
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As in Thru, in Amalgamemnon we have a continual transgression of narrative 
levels and the ontological status of characters is increasingly blurred. The reader is 
almost unable to distinguish the “real” fragments of Mira’s life from her imaginative 
projections, to distinguish among different fictional worlds. Metalepses are 
conducted both by Mira herself and by the characters she creates, who seem to be 
able to pass freely from one narrative level to another, transgressing the fictional 
world of her mind and entering the “real” world she exists in. For instance, they 
argue with her even if she does not want to be disturbed, and write menacing and 
annoying letters to her. The borders between different narrative levels are abolished 
and the novel’s fictionality is constantly emphasised: the text is shown to be only a 
construction of words on the page. The continuous shift of narrative levels becomes, 
as in Thru, a way to endow the text with an open structure, and therefore a way to 
elude fixed meaning. Amalgamemnon is thus another plural text, one which rejects 
the imposition of univocal meaning. Moreover, the multi-meaningful names assumed 
by the characters (which concurrently indicate mythological figures, stars, and 
fictional characters) crucially add to their ontological instability, to their participation 
of different narrative levels or levels of “reality”. 
In the confusion of narrative levels, even Mira gradu lly assumes different 
identities: she becomes Sandra/Cassandra, Emma, the Abyssinian Maid, the 
streetsweeper, and she even identifies with Orion. She also invents for herself and for 
“her characters” three different family trees, which further accentuate the instability 
of the ontological status of all the characters, including herself. The genealogical 
trees can be also read as a mimicry of the realist technique of furnishing extensive 
biographical details in order to support the veridicity of the world depicted. The trees 
become a parody of what Brooke-Rose defines the “semiological compensation” of 
realist fiction (Brooke-Rose 1981 87). Moreover, each time Mira draws a tree, she 
invents stories in order to account for the genealogy she has just imagined, contrarily 
to what would normally happen in realist fiction, where a genealogical tree would be 
presented in order to support the authenticity of the stories narrated. 
In light of the ontological instability of the text, he protagonist’s name 
acquires important implications. Mira is the name of a star in the constellation of 
Cetus, the whale, whilst her surname, Enketei, is made up of two different Greek 
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terms, ἐν – inside, and κήτος – whale. Her name obviously recalls the image of Jonah 
inside the whale (a theme we have already seen in Out and Between), a reading 
which is made explicit by the character later referring to herself as “inside the Whale, 
In Cetus, Mira Enketei” (A 32). The star Mira in astronomy possesses a quality of 
variability. This quality, together with the fact that the character shifts identity many 
times throughout the novel, introduces the reader to a changeable character, one 
which acquires diverse identities in the course of the novel.  
Mira’s continuous shifts of identity are inextricably related to her being a 
woman. In fact, as a woman, she is submitted to a cercive imposition of meaning by 
the society she exists in, and shifting identities becomes a way for her to elude 
categorization, to avoid becoming fixed, to oppose th patriarchal system of 
signification. If the interpreter in Between repeats and transforms all the different 
discourses of society in order to elude fixed meaning and recuperate her own identity 
in between those discourses, Mira does something very similar. She shifts identities 
continuously in order to avoid being categorized once and for all by the society she 
inhabits. Moreover, she continuously reassembles bits of memories, radio 
programmes etc., and invents stories upon stories out of their fusion. She  thus 
assumes for herself the role of author, of creator of stories through language, thus 
exemplifying the way reality is constructed by langua e. This idea is reinforced by 
the fact that she creates both her own identities and those of the other characters in 
the novel. Like the stories, so the identities she inv nts are entirely a construction of 
language. In this way, she subverts the concept of a fixed meaning conveyed by 
language that has dominated our society for centuries and, related to this, the concept 
of a fixed identity. Identity is a fiction itself, a linguistic construct. 
 By means of the continuous stories she invents, Mira also exposes the 
predominantly masculine mechanism of imposition of meaning, one perpetuated 
through and by means of language. Exposing the masculine use of language becomes 
a way of exposing the masculine logic of society. For instance, her imaginary lovers 
Willy and Wally are firmly convinced that they can save Mira from her “emotional 
desert”, but in reality they are shown as they try to turn her “into a captive” (A 10), 
or to “atomize” her “own lifelong passions” (A 130). They easily dismiss her 
inquiries and discourses, including her attempt to break up with them, as “woman-
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nonsense”  (A 61). Far from loving her, men try to own her, patronise her, as already 
we have seen in the case of Between’s interpreter. Both Willy and Wally wait 
impatiently for Mira to be made redundant, as they b lieve that after losing her job 
she will finally accept their marriage proposal, that she “will accept, and face, being 
only a woman” (A 15, 136). Similarly, the consideration of women as exchange 
value among men which we have observed in Between, comes back here as the 
Abyssinian Maid (Mira) is given by her parents upon payment of three camels (Cf. A 
28), or else as the Princess Fatima-my-Folly (again Mira) becomes, together with a 
kingdom and a treasure, the reward for whom will rescue her from the dragon (Cf. A 
88).  
The strategy through which Mira exposes and subverts the patriarchal 
prejudices against women is therefore that already observed in Between. Mimicry, 
i.e. the apparently subservient repetition of man’s discourse by woman, makes the 
logic of that discourse come to light. Mira repeats the stereotyped discourses about 
women in order to expose their underlying logic. For instance she “humbly” states, 
“Even in the supernew present technorevolution I could at best be the female slave 
who’ll type the data into a memory for analysis butnever, never the softquery expert 
who’ll compose the analytic programme. I wouldn’t understand” (A 60), thus 
exposing the cliché of woman’s lack of creativity. The prefix “mim” which is 
repeated throughout the novel comes to stand precisely for the practice of mimicry: 
Mira, for instance, agrees with man, but her agreement is “mimagreement” (A 14). 
Similarly, when she makes love with her lover, she expressly says that “There will 
occur mimecstasy even if millions of human cells remain unconvinced” (A 15), 
while she will pretend to be “mimecstatic” at the man’s ability to change a light-
switch (A 14,15, 127). 
Apart from mimicry, Mira exposes the masculine mechanism of imposition of 
meaning by juxtaposing men’s discourses. Juxtaposition becomes, as in Thru, the 
basic tool of her deconstructive enterprise, one which makes the phallogocentrism of 
our culture come to light. She repeatedly draws from Herodotus’ Histories, and by 
amalgamating his discourse with the stories she invnts, her thoughts, memories, the 
language of the media, and the discourses of Willy and Wally, she shows how the 
classical tradition inaugurated the prejudices about women which are still very much 
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alive, prejudices and clichés which are so much rooted in our culture that we 
nowadays take them as the norm (Cf. A 8, 12, 23, 37, 40, 69, 135). By inserting 
passages (in translation) from Herodotus’ Histories into her stories, Mira employs 
one of the fundamental texts of Western culture in order to expose its logic, in order 
to demonstrate how its discourse lies at the basis of the unfair treatment of women in 
our society. Herodotus, the father of history, thus becomes the “father of fibstory” (A 
22, 113), the history of denigration of women, the history of lies which keeps alive 
the prejudices against women. The assimilation of woman to animals and objects that 
Herodotus suggested is repeated and exposed by Mira: women are not equal to men, 
but to “eunuchs, pack-animals and dogs” (A 29), or else they are compared to the 
“psychically under-privileged […] the handicapped, the children” (A 51-52). Women 
are described as reward to ancient commanding generals, together with “horses, 
camels, gold pieces and other objects” (A 83). In Herodotus, the description of 
women’s as exchange objects is omnipresent (Cf. for instance Herodotus 200-201). 
Again, Mira defines women as “twittering birds” (A 14), recalling 
Herodotus’definition of women’s language as the “twittering of birds”  (Herodotus 
152). Moreover, Mira crucially identifies with Cassndra,  
As if for instance I were someone else, Cassandra pe ha s, walking dishevelled the battlements of 
Troy, uttering prophecies from time to time unheaded and unheeded, before being allotted as a slave 
to victorious Agamemnon. (Brooke-Rose 1984 7) 
 
This identification bears important implications in the novel. Cassandra is in 
fact the prophetess doomed not to be believed, imprisoned by Agamemnon and 
reduced to silence. Cassandra, known to speak in the fu ure tense (the one used in the 
novel), was not believed and died as a prisoner in complete isolation. She is an 
example of women’s rebellion as she dared to speak, ven if she was not heard by 
society. Through the figure Cassandra, Brooke-Rose se ms to show how even 
centuries ago woman was not deemed capable of  “truthful” discourse and was soon 
reduced to a male custody.  
Amalgamemnon is clearly a deconstructionist novel, one which deconstructs 
the notion of stable significance and fixed identity, and demonstrates how everything 
is constructed by language, consequently demonstrating how the concept of woman 
is in itself a linguistic construct. As already done i  Between and Thru, Brooke-Rose 
deconstructs the idea of a feminine identity by showing how the concept arises from 
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the dominant use of language, a use which acts in accordance with the masculine 
ideology of fixed meaning and appropriation of power. Mira opposes men’s attempt 
to reduce her to fixed meaning by continuously shifting identity, inventing and 
reinventing herself in her stories, whilst at the same time exposing the masculine 
power logic by means of mimicry and juxtaposition. 
The novel’s dubious ontology and the tenses employed ar  strictly related to 
the textual deconstructive strategy. The non-realisd tenses of Amalgamemnon, in 
fact, continuously throw doubt on the events narrated and strongly concur to give the 
idea of the fictionality of the world the text describes. Thanks to the use of non-
realised tenses, facts are never confirmed, as for instance Mira’s redundancy. With 
an opening line which clearly recalls that of Beckett’s Malone Dies (Cf. Beckett 
1979 165), Mira declares, “I shall soon be quite redundant at last despite of all” (A 
5). This, however, is only an hypothesis of a future possibility, never confirmed by a 
present or a past tense. In effect, towards the end of the novel, Mira repeats, still in 
the future, “Soon there will come the expected letter in burotechnish that will make 
me definitely redundant” (A 124).  
The future tense seems to be also employed to expos the fictionality of the 
discourses of the experts who continually presume to be able to predict facts and 
events scientifically. For instance, we are told that “Soon the ecopolitical system will 
crumble, and sado-experts will fly in from all over the world and poke into its 
smoking entrails and utter smooching agnostications” (A 15), or else that the 
“ecozoologists” (A 18) or “the ecopoliticonomists will fly in from everywhere and 
poke the entrails of the grunterranean fire and mutter smoothing pragnostications and 
stake out their statistics” (A 21). Experts such as economists, politicians and 
scientists are in this way compared to clairvoyants or fortune-tellers, as they make 
would-be truthful predictions on the basis of animals’ entrails. The distinction 
between rational, scientific (real) and illogical (fictitious) knowledge is blurred: 
scientific reality cannot be distinguished from theirrational and fictitious discourses 
from which it claims to be different. The future and conditional tenses transmute the 
reality of all the facts narrated into fiction: contemporary society is foregrounded as 
fictional, the nature of the discourses of the media is exposed as novelistic. The 
stories Mira tells shows the equality between the supposedly real and truthful 
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discourse of science and its experts and that of lierature: creative story-telling indeed 
replaces the discourses of the media and shows how t ere is no difference between 
them. The stories Mira tells follow traditional novelistic tropes: different novelistic 
genres such as the spy novel, the popular romance, d the thriller are fused together 
and parodied, together with the discourses of the media and the would-be truthful 
discourses of experts. In this way, the conventional ty of both discursive genres – 
novelistic and scientific – is foregrounded: the assumption of verisimilitude of the 
discourses of authority of contemporary society is undermined. 
The media, it is said in the text, function as an “afterthought rearranging 
history past and present in the light of national self-esteem for political ends and 
means” (A 21). This is clearly an attack on the discourses of the media which ignore 
the fictionality of their status as they ignore thebasis of their constitution, which is a 
linguistic convention. In opposition to this, Mira hypothesises an approach to 
knowledge and reality, past and present, by which “The highest marks will be given, 
not to the most correct which will be unverifiable ut to the most ingenious” (A 21), 
an approach which would therefore subvert the dichotomy fictional/real.  
With a parallel move, Amalgamemnon deconstructs another dichotomy, i.e. 
that of classical/modern knowledge. The novel foregrounds the problematic 
relationship between contemporary science/technology and the humanities. It shows 
how we live in a world where classical knowledge has become more and more 
obsolete, as opposed to the media technology and moern science, which have 
progressively gained importance. In an increasingly technocratic world, the humanist 
academic is in danger of losing his/her role in society. Mira, with her classical 
knowledge is indeed going to be made redundant. Amalgamemnon thus inaugurates 
the main theme of the Intercom Quartet, i.e. the thr at technology could represent for 
the novelistic genre. As Mira foresees, the possibility which lies in wait is that  
“techne […] will soon be silenced by the high technology” (A 5). Amalgamemnon 
expresses the anxiety for the fate of the novelistic genre in a world of “secondary 
orality”, i.e. the return to oral culture engendered by the media and discussed by 
Walter J. Ong in Orality and Literacy. As Ong explains, “The electronic 
transformation of verbal expression has […] brought consciousness to a new age of 
second orality”, an age where  “composition on computer terminals is replacing older 
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forms of typographic composition” (Ong  1982 135, 136)18. In order to oppose this 
state of things and deconstruct the dichotomy classic l/modern culture, the novel 
clearly shows that the past still affects the present and that the former cannot be 
abstracted from when trying to understand and interpret the current state of society.  
Brooke-Rose accomplishes this firstly by playing on the etymology of various 
terms and by employing allusions to and quotations from classical texts, thus 
directing the attention of her readers on the history and evolution of language, and 
encouraging them to recognise the legacy of past culture. We have already said how 
the various characters Mira invents are given names of Greek or Latin origins, and 
how their names determine their roles in the stories. Their Greek and Latin names are 
still employed by modern astronomy to designate stars and constellations. The use of 
such astronomical terms in Amalgamemnon seems thus to show the influence the 
past still retains on the present, as we continue to use Latin and Greek terms to 
designate the subject of modern studies. Although we tend to forget the original 
meaning of those terms, the heritage of classical culture is still present in our society 
and understanding it is essential to better grasp many of its characteristics: nowadays 
astronomy is still inextricably related to classical mythology and history. Moreover, 
by drawing together and juxtaposing the domains of m dern astronomy and classical 
culture (Herodotus in particular), the text blurs the distinction between them, 
therefore subverting the dichotomy between past and present systems of knowledge. 
The past still lies at the basis of our world, and we cannot abstract from it when 
trying to understand our society.  
The novel thus accomplishes a double task. On the one hand, it presents the 
increasing technologization of our culture and shows the risk inherent in this process. 
It demonstrates how the subject relying on a classic l culture gets completely 
destabilised by this state of things, and how the risk is that of losing sight of the strict 
relationship between present and past culture, of forgetting that at the basis of the 
contemporary scientific discourse lies the discourse of classical culture. On the other 
hand, it shows how classical culture is also responible for the contemporary gender 
politics. Understanding the origins of our discourses – that of the modern science and 
                                                
18 For a fuller discussion on this topic see in particular Ong 1982 135-38 and 134-179.  
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that of the male dominated society – is of crucial importance to expose both the 
fictionality of the power discourses and recognise their false tropes. 
The theme of technological revolution which Amalgamemnon already presents 
is addressed more directly and developed in Brooke-Rose’s following novel. 
Xorandor (1986) focuses on the discovery of a mysterious talking stone made by Jip 
and Zab, two twins learned in the new cybernetic technology and highly used to 
operating computers. In this novel, Brooke-Rose’s attempt towards more readability 
(after the experimental climax of Thru) is again evident in that the two kids can be 
easily identified as both central characters and narrators of their story. Although it is 
always the author who puts herself inside their cons iousnesses, the characters 
overtly place themselves as the narrators of the events and describe, in a more 
realistic fashion, their own experience. They even provide a more realistic context 
for their story by furnishing precise details on their own physical appearance and on 
their family, a kind of description which we find for the first time in Brooke-Rose’s 
experimental novels. 
The 12-year-old twins discover the stone – Xorandor – at an old cairn in 
Cornwall and realise they can communicate with the stone through their pocket 
computer. Although they initially believe that the stone is the ghost of Merlin, and 
try to teach it to speak their cybernetic slang, they soon conjecture that the stone 
must be responsible for the mysterious disappearance of radioactive materials from 
the local nuclear-waste compartment. They interrogate Xorandor, which explains that 
he feeds on radioactivity, that he has been stealing the nuclear waste, and that he has 
come from Mars in search of provisions. Before long, the adults discover the 
presence of the stone, and whilst in a first moment his “eating habits” appear to be a 
perfect solutions to the problem of nuclear waste, Xorandor then reveals that he has 
mistakenly eaten a perilous isotope which has generated a “syntax error” in Xor 7, 
one of his offspring. At this point, the mutant stone threatens to blow a nuclear 
reactor up if humans do not permanently feed his entire race, but thanks to Jip and 
Zab he is persuaded to give up his terroristic plan. 
Once the world crisis has been avoided, the kids are sent to Germany, in order 
not to stay involved with the discovery, and are able to follow the developments of 
the events only through the media. When, a year-and-a-half later, they are eventually 
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allowed to come back, they learn that the stone and his offspring are under strict 
observation in different parts of the world, and that Xorandor has programmed his 
“children” to escape and destroy nuclear missiles. The defence strategies of the 
nuclear-armed countries are obviously in danger, and a communal decision to send 
all the stones back to Mars is taken. At this time, Xorandor, who had refused to 
communicate with  the adults, tells the children that in reality he does not come from 
Mars: his race has been living on Earth for millions of years and he has decided to 
break the silence only to inform humankind of his dangerous syntax error, or perhaps 
he has produced the syntax error on purpose, in order to warn humans of the danger 
implicit in their nuclear developments. 
Although the kids employ their own peculiar cybernetic slang, the language of 
Xorandor does not present the extended use of puns of novels such as Between or 
Thru. The language used by the kids is at times difficult to read for its neologising 
cybernetic terms, yet it is also very clear-cut, almost telegraphic, as it replicates the 
language used by the new computer technology. Jip and Z b try to furnish a most 
precise account of what happens, as if they were compiling a scientific report. In 
order to show the way they communicated with the stone, they insert in the narrative 
printouts of their conversations with the stone.  
When the kids realise that the stone is itself a computer, they clearly see that it 
operates with a different logic from the machines they know and use. In fact, 
Xorandor is able to use both the rigorous logic of our computer language and 
another, odd and contradictory logic: “His logic could be both absolutely rigorous 
and absolutely contradictory at crucial points, some arguments could be both XOR 
and AND, or XOR and Or” (X 18). The terms AND, OR, and XOR are employed in 
cybernetics to indicate the fundamental operations on which computer logic is based. 
As Birch explains, “The terms, derived from the conepts of Boolean algebra, 
correspond to specific types of logical operators,  gates, in an integrated circuit. In 
an OR gate (also known as inclusive or) an initial input of two binary terms will 
yield one if either or both of the terms is one. In a  XOR gate (exclusive or) the 
output will be one if either but not both of the initial terms is one. An AND gate will 
yield one if and only if both initial terms are one. In all other cases the output is, of 
course, zero” (Birch 124). The stone can use “AND OR for the basic and the full 
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ASCII code, meaning non-exclusive OR, and OR for exclusive OR or XOR, for 
sounds as pronounced”, (X 18), so that  he is able to conceive both inclusive and 
exclusive arguments simultaneously. Xorandor’s logic transgresses that of binary 
systems because he can account for mutually exclusive operations. For instance, 
when the two kids ask him the reason for his contact, he tells them “for security and 
insecurity xor insecurity andor communication” (X 81). Because of this peculiar 
logic(s), the kids name the stone “Xorandor”. 
The paradoxical logic which Xorandor operates with is similar to that 
developed by Kristeva to explain the functioning of p etic language. It is a logic 
other which deconstructs binarism, the logic of the excluded middle on which our 
society (and computer technology) is based. Xorandor operates with both a binary, 
exclusive logic, and with a non-exclusive one. The stone-computer can therefore be 
both logical and illogical. Even before discovering its logical modus operandi, the 
kids can see that “his sense of identity is quite different from ours” (X 17). Xorandor 
thus unites in itself the contraries of logical/illogical and shows how another way of 
thinking, a different approach to meaning is not impossible. In fact, towards the end 
of the novel, Zab will define Xorandor’s logic as “trinary” (X 156) and will explain 
how the stone has “reversed all our, traditional, oppositions, and questioned, all our, 
certainties, through a flipflop kind of, superlogic” (X 157).  
Because of his logic, Xorandor adopts communicative strategy which the kids 
call “Play-acting” (X 190). The stone furnishes different versions of his story 
depending on his interlocutors, modifying the events he recounts in accordance with 
the perceptions and beliefs that different people have of him. His approach to 
“reality” appears to be similar to the art of story-telling: “As mothers with children, 
and sometimes women with their men. Xorandor doesn’t laugh at people, he goes 
along with them at their level, telling them what he knows they want to hear. After 
all, we all play language-games” (X 190). For example, although he can speak 
English, he pretends to learn it from the kids. Similarly, when the postmistress 
conjectures that he comes from Mars, he does not refute the hypothesis, but lets her 
believe what she wishes to believe. Later on, when scientists analyse him in order to  
prove his Martian origin, he even alters his chemical composition to confirm their 
belief, only to eventually reveal to the children that he is a terrestrial creature.  
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Ultimately, Jip and Zab clearly realise that Xorandor has told different versions 
of his story to different people, and that discovering the truth about him and his 
origin remains impossible. The dichotomy real/fictional is thus completely blurred. 
Contradictions and undecidability lies at the basis of the novel, as exemplified by 
non-mutually exclusive logic of Xorandor. The mystery of the stone’s origin will 
never be solved, and the scientists’ speculations about its Martian origin, far from 
being the exclusive “reality”, will appear only as  possible interpretation of the 
events. In this way, the novel undermines the idea of science as able to discover truth 
and meaning in things and shows (once again in Brooke-Rose’s writing) that identity 
is only a linguistic construct, and that the reality we believe to be firm and stable 
only depends on our interpretation.  
As they proceed with their narration, Jip and Zab also discuss, self-reflexively,  
the art of narrating. Because of their young age and their inexperience as narrators, 
and because the contradictions the events present, th y sometimes hesitate in telling 
their story and often furnish a slightly different version of what they have just 
recounted. Throughout the novel, the twins blame the language they use (logical, 
binaristic) for not being able to comprehend Xorandor’s modus operandi. In reality, 
the reason for their language’s inadequacy lies in the use they make of it. In fact, 
from the start, they approach language in an extremely logical way and try to employ 
it as scientifically as possible. What they seem to forget when they lament the 
impossibility of language to understand a “superlogic”, is that language also 
possesses a superlogic, i.e. it can be illogical, metaphorical, non-literal and parodic. 
It is the way the twins consider and employ language which does not permit them to 
understand a different logic. They do not know that language can be effectively 
employed at the service of a superlogic, one which explodes the binary system of 
signification based on the 0-1 sequence. What the nov l seems to imply is that the 
way we use language is fundamental to the way we appro ch and interpret life, and it 
is up to us to exploit the creative and superlogical possibilities of language, and 
therefore to achieve a different understanding of the world.  
The twins’ attitude towards the linguistic means exemplifies the Western 
metaphysical approach to signification which, unable to surpass binarism, does not 
admit any other logic outside of its own. Jip and Zab are experts in the language of 
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computer programming, a language which they believe to be absolutely logical and 
exclusive. They narrate their story following this logic, but eventually discover that 
the logic of narrative is different, that it is less rigorous than the language they try to 
use: “it seems harder to tell a story, even our own, than to make up the most complex 
program. Or at least to choose how to tell it” (X 8). They have in fact problems with 
“sequence-control” (X 23, 28), and complain that “even with hindsight we can’t 
decide what’s really relevant and in what order” (X 35). The twins’ initial aim to 
write an absolutely objective and scientific report n the Xorandor phenomenon is 
destined to be frustrated. Their account will turn out to be full of uncertainties and 
dubious interpretations. The more they strive to write it objectively, the more they 
face the impossibility of doing so, as every attempt to put into words the events will 
inevitably imply interpretation and therefore falsification. Memory also adds to their 
difficulty: once in Germany, they will write by recollecting their experiences, but 
will blame memory as unreliable (Cf. X 126) and recognise that recollecting equals 
interpreting and therefore falsifying (Cf. X 93, 105). In fact, although the positing of 
the two kids as characters-narrators is initially apparently fairly straightforward, the 
several doubts and ambiguities introduced in the story eventually show that the 
seemingly reliable narrators turn out to be unreliable.  The difficulty Jip and Zab 
have in telling their story also derives from the changes in the educative system 
brought about by their highly-technological society. Humanities, as in 
Amalgamemnon, have become obsolete. Universities only offer the c oice between 
physics and high-tech: no possibility of studying philosophy or literature is given, for 
these fields of knowledge are now considered as leisur  pursuits. 
Not only will the children realise that narrative discourse can account for 
contradictions and undecidability, whereas the langu ge they try to use, based on the 
rigorous logic of computer technology cannot do so, but also and most importantly 
they will discover that the high-tech logic has at its basis the same concept of 
undecidability of narrative discourse. The novel indeed deconstructs the dichotomy 
between the two areas of knowledge (scientific and humanistic), as it shows that at 
the basis of the scientific development there lies the discursive mode of narrative. In 
fact, the concept of undecidability is shown not only to work in narrative to put 
together apparently contradictory versions of the same events (as the kids do), but it 
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is also shown to be at the basis of cybernetics. In fact, when Jip tells Zab a sentence 
he has read on a wall’s graffito at school, “If thehuman brain was simple enough for 
us to understand we’d be so simple we couldn’t”, Zab replies that this is “a popular 
version of the Gödel theorem”. He then tries to recall the theorem and explains,  
Gödel’s theorem had been that in any powerful logical system things can be formulated that can’t be 
proved or disproved inside the same system, and that someone called Turing had then applied it to 
machine intelligence and shown that no machine could, erm, I floundered, completely understand 
itself, I mean, tackle all its own problems. (X88) 
 
Gödel’s theorem, reported by Ian Stewart in his work The Problems of 
Mathematics, posits that “(1) If formal set theory is consistent then there exist 
theorems that can neither be proved nor disproved. (2) There is no procedure which 
will prove set theory consistent” (qtd. in Stewart 218). What the theorem implies is 
that no theory or theoretical system can be said to be infallible: “Gödel showed that 
there are true statements in arithmetic that can never be proved, and that if anyone 
finds a proof that arithmetic is consistent, then it isn’t” (Stewart 214). As Stewart 
further explains, in 1936, Turing applied this principle to a conceptual prototype of 
the modern computer, demonstrating that there exist undecidable problems which 
cannot be solved by any algorithm. He therefore formulated the most basic 
“undecidability theorem”, since “certain very natural questions have no answer 
whatsoever” (Stewart 214)19. What follows from this, i.e. what Brooke-Rose’s novel 
exposes, is that at the basis of the science of cybernetics and its language lies the 
concept of indeterminacy, of undecidability, and that contemporary scientists often 
overlook this fundamental tenet and believe that their science expresses absolute and 
stable truths. The twins father, a physician, explains in fact how computer logic 
“can’t cope with a word used in a figurative sense, or with humour, which depends 
on word-play, which is like assigning two values to a character” (X 87). But this is 
not true of Xorandor, which on the contrary, uses puns. For instance he puns on 
Shakespeare and says “SOFTWARILY WE ARE OBSERVED” (X 179). One of the 
kids, puzzled at this pun, asks, “How can a computer give a playful answer, or even 
an ambiguous answer?”, whilst the other promptly replies, “We called him Xorandor, 
dodn’t we?” (X 182). What the kids realise is that no only Xorandor’s logic entails 
undecidability, but above all that this undecidability lies at the basis of the computer 
                                                
19 For a fuller discussion on the limits of computability see Stewart 213-221.  
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language they use: “even computer logic can contain ambiguities […] you know very 
well that in a context-free grammar no general procedure exists for determining 
whether the grammar can be ambiguous in any one of every single case […] The 
question is then said to be undecidable” (X 182). The apparently illogical modus 
operandi of Xorandor is thus revealed to be at the basis of the computer science. The 
kids realise that indeterminacy lies at the basis of apparently logical operations: a 
characteristic specific to narrative is shown to be central to the most logical of 
sciences. 
In this way, Jip and Zab exemplify the approach which should be taken by 
scientists in relation to their discipline: a diachronic approach which accounts for the 
origin of their discourse, and therefore recognise how the logic they employ  is not 
absolute but depends on interpretation. The kids ineed criticise the scientists who 
analyse Xorandor only in terms of his synchronic functioning and do not try to 
discover his genealogy. They see that “modern scientists are rarely concerned with 
the genealogy of things, only with their present structure and functioning” (X 191). 
Xorandor thus seems to warn scientists of the danger implicit in a monolithic and 
synchronic approach to their discipline, stimulating them to recognise the genealogy, 
the story of their science. 
The third novel of Brooke-Rose’s second tetralogy,  Verbivore (1990), is the 
sequel to Xorandor. The novel describes how Xorandor’s offspring manage to stop 
the earth’s wave communication system. As in Thru, in this novel, the narratorial 
points of view shift repeatedly. However, as with Amalgamemnon and Xorandor, 
Brooke-Rose tries to be more “readable” and in spite of the continual shift of 
narrators, the reader is able to distinguish each time whose point of view narration is 
being filtered through. Even  the doubts occasionally introduced in relation to the 
viewpoint adopted are instantly solved by the text. Moreover, Verbivore is even 
linguistically much more straightforward than Xorandor: the somewhat difficult 
cybernetic slang adopted by Jip and Zab in the previous novel is here highly reduced, 
and so are the linguistic puns. As Birch recognises, V rbivore “is the most accessible 
of Brooke-Rose’s [experimental] novels” (Birch 128). 
Verbivore takes place twenty-three years later after the events presented in 
Xorandor. The kids are now grown-ups: Jip has become a nuclear physicist at 
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NASA, whilst Zab is a member of the European Parliament in Aachen. The event 
known as Verbivore is a strange phenomenon which flattens the electromagnetic 
waves’ modulation, thus interrupting any kind of communication based on waves 
transmission. The phenomenon is more and more recurrent, until it becomes 
permanent: all radio and video communications, all computer networks, satellites, as 
well as the navigational systems of planes and other vehicles are interrupted. The 
economy itself stops growing, and society must necessarily turn to the written 
medium for communication. At this point, Jip and Zab wonder whether Xorandor’s 
offspring might not be responsible for the phenomenon, and Zab decides therefore to 
contact one of the stones. She learns from it that the mineral race had to sabotage the 
airwave-transmission in order to stop the information overload of society with which 
they can no longer cope. Persuaded by Zab, the stones accept to reinstate 
communication, but on one condition: people will reduce the amount of information 
emitted. Things seem to work finely for a period, for people actually watch the 
amount of their data emissions. However, society soon comes back to its previous 
habits and overloads the system with information, s that the Verbivore phenomenon 
inevitably starts again. 
At the beginning of the text, a mysterious figure reads several reports made by 
unidentified subjects about their experiences of the Verbivore crisis. This figure is 
soon identified as Mira Enketei, the narrator of Amalgamemnon, who now conducts a 
radio programme in which she presents different accounts of Verbivore made by 
different people. The novel is thus a sort of collage narrative, made up of several 
short stories or fragments of stories, each told from a different point of view and in a 
different way: letters, diary entries, newspaper articles, fragments from TV 
programmes, printouts of recorded conversations, and a radio-play script. Verbivore 
therefore mixes typical eighteenth-century genres – the epistolary novel, the journal 
novel, and the fictional autobiography – with the nw possibilities of story-telling 
brought about by the technological media – television programmes, radio broadcasts, 
and word-processed documents. Each “small narrative” is told in a different 
linguistic style, so that, even if the novel never explicitly refers to the change of 
focalization, the reader can nevertheless recognise the shifts of viewpoint thanks to 
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the different idiolects employed, their use of grammar and orthography (correct or 
less correct), their linguistic inflections and rhetorical tones.  
The situation, however, is complicated by the fact that Mira seems not only to 
assume the typical role of the omniscient narrator, but also to play with Genette’s 
theory and provide what he defines as “paralepses” (Genette 1972 211), i.e. pieces of 
information which could not be available to the narrator. She does in fact not only 
refer to the events recounted in Xorandor as if she witnessed them directly, but she 
also seems to know Jip and Zab in person, although we are told that she meets them 
only much later in the novel (Cf. V30, 6, 174). She also seems to know information 
which only the two twins know in Xorandor, as for instance the various attempts 
made by the kids to contact the stone (Cf. V 173), the secret story told by the stone to 
the kids (Cf. V 84), or the conversation between the kids and their mother (Cf. V 84). 
Other characters from Amalgamemnon also return in this novel, as for instance Perry 
Hupsos (a radio presenter in the previous novel) who is now the author of a radio 
play called “A Round of Silence”. Mira could be therefore seen as the fictional 
“author” of both Xorandor and Verbivore. Her role seems to be confirmed by the 
words Mira utters after seeing for the first time a photograph of the small Xor, “It 
was the first time I’d seen actual pictures, instead of just imagining” (V 176). Other 
characters also point towards this possibility when they conjecture, “maybe it’s all 
Mira’s fault. Probably she imagined the whole thing and it occurred” (V 129), or else 
when they notice, “she sometimes behaves as if I had sprung ready-armed from her 
head” (V 88). In light of this insight, we understand that in Xorandor Zab already 
anticipates the idea of Mira’s authorship when she tells Jip, “we’re characters too” 
(X 9). Verbivore thus retroactively undermines the reader’s assumptions regarding 
the characters-narrators of Xorandor and blurs the distinction between the various 
narrative levels which the three novels – Amalgamemnon, Xorandor, and Verbivore – 
present. This technique obviously plays on the readers’ habit to trust the narrator and 
to look for the description of a stable reality in a text. What is played upon is the 
border which divides “real” and fictional within the very fictional text. The 
characters seem to be, as it was the case in Thru, aware of their own fictionality, of 
being mere letters on a page. In particular, the two main characters in Perry Hupsos’ 
play, Julian and Decibel, are fully conscious of their fictional status. In this way, the 
 277 
fictionality of the narrative construct is exposed and the fact that “identity is a 
fiction” constructed by language is once again highlighted. 
The main theme of the novel seems to be the possible outcome of the 
increasing technologization of our society. Verbivore shows the possible cultural 
consequences of a radical change in the communicative means. In the society 
portrayed, media networks process masses of information which, far from facilitating 
communication, in reality contribute to people’s increasingly preoccupying isolation 
in front of their TV sets or computer screens. Moreover, the processed information is 
soon outdated, so that more up to date information is eeded, hooking people 
continuously in front of their machines. The endless flow of information so much 
needed by people has replaced human relationships, as Mira clearly explains, 
our minds and psyche, our entire nervous system and networks of expectations have been transformed 
by the media […] We depend on the media for our life-blood, the stream of information, the 
adventures, the violence, the romance, the games, th  idols, the beauty, the knowledge, the gossip, all 
that Plato called Love Truth and Beauty, the explanatio s, the wooing of our beliefs, the eternal 
commentary that lines our lives like a loving companion, a double, making sense of it for us in its 
fragmentary and fragmented fashion. (V 30-31) 
 
Mira’s words reveal how the “double” of the media hs replaced real human 
relationships: computer processing has replaced dialogue and direct contact among 
people. This clearly recalls Baudrillard’s concept of simulacra, i.e. the idea that our 
culture is essentially unreal: we live in a world of signs in which we mistake 
simulacra for real things. Notwithstanding our impression of being dynamically 
living into vast information networks, the reality of things is much less positive: we 
passively incorporate data and become more and more is lated in front of our 
television or computer screens. We are, as Baudrillard saw, slaves of the process of 
alienation brought about by technologization, i.e. “of the generalized pattern of 
individual and social life governed by commodity logic” (Baudrillard 1998  190-91). 
For Baudrillard, the society we exist in is one “where there is more and more 
information, and less and less meaning”. The loss of meaning is engendered 
primarily by the media, which are “producers not of  socialization, but of exactly the 
opposite, of the implosion of the social in the masses”  (Baudrillard 1994 79, 81). 
Verbivore depicts the age we live in as one where technological innovations are 
increasingly overtaking the printed medium. The effect of this overexploitation of 
electronic networks to the detriment of the written medium is that our ability to think 
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individually and communicate is decreasing. In the novel, Zab significantly 
asks, “What have we lost […] since the disappearance of books? Everything being 
on hard disc or diskette now” (V 38), whilst another character, Tim, explains how we 
live in “A simulated world, like those that computer produce”. As he further 
explains, in our society,  
The population has learnt to live on abstractions and interpretations of the world as presented by a few 
[…] They have forgotten the smell of sawdust and leath r and dung and sweat, the feel of gnarled 
wood, of a cow’s udder, the taste of unchemical tomatoes and wild bilberries, the sight of clear water, 
the sound of crickets and birdsongs. (V 92)  
 
Tim also describes cybernetic abstractions as the causes of mental and 
psychological degeneration, “We’ve become stunted human beings. Loss of senses 
and muscle through the media, loss of memory and logical capacity through 
computers”. For him, “the so-called civilised populations” have become only 
“stupefied incompetents in acute media-withdrawal” (V 92). 
Word processing has brought about a fundamental change in the way we 
perceive the act of writing: it is nowadays extremely asy to erase a sentence, a 
paragraph, or an entire story and substitute it with a new one. The novel thus depicts 
a society where printing has become outmoded: books are old in diskettes and they 
can be modified at will. No one version of a story is final in an era of complete 
computerization. Cybernetic texts are subject to continuous changeability. The novel 
thus addresses the idea Richard Lanham brings forward, n mely that the cybernetic 
technology will indelibly alter our notion of text. For Lanham, “the electronic word 
has been producing profound changes in the outside world […] Sooner or later, […] 
electronic ‘texts’ will redefine the writing, reading, and professing of literature as 
well” (Lanham 1993 3). Digitized communication will unavoidably force “a radical 
realignment of the alphabetic and graphic components of ordinary textual 
communication” (Lanham 1993 3), for the textual surface is no longer unchangeable 
by the reader, but it is rather “malleable and self-conscious” (Lanham 1993 5). 
In Verbivore, this situation is shown to have deleterious effects on people, for 
their individual creativity and uniqueness is being gradually lost. As Mira explains, 
“Gradually all our secret treasures have been removd and we’ve all been made to 
share the same abstracted and alienating public knowledge” (V 111). As Brooke-
Rose clearly puts it in an interview,  
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the crisis today is that we have fictions which no one admits to be fictions, whereas people before had 
myths, people had religions, and so on, and a lot of it was believed in as a matter of faith, […] now 
everything is presented as real, and it is no more real than the myths of before. (Hamilton)  
 
With the advent of the Verbivore phenomenon, people are required to go back 
to the written medium. In doing this, they are forced to employ once again their 
personal imaginative abilities: in order to write their reports, they have to rely on 
their almost forgotten creative faculties. They start writing “screen-diaries” or 
“mimic minimemoirs” (V 7), and gradually seem to rediscover the pl asure which 
derives from the use of their individual cognitive resources. For instance, Zab starts 
noting facts on her word processor and declares, “clearly I am deriving pleasure, just 
as fiction-writers used to, from the mere noting of facts, instead of getting to the 
point” (V 37). The imagination of the various characters-reporters is necessarily 
reactivated. In fact, the shift from one narrator t the next is first imagined by the 
narrator of the moment and then actualised: Mira for instance imagines what Zab 
must be writing, and then we are reading Zab’s words, who in her turn imagines what 
Jip must be writing, and then their mother, Paula, Perry, Decibel and Julian, and 
finally Mira again. When Zab imagines transcribing Jip’s diary, she soon stops and 
recognises, “No, he wouldn’t say all that” (V 54). Similarly, it is Jip who starts 
imagining his mother’s throughts, and asks himself, “why am I writing all this out as 
if I were trying to assimilate myself to her? Are these increasing breaks in our daily 
fictions turning us all into d.i.y. fiction producers? Which, Zab would cut in, we’ve 
all been all along anyway” (V 75). 
As shown by the above quotations, Verbivore continuously reminds its readers 
of its own status of fiction, but also shows how the act of creating fiction, of story-
telling, is able to reactivate the lost imaginative ability which the advent of the oral 
media had cut off from society. The habit of passively absorbing heaps and heaps of 
information is contrasted with the activity of writing one’s own perceptions and 
ideas, an activity which obviously forces people to think for themselves and be 
creative. In this way, the novel posits the possibility of a shift from second orality to 
second literacy, a situation in which society would be once again forced to rely on 
the written method, since the orality of computer tchnology has failed. Verbivore 
shows how the written codex reactivates a human force which the oral media tend to 
repress. Outmoded at the beginning of the novel, writing is necessarily rediscovered, 
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bringing about a renewal of the creative abilities of the human mind. The reader is 
constantly reminded that one of the characteristics of the novel is its ability of mixing 
fantastic and realistic elements, i.e. that narrative sets free our ability to create and 
imagine. For instance, when Zab meets Decibel – an overtly fictional, “unreal” 
character as we will see below – she thinks she must be dreaming, and when she 
relates her encounter to Jip, he tells her that she must be doing so, for “only dreams 
mix real and fantasy items” (V 139). 
However, it is necessary to make clear that the novel does not seem to advocate 
the return to the written method as a complete abandonment of the oral culture. The 
aim of the novel is rather that of deconstructing their binarism. In our society, orality 
has taken more and more over the written text, and in order to oppose this state of 
things and find a reequilibration, Brooke-Rose tries to subvert their dichotomy. The 
novel demonstrates that writing is a medium which retains communicative 
possibilities which the oral media do not possess, and that therefore the written word 
still retains an important role in contemporary society, but it also shows that the two 
media (oral and written) are inextricably interrelat d and interdependent. The written 
text can and should incorporate in itself elements of the oral culture,  while people 
should recognise the importance of the act of writing as a creative process of the 
subjectivity. As Ong makes clear towards the end of his already cited work, “Both 
orality and the growth of literacy out of orality are necessary for the evolution of 
consciousness” (Ong 1982 175). In fact, in Verbivore, written and oral texts 
inextricably mingle with each other: we have many transcriptions of dialogues, and 
although the written vehicle is shown to possess a fundamental role in our culture, it 
cannot abstract from the oral media. This is made clear by Mira as she says,  
If the eternal commentary disappears altogether in this way […] won’t mankind go slowly mad? Or 
shall we simply turn back to reading and writing and talking and behaving as if the media had never 
been? But that’s no longer an option, I believe, our minds and psyches […] have been transformed by 
the media. (V 30) 
 
The second literacy which is hypothesized in the novel could not do without 
the oral medium. The fragments of fictions the characters create are necessarily 
dependent upon the technological advances of our age. This is particularly made 
clear by the two main characters of Perry’s play: Julian, a young man who is writing 
a thesis on “neopostdeconstructionism”, and Decibel, a voice in his head which he 
hears during his convalescence in hospital after an accident. Julian needs and wants 
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silence, whilst Decibel feeds on noise. Even after th  radio play has finished, Julian 
and Decibel continue to appear in the novel. Julian will eventually decide to write a 
novel (Cf. V 82), and Decibel will declare that “Writing is [her] natural enemy, 
especially Chinese writing that manages to convey meaning without sound, and 
groups of entities rather than just one entity” (V 186). It is clear that Julian embodies 
the figure of the writer, while Decibel personifies his “enemy”, the oral media. 
However, they are presented as mutually dependent: Julian in fact is aware of the fact 
that he is a character in a radio play and therefore knows that his life depends on 
radio broadcasting: Decibel, in her turn, represents the oral media, but she is also 
conscious of being a written character – she has been invented and written by Perry. 
This clearly shows how the two apparently opposite communicative means – the 
written and the oral – are interdependent: they need each other in order to be. 
Only the recognition of mutual dependence, exemplified by Julian and Decibel, 
can bring about renewal in the practice of fiction writing and save society from the 
risk of completely losing our creative capacities. In a situation of increasing 
technologization, literature cannot but recognise th  role and importance of 
cybernetics in our culture. Computer technology should indeed be approached as a 
chance of renewal of literature. In her essay “The Dissolution of Character in the 
Novel”, Brooke-Rose puts forward the idea that the technological revolution could 
bring about renewal in the practice of writing, in the same way the invention of the 
print has done five centuries ago,  
perhaps the computer […] will alter our minds and powers of analysis once again, and enable us to 
create new dimensions in the deep-down logic of characters […] a completely different development 
arising from computer logic but as unimaginable to us now as a Shakespearean character would have 
been to an oral-epic culture, and a different way of thinking about and rendering  […] all worldly 
phenomena, as revolutionary as the scientific spirit that slowly emerged out of the Renaissance and 
the Gutenberg galaxy. (Brooke-Rose 1986 195) 
 
It appears clear how, with Amalgamemnon, Xorandor and Verbivore, Brooke-
Rose approaches the changes in our technological soiety (television programmes, 
radio-broadcasts, instant word-processing, and apparently fast-expanding 
communication) and shows how the non-literary forms of representation of the oral 
media have become in our society power discourses which threaten to supplant the 
novelistic genre. The three novels seem to simultaneously (1) point out the 
fictionality of the discourses of authority, (2) show that the risk inherent in them is 
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that of losing sight of the  relevance of the narrative genre, (3) reinstate the proper 
merits and uniqueness of the novel (creativity, ability to account for ambiguity and 
paradox), (4) point to the possible fusion of the two discourses (fictional and 
scientific) in order to reequilibrate the polarities. 
The first three novels of the Intercom Quartet explore the cognitive and cultural 
upshots of modern technological developments and repres nt an attempt to move in 
the direction of a reequilibration. If modern technology can represent a danger for 
literature and society, the incorporation of the technological discourse into the 
novelistic genre is posited as a possibility of renewal and expansion for both the 
novelistic genre and human consciousness. By incorporating the discourses of the 
media into her novels, Brooke-Rose demonstrates that the novelistic genre can be 
enriched by them, and that the role of the novel in co temporary society is still 
important, in so far as it evolves to both reflect those discourses and show their 
possible effects on the human mind. 
Textermination (1991) is the fourth novel of the Quartet, and even though it 
does not address directly the question of computer technology, it does transversely 
for it focuses on the relationship between fictional characters and readers in an era in 
which readers read less and less and characters are dying as a direct consequence. 
The novel centres around an international conference whose participants are fictional 
characters coming from disparate times and cultures. They reunite at the Hilton hotel 
in San Francisco, listen to various papers delivered and attend sessions of “pray-ins”, 
where they pray to the Implied Reader, their God, for their survival. Their lives 
depend in fact on the reader’s reading/not reading the novels of which they are part. 
The annual convention is organized by literary critics, and interpreters are employed 
in order to facilitate communication between the characters. 
The opening of the novel describes various journeys made by various 
characters in carriages – each journey described being itself a quotation from other 
novels. Subsequently, all the characters embark on an “aerobrain” and fly towards 
San Francisco. The aerobrain stops over in Atlanta d then departs again. As it takes 
off, the city is seen burning down, and the reader is presented with another series of 
quotations of cities, libraries and books catching f re. It is as if the novels of origin of 
the various characters were burned down, so that they are now free to enter another 
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fictional world. A huge community of characters coming from disparate narratives is 
thus drawn together at the convention, from Jane Austen’s Emma, Emma Bovary, 
Dorothea Brooke, Goethe’s Lotte (coming not from Goethe, but from Mann’s Lotte 
in Weimar), to Fuentes’ Felipe Segundo, Gibreel Farishta and many others. 
Intertextuality is brought to extremes, for not only discourses (as in Thru), but also 
characters interact with each other. In this way, Textermination perfectly epitomizes 
what the narrator of Flann O’Brien’s At Swim-Two-Birds sees as one of the main 
features of the modern novel, namely that characters should be interchangeable 
among books, and that “the modern novel should be large y a work of reference” 
(O’Brien 25).  
The technique here used by Brooke-Rose is no longer the scientific, objective 
description of the characters’ perceptions, but rather the more traditional one of a 
third person narrator who describes the events; a technique Brooke-Rose seems to 
employ because otherwise it would be absolutely impossible to distinguish the 
various characters. The narrator is Mira, who overtly admits to have invented four 
novels: “I’m here on at least two counts, I mean I appear in two books, though I 
invented four” (TX 66), and thus confirms her role of “author-narrator” of all of 
Brooke-Rose second tetralogy.  
At the convention, we witness many incidents caused by the interaction of so 
many different novelistic realities: Muslim fundamentalist protest during a pray-in 
session because the session is evidently based on a Christian set-up. Soon after they 
target Gibreel Farishta and try to strike a terrorist attack against him. The police 
eventually arrive and investigate the event, but the inspector is no less than Columbo. 
Later on, we witness a second attempt at disruption made by characters from TV: 
they irrupt at the convention demanding representation, and quarrel with  the 
characters from written texts on whom is in more need of prayers for survival. 
Among other events, there is the rebellion of some of the characters against their 
authors, in particular Oedipa Maas decries the masculine standing of Pynchon and 
spells out her own feminist stand, while gay characters also protest because of their 
scarce representation in fictional works. At the end of the novel, a fire burns down 
the hotel where the conference is being held and an e rthquake destroys San 
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Francisco. The characters, however, are seen as they saf ly embark the aerobrain to 
go back to their originary sources.  
The various characters’ ontological status is obviously problematical from the 
outset: each of them comes from another narrative, another time and place, and is 
now part of a new text where a third person narrato introduces them. Upon entering 
Brooke-Rose’s text, however, they do not lose the distinctive traits, qualities and 
characteristics they possessed in their narrative of origin. Textermination becomes a 
collage of different narratives, one in which the various characters’ cultural tropes 
and systems of belief are irreconcilable. The interaction among altogether different 
eras and cultures brings about misunderstanding and engenders utterly comical 
situations. In addition, some of the characters already possessed a dubious 
ontological status in their original narrative, as for instance Calvino’s non-existent 
knight, Fuentes’ Felipe Segundo (from Terra Nostra, where Fuentes gives him a 
different family history from the real Felipe of Spain), or Rushdie’s Gibreel Farishta 
(a film actor and expatriate, divided between two cultures). They therefore add to the 
already dubious ontology of the novel.  We are alsopresented with different versions 
of the same characters, in the cases where diverse r ions of the same story or a 
sequel to a novel has been written. Similarly, when a ovel has been turned into a 
film, even characters-as-actors (i.e. neither the characters of the novel, nor the actors 
in flesh and blood, but the characters the actors interpret) participate in the 
conference. 
Some characters, initially considered “real” people as opposed to the fictitious 
conference participants, are later recognised to be fictional characters as well. Such is 
for instance the status of the police inspector (Columbo) who investigates the 
terrorist attack made by the Islamic fundamentalists against Gibreel Farishta, the 
journalists arrived on the scene to report the terroristic attack, and eventually the 
convention organisers and the hotel staff. They are all recognised by the interpreters 
of the conference as fictive figures coming from different novels or from TV series 
or films. As the novel progresses, all the characters, including the interpreters, will 
be one by one revealed to be fictional characters. Kelly the interpreter indeed 
disappears from the text after having read her name, as a representative of 
Textermination, on the list of characters who have died because of the readers’ 
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forgetfulness: “McFadgeon, Kelly. From Textermination, by Mira Enketei” (TX 92). 
Even Mira will eventually read her name on the same list,  as a representative of 
Amalgamemnon, and, since “She doesn’t exist”, will therefore abandon her role of 
narrator (TX 105). If all identities, even those believed to be “real” (policemen, 
journalists, conference organisers, interpreters, and Mira herself) are shown to be 
fictional, Brooke-Rose’s texts demonstrates how everything in a narrative is made up 
of just words on a page: The Cartesian notion of identity is deconstructed as it is 
shown to be only a product of language, a linguistic construct. 
Apart from their highly problematical ontological status, not all the characters 
are formally introduced by the narratorial voice. Mira, in many cases, limits herself 
to describe the events and give clues as to the chara ters’ identity. The task of 
recognising them is thus left to the reader and depends on his/her literary knowledge. 
In a sense, the reader progressively fills in the “spots of indeterminacy” (Ingarden 
249) of the text. It is the reader who activates the gaps the novel presents and co-
creates the text together with the implied author. The novel thus foregrounds the 
active role of the reader in the (re)construction of the text. However, in the case of 
such an abundant number of characters and such a variety of cultures involved, 
nobody can virtually recognise all the intertextual references, and the reader will 
experience both the pleasure of recognition and a sense of loss at not being able to 
fill in all the gaps. Nonetheless, Textermination makes clear that it is neither possible 
nor necessary to identify all the characters and fill in all the cultural gaps in order to 
enjoy the text. In fact, it overtly posits its own incoherence and illogicality as the 
main source of pleasure for the reader: “It’s in illogics that the interpreter takes his 
pleasure”, for the reader’s task is that of  making “the apparently incoherent 
coherent” (TX 36). 
The interpreter Kelly embodies the reader’s frustration at not being able to 
recognise all the characters. She confesses to be ashamed of her ignorance: “to her 
horror she doesn’t recognize every name” (TX 22); She weeps and asks herself 
“What am I doing here? I’m hopeless. I shouldn’t even be in academia” (TX 92). 
“She feels ashamed and rattled. Gaps, so many gaps in her reading, she’ll never catch 
up” (TX 22). Textermination thus foregrounds, more overtly than any other textby 
Brooke-Rose, the active participation of the reader in the text, the relationship 
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between the text and the reader, as well as the intimate dependence of a text’s life on 
its readers. 
After Mira has left the convention, another voice assumes the role of narrator 
and announces, “If she can’t go on, I suppose I’ll have to. I’m not Mira of course 
[…] As eye-narrator I’ve kept pretty quiet, effaced as they say” (TX 106). This 
anonymous narrator is the implied author, the one who already appeared in Thru to 
play a cat and mouse game with the characters and the readers. The implied author 
here makes an excursus on the idea of the author’s presence in the text and reinstates 
that the difference between author in flesh and blood and implied author must not be 
forgotten: the risk is that of “losing an important distinction” (TX 106). This voice 
then overtly declares to be “not of course the real author […] but the Author, 
Implied, Ideal, or whatever […] I am the author, take it how you will, and I am still 
alive and well” (TX 106-7).  
Brooke-Rose thus reasserts the presence of the implied author in the narrative, 
showing how this is not the real author in flesh and blood, but a fictional and 
linguistic construct itself, but inevitably present i to the narrative. The implied 
author then expounds on the critical idea of Implied Reader (Cf. TX 106-107), and 
makes clear that each possible reading of the text,even that of a critic, is after all 
always an interpretation: “behind […] what the author intends, what the text says, 
what the reader infers, is in every case what one critic interprets. He too is Reader, he 
too is God” (TX 107). In this way, the text plays with the idea of the “one truthful 
reading” of a text, making clear that such a reading does not exist: each reading, 
however accurate, remains an individual interpretation. In this connection, the author 
reveals, or better confesses, that she herself does not know all the characters she has 
brought together in her works. In this way, she encourages the reader not to be 
frustrated about his/her literary gaps, and puts the accent on the enjoyment on the 
reader’s part as the main aim of her novel. Overtly quoting Beckett, this implied 
author further asserts her own difficulties in the construction of the text and declares, 
“As to the arranging aspect, I too, like Mira, have no idea how to go on. I must go 
on, I can’t go on, I’ll go on (Beckett, The Unnameable)” (TX107). 
Textermination is clearly different from the other three novels with which it 
makes up the Intercom Quartet. This novel does not address directly the issue of the 
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technological revolution, but it sits perfectly within the Quartet as it focuses on the 
possible consequence of a second orality for the lives of fictional characters: if the 
reader stops reading literature, characters unavoidbly die. The mixture of 
ontological worlds, apart from being utterly humorous and entertaining, also seems 
to point to literature as a cognitive activity, an ctivity able to enrich the human 
being. The reader is frustrated at not being able to recognise all the different 
characters, and a possible consequence of this sense of frustration (the result the 
novel proposes to produce) is that of stimulating the reader to broaden their 
knowledge, as well as showing the reader how literature can still serve as a cognitive 
tool, one which can make him/her enter into different cultures and eras and broaden 
his/her cultural horizons.  
The novel which follows Textermination, Remake (1996), is an 
autobiographical novel, but one where the relationship between memory and 
“reality” is overtly foregrounded as problematical. In fact, while focusing on the 
personal experiences and memories of the author, the main idea the novel puts 
forward is one we have already observed in The Dear Deceit, i.e. that remembering 
past experiences and putting them into words inevitably implies a process of 
reconstruction which transforms the “reality” of the events called to mind. 
Remembering is always an arbitrary process of interpretation, one which produces a 
fictionalization of the life the author here tries to recollect: “The old lady’s publisher 
has asked for an autobiography. But the resistance is huge. The absorbing present 
creates interference, as well as the old lady’s lifelong prejudice against biographical 
criticism” (R 6). Remake thus puts the accent on the concept of memory and,
extremely linked to this, on the role of language in the “creation” of reality. In fact, it 
is through language that the author tries to put into words her past experiences, but 
language also and unavoidably transmutes those experi nc s into something 
different. 
Brooke-Rose adopts here a new narrative constraint: the text is almost entirely 
written without personal pronouns. The only exception being the third chapter, where 
Brooke-Rose describes her mother’s death. The use of personal pronouns in this 
section fulfils the aim of emphasising the author’s strong feelings in relation to the 
subject narrated, whilst the avoidance of personal pronouns and possessive adjectives 
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in the rest of the narrative abolishes gender and possessive-power problems, creating 
a peculiar textual instability. The lipogram strongly concurs to convey the author’s 
position towards the notion of possession and identty. I  perfectly exemplifies her 
rejection of fixed identity and her questioning of the notion of biographical truth, 
even in the midst of an autobiographical novel. 
The old lady wonders whether autobiographical writing is in fact a “remake” or  
a “self-confrontation”, and in the case of a self-confrontation, she asks whether she 
would “Self-confront many selves or one?” (R 3). At this point already, she admits 
that the selves to confront would be too many: “the confronter is a speck in time 
compared to the army of confrontable selves” (R 3). As already done in her essay 
“Self-Confrontation and the Writer”, she employs the Chomskyan “John” in order to 
overcome the stylistic problems posed by the linguistic constraint adopted. Already 
at the beginning of the novel, we are told that John has “as many selves as utterances, 
virtual or realized, as many selves as there are words in lexicons” (R 3). John gets 
eventually split into many different selves, each with a different personality and a 
“serial number” which distinguishes him: there is John13, the “litcritter” (R 11), 
John32, the “pedantic” (R 16), John45 the “focus-puller” (R 45), John56 the “script 
consultant” (R 100), John53, a “nasty piece of perk, the floor-manager perhaps” (R 
107), John “le méchant loop” (R 65), and so on. John’s multiplication of identities s 
also echoed in the names of the other characters in the ovel: Brooke-Rose’s mother 
becomes for instance Jeanne, her sister is Joanne, her cousin Jean-Luc, her husbands 
Jan and Janek, her lovers Jon and Sean, and her friends Janet and Jock.  
John becomes a sort of mirror identity through which the author confronts her 
different selves or the different aspects of her lif . John intrudes in the narrative and 
introduces her many selves, but he is also sceptical and constantly enquires about the 
truth of her memories, questioning the reality, the trustworthiness of her 
reminiscences. For example, when the old lady praises her sister Joanne, John 
immediately intervenes, “Hey, says John45 the focus-puller, could the old lady be 
dubceking memory?”. He is implying that her sister exhibited envy towards her as a 
young girl, but the old lady reinstates that “There was no envy. Tess simply admired. 
Joanne didn’t” (R 45). In another example of this practice, John blames Tess for 
being personally responsible for her urethro-genital problem, but the old lady soon 
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makes clear that “John the psycho, the casting adviser” has been taken by his “usual 
haste to blame Tess not the mysteries of creation” (R 51). John constantly challenges 
the reliability of the old lady’s memories, while the latter openly admits that her 
memory might be faulty and that “perhaps the old lady has invented” (R 121). What 
the reader faces is the impossibility of distinguishing “real” memories from faulty or 
newly invented ones: the concept of memory is shown to be a treacherous, a deceitful 
one. 
The old lady does not confront only the many Johns of the novel, but she is 
also confronted by Tess, her younger self. Descriptions of the present life 
inextricably mingle with events from Tess’ life. The “old lady” now living in 
Provence goes back to the child and the young girl she was in London and in 
Brussels.  Her earliest memory of singing to her father at the age of two in 1925 is 
shown to be faulty, as the old lady can no longer situate her reminiscence, places and 
names inevitably mixing up in her mind: “St. John’s Wood, not Chiswick […] 
Chiswick was later. The old lady has no memory at all of St. John’s Wood at two” (R 
2). A TV programme about the war triggers her memory of Tess at Bletchley Park, 
while the new life that Brooke-Rose embarks on when she moves to France is 
remembered as an adventure,  
Tess joins the ’68 generation, the teachers all twen y or thirty, the students all ages but mostly very 
young, Tess now forty-five, slimmed by illness and crisis, rejuvenated by freedom, excitement, 
hormones after a hysterectomy […] A second career, a second life. (R 164)  
 
Unlike John, the name of the little girl is not formally introduced at the 
beginning of the novel, but only in the fourth chapter, as we are told that “The little 
girl’s name is Tess. Only a name and memory can tesselate and texture all those 
different beings, the baby in Geneva, the little girl in Brussels, Chiswick, Brussels, 
Folkestone, London, and all the others to the old lady in Provence” (R 41). The 
reference to the verbs “tessellate” (spelt in the novel with only an l) and “texture” 
indicates that life, like fiction, is made up of a tissue of stories and events which the 
subject(s) sews together in order to form a story, but this is inevitably an artificial 
operation of collage, of assemblage, for in memory, like in imagination, loose ends 
unavoidably mix and confuse with each other. Life, like fiction, becomes a text, a 
network of stories, memories and imagination where th  real and the fictitious 
become one and impossible to distinguish. The novel do s not follow a chronological 
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order, but it rather follows the associations of the lady’s mind. Moreover, the steady 
use of the present tense renders indistinguishable the time-shifts from the present in 
Provence to the past of the childhood and young age and vice versa, thus challenging 
the boundaries between the present and the past and undermining the very idea of 
autobiography as a series of events chronologically developing. 
The interaction of the old lady and the many Johns in  the novel seems to have 
the purpose of emphasising the bi-focal character of autobiographical writing. If we 
consider the doubling of the central consciousness into the old lady and Tess, and the 
multiplication of Johns, however, we could say that Brooke-Rose’s autobiographical 
novel offers a multi-focal point of view where it is mpossible to distinguish real 
events from dreamed, invented, imagined, or faulty memories. Brooke-Rose thus 
deconstructs, once again, the binarism fiction/reality by showing how the act of 
remembering always implies that of fictionalising the events in question: each 
“portrayal” always implies a “betrayal” (R 165). 
Challenging once again the autobiographical genre, which would demand a 
closure with the least distant point in time to thenarrating, the final chapter begins 
with the little girl taking the word and addressing directly the old lady,   
Hello, Tess. 
Hi, ole lady. Writing nicely? 
Nicely? How tell? But writing. Is the portrayal a betrayal? 
Always is. For others especially. (R 165) 
 
Tess’s words emphasise once more what the confrontati  between the old 
lady and John has been suggesting all along, i.e. that the reconstruction of facts is 
always an interpretation, a new invention, a fictionalization. The fact that this point is 
made clear by Tess in first person, shows even more clearly that the old lady’s 
writing is a subjectivization of her own memories: Tess would most probably not 
share her views and implications. Tess is inevitably  different person from the old 
lady. Brooke-Rose is clearly deconstructing the notion of fixed identity, as already 
observed in her previous novels. Here the more so, a  she does it in the context of a 
“should-be” autobiographical work. The artificiality inevitably generated by the 
arbitrary operation of “life-remaking” is constantly highlighted: the old lady tells 
Tess that “Memory’s […] a variable geometry” (R 165), and that “Personal 
relationships, like politics, consist of constantly orbiting blind spots” (R 166). Even 
the idea of historiographical truth is shown to be,like memory, a fiction. Indeed, if 
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biography becomes “Bifography”, which is “always fiction” (R 11), history is merely 
“A sorry series of sad remakes” (R165). Memory, like life itself, is a fiction.  
But the novel also does something more: in line with the deconstructive 
strategy, it carries out the subversion of the dichotomy fiction/reality in order to 
reaffirm the importance and the uniqueness of memory. In fact, although throughout 
the text, memory is equated with various data storing devices such as files, diskettes, 
or index cards (Cf. R 65, 100, 113), at the end of the novel the narrator will make 
clear that “Memory is not after all a computer, nor, a fortiori, a diskette or even a 
card-index” (R 170). What distinguishes memory and renders it irreplaceable is its 
“sense of time” and its ability to “see […] smell […] hear […] touch or taste the 
world”. She continues by further distinguishing memory from books and films, for 
“an image in memory may be different each time and su denly aggregate others”. 
Moreover, whilst fiction is “prearranged”, memory is dominated by chance, which is 
“at the heart of biology, of life”. Memory, thus, “is unique, random and fragile, like 
life, and like life dies for ever” (R 171).   
With a typical operation of deconstruction and reconstruction, Brooke-Rose 
exposes the fictionality of any would-be truthful account of “reality” – in the end, she 
will admit that “the remake of a life becomes more and more impossible” (R 172) – 
while reinstating the value of human memory, its importance and uniqueness which 
derives from its fragility, from the fact that like life, memory vanishes for ever and 
cannot be replaced. 
Brooke-Rose’s subsequent novel, Next (1998), leaves behind the media of her 
“Intercom Quartet” and the autobiographical questioning of Remake to approach a 
different theme. It is set in London and evolves around the experiences of homeless 
people. The author seems to play with the idea of structural secrets, as there are 
twenty-six characters in the novel, and each of them b ars a name beginning with a 
different letter of the alphabet. Ten of them are homeless, and the initials of their 
names spell out among them the ten letters of the top row of the keyboard, 
QWERTYUIOP. The characters are linked to one another because one of the 
homeless, a black girl, has been raped and murdered, and the police is investigating 
the crime. 
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In contrast to the other novels by Brooke-Rose, which always present indefinite 
settings, this time the topography of the English capital is traced with accuracy: 
names of streets, squares, parks and buildings are all presented in the novel, and give 
the reader a strong sense of following actively the incessant wanderings of the 
homeless characters, their rounds from doorway dossto treet begging to homeless 
shelter to job centre to park and around again.  
Brooke-Rose explores here a different lipogram and writes the entire novel 
without the verb “to have”. The lack of this verb oviously serves the purpose of 
expressing the lack of belongings of the homeless: they do not own anything 
material, and therefore they do not employ the verb to have. Possessive pronouns are 
also extremely rare in the narrative, and only uttered by the other characters, not by 
the homeless.  
The narrative technique is again that of immediate pr sentation: the author 
enters in the minds of her characters and describes o jectively their thoughts and 
perceptions, shifting freely from one character-narrator to the other, as already seen 
in Thru and Verbivore. The novel does not present paragraph or chapter breaks and is 
made up of a continuous flow of words passing from one consciousness to the next 
without any formal introduction. However, while in Thru it was very difficult for the 
reader to distinguish the various shifts of viewpoint, n this novel Brooke-Rose – as 
she has already done in Verbivore – employs different uses of language to 
differentiate the narrators. The reader can in factdistinguish the various characters 
thanks to the their linguistic differences. The varieties of London speech, or 
“Estuarian” as Brooke-Rose defines it, are carefully registered. Each character 
employs language differently, revealing various leve s of knowledge of English 
grammar, presenting different inflections and accents, and employing personal 
rhetorical tones. These diverse uses of the same language, ranging from learned 
bureaucratese through average standard use to immigrant variants of language, are 
also phonetically transcribed by the author. 
The tone of the novel is much less optimistic than the preceding ones. We’re 
told that we live in the age of “The end of meganarratives, of all the fictions we live 
under” (N 202), thus clearly addressing the famous claim made by Lyotard in his The 
 293 
Postmodern Condition, which we will further consider below. Our age is described 
as the age, 
of the death of God […] the withering of the state, the collapse of communism, the corruption of 
capitalism, the end of meritocracy […] the cancerous growth of burocracy, eurocracy; the end of the 
nation-state, of ideology, so they say, though it still misleads millions. (N 202) 
 
It is an age where “There’s usually more than one horror for each letter”: “A 
for Auschwitz. B for Belsen. C for Cambodia. D for D esden. For Deportation. E for 
Ethiopia, for Ethnic Cleansing… F for, what’s F? Famine […] Fundamentalism” (N 
3). In a posthuman age where people are more and more alienated and far away from 
each other, one of the characters asks: “are we now so dead to it all, like plugged off 
walkmen, that we don’t hear each other any more? (N 169). In a nation which is 
founded on the equality of all citizens, where “MEN [are] BORN EQUAL”, we are 
told that what “the Declaration forgot [is] that a sl ve is not a national, that a refugee, 
like a dropout, ceases to be a citizen” (N 2). Recalling Amalgamemnon, the society 
depicted in Next is one where most education is useless and people remain 
unemployed despite their studies (Cf. N 181). 
The main theme of Next is clearly a social one: the novel overtly condemns the 
government and the media for the situation in which the homeless are: 
“Disappearing. That’s what the government wants after all” (N 184), says one of 
them, while another significantly declares, “If the government states in morphed stats 
that we don’t exist Then we don’t. Presto! We disappear. We’re words, we’re 
statistical curves and columns” (N 204-5). Homeless do not exist because the 
government does not clearly recognise the problem they represent. They are treated 
as cold statistical data and soon forgotten after th  statistics have been drawn. The 
language used by the government and the media strongly concurs to maintain the 
problem of drop-outs, for it does not acknowledge th ir cogent reality, but only 
furnishes abstract statistical data which does not account for their individual 
uniqueness and different problems. It is as if these people were refuted recognition of 
their individual realities.  
Apart from overtly criticising the government and the media, the novel also 
posits the responsibility of each member of society n perpetuating this situation. It 
shows how people generally act as if homeless did not exist, ignoring a social 
problem which is in front of their eyes. We are told that “Drop-outs mustn’t be 
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visible” (N 9), and the accent is often put on the way beggars and rough sleepers on 
the streets are ignored by passers-by because they are an uncomfortable reality to 
acknowledge. For example, a man and a woman in a rest urant refuse to help a 
beggar, Ulysses, and pretend not to notice him (Cf. N 95-96). By doing so, they 
actually refuse to recognise him as a member of society, and deprive him of his own 
status as human being. Indeed, all homeless are shown to be deprived of their own 
identity, as they all appear the same to the people who pass them by and pretend not 
to notice them. Even the inspector working at the mystery of the murdered girl shows 
no real desire to solve the case and do justice, for the victim was herself a drop-out of 
society.  
Brooke-Rose’s phonetic transcription of the different levels of the Estuarian 
dialect seems to have different purposes. On the one ha d, it slows down the reader 
and forces him/her to think and pay attention to what e/she reads. On the other 
hand, by forcing the reader to pay attention to what differentiates the various 
characters, it seems to recuperate their peculiar individual dimension. The phonetic 
transcription shows that, although the homeless look all the same to us passers-by, 
they are not so: each of them possesses his/her own individuality, education, and past 
experiences. The reader is therefore forced to pay attention to their differences and 
recognise their uniqueness. By doing so, the author succeeds in giving a real voice to 
the speechless figures of governmental statistics, to the reality most people pretend to 
ignore. The reader, struggling to voice the phonetic notation of their speeches, finds 
himself/herself imaginatively occupying their minds, ympathetically identifying 
with them: the text thus succeeds in making readers s e things from a different 
perspectives, from the perspective of the rejected an  forgotten. At the same time, 
the reader is reminded that our “century’s obsessiv earch for identity [is] just a sick 
humanoid joke” (N 91), and therefore that it is the individual who believes in the 
concept of fixed notions of truth and stable identity who is unable to acknowledge 
the reality of people who, for one reason or another, ave become emarginated and 
do not possess a stable social standing.  
Clearly, it is not the first time Broke-Rose focuses on marginal figures. Indeed, 
Out, Such, Between, and Amalgamemnon already approach the narrated from the 
perspective of the less powerful and different, yet N xt is distinctive for its overtly 
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pessimistic tone. In Brooke-Rose’s previous novels, linguistic creativity never fails 
to offer a powerful alternative to the problem posited. In particular in Out, Between, 
and Amalgamemnon, the characters positively exploit their position f marginality. 
They recuperate the creativity of language and subordinate it to their ends, thus 
showing the possibilities of alternative versions of “reality”. In Next, it is not so: the 
figures are marginalised and so they remain throught the novel. In the end it is 
sadly stated  that for these people there exists “no next, no story” (N 203), i.e. no 
possibility of going forward from the position in which society has relegated them. 
The “no story” of the end, seems also to mean that for the first time Brooke-Rose is 
clearly hinting at the reality of the subject matter r ated: it is not a story, it is a social 
problem we need to acknowledge.  
In 1999, Brooke-Rose publishes Subscript. The novel describes the evolution 
of humanity from the moment life began on our planet about 4,500 million years ago 
– as a cell formed itself out of a chemical reaction – to the appearance of the human 
race fifty thousand years ago, its first attempts at agriculture and other fundamental 
steps towards evolution.  
The technique is here again that of an objective presentation and internal point 
of view: it is the author who describes from within the various characters’ 
consciousnesses their perceptions unreflectively. The initial characters of the novel 
are the primary cells and the prehistoric creatures which populated the earth millions 
of years ago. They therefore lack the ability to speak and during the first part of their 
evolution they lack any kind of consciousness. The reader thus follows the 
development of the species from a single, speechless and unconscious cell, through 
more and more complex organisms, to the creatures which will give way to the 
human race. 
Brooke-Rose does divide the narrative into chapters, and provides in their titles 
information on the time elapsed from one section to the next. Although this allows 
the reader to follow the passing of time, which is otherwise never directly stated, the 
information given by the chapters’ headings is somewhat vague: it does not refer 
directly to the various prehistorical ages the novel describe, but only to the millions 
of years which divide each chapter. For this reason, this novel presents, in my view, 
more difficulties for the reader than the preceding o es (exception made for Thru), as 
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the task of identifying the various creatures and follow the evolution of the species is 
almost entirely left to the reader. At the same time, this technique seems to have the 
purpose of stimulating the readers’ curiosity: if they want to better grasp the various 
evolutionary steps, they necessarily have to document themselves, to make and 
independent research on the subject in question. 
The choice of the topic, together with the narrative technique which adopts the 
strict point of view of single cells, more complex organisms, and then human beings, 
obviously does not permit the author to mention anything that these “characters” 
would not know by themselves at that time. The novel thus opens with an impersonal 
(and very poetical) description of a pre-biotic chemical reaction which happens at the 
time life started on earth, 
 Zing! zinging out through the glowsalties the punge t ammonia earthfarts in slithery clay and all the 
rest to make simple sweeties and sharpies and otherstuffs. Dust out of vast crashes and currents now 
calmer as the crust thickens and all cools a bit. Over many many forevers. Waiting. Absorbing. 
Growing. Churning. Splitting. Over and over. (SS 1) 
 
As the novel progresses, the creatures increasingly acquire self-expressive 
tools, often passing from a stage of doubt regarding the external entities they observe 
or feel, to a more conscious state which corresponds to their gradual evolution. For 
instance, one of these consciousnesses, initially perceives above herself “another sea 
far up, much paler in tinge and not wet at all. At least, like a sea but not made of 
water” (SS 26). She gradually realises that this kind of “upper s a can also darken” 
(SS 27), and that it is a “dry sea made of air” (SS32), and eventually comes to define 
it as “the sky up there” (SS 43). 
The novel is particularly poetical for its use of language: assonances, 
alliterations, onomatopoetic words, and an extensive employment of paleontological 
and chemical jargons which give life to most beautiful and poetic descriptions. At the 
basis of the evolutionary process lies “the code”. It is thanks to the code that the 
creatures work to mutual advantage. The code registers everything inside the 
creatures and is the force which drives them towards advancement. Every 
developmental stage is characterised by specific achievements commanded and 
registered by the code. By following step by step the advance of the species, its small 
discoveries, the reader learns to see the whole process from a different, much more 
poetical perspective, experiencing enthusiasm for the smallest evolutionary steps 
which are nowadays taken for granted and forgotten. Life on our planet is described 
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as a course of constant creation and destruction where complete efficiency reigns. 
Even the initial cell is shown to be a perfect example of efficiency. This first, newly 
formed cell is soon approached by more and more cells, for only together they can 
start their journey towards extreme complexity, andit always the code which dictates 
their evolutionary steps, which make “More and more cells cling[…] together, 
working together” (SS 8). Four billion years after the first cell’s appearance, the now 
evolved organism can detach itself from the sea bottom and finally emerge to the 
light, “up to the surface with what feels like a new imbiber of that lifeforce made by 
the stuffsacs. And the surface is astonishing. At firs eyeful just above water, the 
body held up by the new swimflaps” (SS 25). 
The seas recede, the masses of land move and rearrange themselves, the 
evolution of the species continues. Eventually, after another 115 million years, the 
creatures acquire forward-facing eyes thanks to which they are able to better observe 
the world. There are no “animals that swim in the air” (SS 62) and the creatures, now 
staying in tribes, also discover the “pleasure of making noises out of the throat” (SS 
61) and learn to communicate with different pitches and lengths of noises. The noises 
soon become the first fully articulated vowels and consonants, among the general 
excitement of women who play the game of discovering new sounds,  
we can make a different noise by simply surrounding the airy noise with a blocking noise at both ends, 
as with KEK. or GEG. Or GOG. MEM, BEB, PEP. It all depends which bit of the mouth is closed 
after the airy noise, and for how long. (SS 109) 
 
One of the main themes of the novel is memory. Like in Remake, in Subscript 
Brooke-Rose seems to demonstrate the fallibility of human memory. The characters 
in the novel often cannot remember precisely certain evolutionary steps or 
discoveries they accomplished, and they have to admit that such events remain vague 
in their minds. However, “the code” infallibly registers and remembers everything: 
the DNA and RNA codes, on which Brooke-Rose already touches in Between, are 
here given full recognition. The code lies at the earth of human existence and 
development. It is already present in the first cells: “After the sperm cell’s visit the 
eggcell divides […] And divides again, and again and gain […] Repeating also the 
code, with the endless acid strings” (SS 10). The code “forgets nothing” (SS 10). The 
idea of the code clearly recalls Derrida’s idea of arche-writing as the first and 
indelible form of writing which lies at the basis of human life. Commanded by the 
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code, the evolutionary spiral never stops: the prehistoric creatures acquire nails, 
discover the pleasure of staying close and nit-picking, learn the way to cook raw 
meat, start walking in erect position, their “fur” thins out and so on. Finally, 
reasoning replaces instinct, yet it is precisely when  the human race can be rightly 
called such, i.e. during the final 40,000 years of the story, that their behaviour 
already points to the contemporary sexual politics. In fact, the evolution of the 
species is approached in the novel from a female perspective. All the creatures whose 
point of view is adopted are female, as the text clearly states at various times (Cf. SS
95). The gender distinction, very vague at the beginning, becomes clearer as the 
novel progresses and the first steps towards the contemporary iniquitous treatment of 
women are made. In particular, it is their procreative ability which puts women in a 
position of weakness in respect to men. With Motherhood,  “the original division of 
labour between male and female has become even more unequal” (SS 57). This 
division progressively gives way to women’s exclusion from the most important 
activities of men, and particularly from their decision making meetings. The novel 
thus shows how the masculine appropriation of power and the subordination of 
women find their interlocking roots in prehistory. 
With a parallel move, Subscript describes women as responsible for the most 
important ideas which contributed to the evolution of the species, and shows how 
men soon appropriated these ideas for themselves and refuted to recognise women’s 
fundamental contribution. According to the novel, this has been the case of various 
ideas and discoveries, among which, to name but a few, that of standing and walking 
on the back legs (Cf. SS 93), of cooking meat (Cf. SS 119), and that of the “mouth-
noise game” (SS 109), which will eventually become language. Notwithstanding 
women have invented the game of language, male soontake over and marginalise 
women from their speeches,  
males do so enjoy hearing males make speech. So we have to bring them food, up in the mountain 
cave […] And naturally we won’t be allowed to be present at their grand decisions so they’ll stop 
talking as we enter. (SS 127) 
 
This kind of gender exclusion is still suffered by women in contemporary 
society, and Brooke-Rose had already treated the issu  in particular in Between. With 
Subscript, she goes back to the very beginning of our civilization in order to show 
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how masculine discourse dates back to the very moment human beings could be 
perceptibly recognised as such. As one of the charaters says in the novel, men, 
never help on women’s work, unless it suddenly interests them and then they take it over and call it 
men’s work. That’s what Gavrina says, and it’s a secret, that women first worked stone, made 
ornaments, invented slow cooking in the earth, discovered speech, told stories of the clan and 
prophesied, sang to our young. And other things perhaps. We teach them to speak so they silence us. 
(SS 191)   
 
In this way, Subscript exposes the cliché, still widespread in contemporary 
society, of women’s passivity and lack of creativity, a cliché already exposed in 
Between and Amalgamemnon. Despite they have first bred the most original ideas, 
women are not deemed worth persecuting their insight  and get “stuck with the most 
unchanging tasks, the same old scrapers and footheld choppers. A sitting task, a 
female task, is the feeling” (SS 107). 
Women have been believed to lack the spark of genius which characterises 
men since the appearance of the human race on the earth: the subjugation of women 
has now been lasting for millions of years. This issue has been variously addressed 
by Brooke-Rose in her critical writing. In particular, in her essay “Illiterations”, she 
overtly attacks the widespread assumption that women ar  not capable of giving life 
to new ideas and forms of art:  if the number of women artists is reduced in respect to 
men it is not because women are less capable of the spark of genius which 
characterises men, but rather because they have suffered marginalization for a long, 
too long time,  
It takes centuries, generations of artists being allowed and expected to practice their art and to show 
themselves practicing it, rather than just looking pretty at a spinet as an asset on the marriage market 
[…] for a Mozart or a Michelangelo or a Shakespeare to merge. (Brooke-Rose 1991 253) 
 
Subscript thus perfectly support this idea by showing how the marginalization 
of women is so much rooted in our culture, that we not take it for granted, mistaking 
a consequence for an inherent biological reality. Opposing this state of things, the 
novel prompts us to recognise its real causes, it makes us clearly see that what a 
masculine society believes to be the real state of things, is in actual fact only a 
consequence of their masculine appropriation of langu ge and exploitation of power.  
In Amalgamemnon, Mira had already exposed the “fibstory” to which women 
have always been subjected. She had also imagined arguing with Willy, 
counterposing the real causes for women’s apparent lack of creativity to his 
prejudices, 
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Tomorrow at breakfast Willy will [..] bring out as the fruit of deep reflection the non-creativity of 
women look at music painting sculpture in history and I shall put on my postface and mimagree, 
unless I put on my preface and go through the routine of certain social factors such as disparagement 
from birth the lack of expectation not to mention facilities a womb of one’s own a womb with a view 
an enormous womb and he won’t like the countertone at all. (A 16) 
 
In this way, Subscript becomes in a sense a sequel to Amalgamemnon, for it 
shows how the history of women’s subjugation initiated even much earlier than the 
classical culture Mira had referred to.  
With her last published novel, Life, End Of (2006), Brooke-Rose goes back to 
the autobiographical genre after Remake. The novel describes the experiences of the 
author’s old age. Brooke-Rose is over eighty, she is disabled and her bodily 
coordination, once taken for granted, now appears as more and more difficult to be 
achieved. Although, as already seen in Remake, writing always implies a 
fictionalization of the events described, when I interviewed the author she explained 
that the novel is “closer to a diary”, for it is the only novel which she wrote as she 
actually experienced the events narrated: “every idea that I get about a wheelchair or 
what you feel like when you are ill, it came to me as I lived those things. I think it’s 
the only novel that I’ve written as I went through those experiences”  (Brooke-Rose 
2008). 
The technique is still the subjective description of the consciousness’ 
perceptions. Her present and past experiences, thoughts and memories are therefore 
inextricably mingled together. The text presents in mi ute details the daily trials of 
what were once little automatic tasks: walking is painful, and standing up without the 
help of both arms is impossible; she staggers around the house from one support to 
the next, and her beloved books, which are in the upper rooms of her house, are now 
inaccessible to her. The social experiences of the old lady’s life, now highly reduced, 
are also described: her meeting with the doctor andthe physiotherapist, her 
relationship with the young lady who occasionally looks after her, and her love of old 
friends, whom she defines as “T.F.”, True Friends, a  opposed to “O.P.”, Other 
People (LEO 112). One of the main themes of the novels seem to be, in my view, the 
way human relationship are ineluctably altered by illness. In fact, apart from 
describing her condition, the author often stops and ponders on various aspects of her 
illness, on the consequences it has on different aspect  of her life. For instance, she 
expounds on friendship and on what has changed in her relationship with friends 
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since she is disabled. She inevitably notices that something changes in other people 
when one is ill: the individuality which she was once given recognition for, is now 
no longer taken into account. People see her only in light of her physical difficulties 
and approach her in a different way: it is as if their respect for her person diminished 
with the arrival of illness. In the above-cited interview, Brooke-Rose in fact 
explained,  
Sometimes I wrote not at all really what was actually happening but pondering on various aspects of 
illness: why does one lose one’s charm and vivacity, but also why do people take it out of you without 
realizing it either, they quite quickly sort of lose interest, a sick person is not interesting, and I go into 
these things, this inability to think what is like to be that person who can’t walk and who can’t see, 
and there is no reason why they should, but something always changes when you’re seriously ill, in 
them and in you. (Brooke-Rose 2008) 
 
The old lady is therefore another marginalised figure, one which perfectly 
understands why she is being marginalised and learns to distinguish true friends from 
other people. Deprived of the total independence she once used to enjoy, she now 
withdraws in herself and describes this withdrawal as “the last tiny freedom, the last 
small piece of autonomy” (LEO 11). Later one, when memory falters, she covertly 
and humorously addresses the idea of the intellectual losed in his ivory tower (a 
vision often applied to her by critics) and asks, “Can a black hole become an ivory 
tower?” (LEO 62). In particular, as the novel progresses and her physical faculties 
falter, we can detect a certain striving for the right expression we find in Beckett: for 
instance we are told that the legs “flinch wince jerk shirk lapse collapse give way 
stagger like language when it can’t present the exact word needed, the exact spot 
where to put the foot” (LEO 9). This sentence strongly recalls those continuously 
uttered by Beckett’s narrators in the trilogy and reveals their same kind of striving 
for the exact definition or expression. 
However, the tone of the novel is much more varied than that of the Beckett 
trilogy. It varies from the critical and analytical, to the descriptive, to the funny and 
entertaining. The author changes register from one moment to the other: personal, 
frivolous, witty, humorous, philosophical, rhetorical, political, historical, technical. 
The author never abandons herself to blatantly pessimistic considerations, never 
approaches her situation with an overtly negative attitude: what we have is the lucid 
exposure of her perceptions associated with an ever-present tongue-in-cheek tone 
towards the people around her and towards the problems experienced. With the same 
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tongue-in-cheek tone, she also approaches a variety of topics, from the 
overpopulation, to the ever increasing power of advertisement, to the decline of 
grammar as  a subject in schools. She also discusses to some length the difference 
between Narrative and the Speech modes, as well as the role of the author in the text 
(Cf. LEO 65-69). In relation to this last issue, she reinstates, as already done in Thru 
and Textermination, that she is not dead but present in all of her novels as implied 
author (Cf. LEO 76-77). Her increasing physical difficulties do not prevent her from 
employing her typical linguistic humour. The novel in fact abounds with a vast range 
of linguistic puns, as for instance the ones which refer to her cardio-vascular system, 
variously identified as the “cardiovasco de gamma network”, “Vasco the Qualmer” 
and “Vasco the Charmer” (LEO 10, 20, 36).  
Towards the end of the novel, the computer is dead, and her sight is 
increasingly deteriorating. The text conveys a strong sense of the approaching end, 
yet it ends with a multi-metaphorical linguistic pun typical of the author. The phrase 
“Les jeux de maux son faits” (LEO 119) retains in fact the echo of the original phrase 
from the casino language – les jeux son faits – but it also plays on the idea of les jeux 
de mots. Being written in French, it also recalls the typical mixture of languages of 
the author, whilst alluding at the “French facet” of her chameleonic writing.  
Having outlined the main characteristics of Brooke-Rose’s novels from 
Amalgamemnon to Life, End Of, it is easy to see that, although the presence of 
literary theory can be said to be a distinctive feature in most of them, these novels 
cannot be defined as “critical fiction” or “fictional criticism” in the same way as I 
have hypothesised for Between and Thru. 
Brooke-Rose’s fictional output subsequent to her first experimental tetralogy, 
in fact, does not present the p rvasive presence of theory we find in Between and 
Thru. Moreover, these works neither anticipate critical theory, as Between does, nor 
furnish an ongoing critique of theory, as Thru does.  
For instance, although Amalgamemnon exposes, by means of mimicry and 
juxtaposition, the prejudices which lie at the basis of our masculine society, Between 
had already done something similar, but it had done it at a time when Kristeva’s 
main work, Revolution in Poetic Language, and its deconstruction of feminine 
identity, was still to appear on the literary scene. From Amalgamemnon onwards, the 
 303 
author explores in each of her novels different themes and with different techniques, 
but does not anticipate critical issues which will be at the centre of the critical debate 
in the years to come, as she does in Between. Similarly, she neither presents an 
inextricable mixture of literary theory, nor actively criticises the theories she 
addresses, as she does in Thru. For this reasons, only these two novels can, I believe, 
be defined as “critical fiction” or “fictional criticism”, with Thru in particular 
representing a climax which will never be touched again in Brooke-Rose’s writing. 
Xorandor and Verbivore address the theme of a second orality engendered by 
the increasing technologization of our culture, yet the novels are much more 
straightforward than Brooke-Rose’s initial quartet (Verbivore in particular is perhaps 
the most “easy to read” of her novels). Although they address a theoretical problem, 
their theme is much more ready at hand, for they reflect a reality experienced and 
shared by all members of society. Textermination might be said to be difficult for its 
many references to texts which the average reader might not know, yet the accent on 
the playfulness of the text points primarily towards the enjoyment on the reader’s 
part. In addition, the fact the reader must not necessarily know all the characters and 
the novels they come from in order to enjoy the reading is overtly explained by the 
implied author in the text. Remake presents the subversion of the dichotomy 
reality/fiction and the deconstruction of the notion f fixed identity and meaning, but 
it does so in 1996, i.e. at a time when these issues had already been extensively 
tackled by criticism. Next is different from the other novels by Brooke-Rose for the 
overtly social and practical, more tangible problem it tackles, as well as for its much 
more pessimistic tone. It explicitly addresses Lyotard’s claim of the end of 
metanarratives, but again at a time when Lyotard’s theory was widely known, and at 
a time when society as a whole had begun to sense the end of an epoch which 
postmodernist theory posits. Subscript is highly original in theme and also highly 
poetical (in my view the most poetical of Brooke-Rose’s novels), but it cannot be 
said to forerun critical theories. Finally, Life, End Of tackles sporadically such 
themes as the fictionalization of life through writing or the idea relationship between 
implied author and reader, but it is probably the most personal of Brooke-Rose 
novels, the “less fictionalised” we could say, and certainly it cannot be said to 
address critical theories in an innovative way. 
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This does not mean that the novels Brooke-Rose wrote f m Amalgamemnon 
onwards lack something in respect to Between and Thru, but rather that they are 
different from them and cannot be defined as “critical” in the way I put forward in 
this thesis. All of Brooke-Rose’s novels do make th reader see things from a 
different angle, stimulating him/her to look at things from a different perspective, the 
perspective of the less privileged term of a dichotomy (male/female, reality/fiction, 
speaking/writing, rich/poor), yet Between and Thru not only reflect the theories they 
address, but also actively contribute to the theory of the time; they vigorously add to 
their making. 
Brooke-Rose’s novels, after Thru, address literary theory, but do not employ it, 
as Thru does, as their basic structuring principle. Theory is clearly reflected by and 
in them. They address theory and subvert binarism, but do not actively engage with 
the critical theories they refer to, in the sense that hey do not critically refigure their 
tenets. They therefore do not represent an active critique of the theories they tackle. 
They subvert, in line with Derrida’s deconstructive strategy, the dichotomy 
fiction/reality, classical/modern knowledge, orality/ eracy, technological 
media/human creativity, cybernetic storage devices/human memory. They reassert 
the importance of fictionality, the role of classical culture in our modern world, the 
significance of the written medium and its ability to activate our imagination and 
creativity, the fragility and beauty of human memory, the presence of writing in our 
most intimate human nature (the code, arche-writing). Yet, they cannot be compared 
to Thru, for in it Brooke-Rose directly and critically targets the validity of the 
theories the novel addresses. Thru, in other words, does not simply employ critical 
theory, but becomes criticism itself as it goes beyond such theories, pointing, with a 
tongue-in-cheek attitude, to their inherent risks and possible outshoots. Nor they can 
be compared to Between for the fact that this latter was published in 1968 and 
presents ideas and concepts which were still to find general recognition in the literary 
field (in particular Kristeva’s deconstruction of feminine identity and Derrida’s 
subversion of binarism). 
My aim has been therefore that of analysing Brooke-Rose’s initial parabola and 
approach to experimentalism, from Out and Such, to Between and Thru. Out and 
Such represent in fact a prologue to the full experimentalism of Between and the 
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unrepeatable climax of Thru. From Amalgamemnon onwards, and especially after 
Amalgamemnon, Brooke-Rose’s attempt towards more readability is evident. Thru’s 
specific focus on critical theory is abandoned in favour of more ready at hand 
themes. Between and Thru can, in my view, be defined as “critical fiction” or 
“fictional criticism”, in that they address ideas and concepts which were still to be 
addressed by criticism at the time they were published. The two novels forerun major 
critical issues which were to take decades to be fully grasped and tackled. In 
particular, I remand to the following section for a fuller discussion on postmodernist 
theory, which I hope will make clear the way Thru posits itself as a very original and 
ahead of its time critique of some of the main tenets of poststructuralist and 
deconstructionist theories, i.e. a critique of the still to come development of 
postmodernist theory. Before going into the specific of postmodernist theory, 
however, I will illustrate the two major literary influences present in Brooke-Rose’s 
writing, namely Ezra Pound and Samuel Beckett, in order to show how Brooke-Rose 




Influences and postmodern nihilism: 
Brooke-Rose’s distinctiveness and countertendency  
This chapter will initially expound on the two major literary legacies evident in 
Brooke-Rose – Ezra Pound and Samuel Beckett – in order to show how the linguistic 
scepticism inherent (with due differences) in their works, is in Brooke-Rose’s writing 
both addressed and surpassed into a more enabling view and use of language. I will 
subsequently draw on the major implications of the postmodernist debate in order to 
show how Brooke-Rose overcomes the nihilism which she recognises as already 
inherent in much of the critical theories of the sixties and seventies. By doing so, I 
will demonstrate why Brooke-Rose can be rightly praised for contributing in a highly 
original way to the writing practice of the sixties and seventies.  
As regards Ezra Pound’s influence, Brooke-Rose share  with Pound a deep 
sense of language’s consumption and a strong resolution to renew the way the 
subject conceives and employs language. Pound felt that language and literature 
needed to be revitalised, particularly because of his sense that language had been 
worn out by its misuse in journalism, advertising, and the general state of traditional 
culture. On many occasions, he expressed his belief that “the press, daily, weekly, 
and monthly, is utterly corrupted” (Pound 1934a 631), and described the entire 
cultural system as “a mere matter of successive d lutations of knowledge” (Pound 
1934a 632). He moved a series of polemical attacks on the present state of culture, 
criticising the “mental LAZINESS” and the “lack of curiosity” of contemporary 
society (Pound 1934a 631). He frequently expressed th  idea that “literature is a 
whole, parts of which exist in different languages and are capable of comparison”, 
and attacked the backwardness and ignorance of “profess rs and publicist 
cheapjacks” who do not approach literature in this way and “have no ambition above 
that of leading an easy life and protecting their own ignorance or their own 
educational limitations” (Pound 1933 318). Pound’s “campaign against human 
deadwood still clogging the system” (Pound 1934a 634) aimed at renewing the way 
we use and understand language, and consequently the way literature is conceived, 
produced and approached. His motto  “make it new” lay at the basis of his scepticism 
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about the manner language was employed in contemporary society20. In Pound’s 
view, language had become an instrument of concealment of the horrors of 
civilization and social problems, rather than a means of clear expression,  
As language becomes the most powerful instrument of perfidy, so language alone can riddle and cut 
through the meshes. Used to conceal meaning, used to blur meaning, to produce the complete and 
utter inferno of the past century …. […] against which, SOLELY a care for language, for accurate 
registration by language avails. (Pound 1934b 7) 
 
A first step towards the renewal of language was made by the Imagist 
movement, which Pound co-founded with H.D. and Richard Aldington. Imagists 
advocated a direct treatment of the subject matter, the use of no superfluous word, 
i.e. no term should be used which does not contribute to a direct presentation of the 
subject, and the composition of poetry in the sequence of the musical phrase, not in 
the sequence of the metronome: “The point of imagisme is that it does not use 
images as ornaments. The image itself is the speech. The image is the word beyond 
formulated language” (Pound 1915 280). After Imagism, Pound’s involvement with 
Vorticism in London (1908-1920), and his commitment to he attitudes and activities 
of London’s avant-garde artists, signed a reinforcement of his critique and his poetic 
ambitions. A much more violent mode of expression began to appear in his work, 
paralleling his more and more critical attitude towards contemporary culture. “To the 
present condition of things […] we have nothing to say but ‘merde’”, Pound wrote in 
the Egoist in February 1914 (Pound 1914a 68), while a few months later he would 
declare: “We will sweep out the past century as surely as Attila swept across Europe” 
(Pound 1914b 234). The artist is now seen as a “savage” who “must live by craft and 
violence” (Pound 1914a 68). This violence is evident in such poems as “Salutation 
the Third”, which exhorts, “Let us deride the smugness of ‘The Times’”, and overtly 
attacks the conservative literary critic as a “slut-bellied obstructionist”, “sworn foe to 
free speech and good letters”, “fungus”, and “gangre e” (Pound 1914c 45). Pound’s 
turn to Vorticism was strictly linked to his interest in the avant-garde art of painters 
and sculptors in London. In the English capital, Pound joined in the discussions on 
Cubism, Futurism, and Expressionism. Particularly interested in the works of 
Wyndham Lewis and Henri Gaudier-Brzeska, he found in their art an innovative 
strength which functioned as an example for him to develop his new and 
                                                
20 For a full, published articulation of this position see Ezra Pound, Make it New, London: Faber, 
1934. 
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revolutionary ideas in poetry. These artists had reject d the romantic-realist style in 
favour of geometrical and abstract forms. Gaudier-Brzeska’s sculptures presented an 
extreme geometrization of shapes, whilst Lewis created sharp designs based 
primarily on the relationship between lights and shadows. By focusing on the 
abstract relations of lines, colours, planes, and masses, both artists discarded the 
traditional realist representation of subject matter and the notion of fixed meaning it 
entailed.  
The journal Blast was launched in 1914, together with the idea of the Vortex. 
As Pound explained, the image used by the Vorticist artists “is not an idea. It is a 
radiant node or cluster; it is what I can, and must perforce, call a VORTEX, from 
which, and through which, and into which, ideas are constantly rushing. In decency 
one can only call it a VORTEX” (Pound 1916 106). The image was thus conceived 
as a sort of cluster, whirlpool, or Vortex of concentrated energy, which contained in 
itself diverse ideas and concepts: “An Image is that which presents an intellectual 
and emotional complex in an instant of time” (Pound 1914d 154). The aim of the 
Vortex was to produce a continuously self-renewing expression, to reject mildness 
and softness, and to create images of geometrical precision, sharpness, and rigidity. 
The “primary pigment” of the Vorticist artists is the “picture that means a hundred 
poems […] the most highly energized statement”, whilst the Vortex is precisely “the 
point of maximum energy” (Pound 1914d 153). To reinforce the vigorous statements 
made in Blast, is the use of typography and layout. The emphasis on the visual is 
evident in the typography of the Vorticist manifesto, in its large patterns of writing 
peculiarly arranged on the pages to create intense a d dynamic designs (Cf. Lewis 
11-43). 
In his memoir of Gaudier-Brzeska, Pound tried to put into words what 
Vorticism had given him, and explained that the movement had made him more 
conscious of the appearance of things, that it had “awakened [his] sense of form”, 
that it had given him “a new sense of form” (Pound 1916 155). The visual art of 
Vorticism had made him see form in a different way, giving him the possibility of a 
new perception of form in literature, a perception based on the interaction of lines, 
colours, and patterns. Already present in the Imagist movement, the spatial concept 
of poetry was thus brought to extreme consequences by Vorticism. Pound envisaged 
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the possibility of composing intensive and dynamic poetry as “an arrangement of 
masses in relation” (Pound 1916 130), a kind of poetry where forms become “planes 
in relations” to each other (Pound 1916 153).  
Drawing on the Vorticist sculptures and paintings, Pound developed a 
visual/spatial sense of form which became a basic characteristic of his poetics. This 
propulsion towards the visual was particularly evidnt in his interest in Chinese 
characters. His work on Fenollosa’s manuscripts represented indeed a further input 
towards the understanding of literature as visual display. In 1920, he edited 
Fenollosa’s The Chinese Written Character as a Medium for Poetry. In this essay, 
Fenollosa clearly saw that, contrarily to our phonetic language, which presents “no 
natural connection between thing and sign” because the relationship between 
signifier and signified “depends upon sheer convention”, the Chinese linguistic 
method “follows natural suggestion”. Chinese ideograms are “thought-picture[s]”, 
much more vivid and concrete than phonetic language (Fenollosa 8). Ideograms 
speak “at once with the vividness of painting, and with the mobility of sounds” 
(Fenollosa 9), giving life to a form of poetry whic is “alive and plastic, because 
thing and action are not formally separated” (Fenollosa 17). The “pictorial visibility” 
of Chinese characters can therefore produce poetry “with far more vigor and 
vividness than any phonetic tongue” (Fenollosa 24). Moreover, each ideogram 
possesses a changeable valence which depends on its context (on the adjacent 
characters), and therefore carries in itself numerous interpretive possibilities. The 
poet who employs Chinese ideograms, carefully works with juxtaposition, selecting 
“those words whose overtones blend into a delicate and lucid harmony” (Fenollosa 
32). 
From his appreciation of both Fenollosa’s insights and the Vorticist visual art, 
Pound derived his idea of a poetry made up of “physical” objects on the page, a 
poetry which would be both economical and deeply charged with metaphorical 
meaning. The Cantos exemplify Pound’s “new awakening to form” (Pound 1916 
156). In the poem, Chinese characters convey visually – therefore in a much more 
straightforward way than phonetic languages – their meaning. But the visual display 
of the Cantos is not limited to Chinese ideograms. The poem alsoincludes a variety 
of elements of rhythm, planes, and colours which interact with each other, becoming 
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precisely “planes in relation”. The juxtaposition of manifold, coordinated elements 
reveals Pound’s new sense of form: his mosaic technique mingles quotations, 
allusions, physical “objects” on the page and different languages, in order to let 
metaphorical relations of meaning emerge. All the elem nts of the Cantos become 
“planes in relation” to each other and concur to structure the poem. The same 
elements often come back in a different context andestablish new relations of 
meaning, so that the structure of the Cantos is not only based on juxtaposition, but 
also on recurrence, on repetition. The necessity of intensity and efficiency in the use 
of language, which Imagism already advocated, is streng hened by the Vorticist 
adaptation of the techniques of visual art in litera u e. Pound did seek a language that 
learned from visual art, in a sense a language that did not want to be a language, 
literature that did not want to be literature but sculpture, attaining a more immediate 
and multi-meaningful level of expression, and therefore renewing the static and 
abstract use of language which contemporary society suffered from. The “Sculptural 
feeling” which Gaudier-Brzeska had defined as “the appreciation of masses in 
relation”, and the “Sculptural ability” which he had identified as “the defining of 
these masses by planes” (Gaudier-Brzeska 155), are both present in the Cantos. 
Learning from the concreteness of sculpture or painting becomes for Pound the 
only way to renew language and literature. Apart from the visual display of the poem 
and from the different languages which block the reader and stress the form of the 
signifier, in the Cantos, conventional syntax disappears and leaves the place to 
parataxis: staccato sentences with no coordinating or subordinating conjunctions. 
The structuring method Pound adopts in his polyphonic poem is the same he 
advocates for the analysis of literature. On different occasions, in fact, he expressed 
his belief that literature should be approached with hat he defines an “ideogramic” 
method,21 a critical method based not on the general and abstract consideration of an 
author’s standing and ideas, but rather on the dir ct analysis of the textual 
characteristics and the “juxtaposition of specimens of writing” (Pound 1934a 632) 
which would implement the appreciation of the specificity of a literary work. This 
method alone, for Pound, could enhance the understanding of each specific text, as 
opposed to the contemporary widespread abstraction and cultural laziness. 
                                                
21 Sometimes also spelt as “ideogrammic method” (Cf. for instance Pound 1934b 7). 
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It appears clear how at the basis of Pound’s poetics lies a deep sense of 
language’s exhaustion, abuse and misuse in contemporary culture, together with a 
strong will to renew the way the individual uses and approaches the linguistic 
system.  
Pound’s influence on Brooke-Rose is present in her att mpt to free her writing 
from the static, monolithic approach to language. It is present in her attempt to derive 
from different languages what can enrich her texts with metaphorical value. The 
different languages Brooke-Rose employs in her novels also show that “it can’t be all 
in one language”, while functioning in the same way as Pound’s ideograms, for they 
“block” the reader and make him/her think. Pound’s influence on Brooke-Rose is 
present in the stress on the signifier, in the visual display of Brooke-Rose’s novels, 
which include Chinese ideograms as well as a vast range of typographical material. It 
is present in the importance assumed by the form of Br oke-Rose’s novels as 
indissociable from their content. It is present in he fact that Brooke-Rose’s writing 
attains both the status of poetry and that of object on the page. Pound’s influence on 
Brooke-Rose is present in the technique of juxtaposition, which constantly generates 
new associations of meaning and interpretive possibilities. It is present in the 
repetition of words and sentences coming back in different contexts and acquiring 
different connotations of meaning. It is present, i other words, in the highly 
metaphorical value of the language she uses, in the “tension” between the surface 
(literary) and the deep (metaphoric) structures. This tension is generated not only by 
the terms employed and their juxtaposition, but also by the syntax, which is “twisted” 
in order to provoke different possible interpretations. It is present in the peculiar play 
with negative and positive statements we find in Between, as well as in the play with 
dubitative adverbs and the peculiar use of conjunctio s observed in Thru, from which 
ambiguity of meaning arises. Pound’s influence on Brooke-Rose is present in the 
vast play of intertextuality, which induces the read r to realise that “literature is a 
whole” (Pound 1933 318) and should be approached as such. 
Apart from the technical level (juxtaposition, repetition, use of graphical 
display, different languages), Pound’s influence on Brooke-Rose is above all present 
in her intention to make her readers see things in a new way, to induce them to slow 
down and think, to make them pay close attention to what actually happens on the 
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page. Brooke-Rose’s novels force readers to abandon their habit of reading passively, 
a habit which clearly derives from the realist tradition. This attitude can be better 
explained by Pound’s own words in the “Finale Enfatico” of one of  his polemical 
pamphlets,  
I should like to invent some kind of typographical dodge which would force every reader to stop and 
reflect for five minutes (or five hours), to go back to the facts mentioned and think over their 
significance for himself. And I should like him to sum the facts up for himself, and to draw his own 
conclusions.  (Pound 1951 17) 
 
Brooke-Rose shares with Pound his sense of language’s exhaustion. The 
cultural situation she observes around her is one of “over-exploitation” of language, 
which derives from the extenuating critical debate ov r language and reality (Thru), 
from the misuse of language as perpetrated by the media (Amalgamemnon, 
Xorandor, Verbivore), from the abuse of language by the institutions of power (Out, 
Between, Next), from the use of language as a tool of masculine domination 
(Between, Remake, Amalgamemnon), as well as from the fundamental lack of 
communication paradoxically engendered by the fast expanding global 
communicative system (Between). In a society where the faith in language as a form 
capable of producing understanding and communication is crumbling, in a world 
nevertheless dominated by computer languages and the discourses of the media, 
where words and contacts amongst people apparently proliferate, but in fact result in 
basic lack of communication, Brooke-Rose recognises the danger of losing the 
reliance on such an abused and overworked means. As the author herself explains, in 
fact, at the basis of her work is the idea of “the fundamental disbelief in words, 
which we all suffer from with propaganda, publicity and so on” (Hayman & Cohen 
9). 
In this perspective, she employs the basic tenets of Pound’s poetics in order to 
“make it new”. The importance of choosing every single word with attention is 
evident in Brooke-Rose. She constantly tries to avoid the expected use of language, 
the cliché, putting herself in line with Pound’s aim to create a new language for 
people to think in. Brooke-Rose’s writing stimulates the reader not to take 
signification for granted, but rather to think over and pay more attention to what 
happens on the page. Her writing aims precisely at sh king the reader’s passive habit 
of giving for granted their understanding of languae. It aims at inducing the reader 
to conceive and approach language in a different, active way. Like Pound’s poetry, 
 314 
Brooke-Rose’s novels aim at renewing language at each and every word. Her use of 
language possesses the same intensity which Pound claimed for the Vortex and for 
his poetry when he explained that “One desires the most intense, for certain forms of 
expression are ‘more intense’ than others. They are more dynamic” (Pound 1916 
104). 
Differently from Pound, however, Brooke-Rose approaches the problem of 
language’s exploitation and misuse in a constantly humorous way. Brooke-Rose 
recognises the problem inherent in the contemporary, “monolithic” use of language, 
one dominated by clichés, automatic associations of w rds, and ready-made 
significations. Yet, instead of adopting Pound’s “violent” and aggressively critical 
approach towards the present state of things, she expos s the problem in her texts 
with a pervasive tongue-in-cheek attitude, and approaches the linguistic system with 
an all-encompassing ethic of playfulness. The persistent linguistic humour of her 
novels becomes a way to face the question Pound posed, and to renew language by 
means of a playful exploitations of the possibilities that language offers to recreate 
itself anew at each and every word.  
Brooke-Rose’s peculiar humour partly derives from the other major influence 
evident in her work, that of Samuel Beckett. However, even in this case, Brooke-
Rose succeeds, in my view, to overcome the deep linguistic scepticism Beckett 
expressed in his writing. For this reason, as we will see, she can be said to adopt a 
Joycean approach to language, even though Joyce does not appear to have a direct 
influence on her work.  
Beckett’s influence on Brooke-Rose is evident in her flowing syntax, in the 
sheer flow of her novels which strongly recalls Beckett’s monologues. Although 
Beckett’s narrators face the void of language and exist nce, they continue to narrate 
in order to keep the void of existence from advancing, often challenging it with their 
peculiar black humour. The language of Beckett’s characters stands for their 
impossibility of getting at reality, for their impossibility of moving beyond the 
linguistic means. The inability to express is equated to the inability to know, as the 
Unnamable remarks, “I shall have to speak of things of which I cannot speak” 
(Beckett 1979 267). Such an impossibility, however, does not keep the speaker from 
continuing to talk: “I am obliged to speak. I shall never be silent. Never” (Beckett 
 315 
1979 267). Beckett’s narrators keep on talking because talking appears to be the 
necessary condition for living,  
This voice that speaks, knowing that it lies, indifferent to what it says, too old perhaps and too abased 
ever to succeed in saying the words that would be its last, knowing itself useless and its uselessness i  
vain, not listening to itself but to the silence that it breaks. (Beckett 1979 281) 
 
Going on speaking means going on living, as the narrator of How It Is 
elucidates: “my life a voice […] on all sides words scraps” (Beckett 1964 146). Stop 
talking would therefore equal dying, as the same narrator will recognise: “to have 
done then at last with all that last scraps very last […] and this voice to have done 
with this voice namely this life” (Beckett 1964 157). Beckett’s heroes try to find 
words to express their situation, but words cannot fulfil their aim. Any attempt to 
articulate reality is vain. For Beckett, the only thing we can achieve is a denial of the 
human self-deception about language, a confession that language is of no help, and a 
critique of language and its history. Indeed, what Beckett frames with his language is 
precisely this human self-deception. His characters r cognise that language is the 
main obstacle to knowing. They keep trying to find words able to express what they 
want and need to express, but they irremediably fail. They cannot overcome the 
limitations of language: “All my life long I have dreamt of the moment when, edified 
at last, in so far as one can be before all is lost, I might draw the line and make the 
tot” (Beckett 1979 167). The ego can never be known as it has no way of articulating 
itself. Characters incessantly speak, but their selve  cannot be given voice, words 
cannot describe their condition. No matter how carefully chosen words are, truth is 
impossible to articulate. As Malone comments, “I know those little phrases that seem 
so innocuous and, once you let them in, pollute the w ole of speech. Nothing is more 
real than nothing. They rise up out of the pit and know no rest until they drag you 
down into its dark” (Beckett 1979 177). The very misunderstanding that the use of 
language generates is expressed by Malone who, referring to the Saposcats, declares, 
“They had no conversation properly speaking. They made use of the spoken word in 
much the same way as the guard of a train makes use of his flags, or of his lantern” 
(Beckett 1979 173). 
In Beckett, silence is seen as the final answer to the failure of language. 
Silence over the human condition equates with the despair over the inability to 
articulate this condition: “My speech-parched voice at rest would fill with spittle, I’d 
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let it flow over and over, happy at last, dribbling with life, my pensum ended, in the 
silence” (Beckett 1979 284). Silence, however, is impossible to obtain as long as 
man lives and is caught up in language: “I know no more questions and they keep on 
pouring out of my mouth. I think I know what it is, it’s to prevent the discourse from 
coming to an end, this futile discourse which is not credited to me and brings me not 
a syllable nearer silence” (Beckett 1979 282). What, in my view, we find in Beckett, 
is a closed circularity: the recognition of the limits of language on the one hand, and 
a tenacious desire to go on speaking, knowing it is in vain, on the other. In this way, 
Beckett’s characters succeed in conveying (a paradox in a sense) their situation of 
entrapment, their condition of impasse.  
The same “urge to narrate” of Beckett’s narrators is to be found in Brooke-
Rose’s novels, and particularly in Thru, where each narrator is revealed to be only a 
“paper eye”, a fictive illusion sustained in order to keep inventing stories, in the same 
way as Molloy, Malone, and the Unnamable will be revealed to be just successive 
paper inventions, puppets created only to continue arrating, empty figures which 
eventually will point up to their creator, Beckett himself. In Thru, characters are 
shown to be mere verbal constructs; each of them is simply “a well established 
structure that presupposes a void a fall into a delirious discourse” (T 695). In the 
same way, in Amalgamemnon, Mira continuously invents paper identities and stories 
by means of language. She will also invent, as already seen, the characters of 
Xorandor and Verbivore, but only in order for her own fictive status to be finally 
revealed in Textermination, when she reads her name on the list of forgotten 
characters and must therefore abandon the convention. 
The “fall into language” is an omnipresent possibility n Brooke-Rose’s novels. 
It is present in Thru with its delirious discourse which risks precipitating in the void; 
it is present in Between with its free-ranging syntax and lack of punctuation; it is also 
present in Remake and Amalgamemnon, the latter directly recalling in its opening the 
first line of Malone Dies (Cf. A 5). Brooke-Rose’s narrators, like Beckett’s, keep on 
telling story after story as the only means to go on living, as one of the teachers 
overtly declares in Thru: “I know, it’s a flop. As this one, and the next, redundant but 
necessary for qualcosa to continue. Narration is life and I am Scheherezade” (T 711). 
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As for Scheherezade, narrating becomes a way of escaping death: the only thing 
which matters is to keep inventing stories. 
However, although Brooke-Rose’s characters seem to embody the same urge to 
narrate of Beckett’s ones, they do so with a different, more constructive and 
affirmative perspective. For Beckett, narrating becomes a way to keep on living, but 
with the clear conscience that language can not convey the meaning they nonetheless 
“feel”. For Brooke-Rose, narrating becomes a way to keep the reader’s pleasure and 
curiosity alive, and it is in this sense that, in my view, the sentence “Narration is life 
and I am Scheherezade” (T 711) should be interpreted: what is at stake here is the 
life (or death) of literary creativity. Continuing narrating is a way to sustain this 
creativity, not a way to evade the advancing void of existence. In Beckett, despair 
seems to take over, to outrun humour. The trilogy finally conveys the sense of 
solitude of its narrators trapped within their own skull or within the closed spaces of 
their rooms. It conveys the sense of the solitude of the modern mind, as its narrators 
cannot escape their “prisons”, for they cannot know and communicate their selves. In 
Brooke-Rose’s novels, differently from Beckett’s, there is no sense of “entrapment”, 
of being trapped in language’s impossibility of expression. Although there is a strong 
sense of the void of language, this never takes over, never diminishes the creative 
possibilities of the linguistic means. On the contrary, the discourse becomes the more 
delirious and playful precisely because it plays on the verge of the void. Brooke-
Rose develops Beckett’s “obstinate humor in the face of despair” (Hayman and 
Cohen 14) for her own ends: through humour, her langu ge assumes a more positive 
and enabling valence. In her novels, humour predominates and offers a way of facing 
the void of existence. Language, creativity, and linguistic humour retain a strong 
oppositional power against the lack of foundations of existence. In Brooke-Rose, 
humour possesses the ability to save the subject from a monolithic approach to 
signification. Brooke-Rose’s characters offer an example of creative use of language, 
a use which enables them to escape the power logic of signification and the concept 
of fixed meaning that such a logic entails. Brooke-Rose offers an example of creative 
exploitation of language by means of which the subject is able to express its own 
individuality. The reader of Thru is continuously reminded of the void which 
language entails, the void that any linguistic structure presupposes: “every structure 
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presupposes a void, into which it is possible to fall” (T 705). The fall into language, 
however, is in Brooke-Rose a fall “into delirious discourse” (T 705). In Thru, the 
reader is shown how the void of language can be played upon, how it does not 
necessarily lead to despair about the impossibility of discovering fixed meaning. 
With the play of  language, the subject reaffirms itself: no longer passive receptacle 
of a meaning which comes from outside the individual, the human being has the 
chance of using and enjoying language, the chance of reating a delirious discourse 
which will again posit the subject as the dynamic creator of a linguistic act. The fact 
that language does not express fixed meaning acquires a positive valence: instead of 
despairing, we can play with the undecidability of meaning and enjoy the plurality of 
existence. 
In particular, far from implying that communication is not attainable, Brooke-
Rose surpasses Beckett in that she reaffirms the referential value of language. Even 
in the face of the difficulty of representation (the world is unknowable, meaning 
continually slips away, there is no transcendental signifier, everything depends on 
interpretation), representation is not deemed impossible by Brooke-Rose. On the 
contrary, it is thoroughly reaffirmed. This reaffirmation of language’s representative 
function is countertendential to the critical panorama of poststructuralist theories 
which emerged in France at the end of the sixties, as I will extensively consider 
below. For the moment, it will suffice to say that, if Beckett denies ontological 
certainties and posits despair as the outcome of the loss of ontological stability in the 
contemporary world, Brooke-Rose denies any ontological stability, but not the ability 
of language of representing this instability. In fact, if on the one hand her characters 
acknowledge that “reality […] merely seeks to appear true […] the signifier of 
signifiers beneath which the truth escapes” (T 727), on the other hand they also 
recognise that “Language is all we have to apprehend r ality, if we must use that 
term” (T 642), as already lengthily explained in the course of our analysis. 
This basic difference between the two authors probably derives from the 
impact which the War and the existentialist philosophy had on Beckett. He lived in 
France throughout the debilitating period of the Second World War, experiencing in 
first person the traumatic German invasion of Paris. Referring to this experience, and 
to the reality of the concentration camps which later came to light, Adorno says that 
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“Beckett has given us the only fitting reaction to the situation of the concentration 
camps” (Adorno 1973 380), for although he never mentions it, the reality of the War 
is ever present in his works. In Adorno’s view, Beck tt never mentions this reality 
because words cannot but be silent in front of such a horror. For Adorno, by totally 
negating the world as it is, Beckett negates its fal e and diminished positives. 
Consequently, Beckett’s despair is in a sense not really despair, but an effort to 
confront the world which produced that despair. As Adorno explains, in Beckett  
nihilism implies the contrary of identification with nothingness. To Beckett, as to the Gnostics, the 
created world is radically evil, and its negation is the chance of another world that is not yet. As long 
as the world is as it is, all pictures of reconciliat on, peace and quiet resemble the picture of death. 
(Adorno 1973 381)  
 
Adorno’s view of nihilism as a “positive” approach is in my view disputable. I 
will, however, consider the concept of nihilism later on in this chapter. For the time 
being, what is important to make clear is that Beckett can, in my view, be interpreted 
as an example of increasing despair, most probably deriving from his experience of 
the War and the influence existentialist philosophy had on him. In Paris, in fact, he 
was in strict contact with the philosophy of Sartre and Camus. Existentialism 
conceived man as ultimately alone, a solitary island in a world from which God has 
vanished. In a world devoid of any external significance, the single individual 
acquires absolute freedom to act. This freedom undobtedly represents a chance for 
the subject to act independently and to self-determine itself through its free choices. 
However, at the same time, such an immense freedom, together with the loss of any 
foothold, of any source of value which comes from outside the individual, can easily 
throw man in a state of deep-seated fear of void, of radical anguish. The course 
which Beckett seems to take from the premises of existentialism is one of despair 
and pessimism, whilst  Brooke-Rose opts for a more p sitive approach to the lack of 
foundations of “reality”. This point would, again, require us to enter into the specific 
context of the postmodern debate which evolved around the lack of foundations of 
our world and which we will consider in depth below. 
Beckett’s career moves from a Joycean play with langu ge, and across 
languages, in his earlier fiction, to a much more resigned or tired, and very pared 
down and sparse later drama. In fact, at the very bginning of his career, in his essay 
in defence of Joyce’s Work in Progress, Beckett praises Joyce for his use of 
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language: “This writing that you find so obscure is a quintessential extraction of 
language” (Beckett 1972 15). In Joyce, he explains, words “are alive. They elbow 
their way on to the page, and glow and blaze and fade and disappear ” (Beckett 1972 
16). Already in his critical work on Proust, however, Beckett is concerned with the 
problem of language’s ability to convey “reality”. Despite Proust’s own 
accomplishments, and although the latter has given form, through his writing, to the 
dilemma of life, Beckett sees that words cannot define, pin down, this dilemma: 
“Reality […] remains a surface, hermetic”, “We cannot know and we cannot be 
known” (Beckett [1931] 1957 56, 49). Already at this stage in his career, Beckett 
envisages the failure of language to articulate the human experience: “There is no 
communication because there are no vehicles of communication” (Beckett [1931] 
1957 47). The problematic relationship between subject and object of representation 
is clearly addressed:  
Imagination, applied – a priori – to what is absent, is exercised in vacuo and cannot tolerate the limits 
of the real. Nor is any direct and purely experimental contact possible between subject and object, 
because they are automatically separated by the subject’s consciousness of perception. (Beckett 
[1931] 1957 56) 
 
In 1937, in a letter to Alex Kaun, Beckett clearly expressed his view of 
language as an operation of ceaseless unveiling that reveals only further veils, as 
reality remains beyond the reach of the subject and yet the subject cannot abandon 
the urge to capture it. Representation is impossible, as it fails either to retrieve the 
object or to abandon it  (Cf. Beckett 1983 171-72). On many other occasions, Beckett 
lamented that the essence of the object cannot be repr sented, it is absconded from 
representation: “Car que reste-t-il de représentable si l’essence de l’objet est de se 
dérober à la représentation?” (Beckett 1983 136). Facing the impossibility of 
representation, Beckett’s narrators talk in order to distract themselves from their 
loneliness and weakness. Articulating words and narrating becomes a way to try to 
turn a blind eye to the void which constitutes reality, to the “black void” (Beckett 
1979 278) of language. The void, however, remains ineluctably there: endowing 
reality with meaning and sense by means of words is a chimera; communication 
cannot take place by means of language.   
As already explained above, the possibility of falling into the void of language 
is ever present in  Brooke-Rose’s works, but rather an mere despair and exhaustion 
of possibilities, her works convey a sense of new possibilities, a sense of freedom 
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obtained by twisting language beyond its limits. Her characters face the void of 
language, but find a way of overcoming through the continuous and 
“delicious/delirious” play of the signifier. Like Beckett, Brooke-Rose undermines the 
ideas of logical coherence in narration, formal plot, regular time sequence, and 
psychologically explained characters, but she concurrently surpasses Beckett’s sense 
of despair and endows her characters with the possibility of representing their own 
lack of fixed identity, with the chance to play with i  and attain a new degree of self-
expression. Brooke-Rose, therefore, appears not to share Beckett’s lack of faith in 
communication. This is also corroborated by the author as she explains, “man is a 
social animal and we do have to communicate. We can’t just stay within our shells. I 
don’t want to get on to this thing of noncommunication” (Hayman and Cohen 18). 
Obviously, Beckett cannot be seen as an example of mere bleak despair. There 
is not only despair in his works, but also a peculiar black humour and most striking 
and beautiful descriptions, which in a sense contradict his tenet of non-
communication. For his narrators, however, humour becomes a way of escaping the 
void, but only temporarily: they unavoidably face, again and again, the hopelessness 
of overcoming this void and the unfeasibility of rep sentation. Differently, for 
Brooke-Rose, humour does not represent an escape from the lack which lies at the 
heart of reality, but rather a way to positively face it, as already extensively 
demonstrated in the sixth chapter. By playing with the linguistic system, by 
producing a delirious discourse which offers endless interpretive possibilities, 
Brooke-Rose’s characters face the void of reality and reinstate the representational 
ability of language, even in the face of its referents’ ontological uncertainty and 
instability. Language, for Brooke-Rose, can still touch on the essence of things, a  
Larissa argues in Thru (Cf. T 640), even though the essence of things lies in the 
infinite referral and deferral of signifiers which constitute language. The eternal 
game of language is conceived, in Brooke-Rose’s writing, as a way to cope with the 
lack at the hearth of the reality, as Thru puts forward: “It is the pain […] and pain 
[…] has to be lived through, and you could cover pages and maybe you do, 
rehandling the signifiers into acceptability and even amusement so that at last it 
vanishes like delight” (T 690). Brooke-Rose makes the best of the humour she 
appreciates in Beckett: through humour, she utterly overturns the despair in the face 
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of the void of existence. In Brooke-Rose, Beckett’s influence is evident in the 
persistent possibility to fall in the void which language presupposes, a void in which 
her characters risk to fall because of their continuous linguistic flights. Brooke-Rose, 
however, surpasses Beckett’s pessimism and reaffirms, in line with Joyce, the 
possibilities of language. By celebrating the richness and creative possibilities of 
language, she counters Beckett’s pessimistic attitude, his focus on the impossibilities 
of language, on its failure and poverty. 
In this light, Brooke-Rose’s writing could be put in direct line with Joyce. 
What crucially links Brooke-Rose to Joyce is certainly the extensive use of linguistic 
puns, of different languages, the “musical flow that fl tters the ear” (Jolas 89), and 
above all the positive approach towards the linguistic means and its possibilities. 
Like Joyce, Brooke-Rose “has recognized the autonomy f language”, i.e. that “The 
epoch when the writer photographed the life about him with the mechanics of words 
redolent of the daguerreotype” has come to a close (Jolas 79). She has recognised 
that the old, realist use of language is no longer apt to express the new reality. But far 
from precipitating into despair, she subverts the orthodox use of words and shows 
how much is contained into a single word. She shows, like Joyce, that language is 
not a static system of signification: language is alive and can be twisted in order for 
the subject to express its creativity. In Brooke-Rose, as Jolas recognised of Joyce, 
“language is being born anew before our eyes” (Jolas 89). Her language is “a 
language of a certain bewilderment, to be sure, but of a new richness and power for 
those who are willing to enter into the spirit of it” (Jolas 90). 
Whilst in Beckett we find a strong critique, or better a refusal of the traditional 
subject/object relation, as the subject cannot achieve knowledge of the object (and of 
itself as object represented) by means of language, in Brooke-Rose, the relationship 
between subject and object is addressed and subverted in o a critique of their 
dichotomy. Subject and object are revealed to be one and the same thing. In Thru, the 
dichotomies master/slave, subject/object, narrator/nar ated, are playfully subverted in 
line with Derrida’s deconstructionist theory. The same happens in Amalgamemnon, 
where the distinction between creator and created, subject and object of 
representation, is increasingly blurred.  
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In actual fact, the blurring of the subject/object relationship which Brooke-
Rose fully enacts is already envisaged by Beckett. In fact, although the language he 
conceives remains a veil between the object and the subject of representation, a veil 
which must be torn asunder in order to get at the things (or the nothing) which lies 
behind, Beckett also seems to look at other artistic forms in order to find new literary 
pathways. In the already cited letter to  letter to Alex Kaun, in fact, Beckett envisages 
a form of literature which would posit no distinction between form and matter, one 
which would learn from other arts and blur the subject/object relationship,  
more and more my own language appears to me like a veil that must be torn apart in order to get at the 
things (or the Nothingness) behind it.  […] Let us hope the time will come […] when language is most 
efficiently used where it is being most efficiently misused. As we cannot eliminate language all at 
once, we should at least leave nothing undone that might contribute to its falling into disrepute. To 
bore one hole after another in it, until what lurks behind it – be it something or nothing – begins to 
seep through; I cannot imagine a higher goal for a w iter today. Or is literature alone to remain behind 
in the old lazy ways that have been so long ago abandoned by music and painting? Is there something 
paralysingly holy in the vicious nature of the word that is not found in the elements of the other arts? 
Is there any reason why that terrible materiality of the word surface should not be capable of being 
dissolved, like for example the sound surface, torn by enormous pauses, of Beethoven’s seventh 
Symphony, so that through whole pages we can perceiv  nothing but a path of sounds suspended in 
giddy heights, linking unfathomable  abysses of silence? (Beckett 1983 171-72) 
 
Beckett looks at music and painting in order to approach the problematic 
relation between the means of representation and the object to be represented. He is 
clearly arguing that literature should catch up with visual arts. He is calling for a 
form of literature which would employ language in a similar way as the other arts. 
Since we cannot obliterate language completely, a new way to use it would be that of 
concentrating self-reflexively on the limits and processes of representation, thus 
blurring the distinction between subject and object of representation, and therefore 
between form and content. As Lloyd hypothesises, “the counter-analogy with music 
and painting suggests that he may already be grasping for a notion of an art in which 
there is no distinction between form and matter” (Lloyd 469). For Beckett, this 
would be the highest goal for the modern writer. In this light, the “visual literature” 
of Brooke-Rose, which is obviously a way of blurring the distinction between form 
and content, can be considered as achieving that rejuvenation of language and 
literature which Beckett already envisaged.  
What Brooke-Rose seems to unite in her writing is thus Beckett’s sheer flow, 
the flowing syntax, the peculiar musicality of his monologues, together with the 
blurring of form and content which Beckett envisages above and which is 
 324 
engendered by the visual display of Brooke-Rose’s novels. She also positively 
employs Beckett’s “humour in the face of despair”, for she subverts despair into a 
playful reaffirmation of the possibilities of language. To all this, must be added 
Brooke-Rose’s belief, in line with Pound, that a more precise expression, one which 
continuously self-renews itself (as in Pound’s Vortex), and constantly tries to avoid 
the cliché of bourgeois society, is the basic means to fight the abuse and misuse of 
the linguistic system which our culture suffers from. Pound’s careful choice of each 
and every word, together with Beckett’s humour, with a Joycean employment of pun 
and linguistic creativity, become the main traits of Brooke-Rose’s writing. 
Brooke-Rose, however, does even more. In fact, far from being merely 
humorous, her novels deconstruct – through humour – the dichotomies which lie at 
the basis of the monolithic and orthodox use of language she observes around. As 
already said, at the basis of her writing there is a clear feeling of language’s 
exhaustion. This feeling clearly appears in all of Brooke-Rose’s novels and is 
transmuted into an implicit critique of the misuse of language in contemporary 
society. Her novels, in fact, expose the logic which l es behind the way our society 
employs language. They critically target various uses of language: the language of a 
coercive society in Out, psychoanalysis in Such, the discourses of masculine power 
in Between and Amalgamemnon, literary critical theories in Thru, the language of the 
media in Amalgamemnon, the language of computer technology in Xorandor and 
Verbivore, the governmental use of language in Next. These novels demonstrate that 
reality is entirely constructed through language, and that the way we use language 
determines the way we look at reality and conceive it. They thus exemplify Brooke-
Rose’s belief that “certainly all around us language is just falling to pieces” (Hayman 
& Cohen 10). However, they carry out a double task: while demonstrating the 
powerful role that language has in shaping our reality nd therefore the way language 
strongly influences, or even determines our lives, Brooke-Rose’s novels also 
exemplify the way the subject can free itself from the power mechanism which lies at 
the basis of these linguistic systems. They show that if language is a system, its codes 
can be played on, rather than destroyed. They show t at, by playing with language, 
the subject can attain a new degree of freedom and creative self-expression.  
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In other words, if at the basis of her practice clearly lies the sense of language’s 
overexploitation and exhaustion, the author tries to find a solution to the threat 
represented by what can be called the “power-use and misuse” of language. She 
approaches language with an ethic of intelligent playfulness. Whilst showing how 
everything is a product of language and exposing the linguistic mechanisms of 
control which bear upon the subject, she also shows her readers the way they can free 
themselves from the monolithic logic of the dominant l guage.  
Having explained how, in my view, Brooke-Rose surpasses the linguistic 
scepticism inherent in Pound’s and Beckett’s writing, I will now draw on the 
postmodernist debate and situate Brooke-Rose in relation to it. In doing so, my aim 
will be less that of providing a comprehensive analysis of a wide-ranging and well-
known debate, than that of supplying a specific background from which the 
understanding of Brooke-Rose’s fiction and my claim of a countertendential 
standpoint in her writing would benefit. 
The term postmodernism and its implications have been at the centre of critical 
attention for the last forty years. Far from being a systematic theory or a unified 
socio-cultural movement, postmodernism, as Bauman puts it, “means many different 
things to many different people” (Bauman vii). It is a complex and multiform mode 
of thought which resists any reductive and simplistic explanation, and whose 
definition has been the focus of a particularly alive and prolific critical dispute.  
The postmodern debate first originated in the aesthetic field and was strictly 
linked to the emergence of literary experiment. Olson, Sontag, Robbe-Grillet and 
Barth were among the first to expound on this new form of literary exposure, as 
already observed in the first chapter. The debate also bred on the poststructuralist 
theories of such figures as Derrida, Barthes, Kristeva, Irigaray and others, whose 
ideas we have extensively considered in the course of this dissertation. Having 
originated within the aesthetic field, the term postmodernism, however, gradually 
acquired a much more comprehensive meaning as it got charged, all the way through 
the seventies and eighties, with implications coming from disparate fields of 
knowledge. The term came to identify, widely speaking, the socio-cultural condition 
which emerged in the Western countries during the second half of the twentieth 
century. One difficulty in defining the term nowadays, derives precisely from the fact 
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that the phenomenon has come to stretch across a number of different disciplines to 
which the literary output is intimately tied up, and which therefore it is impossible to 
separate from literature/literary criticism with a cut line. 
The most basic tenet of postmodernism is the claim made by Jean-François 
Lyotard in 1979. In his famous work The Postmodern Condition, he analyses the way 
the legitimization of knowledge has changed in our Western society. Lyotard puts 
forward the idea of “the decline of the unifying and legitimating power of the grand 
narratives” (Lyotard 1986 38) of the Enlightenment, such as reason, truth, god and 
history. The metanarratives on which the Western culture was once built have now 
collapsed, leaving a void where knowledge seems to find no longer any 
legitimization. What he defines as the postmodern co dition is thus the essentially 
different attitude to knowledge of twentieth century society. The fall of grand 
narratives has left us with little narratives, i.e. Wittgenstein’s “language games”, 
limited contexts in which there are clear, if not clearly defined, rules for 
understanding and behaviour. In actual fact, already in 1947, Adorno and 
Horkheimer, in their Dialectic of Enlightenment, criticise the Enlightenment values 
as responsible for the wreckage of the Western world. They see how the “happy 
match between the mind of man and the nature of things”, which the 
Enlightenment’s grand narratives of progress and justice once bred upon, have now 
collapsed. After the Second World War, and with the reality of the Holocaust coming 
to light, they observe how “the fully enlightened earth radiates disaster triumphant” 
(Adorno and Horkheimer 3). In the same year, in his work A Study of History, the 
historian Arnold Toynbee declares that the Western world is about to enter, after the 
second world war, its final phase, an era of irrationality and helplessness (Cf. 
Toynbee 1963). Although not postmodernists, Toynbee, Adorno and Horkheimer can 
be seen as part of the broad process which takes place across the twentieth century 
and which sees the assumptions of the Enlightenment collapsing upon themselves. 
They undermine the grand narratives of reason and truth post Second World War and 
post Holocaust in ways that have similarities to Lytard. 
Another major thinker of postmodernism, whose work is characterised by an 
ongoing critique of fixed notions of truth and universal categories, is Michel 
Foucault. He condemns in particular the idea of a phenomenological and universal 
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subject as the source of knowledge of the world. He opposes the idea that reason is 
synonymous with truth and that it represents a solution to social problems, noting 
how repressive social systems are generally highly rational. Opposing the equation of 
reason and truth, Foucault analyses the production of different forms of knowledge in 
terms of discursive practices, i.e. specific sets of rules which engender different types 
of knowledge. He sees the subject as the product of the relation between power and 
knowledge: the mechanisms of power produce different forms of knowledge which 
collate information on people and which have the eff ct of further reinforcing the 
exercise of power. The subject is controlled, or rather constituted, by the discourses 
of power. Power is thus exercised at the level of social relations and is omnipresent 
in the social body. For Foucault, the will to exercise power outdoes humanitarian 
egalitarianism: even the Enlightenment reliance upon universal principle and reason 
is always incipiently totalitarian. Foucault’s concept of subject, central to 
postmodernist thinking, challenges the individualist rationalism and its emphasis on 
personal autonomy. 
The postmodernist question also proliferates in the works of Jürgen Habermas, 
Louis Althusser, Jean Baudrillard, Gilles Deleuze and Felix Guattari, Fredric 
Jameson, and others. My aim, however, is not to furnish a comprehensive account of 
a wide-ranging debate, but rather to extrapolate from it those notions and issues 
which will serve my aim of positing Brooke-Rose’s writing as a positive 
countertendency within postmodernism as a mode of th ught. In particular, I will 
address (1) the issue of the proliferation of theories engendered by the postmodernist 
debate, and (2) the nihilistic attitude which its main tenets appear to carry within 
themselves.  
 From the end of the sixties, all the way through the eighties, cultural theory 
witnesses what Eagleton defines as its “golden age”(Eagleton 2003 1), an age which 
sees a proliferation of analyses of the contemporary status of culture in many 
different fields of knowledge. Butler describes the condition of the “the rise of 
theory” as one in which thinkers “in all sorts of fields develop[…] an excessively 
critical self-consciousness”, one which sees the “extraordinary dominance of the 
works of academics over that of artists” (Butler 6, 7). As Waugh explains, “At this 
point, the term becomes inflected with a kaleidoscope f meanings drawn from those 
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human sciences variously engaged in the production of a theoretical palimpsest 
where the specific aesthetic origins of the term are almost entirely obscured” (Waugh 
1992 5). 
The postmodernist debate has been more and more blamed for its endless 
proliferation of theoretical works which try to make sense of the phenomenon in a 
self-referential spiral. Steven Connor, for instance, riticises the extenuating debate 
which evolves around postmodernism and its issues. H  defines the debate as a 
“spiral of academic self-contemplation”, a “generative machine”, self-perpetrating in 
endless books, conferences, journals, and academic courses. As he points out, “It is 
possible to become very cynical about this, and to see the whole postmodernism 
craze as being kept going Scheherezade-like by long-wi ded academics concerned 
[…] to perpetuate themselves” (Connor 18, 16, 7). Randall Stevenson moves a 
similar charge to the postmodern debate, pointing out that “Given the range of 
disciplines now involved, sheer volume has inevitably added to vagueness” 
(Stevenson 2004 210), while Terry Eagleton describes postmodernism as “such a 
portmanteau phenomenon that anything you assert of one piece of it is almost bound 
to be untrue of another” (Eagleton 1996 viii).  
If Between, as already seen in the second and third chapters, anticipates certain 
critical issues which Barthes and Irigaray were still to analyse at the time the novel 
appeared, Thru significantly progresses in this line. The novel, in fact, not only 
presents and embodies some of the basic theoretical concerns of the time, but also 
and most importantly it seems to foresee the parabola which criticism was to make 
during the decades to come. Thru seems to point out both the exhausting nature of 
the postmodern debate and its internal contradictions/ mplicit dangers. These aspects 
of the debate, which Thru seems to already indicate, have been brought to light more 
and more as the debate evolved, up until recently, when there has been a turning 
away from the exhausting critical discourse (even if, necessarily, by means of critical 
discourse itself) and a return to aestheticism, which we will better examine below. 
Before going specifically into my argument, however, it needs be said that 
Brooke-Rose’s subsequent fictional works, from A algamemnon onwards, certainly 
share with Thru some of the critical qualities I advocate, yet it has not been my 
intention to expound extensively on such novels. As already explained, this choice 
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has been dictated by my wish to show the parabola that Brooke-Rose’s writing 
accomplishes in the years of her initial approach to experimentalism, years which 
correspond to the early period of the “rise of theory”. In other words, my dissertation 
aims at demonstrating how Between (Brooke-Rose’s first fully experimental novel) 
anticipates some of the theories which were to acquire relevance in the years to 
come, while Thru (which reaches the climax of Brooke-Rose’s experimentalism) 
points out the contradictory aspects of the contemporary theories. Such contradictory 
aspects were yet unnoticed at the time the novel was published, and took a long time 
to receive proper critical attention. By the eighties – when Amalgamemnon was 
published – critics and writers were much more aware of both critical theories and 
the internal contradictions the debate presented. For this reason, Brooke-Rose’s later 
novels, although certainly addressing critical theories, cannot be considered as 
forerunning criticism. I have therefore chosen to focus on what I call Brooke-Rose’s 
“critical fiction” or “fictional criticism” in the years when theory “rose” but was not 
yet aware of its own contradictions.   
Thru is distinctive in that it was written during the “golden age” of theory and 
is concerned with its possible outshoots. The novel runs counter to the critique which 
was to occupy the decades to come, foreseeing some of the core dangers and 
contradictions implicit in some aspects of the postmodernist debate. The text, in fact, 
presents a certain dialectic which splits down into two different but convergent 
directions. On the one hand, Thru seems to indicate the danger implicit in the 
proliferation of theories which, coming from disparate fields of knowledge, now bear 
upon the production of literature. It seems to show that the rise of theory, while being 
undoubtedly enriching for literature, can nevertheless have the effect of drawing the 
attention away from the specificity of literary practice. On the other hand, Thru 
seems to call the attention of its readers to the fact that denying any notion of truth 
which exists “out there in the world”, postmodernism runs the risk of becoming the 
herald of a banal and all-encompassing form of nihilism, one which denies any 
oppositional space outside of itself and transmutes into a form of absolutism, 
paradoxically reversing into what it tried to eschew in the first place. 
As regards the first point made above, the multiplication of theories and the 
pile-up of disparate fields of knowledge which “intrude” into the sphere of literature 
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is treated in Thru with ambiguity. A critical theorist herself, Brooke-Rose is very 
conscious of all the theories which come to bear on the production and interpretation 
of a literary text, and seems to be taking them seriously in Thru. In fact, as already 
seen, the novel puts into practice Derrida’s proliferation of meaning, Lacan’s 
dialectic of desire, and Kristeva’s poetic language and dialectic 
author/reader/character, ratifying these theorisations in its fictional tissue. On the 
other hand, however, Brooke-Rose never subscribes to those theories without 
reservation: challenging dogmatism, she critically nd humorously deals  with them. 
The “confusion” of theories Thru presents is subtended by a pungent humorous 
attitude. There is always a certain tongue-in-cheek approach towards all the theories 
which were proliferating at the time. Thru wittily targets the critical jargon on which 
they bred, a jargon often charged of obscurantism and which “imparted a tremendous 
air of difficulty and profundity” to the new “intellectual authorities” (Butler 8) who 
employed it. Brooke-Rose seems to hold a stance which is both humorous and 
critical towards those theories and their “authority”, showing how both their 
proliferation and some of the basic points they claimed bear in them dangers and 
potential contradictions. The ambiguity the novel presents in regard to the theories it 
targets seems to suggest that the present state of things can have dangerous outcomes 
for the practice of literature. Thru demonstrates that we have come to a point when 
creative writing is excessively dependent on the “rise of theory”, and this situation 
can have a bewildering effect on both writers and readers. The novel seems to 
suggest that an excessive self-awareness of theory can have the effect of blocking the 
reader’s and the writer’s inventiveness to the point f threatening the basic principles 
of creative writing and reading, namely imagination a d enjoyment. The endless 
class discussions between teachers and students throughout the novel make clear this 
point: the innumerable theories which bear upon the construction of the students’ 
written pieces have often the effect of blocking their imagination, rather than 
enhancing it. The teachers frequently refer to the bewildering effect critical theory 
can have on students (who represent both readers and writers). For instance, during 
one of the numerous class debates, Larissa declares: “I am astounded. I think it is 
quite aberrant, not to mention confusing […] to be plunged into Generative Grammar 
in one class and Black Protest or Women’s Lib in another” (T 635). Another instance 
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of critique of the exhausting theoretical debate of the time to be found in Thru is 
openly directed to the readers/critics of the text. The novel defines itself as “a busy 
competent performance before busy bees who palp oscult measure time listen see 
smell taste imitate suck the performer dry” (T 585). The busy bees clearly stand for 
the readers/critics who try to ascertain truth and meaning in the text. They are busy in 
trying to discover the functioning of the text, and in doing so, they “suck the 
performer dry”, i.e. they deprive the novel of its imaginative spirit. In fact, later on 
we are told that the “queen bhi” (the implied author), who executes a ballet for the 
bees (the readers/critics), is afraid of their “honeyvorous impulses that palp oscult 
measure and imitate the message sucking the performer dry” (T 674). The implied 
author, in other words, is afraid that the critical interpretation of her text will reduce 
it to an abstract construct, without leading to the appreciation of its imaginative and 
creative value. 
In line with poststructuralism, Thru plays with structuralism and undermines its 
claim of discovering fundamental structures which are ble to explain in toto the 
rules of a narrative. By juxtaposing texts to other texts, she shows how behind each 
text is another text and so on ad infinitum: no fixed structure can explain the 
functioning of the text. What the text reveals are other texts behind, and in the 
intertextual chain it is impossible to ascertain fixed meaning: everything is variable 
and depends on the reader’s capacity for interpretation. Yet, Brooke-Rose also shows 
how poststructuralist theories themselves are subject to the same deconstruction they 
advocate. They, too, depend on interpretation and must not be taken as the unique 
interpretive key to the text. Opposing the danger of taking too seriously the various 
theories which have come to bear on the interpretation of a literary text, all the 
theories the text addresses are treated humorously and are revealed, like its 
characters, to be only words on the page, mere linguistic constructs. As Kermode 
explains, in Thru, “deconstruction rejoices to demonstrate that an author has really 
done the opposite of what she meant to do, and narratological theory can itself be 
deconstructed, which, in a way, is what Thru achieves” (Kermode 2006 17). 
Therefore, while writing fiction, Brooke-Rose produces literary criticism. Barthes’ 
death of the author, for instance, is presented in the form of a fairy tale: “once upon a 
time the author had supreme authority” (T 605). Similarly, Barthes’ theory of the 
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multiplication of voices in an open text is treated humorously as Brooke-Rose 
transforms it into a pseudo commandment echoing the biblical order of God to Adam 
and Eve: “Go forth and multiply the voices” (T 637). The text frees itself from the 
grip of theoretical constructs by clearly proclaiming their linguistic nature: “ideas are 
always words, come out of a mouthful of air, jostling each other, bursting like atoms, 
or hoops if you prefer, set theory gone wild, and the text slowly forms itself” (T 607). 
By means of the endless class discussions among the characters which revolve 
around the text and its supposed structure, functioing and meaning, Thru shows that 
all critical theory depends on interpretation. In a literary text, there is always 
something which escapes set theories. The implied author, for example – dead 
according to Barthes – appears and disappears throug out the text, challenging the 
notion of its complete absence. The mysterious figure which continually hides away 
and reappears from behind unsettles the critical assumption of the death of the 
author. By means of this figure, Brooke-Rose clearly c iticises the extremist belief 
that behind the modern novel there exists no author and that the reader alone is the 
supreme interpreter of the text. 
The confusion of theories of Thru perfectly shows how the excessively 
theoretical attitude towards literature can have deleterious effects upon the 
enjoyment of narrative. Most of the text is apparently made up of discussion on 
creative writing, rather than pieces of writing themselves, so as to suggest that the 
contemporary situation is one where the talking has actually outdone the writing. 
Brooke-Rose plays with the proliferation of theories to show how the aesthetic 
debate can become dogmatic and go too far, losing sight of the text. She plays with 
the obscurantism of its jargon to show the confusion which can arise from it. 
Recurrent questions on the students’ part seem to put the accent on the confusion 
which arises from the many theories which they have to consider when writing or 
reading a text, and from the difficult jargon these th ories employ. Such a jargon, as 
already considered, is rehandled in Thru in a humorous manner. Brooke-Rose’s 
peculiar tongue-in-cheek approach towards the contemporary theories renders 
explicit the textual parodic critique. The way she mixes theories to let metaphorical 
meaning emerge transforms set theory into linguistic puns. All this relativizes the 
importance of theory and reaffirms the value of play for the practice of literature.  
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As Canepari-Labib says, “Brooke-Rose’s aesthetic attraction towards theory 
and her interest in beautiful systems which she can use and play against one another, 
is counterbalanced by her suspicion of theory and her refusal to subordinate her 
narrative to it” (Canepari-Labib 33). Critical theories give Brooke-Rose the 
possibility of creating something new out of them, but at the same time she 
approaches them with distance and caution. She questions their authority and their 
over-systematization, and explores their inconsistencies by means of her humorous 
stance. There is, in Thru, an attitude of demystification towards critical theory, by 
means of which the author also challenges the binarism serious/playful approach 
towards literature. Brooke-Rose seems thus to exorcise the risk of taking the 
contemporary theories too seriously, exposing their inherent risk of dogmatism and 
their limitations. What Thru seems to do as a part of its deconstructive approach, is to 
reverse the dichotomy literature/literary criticism, for the narrative produces the 
criticism of the theories it is made up of, and reaffirms at the same time the role and 
importance of literature, of the text itself. Thru thus foreruns basic issues which were 
to be at the centre of critical attention only years l ter, anticipating the critique which 
many thinkers have recently moved to postmodernism, namely the fact that it has 
become a “generative machine” which subsumes all experimentation in its own terms 
and which, generating discussions upon discussions, has become a grand narrative 
itself. In her essay “Whatever Happened to Narratology?”, Brooke-Rose explains 
that “critical and creative writing have become one and are indistinguishable […] It 
is as if phiction and filosophy had changed places” (Brooke-Rose 1990 285). Initially 
concentrated on the study of narratological phenomena, the debate has become “an 
endless discussion about how to speak of them” (Brooke-Rose 1990 291). As Waugh 
has observed, the aesthetic debate increasingly incorporated and became dependent 
upon philosophical, political and social theories, with the result that nowadays its 
theorists “rarely discuss actual works of art” (Waugh 1992 7). Thru seems to imply 
that so many theories come to bear upon the practice of creative fiction, and that 
creative fiction becomes so much self-aware, that te risk that literary criticism runs 
is that of rendering the appreciation of literature more difficult, rather enhancing it. 
Referring to the above-quoted essay by Brooke-Rose, Kermode explains that for the 
author, “narratology […] had its uses, but it also had the fatal flaw of defeating 
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pleasure; and pleasure, whatever the result, is always the intention” (Kermode 2006 
17).  
As regards the second point mentioned above, namely th  nihilistic aspect of 
the postmodern debate, Thru seems to already point towards the dispute which 
originated around this concept and its implications. The novel in fact seems to imply 
that, although truth is relative, by pushing relativism too far, critical theory can tip 
over into a negative form of anti-foundationalism which entails nihilism as a total 
and debilitating denial of truth. 
By the early eighties, Lyotard’s scepticism of metanarratives is so widely 
accepted and extended to the extreme, that the idea of the collapse of metanarratives 
becomes an almost universal tenet of postmodern thinking. A congeries of thinkers in 
different disciplines target the rationalist tradition of Western culture and its equation 
of knowledge to truth. The term postmodernism comes to acquire the pervasive 
meaning of end of an epoch. Specifically, it expresses a sense of the end of 
modernity, that modernity which begun with the Enlightenment and which heralded 
progressivist ideals. Deconstructionism and anti-foundationalism arise as a rejection 
of the notion of truth existing “out there in the world” and objectively knowable by 
the subject. In France, Derrida is the major exponent of deconstructionism, while 
Rorty inaugurates anti-foundationalism in America. The scepticism about loyalties to 
master narratives endorsed by Lyotard, largely supported by postmodernists, 
produces a pervasive cynicism about any claim of truth or value. The result is a 
feeling of suspicion towards the absolute ideals of reason, science, religion and 
history, and therefore towards the progressivism inaugurated by the Enlightenment: 
“a scepticism about the claims of any kind of overall, totalizing explanation” (Butler 
15). The human subject, once considered to be the responsible agent and “origin” of 
meaning, is now considered as passively constituted by language. The world, the 
object of our knowledge, is no longer seen as a given entity which language can 
represent and/or convey, and which therefore we can objectively know. On the 
contrary, everything – including ourselves – is constructed and constituted by and 
through language. Like the language we speak, we are c ught up in its chain of 
signifying references. Arriving at meaning itself is impossible, for everything 
depends only on interpretation. Any claim of fixed truth, knowledge and value, must 
 335 
be therefore given up, along with the idea of language as capable of representing 
reality.  
These crucial assumptions could be responded to in different, opposite ways. 
On the one hand, the collapse of all grounds of knowledge, and the absence of 
something which could replace those grounds, can generate a negative view of 
postmodernism as an era of bleak despair, one in which we have completely lost our 
power of self-determination. What follows is a view of the postmodern as “a fall 
from the oppositional autonomy of Romanticism and Modernism into the 
commodified complicity with mass culture which is the most obvious sign that 
capitalism has at last invaded all, leaving no space outside its logic of appropriation” 
(Waugh 1992 8). On the other hand, the deconstruction of previous illusions and the 
endless proliferation of meaning can inversely engender a strong feeling of new 
freedom and open up new possibilities for the human bei g. The subject is seen as 
released from a totalising view of the world which once trapped it within its 
boundaries. Once humanity accepts the interpretive “op nness” of “reality” and frees 
itself from dogmatic beliefs, it can acquire a renewed freedom of expression and 
interpretation. This is what Derrida’s deconstructionism and, in a more radical 
fashion, Rorty’s anti-foundationalism claim. This ialso what Brooke-Rose – 
following Derrida’s theories – seems to put into practice in Thru. 
As Waugh explains, however, “every position on Postmodernism is hedged 
about with its own dangers” (Waugh 1992 9), and the enthusiastic attitude towards 
the collapse of metanarratives described above, also c rries within itself some perils. 
Indeed, if the claim of anti-foundationalists and deconstructionists is that “truth does 
not exist”, it is easy to see how this claim buys precisely into that very kind of 
totalising ideology it apparently discards. The total rejection of foundations and 
universal claims of truth does not seem to be different from the metanarratives it 
wishes to rebuff. As Waugh suggests, postmodernism seems to have become a grand 
narrative itself, a virus which infects all fields of enquiry with scepticism towards the 
assertion of any truth: “Postmodernism is itself, in this respect, another Grand 
Narrative, but one about the end of Grand Narratives. It is impossibly tied up with 
performative contradictions” (Waugh 1992 12). While subsuming everything in its 
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own terms, postmodernism leaves the subject no space for ordering beliefs and/or 
values,   
if neither history nor religion nor metaphysics can give meaning to our lives, whence shall we derive 
significance? If all general categories are arbitrary or imperialistic, how shall we order our beliefs and 
values? Are we faced only with a choice between totali arian order and nominalist chaos? (Waugh 
1997 6) 
 
In the same line, Linda Hutcheon explains how Lyotard’s assumption has in 
the end produced a “meta-narrative theory of postmodernism’s incredulity to meta-
narrative” (Hutcheon 1988 198). For Connor, postmodernism has become a self-
referential activity which thrives on the multiplication of discourses about itself and 
simultaneously does not leave space for opposition, 
What is striking is precisely the degree of consensus in postmodernist discourse that there is no longer 
any possibility of consensus, the authoritative announcements of the disappearance of final authority 
and the promotion and recirculation of a total and comprehensive narrative of a cultural condition in 
which totality is no longer thinkable. (Connor 9) 
 
Christopher Norris, in What’s Wrong with Postmodernism (1990), remarks that 
the theoretical debate on postmodernism has reached a point which admits no 
counter-argument to itself. Theory, he explains, “has effectively turned against itself, 
generating a form of extreme epistemological sceptiism which reduces everything – 
philosophy, politics, criticism and ‘theory’ alike – to a dead level of suasive or 
rhetorical effect” (Norris 4). In the same way, for Zygmunt Bauman, the postmodern 
mind is a critique which finds it difficult to go on precisely because “it has destroyed 
everything it used to be critical about […] There is nothing left to be opposed to” 
(Bauman viii). Bauman is highly critical of what hed fines the postmodernist “state 
of mind”, one marked “above all by its all-deriding, all-eroding, all-dissolving 
destructiveness” (Bauman vii-viii). For him, this state of mind means to many 
“licence to do whatever one may fancy and advice not to take anything you or the 
others do too seriously” (Bauman vii). Terry Eagleton clearly criticises the 
postmodern phenomenon as contradictory and prey to its wn contradictions, a 
“logical deadlock” (Eagleton 1996 6), which has produced “an invigorating and a 
paralysing scepticism”, for it has “unseated the sovereignty of Western Man […] by 
means of a full-blooded cultural relativism” (Eagleton 1996 27). Postmodernism, he 
explains, has left us with no better choice than the one between “a brittle pessimism 
[…] and an exhilarated vision of ceaseless difference, mobility, disruption” 
(Eagleton 1996 3-4). Similarly, Butler talks of a “crippling contradiction” which lies 
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in the postmodernist “hermeneutics of suspicion”, for “if anyone says that everything 
is ‘really’ just constituted by a deceiving image, and not by reality, how does he or 
she know? They presuppose the very distinctions they attack” (Butler 118). 
Postmodernist sceptics, as Butler calls them, believ  that “the lack of foundations 
and the contingency of everything is a good thing” (Butler 119). However, he 
rejoins, “this condition should be resisted, and not allowed to justify a kind of ironic 
indifferentism” or “indifferentist relativism” (Butler 121). A similar allegation is 
levelled at postmodernism by Fredric Jameson. In Postmodernism, or, the Cultural 
Logic of Late Capitalism, Jameson defines the postmodern age as one “that has 
forgotten how to think historically” (Jameson ix), a culture which has lost memory of 
its tradition and sense of history, where the “new expansion of multinational capital 
ends up penetrating and colonizing” everything, leaving no “footholds for critical 
effectivity” (Jameson 49). Jameson criticises Lyotard’s claim of end of 
metanarratives as a narrative itself, “the narrative of the end of narratives”, for “the 
deeper logic of the postmodern […] imperceptibly turns into its own theory and the 
theory of itself […] harboring a pathology distinctively autoreferential” (Jameson 
xii). Postmodernism, for Jameson, has generated “a new depthlessness, which finds 
its prolongation […] in contemporary “theory”” (Jameson 6). Jameson is highly 
critical of the production of theoretical discourses which are totalizing while 
claiming not to be so: 
the crucial feature of what we have called a theoretical aesthetic lies in its organization around this 
particular taboo, which excludes the philosophical proposition as such, and thereby statements about 
being as well as judgements of truth. The much-decried poststructural swerve away from truth 
judgements and categories [is] a second-degree effect o  a more primary requirement of language, 
which is no longer to frame utterances in such a way th t those categories might be appropriate. 
This is clearly a demanding aesthetic indeed, one in which the theorist walks a tightrope, the 
slightest lapse precipitating the sentences in question into the old-fashioned (system, ontology, 
metaphysics) or sheer opinion. […] My sense is thateveryday garden-variety theoretical discourse 
pursues a task finally not very different from that of common-language philosophy […] namely, the 
exclusion of error by way of the vigilant tracking of ideological illusions […] Language can, in other 
words, no longer be true; but it can certainly be false; and the mission of theoretical discourse thus
becomes a kind of search-and-destroy operation in wh ch linguistic misconceptions are remorselessly 
identified and stigmatized, in the hopes that a theoretical discourse negative and critical enough will 
not itself become the target of such linguistic demystification in its turn. The hope is, of course, vain, 
insofar as, like it or not, every negative statement, very purely critical operation, can nonetheless 
generate the ideological illusion or mirage of a positi n, a system, a set of positive values in its own 
right. 
This illusion is ultimately the object of the theortical critique (which thus becomes a bellum 
omnium contra omnes). (Jameson 392-3) 
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For Jameson, the “desperately repetitive situation” (Jameson 393) engendered 
by the endless debate of postmodernist theory is clearly not culturally beneficial. 
The list of accusations which have been levelled at postmodern concepts is 
long and contains charges of different kinds. My argument of a countertendential 
standpoint in Brooke-Rose’s writing refers in particular to the accusation of nihilism 
which has often been levelled to postmodernism. Indeed, for its declared war against 
any kind of truth or set value, postmodernism as a mode of thought has often been 
charged of being a nihilistic cultural phenomenon. A ti-foundationalism has been 
seen, in its most radicalized expression, as inducig only relativism and bleak 
despair, for without foundations, there is no criteria for knowledge claims and values. 
In “Game with Vestiges”, Baudrillard explains how postmodernism has become a 
process of “proliferation and relativization of everything” (Baudrillard 1993 92), 
which has led to its own delegitimization. In its absolute relativization, everything 
which previously constituted an oppositional point has vanished, leaving only 
anguish and the impossibility of critical judgement, 
There is no longer anything to destroy […] for the last twenty years one has joyfully destroyed 
everything […] Negativity is no longer possible precisely because there is no longer any positivity. So 
one has departed from the dialectic already. I findit a weightless universe where one is forced to 
operate without really having an adversary […] This is a fairly dramatic situation. There is a specific 
anguish in it. (Baudrillard 1993 93) 
 
In Baudrillard’s view, postmodernism has, in its wish to deconstruct, 
deconstructed itself. It has destroyed itself, leaving us with an emptiness against 
which we can only try to “find once again a moral, an intellectual virtue” in order to 
continue living (Baudrillard 1993 94). For Baudrillard, the culture in which we live is 
essentially unreal: we live as if trapped within a world of signs generated by 
capitalism, a world in which we mistake simulacra for real things. Postmodernity, in 
its relentless process of destruction of meaning, has emptied the dialectical stage of 
meaning: “the critical stage is empty. There is no more stage. There is no therapy of 
meaning or therapy through meaning”. What we are left with is only a “generalized 
process of indifferentiation” where “theories float” and bring about a “surplus of 
meaning” which generates impasse (Baudrillard 1994 161). Similarly, David Michael 
Levin sees in the postmodern collapse of the paradigms of knowledge, reason, truth 
and reality, “the spread of a latent culture of nihilism, cancer of the spirit, contagion 
of despair” (Levin 4). In order to recover from this situation, he advocates a clear 
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distinction between the deconstruction and the destruction of metaphysics: 
“Metaphysics can be deconstructed, but not completely d stroyed” (Levin 6), for 
destroying the ontological tradition altogether would mean abandoning the question 
of Being, of the dimensionality of the human being.  
Many other commentators have discarded the postmodernist mind-set as an 
altogether nihilistic one,22 while others have defended its form of nihilism as the only 
and positive attitude to be held towards our culture and society. For instance, 
contrarily to the views considered above, for Adorno,   
The true nihilists are the ones who oppose nihilism with their more and more faded positives, the ones 
who are thus conspiring with all extant malice, and eventually with the destructive principle itself. 
Thought honours itself by defending what is damned as nihilism. (Adorno 381) 
 
Adorno sees positivism as nihilistic, as it perpetuates the naive repetition of the 
emptiness of a belief in the world as progressive and meaningful. He believes that 
“Acts of overcoming […] are always worse than what they overcome” (Adorno 380). 
Similarly, the philosopher Gianni Vattimo, defends the critique of humanism and the 
nihilistic stance of postmodernism as positive phenomena for our culture, 
considering them “not merely as symptoms and declarations of decadence” (Vattimo 
1991 1). Vattimo believes that postmodernists should affirm and embrace nihilism, 
rather than accusing it, for the wish to overcome it would necessarily imply the 
conception of history as progress and therefore as foundation. For him, the category 
of overcoming is inextricably linked to and dependet upon the idea of 
progressivism: “any call for an ‘overcoming’ would involve remaining captive to the 
logic of development inscribed in the tradition of European thought” (Vattimo 1991 
2). For Vattimo, therefore, only a radical acceptance of nihilism can bring about 
renewal in our society. 
The dispute between those who believe that postmodernism entails a negative, 
nihilistic attitude, those who reject the charge of nihilism, and those who advocate a 
positive consideration of nihilism is long and often contradictory. My aim will be 
less to discard postmodernism and postmodernist thinking as an altogether negative 
or nihilistic mode of thought, than to emphasise the way Brooke-Rose’s Thru already 
                                                
22 For other examples of the view that postmodernism is a nihilistic and negative mode of thought see 
in particular Mills 1959, Bell 1976, and Rose 1984.  
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points to a dispute which was to develop many years after the initial theoretical 
“boom” of the sixties and seventies.  
Before going deeper into my argument, however, it is necessary to clarify the 
notion of nihilism. Widely used during the last two centuries, the concept can be 
confusing as it has no set and mutually agreed definition. The term comes from the 
Latin nihil, which means “Not anything, nothing” (Oxford Latin Dictionary). Coined 
in the late eighteenth century, it was widely employed by the German Idealism at the 
beginning of the nineteenth century, and it indicated “the loss or dissolution of an 
independently existing world external to consciousness” (Carr 14). In the last 
decades of the nineteenth century, Nietzsche expounded much more extensively on 
the implications of the advent of nihilism for our culture, giving way to the 
understanding of the concept in the first half of the wentieth century.  
In The Will to Power, Nietzsche gives a definition of the “European nihilism” 
which “stands at the door” of our culture as “the radical repudiation of value, 
meaning and desirability” (Nietzsche 1968 5, 7). For Nietzsche, nihilism was a 
cultural disease resulting from the dissolution of Christianity and the ensuing crisis in 
European history and civilization. Nihilism was thus a consequence of the collapse of 
the Christian way of interpreting the world, and therefore a crisis of our interpretive 
ability. Yet nihilism was not, in his view, a necessarily negative and insurmountable 
phenomenon. For Nietzsche, “nihilism had within it the possibility of redemption 
from an interpretation of life that was both hypocriti al and debilitating” (Carr 4). He 
interpreted the phenomenon as a turning point in our history, a point which could 
either lead to the ruin of our culture, or inaugurate  new, life-affirming manner of 
experiencing the world and ourselves. In other words, the crisis-value he attributed to 
nihilism was not necessarily debilitating, as he believ d that the crisis could stimulate 
recovery from the disease which affected our society. Recovery from nihilism could 
engender socio-cultural renewal: “Disease, degeneration, decadence […] can 
culminate in dissolution and death but can also result in increase and improvement” 
(Carr 28). For Nietzsche, nihilism should not engender scepticism or disengagement 
from the problems of society: “He asked not that we stop interpreting […] but only 
that we recognize any particular interpretive act for what it is, namely, an 
interpretation” (Carr 31). In Nietzsche’s view, nihilism, taken as “absolute 
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valuelessness” (qtd. in Carr 38), was extremely dangerous, because it is 
interpretation and the will to truth (the will to interpret and understand) which enable 
us to survive: “The attribution of meaning enables us to endure life […] To will no 
longer, to suffer existence merely passively withou offering some sort of 
interpretation, explanation, or justification, signifies the ultimate degeneration of an 
organism” (Carr 38). As Carr reinstates, 
Despite its necessity, Nietzsche found “the inference that there is no meaning at all” to be a 
“tremendous generalization” that was “pathological” in being so extreme […] While he acknowledged 
that “the world is not worth what we believed,” he suggested that, far from having no meaning, “the 
world could be worth much more than we believed”. (Carr 42) 
 
Nietzsche distinguished between two different possible reactions to the 
problem of nihilism: one passive-negative, the other active-positive. If passive 
nihilism “merely succumbs to the nothingness that surrounds it” (Carr 42), its active 
counterpart is cathartic, as it embraces completely the destruction of previous beliefs 
and values only in order to recover from it and reaffirm life, 
the free spirit […] goes through a transitional period of radical doubt and suspicion, seeking to 
overthrow not only the values that bred [his or herculture] but all values altogether. This massive 
suspicion ultimately […] engenders a renewed appreciation for the world that had been previously 
devalued. (Carr 45) 
 
After Nietzsche, in the first half of the twentieth century, the concept of 
nihilism was resumed by such thinkers as Heidegger, Sa tre, Jünger, Jaspers and 
Camus. Although a thorough analysis of the different approaches to the concept 
would go beyond the scope of this thesis, what is important in the light of our 
dissertation, is to note the basic significance the concept of nihilism possessed for 
these thinkers. Notwithstanding the differences which exist among their systems of 
thought, they all shared the attempt to embrace the condition of meaninglessness as a 
necessary step towards renewal: nihilism was seen as a possibility for the human 
being to access a new and “liberating” degree of exist nce. Heidegger saw that 
recognising the non-existence of God and facing this fundamental lack was necessary 
for man in order to take full responsibility for his actions. Jaspers, Sartre and Camus 
also saw that nihilism was not the only and final solution to the question of being, but 
rather the very and necessary precondition for authentic human existence (Cf. Carr 
85-86). In accordance with the meaning Nietzsche first gave to the concept – as a 
crisis which could generate cultural renewal – the goal was thus to overturn 
circumstances which seemed paralyzing (the loss of everything which is ultimately 
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true or meaningful) and achieve a renewed status which would affirm existence on 
fresh bases.  
During the second half of the twentieth century, however, the problem of 
nihilism has been recast into a different framework, in which the significance and 
possibilities that Nietzsche attributed to the problem have been dangerously lost. As 
Karen Carr shows in her work The Banalization of Nihilism (1992), the concept of 
nihilism has undergone, during the second half of the twentieth century, a 
banalization of its meaning and purpose which is not culturally and socially 
constructive. The new attitude towards nihilism is evident in the anti-foundationalist 
and deconstructionist approaches to the concepts of truth and reality. Thinkers such 
as Rorty and Derrida attack the metaphysics of presence and the concept of truth 
linked to it, seeking to uncover the absolutist pretensions of the Western cultural 
tradition. What characterises their approach is the rej ction of all claims of truth, 
value or meaning: “The dissolution of foundations – a source of anxiety (or at least 
concern) for the existentialists – is now seen as a source of joyous affirmation, of 
lighthearted playfulness, or benign indifference” (Carr 86). In other words, the loss 
of the nostalgia for the collapse of metanarratives d cribed by Lyotard, now 
becomes a source of joy. For deconstructionists and anti-foundationalists, nihilism is 
not to be seen as engendering despair and negating life, but rather as joyously 
affirming the plurality of existence: only once the subject has given up the claim to 
foundations and fixed truths, can it see the value that lies in untruth. For such 
theorists, metanarratives can no longer explain social reality as a whole, as reality 
appears now fragmented into multiple, incommensurable forms. Rather than seeing 
nihilism as a reason for despair, these postmodernists rely upon it as the source of 
inspiration which can allow them to develop new andradical ideas. 
Carr criticises the shift that the concept of nihilism has undergone within 
postmodernism as a process of domestication or banaliz tion of the nihilistic attitude. 
Nihilism is no longer seen as a historical phenomenon which can and should be 
overcome, but as a fact which is coextensive with humanity. As a consequence, 
“nihilism ceases to be something from which we must escape, loses its potentially 
transformative and redemptive power, and becomes instead simply a rather banal 
characterization of the human situation” (Carr 7). 
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With the term nihilism, I will now indicate the rejection of all claims of truth, 
an attitude that can be summed up in the sentence “there is no truth”. In addition, it is 
important to distinguish nihilism from both scepticism and relativism. These 
approaches towards knowledge and truth, in fact, crucially differentiate from one 
another. While scepticism represents a dubious stand in respect to an entity, nihilism 
denies that entity. In the same way, relativism is the viw that a given claim is 
relative to whom makes the claim, rather than a complete repudiation of that claim 
(nihilism).  
Carr’s examination ponders on the upshots which emerge when nihilism is no 
longer considered as a disease of the human conditi, but it comes to be seen as the 
inherent condition of humanity. In Carr’s view, nihilism has become a banal feature 
of modern life because it has lost its power to shock, and with it (as it was for 
Nietzsche) its power to redeem. What has been abandoned, with the postmodern turn, 
is the search for meaning and for the foundaments of our life. If what we gain with 
this shift is essentially freedom of expression, what we lose is represented by “our 
inability to move from our language and our beliefs to something behind or beyond 
that serves as a legitimating ground” (Carr 88). Moreover, it is easy to see how this 
form of nihilism, which does not admit any counterargument, is in itself a totalizing 
narrative which claims to reject all totalizing narratives. The total rejection of all 
truth claims “paradoxically results in an absolutism at once pernicious and covert” 
(Carr 8). Nihilism reverses into dogmatism or dogmatic absolutism. As Carr 
explains, 
When we fully and happily dispatch with truth, what we gain is not pluralism, not toleration, but 
rather the absolutization of the dominant power structures of the culture to which we belong. Nihilism, 
once complete, leaves us with nothing but the set of currently existing social practices and beliefs; in 
the absence of anything else, these practices and beliefs become, for all intents and purpose, absolute. 
(Carr 134) 
 
For Carr, the mere multiplication of interpretations, without any ground which 
permits us to choose between them, can only lead to impasse. The logic of 
“everything is equally valid” furnishes no criteria whatsoever by which we can 
choose or privilege one practice over another. Since all knowledge claims are 
subjective, the result is “a subjectivistic leveling of knowledge into mere opinion” 
which destroys “any possible leverage for criticism” (Carr 136, 137). 
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Many other commentators have criticised postmodernist anti-foundational 
claims in ways which bear similarities to Carr’s analysis. For Thomas McCarthy, for 
instance, Rorty’s theory engenders the attitude of “there is nothing left that really 
makes a difference […] everything is permitted” (McCarthy 361). In McCarthy’s 
eyes, a more helpful response to the loss of absolute tr th would be “to develop 
concepts of reason, truth, and justice that, while no longer pretending to a God’s-eye 
point of view, retain something of their transcendet, regulative, critical force” 
(McCarthy 367). Likewise, Richard Bernstein, in hisessay “One Step Forward, Two 
Steps Backward”, explains that in reality Rorty’s theory supports the status quo and 
“diverts us from the pragmatically important issues that need to be confronted” 
(Bernstein 546). Both McCarthy and Bernstein argue that anti-foundationalism has 
the effect of eventually reinforcing the dominant practices of our culture, leaving no 
space for critical and constructive analysis, no grund for a critical evaluation of 
such practices. In the same vein, Butler criticises th  postmodernist scepticism about 
truth as devoid “of a proper concern for the activities of reason-giving and rational 
negotiation” (Butler 115). Similarly, Bauman talks of a “postmodern ethical 
paradox”. For him, while choice and responsibility have been restored to each and 
every single subject, we cannot win acceptance for our moral convictions without 
falling prey to the “already discredited bid for domination” (Bauman xxiii). 
It is however necessary to compare the extremist poi ion represented by Rorty 
to Derrida’s deconstructive theory. In light of these considerations, we will be able to 
better understand the approach Brooke-Rose seems to adopt towards the (potentially 
negatively nihilistic) deconstruction of truth. Carr specifically concentrates her 
analysis on Rorty’s work, referring to Derrida’s theorizations and to the differences 
between anti-foundationalism and deconstructionism. Notwithstanding the due 
dissimilarities between these two critical approaches, however, I find Carr’s account 
particularly useful in that it reveals a danger which s also implicit in the French 
deconstructionism, namely the danger of “domesticating” nihilism, which Brooke-
Rose seems already to point out in Thru. Rorty’s theory may be seen as an 
extremization of the deconstruction which Derrida heralded. It thus shows what can 
happen if we go to the limits of deconstruction, or if we misunderstand Derrida’s 
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claim of multiplicity of meaning. This will serve my purpose of illustrating how 
Brooke-Rose’s Thru already seems to foresee the danger of such an extremization. 
In “From Logic to Language to Play”, Rorty explains that there is no absolute 
truth which can be taken as a ground for our actions, that “nothing grounds our 
practices, nothing legitimizes them, nothing shows them to be in touch with the way 
things really are” (Rorty 753). Rorty thus sees nihilism as endemic to the human 
condition, not as something which can and/or should be changed or overcome. For 
anti-foundationalists, the loss of truth and the multiplicity of interpretations becomes 
an occasion for joyous affirmation. 
For Derrida, as already extensively considered in the course of this dissertation, 
we can have no access to the transcendental signifier. Since signs refer to other signs 
ad infinitum, there is no possibility to break out of this infinite chain. Derrida thus 
shows how truth itself is always relative to the peculiar standpoint adopted and that 
the relationship of language to reality is not given. The linguistic system is a cultural 
construct which does not relate to external reality with a simple equation of signifier 
and signified. The subject, far from knowing reality “for what it really is”, remains 
unavoidably caught within the chain of referentialiy which constitutes language. 
Derrida thus advocates the abandonment of all truth claims, with the aim of 
destroying the metaphysical illusions of our culture. However, the fact that he sets 
out a goal for his enterprise (namely the destruction, or overcoming of the 
metaphysics of presence), makes us realise that, for him, nihilism is not an end in 
itself, but a means for overcoming the present view of things. As Carr makes clear, 
Derrida “links his enterprise explicitly to transformation: ‘an internal critique or 
deconstruction’ is an ‘essential part’ of any culture’s development” (Carr 99). Taking 
up this point, Rorty criticises Derrida as being still trapped within the illusion of 
foundationalism, for he sees metaphysics as something at must be overcome and 
deems deconstruction as a necessary element for cultural transformation (Cf. Carr 
101). In my view, Derrida’s thought represents a positive solution to the problem of 
nihilism. He does not advocate that “there is no truth”, but rather that there is no 
“ultimate truth”, as truth continually slips away in the system of references which 
constitutes language. He posits play as the basis of a possible new way of dealing 
with life and the absence it entails. If for Rorty, Derrida is still caught in a 
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foundamentalist framework, in my view he represents a balance between the two 
absolutist extremes (which are, in the end, one and the same) of a total nihilism and a 
total dogmatism. 
For Derrida, we have to abandon the idea of the origin of meaning as 
transcendental signifier in favour of the practice of play, the play of representation, 
and of its infinite interpretive possibilities,  
There will be no unique name, even if it were the name of Being. And we must think this without 
nostalgia […] On the contrary, we must affirm this, in the sense in which Nietzsche puts affirmation 
into play, in a certain laughter and a certain step of the dance. (Derrida 1982a 27) 
 
Derrida’s reference to Nietzsche is revealing in light of our thesis: he mentions 
affirmation, play, and laughter, as values which can positively overcome the question 
of nihilism. Derrida does not claim that “there is no truth”, but rather that truth lies as 
a trace which is both present and absent in the play of language. However, it is easy 
to move from Derrida’s deconstructionism to a complete denial of all truth claims. 
The border between deconstructionism and anti-foundationalism is very thin. The 
danger is that of throwing out the baby with the bathwater, that of forgetting, in other 
words, Nietzsche’s lesson, namely that nihilism should be seen as a state of crisis and 
a temporary phenomenon which must be overcome. For Nietzsche, in fact, “either 
we give birth to new ways of valuing, new forms of believing, or we perish” (Carr 
137). Contrarily to Nietzsche’s view, the anti-foundationalist acceptance of nihilism 
as “simply the way life goes” appears to rule out any possibility of transformation. 
Brooke-Rose, as we have already seen in the course f our analysis, takes up 
Derrida’s theory and puts it into practice. When I say that she puts it into practice, I 
do not mean that she merely presents Derrida’s theory in her novel, but rather that, 
while presenting it, she plays with it. It must not be forgotten that there is always a 
certain tongue-in-cheek attitude on Brooke-Rose’s part. In Thru, by means of this 
ambiguously humorous attitude, the author seems to be taking a double shot. On the 
one hand, she puts play into practice as theorised by Derrida. She overtly sets in 
motion the infinite deferral of signifiers, showing how “truth is never apparent”, but 
always caught up in the play of language: meaning does depend on interpretation. On 
the other hand, Thru seems to draw the attention of the reader on the fact that saying 
that “meaning depends on interpretation” does not amount to saying that there is no 
meaning and no truth whatsoever. Truth is relative, but we do not have to go too far 
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in the relativization of truth, penalty the fall into the absolute void of “there is no 
truth”. The danger, in other words, is that of falling prey to a banalizing form of 
nihilism which, as Thru seems to suggest, would subsume everything in its own 
terms and result necessarily debilitating for the practice of literature. The ironical 
stand of Thru towards the myriad of contemporary theories, in fact, ppears to be 
primarily directed against the “anything goes” approach which seemed to peep from 
the window of literary practice as a consequence of the endless proliferation of 
meaning and interpretive possibilities strongly advocated by those theories. This is, 
for instance, my reading of the criticism to the notion of death of the author in Thru. 
However carried out with humour, the (serious) message that going too far would 
leave us with no ground or basis for the assessment of our practice is evident in such 
passages as the dialogue between the teacher and one of the students about the 
inversion of author’s and reader’s fallacies,  
But what about the clarity of the message? 
You read what you want into it. 
I see. And what do you read?  
It’s not for me to say, I wrote it. 
But the reader is the writer and the writer is the reader. (T 608)  
 
If everything depends only on the reader’s interpretation, what is left to the 
author? What is his/her ground of action? Does he/she not have any role in the text? 
The danger implicit in the postmodern debate is that the proliferation and 
relativization of values which it advocates, if interpreted in a radical way, leaves no 
criteria of value whatsoever for the assessment of human practices. If there is no 
longer any truth, if everything depends on interpretation, on which ground can we 
choose one thing rather than another? Deconstructionism risks becoming a logic 
which does not allow any other logic outside of itself. 
At the same time, as demonstrated above, the text directs a slightly different 
kind of critique towards the theories it tackles. The endless class discussions during 
which the students argue about their different or opposite interpretations and 
opinions, demonstrate that critical theories are themselves subject to interpretation, 
and that they do not have to be accepted unquestioningly.  
Another danger of absolutism implicit in the postmodernist theories which 
Thru points out is linked to the anti-representational quality of language, i.e. to the 
impossibility of representation these theories advocate. With the poststructuralist 
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debate, language is no longer considered able to repres nt reality. Contrarily to this 
view, Thru, as already seen, reinstates the idea of literature as “mirror” of life, even if 
the “reality” reflected is ontologically unstable. The novel does not deny 
representation: literature, and the language which constitutes it, are necessarily 
representational, even if our notion of representation has changed. As one of her 
characters in Thru says, “Language is all we have to apprehend reality, if we must 
use that term” (T 642). For Brooke-Rose, language is still representational, even if 
what it represents is an unstable reality. We cannot do away with representation in 
fiction without running the risk of stripping fiction of its vital attribute, that of being 
a “mirror” of life, even in the very face of life’s ontological instability.  
In this way, Brooke-Rose seems to anticipate another fac t of the debate which 
was still to come at the time Thru was published. The novel suggests that, while 
providing postmodernist writers with much more freedom than realists had ever had, 
the absolute loss of confidence in the grand narratives of reason, science, god and 
history presents a basic danger, which is inextricably linked to the question of 
language and its ability to represent the world. The danger implicit in all this is that 
of negating representation altogether. As Jacques Rancière argued, Lyotard’s anti-
representational art of the postmodern is necessarily still representational. In other 
words, if once the world was representable and requi d representational forms, it is 
now unrepresentable and therefore requires anti-repres ntational forms, but there is 
still a logic of appropriateness and correspondence (i. . of representation) 
underpinning Lyotard’s anti-representational claim (Cf. Rancière 109-142). 
In the essay “Post-Postmodern Discontent”, Robert L. McLaughlin talks of an 
“aesthetic sea change” evident in many fiction writers since the late eighties. These 
writers, he explains, have been attempting to respond “to the perceived dead end of 
postmodernism, a dead end that has been reached because of postmodernism’s 
detachment from the social world and immersion in a world of nonreferential 
language” (McLaughlin 55). However, he explains, the reason why postmodernism 
has been perceived as a dead end lies in the fact th t its main tenets have been often 
misread. Indeed, Barth’s famous essay “The Literature of Exhaustion” (1967) was 
generally misunderstood at the time it appeared, an despite the fact that he wrote 
other two essays to clarify his point, his basic claim is still largely misunderstood. A 
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typical example of this misunderstanding, continues McLaughlin, is represented by 
Marshall Boswell, who reads Barth’s essay as one which “cut the cord between the 
text and the world, smashed the mirror art traditionally held up to nature, turned the 
referential function of literature in on itself” (McLaughlin 56). Misreading Barth’s 
essay, Boswell thinks that, 
the task of the post-modernist writer was not to develop additional new methods of rendering the act 
of perception but rather to examine the relationship between literary method and the reality it sought 
to depict […] the postmodern novel would employ literary conventions ironically, in the form of 
parody, thereby undertaking a self-reflexive inquiry into the ontological status of literary inquiry 
itself. (Boswell, qtd. in McLaughlin 56). 
 
In other words, in Boswell’s view, postmodernism deals with the process of 
representation, not with the object represented. Barth’s claims has been interpreted as 
embodying a total rejection of reality, and therefo as ungrounding certainties and 
engendering a sense of endless possibilities and anxiety. The text has been seen as 
“grounded in nothing beyond itself” (Boswell, qtd. in McLaughlin 56), made up of a 
language which replaces reality rather than representing it. As McLaughlin clarifies, 
“Barth is certainly making problematic literature’s referential relationship to the 
world, making the process of representation opaque rather than transparent […] but 
he is not severing the connection altogether” (McLaughlin 57). 
In the essay “Postmodernism Revisited”, Barth further clarifies his ideas, 
specifically quoting Umberto Eco’s Postmodernism, Irony, the Enjoyable,  
the postmodern attitude [is] that of a man who loves a very sophisticated woman and knows he cannot 
say to her, “I love you madly,” because he knows that she knows (and that she knows that he knows) 
that these words have already been written by Barbar  C rtland. Still, there is a solution. He can say, 
“As Barbara Cartland would put it, I love you madly.” At this point, having avoided false innocence, 
having said clearly that it is no longer possible to speak innocently, he will nevertheless have said 
what he wanted to say to the woman: that he loves her, but he loves her in an age of lost innocence. If 
the woman goes along with this […] both will consciously and with pleasure play the game of 
irony....But both will have succeeded, once again, in speaking of love. (Eco, qtd. in Barth 1988 22) 
 
Barth continues: “If for ‘Barbara Cartland’ we substitute ‘the history of 
literature up to the day before yesterday,’ it is the very point of my essay ‘The 
Literature of Exhaustion’” (Barth 1988 22). Barth is not suggesting that literature 
stopped referring to the world, that art stopped being referential, but rather that we 
reconsider the problematic relationship between langu ge and its referents. As 
McLaughlin puts it,  
Barth, then, is suggesting neither a dead end for language and literature nor a severing of the 
referential relationship between language and literature and the world. Rather, the used-upness he 
talks about is akin to the loss of innocence of language or representation’s loss of transparency. In the 
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postmodern era language and literature make their own status as representation part of what they’re 
about, but only part: the other part is about our “still-human hearts and conditions”. (McLaughlin 58) 
 
The much accused self-referentiality of postmodernism has been 
misunderstood as a total denial of language’s (and therefore of literature’s) 
connection to the world. However, McLaughlin reinstates, 
postmodernism was never about self-referentiality by itself: postmodernism made the process of 
representation problematic, it foregrounded literature pointing to itself trying to point to the world, but 
it did not give up the attempt to point to the world […] language, narrative, and the processes of 
representation are the only means we have to experience and know the world, ourselves, and our 
possibilities for being human. (McLaughlin 66-67) 
 
What I read in Brooke-Rose’s Thru is not abandonment of literature’s 
referential quality, but on the contrary an attempt to reinstate the referentiality of 
language and literature in the face of a debate which runs the risk of going too far in 
its assumptions and of negating representation. Negating representation would mean 
negating the function and value of literature and therefore “killing” literature. This is, 
in my reading, the meaning of Thru’s “self-evident defence-mechanism against threat 
of extermination” (T 637). The threat of exterminaton which the text faces derives 
from the possibility of a total negation of its referential function. 
Thru represents, in my view, a countertendency to the decried impossibility of 
representation of much postmodernist fiction. Language’s inability to represent 
reality, already considered in relation to Beckett, is a tenet shared by many 
postmodernist writers. It is embodied, for instance, by the heroine of Lessing’s The 
Golden Notebook. Anna tries in vain to find words which would express her 
condition and feelings, but inevitably surrenders to he impossibility of 
representation,  
Words. Words. I play with words, hoping that some combination, even a chance combination, will say 
what I want […] The fact is, the real experience can’t be described. I think, bitterly, that a row of 
asterisk, like an old-fashioned novel, might be better. Or a symbol of some kind […] Anything at all, 
but not words. The people who have been there, in the place in themselves where words, patterns, 
order, dissolve, will know what I mean and the others won’t. (Lessing 549) 
 
In a similar way, in Albert Angelo, B. S. Johnson interrupts the narration to 
deprecate, “Fuck all this lying” (Johnson 165), thus proclaiming his “disgust with the 
inescapability of the condition of fictionality” (Waugh 1995 38). Brooke-Rose, in my 
view, reinstates the referential value of language, reaffirming its role and importance. 
Although she demonstrates the linguistic nature of critical theories, and therefore the 
relativity of their meaning, she does not advocate l nguage’s inability to express the 
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world. Brooke-Rose’s search for new representational means is not a dismissal of the 
realist narrative because language is no longer able to express reality. In Brooke-
Rose’s view, it is rather the way we use language which is no longer able to express 
the new reality of the world around. However, contrarily to much postmodernist 
fiction, Brooke-Rose’s novels investigate new representational devices in order to 
continue reflecting the world, even if within an altogether different cognitive frame 
from that of realistic fiction.  
Intimately tied up to the question of language’s refer ntiality, is the self-
referentiality which has become a widespread characteristic of postmodernist fiction. 
Brooke-Rose’s Thru, as already seen, endorses Derrida’s claim that “there is no 
‘outside’ to the text” , “il n’y a pas de hors-text” (Derrida 1976 158). In my view, 
Thru crucially enters the debate around the concept of text, for it seems to clarify the 
significance and implications of Derrida’s claim, which has been very often 
misunderstood (as is the case with Barth’s essay). In my reading, in fact, Derrida is 
not endorsing the thesis that reality and truth do not exist, and therefore that “nothing 
could count as an effective critique of past or present ideologies and systems of 
representation” (Norris 38). As Norris elucidates, Derrida is pointing to the fact that 
texts always “come up against the ineluctable limits of their own ideological project” 
(Norris 38). Brooke-Rose goes beyond the mere self-referentiality of the narrative 
text, showing how “everything is text”, not in the s nse that the literary text is all 
there is because reality does not exist, but in the sense that reality as a whole is a 
text, and this reality is reflected in and by the literary text. By doing so, she 
reinstates, once more the importance of literature as a mirror of life.    
A further danger implicit in the postmodern debate which Thru seems to point 
out is the emergence of what McHale defines the “anxiety of metanarratives”. As he 
explains, the wide acceptance of Lyotard’s collapse of metanarratives, has generated 
as a counter-reaction a widespread anxiety: “Lyotard’s description has been turned 
into a prescription: avoid at all costs the appearance of endorsing metanarratives […] 
or, more briefly: avoid stories, don’t narrate”. This situation has provoked “a 
paralyzing anxiety not be seen to narrate” (McHale 1992 5, 6), i.e. not to be seen to 
rely on narratives. It is this anxiety which Brooke-Rose positively subverts, showing 
how narration is life, how the life of literature necessarily depends on narration 
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(“narration is life and I am Scheherezade”). The anxiety not to be seen to narrate 
represents a danger for literature: since any narrative might be accused of naïve 
reliance on metanarratives, the risk is that of stopping narrating altogether. Brooke-
Rose seems to foresee this risk and sets out to defen  the act of narrating. As already 
observed, in fact, the metadiegetic levels of Thru, its stories within stories, are not 
important because they fulfil a specific narrative function (explanation, contrast, 
analogy or distraction), but rather because they are a way of bringing forth the 
narration. What is given the utmost importance is the act of narrating itself. This is 
also revealed by Larissa referring to the stories she invents by declaring, “I know, it’s 
a flop. As this one, and the next, redundant but necessary for qualcosa to continue. 
Narration is life and I am Scheherezade” (T 711). As for Scheherezade, narrating in 
Thru becomes a way of escaping death: the only thing which matters is to continue 
inventing stories in a way that keeps the reader’s pleasure and curiosity alive, for to 
stop narrating would inevitably lead to death for literature. In this way, Brooke-
Rose’s work recasts the importance of the narrative act per se: narration is what 
matters, narration is life. 
From what has been considered above, it should be clear that Thru seems to 
amazingly forerun the debate which developed around the danger of absolutism 
implicit in postmodernist theories. While claiming the rejection of absolutism, such 
theories carried in themselves the danger of accepting the relativism of meaning in a 
banalizing (and therefore nihilistic) way, and the danger of negating representation 
and narration altogether. 
Thru offers its readers a rich sense of the contemporary critical panorama, 
simultaneously pointing to the jeopardy of its theori s. Brooke-Rose plays with 
critical theories and shows that they are th mselves subject to interpretation a d that 
they should not be accepted unquestioningly. Not to question these theories would 
mean to fall prey to a totalizing view. While the overcoming of nihilism is not to be 
understood as the replacement of totalizing truths with others, interpretation and will 
to truth are essential for human survival, in the same way as narration is essential for 
the survival of literature. Brooke-Rose seems to imply that crisis thinking should not 
be banalized and, above all, if crisis it is, it is important that we find an alternative, or 
an exit, to it, and not that we accept the loss of any ground for the assessment of our 
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practices with a happy smile. If the deconstruction of fixed notions of meaning is a 
positive and liberating possibility for our human condition, we cannot stop at the 
mere destruction of all claims of truth, we must – after destruction – construct 
something new in order to go on. The claim just made is evident in Thru, for the text 
refers many times to the revolution it engenders, but it also explicitly makes clear 
that “destruction precedes construction” (T 602), thus positing the possibility and 
necessity of a valid alternative to the old beliefs and values. If Bauman criticises 
postmodern thought has having “done next to nothing to support its defiance of past 
pretence with a new practical antidote for old poison” (Bauman xvii-xviii), we see 
how Brooke-Rose actually furnishes an antidote to the crisis generated by the 
collapse of metanarratives. If Butler declares that“Postmodernists are by and large 
pessimists […] and the beliefs and the art they inspire are often negative rather than 
constructive”, and that “postmodernists are good critical deconstructors, and terrible 
constructors” (Butler 114, 116), Brooke-Rose’s novel refutes this accusation. What I 
read in Thru is not the mere destruction of old beliefs (and narrative techniques), but 
a construction of a new text: a new solution emerges out of the old intertextual chain, 
as already extensively considered in the course of this dissertation.  
Jon R. Snyder explains that the dismantling of the positivist and historicist 
culture deconstructs all metaphysical truth claims without posing new truths that 
could fill in the void left by the old ones: “there is no exit, for twentieth-century 
humanity, from a world of contrasting and often conflicting interpretations” (in 
Vattimo 1991 xiii). In light of Snyder’s claim that “there is no exit” from the 
situation postmodernism has engendered, the end of Brooke-Rose’s novel acquires 
salient connotations: that “exit through the text” we have already considered, posits 
itself as an exit from the debate and into the text itself, a text which engenders 
revolution not for the mere sake of destruction, but in order to bring renewal in the 
practice of writing (as we have seen, Thru brings renewal in the relationship between 
author/reader/character, it brings renewal in languge with its endless proliferation of 
meaning and poetic language). 
As Carr explains, the anxiety about the loss of fundaments has not been 
dissolved or even assuaged by anti-foundationalists. It has merely been set aside, as 
the product of a false and illusory quest (Cf. Carr 136-138). Brooke-Rose, instead, 
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resolves this anxiety, i.e. overcomes nihilism into an affirmation of the fictional play 
itself, reinstating its importance and vitality in the face of theories which threaten to 
“kill” the text with too much theoretical thinking. The exit Thru furnishes is therefore 
an exit from the radical relativism (which tips over into nihilism) of postmodernist 
theory, an exit through the very text. The practice of the text is posited as the exit 
from the all-surrounding debate which carries serious dangers for the practice of 
literature. Thru therefore represents a liberatory mode as opposed t  more pessimistic 
forms of postmodernism, those which employ self-refer ntiality in order to deny any 
reality outside of the text, in order to negate representation. Thru also represents a 
step forward in respect to the mere proliferation of meaning which can generate the 
“anything goes mentality”, showing how there is alwys meaning in the “text of 
reality”, even if this meaning is no longer knowable once and for all, but it is rather a 
trace, both absent and present at the same time.  
Moreover, by focusing the attention of the reader on b th the multiplication of 
theories ad its often obscure critical jargon, by repeatedly putting the accent on the 
importance of the act of narrating per se, and by offering an exit from the debate and 
a passageway into the text itself, Thru anticipates the recent critical debate which 
advocates a return to aestheticism. The ideas of the New Aestheticism have been 
brought forward by such thinkers as Thomas Docherty, Jonathan Dollimore and Jay 
Bernstein, to name but a few. In their edited volume The New Aestheticism (2003), 
John J. Joughin and Simon Malpas argue that the succe s of literary theory has, on 
the one hand, rightly challenged the humanist notio of art, i.e. the “assumption of 
art’s intrinsic spiritual value” (Joughin and Malpas 1) and its universality. On the 
other hand, however, what has been lost in this process, is the “sense of art’s 
specificity as an object of analysis […] its specificity as an aesthetic phenomenon” 
(Joughin and Malpas 1). In other words, in the rush to challenge the aesthetic 
independence of a work, the rise of critical theory has more and more analysed a 
literary text solely in relation to the historical, political and cultural contexts of art’s 
production, losing in this way the specificity of any given work of art. The 
singularity of the aesthetic has thus been effaced: “Theoretical criticism is in 
continual danger […] of throwing out the aesthetic baby with the humanist 
bathwater” (Joughin and Malpas 1).  
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While it is important to avoid the reductive approach of an old-style 
aestheticism, it is also important, for the New Aesth ticism, to understand that art 
cannot be explained solely in light of critical theori s (cultural and political 
ideologies, class, race and gender issues, or theories f textuality and subjectivity),  
Art is inextricably tied to the politics of contemporary culture, and has been throughout modernity. 
Aesthetic specificity is not, however, entirely explicable, or graspable, in terms of another conceptual 
scheme or genre of discourse. the singularity of the work’s ‘art-ness’ escapes and all that often 
remains is the critical discourse itself, reassured of its methodological approach and able to reassert it  
foundational principles. (Joughin and Malpas 3)  
 
The New Aestheticism seems thus to imply that while postmodernist theory 
has shown that universal human values have no foundation, analysing art only in 
relation to ideology and set theoretical constructs makes us lose the sense of art’s 
specificity, for there is more than ideology in art,  
the most basic tenet that we are trying to argue for is the equiprimordiality of the aesthetic – that, 
although it is without doubt tied up with the political, historical, ideological, etc., thinking it asother 
than determined by them, and therefore reducible to them, opens a space for an artistic or literary 
specificity that can radically transform its critical potential and position with regard to contemporary 
culture. (Joughin and Malpas 3)  
 
This does not imply a return to aestheticism as a “universally and apolitically 
humanist activity” (Joughin and Malpas 3), as a realm completely independent from 
theory. What the New Aestheticism argues for is not tha  we should stop analysing 
the text in relation to different cultural aspects or critical theories, but rather that we 
should also reconsider the value of art’s specificity as something which goes beyond 
theory. A “post-theoretical” or more reflective approach to theory is thus postulated 
by the New Aestheticism, one which would “reassert the importance of aesthetics to 
contemporary theory and criticism” (Joughin and Malpas 4). 
As Waugh explains, Schiller was one of the first thinkers to put forward the 
importance of the aesthetic “as the redemptive hope f r an age of increasingly 
instrumental rationality […] he recommended the idea of the aesthetic as a 
disinterested realm of play and semblance […] an autonomously existing state which 
could release us from the constraints imposed by utilitarian pressures” (Waugh 1992 
14). For Schiller, art is the means to attain a reconciliation with the world. For him, 
the “reintegration into a lost harmonious world” can only be effected “through a self-
conscious and strenuous aesthetic attempt to reintegrate thought and feeling into a 
state of equilibrium at a higher level in aesthetic activity” (Waugh 1992 14). This 
idea is obviously also evident in postmodernism, and specifically “in those currents 
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of Postmodernism which view the aesthetic in terms of self-conscious activity” 
(Waugh 1992 14). In fact, according to Patricia Waugh, postmodernism is not only 
concerned with the fragmentariness of existence and the impossibility of 
reconciliation, but it is also as much concerned “with reconciliation and 
reintegration” of “thought and feeling” (Waugh 1992 14). For postmodernism, as it 
was for Romanticism, the main vehicle for this reconciliation is seen in the aesthetic. 
However, there are basic differences between the two currents in their approach to 
the aesthetic. What distinguishes postmodernism fro Romanticism is that in the 
former the aesthetic has “invaded the spheres of science and philosophy” (Waugh 
1992 14). In postmodernism, “the aesthetic is no longer simply model or catalyst 
occupying an autonomous realm of its own. It has enter d the lifeworld and invaded 
the spheres of knowledge and ethics in a new version of a longstanding attempt fully 
to integrate body with mind and self with world” (Waugh 1992 14-15). Romanticism 
and postmodernism share the sense of crisis as related to the failure of the 
Enlightenment reason, and “in both the aesthetic becom s the only possible means of 
redemption” (Waugh 1992 15). However, the meaning ad valence of the concept of 
the aesthetic shift within postmodernism. The Schillerean or Romantic influence is 
assimilated into postmodernism, as Patricia Waugh sees, but the redeeming power of 
the aesthetic in postmodernism is different from its Romantic version. It is on the one 
hand stronger for it is considered as inseparable from reality: truth is fiction and vice 
versa. It becomes on the other hand weaker because the lack of metaphysical 
foundations of reality subtracts from the aesthetic the possibility to be considered as 
the expression of any fixed foundation of the world (Cf. Waugh 1992 15). The 
Romantic or Schillerean idea of the aesthetic is thus different from the postmodern 
sublime or absolute. Postmodernist aesthetic is weaker because art is no longer 
considered representative of the world, given the claim of the impossibility of 
representation made by Lyotard and other postmodernist thinkers. 
The New Aestheticism is evaluative rather than relativized. It searches for the 
specificity and singularity of the work of art. It aims at recovering the romantic, 
redemptive notion of art, whereas postmodernist aesthetics are easily collapsed into 
the relativism of consumer society where everything is interchangeable. The New 
Aestheticism puts the accent on the redemptive aspect of art, on the idea that art 
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makes us better, improves us, gives us an aesthetic education, and teaches us to feel 
the world in opposition to the rationalist approach to reality which has collapsed on 
itself. It therefore crucially reasserts art’s oppositional power to the consumer 
society. The New Aestheticism tends to view postmodernism as yet another theory 
that takes us away from the singularity of literatue, from the specifics of aesthetic 
forms. It reasserts the aesthetic in a different way and to different ends than 
postmodernism. It seeks to reaffirm the so-called “singularity” of literature, i.e. the 
fact that it is formally specific and irreducible to political positions, sociological 
abstractions, and ideological fixities. The New Aesth ticism is thus an example of 
criticism turning away from theories that were in force for decades. There is a 
romantic strain to postmodernist thinking, yet the romantic legacy takes a different 
form in the New Aestheticism for its circumspection about theory and its need to 
reassert literature as literature. 
Brooke-Rose seems to recuperate the redemptive prospects of the aesthetic in a 
positive way. As already seen, Thru deconstructs, in line with Derrida, the concept of 
fixed and absolute meaning, but it also reinstates, with a parallel move, the 
representative value of language. Language is still representational, even if the nature 
of its referents is ontologically unstable. In this way, Brooke-Rose seems to upturn 
the claim made above by Waugh (a claim to which I subscribe in the case of other 
postmodernist fiction, that fiction which denies any possibility of representing 
reality), namely the claim that the aesthetic in postmodernism becomes weaker 
because the lack of metaphysical foundations of reality subtracts from the aesthetic 
the possibility to be considered as the expression of any fixed foundation of the 
world (Cf. Waugh 1992 15). In fact, by reinstating the representative role of 
language (although not the foundations of reality), Brooke-Rose also reinstates the 
possibility of art as representing our present condition, and therefore eliminates the 
“weaker” aspect of the postmodern aesthetic. 
On the other hand, by means of the critique directed towards the many theories 
which have come to bear on the interpretation of a text, Thru seems to reinstate the 
autonomy of the aesthetic realm. It reasserts the idea that the aesthetic occupies an 
autonomous territory of its own. The aesthetic of pstmodernism, initially pertaining 
to the field of art, has “at last invaded all”. Art’s specificity has been lost because of 
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the endless proliferation of theories in all fields of knowledge. Brooke-Rose clearly 
opposes this situation by focusing on the impossibility to explain a narrative text 
solely by means of theories. There is always something which escapes theory and 
interpretation in Thru. In this way, the author reaffirms art’s specificity and the 
impossibility to view it solely in light of theoretical constructs. Brooke-Rose’s accent 
on playfulness, in particular, can be read as an attempt to reinstate the redeeming 
power of the aesthetic. Play offers a way out of the debilitating debate: creativity 
remains the most important thing. In the face of theories which advocate an absolute 
lack of foundations, and which can therefore easily induce us to despair, Brooke-
Rose puts forward the idea of the aesthetic as capable of offering the subject 
reconciliation with the world. Even more, play becomes a cognitive activity, for it is 
through play that Brooke-Rose’s novels postulate their relationship with reality: play 
becomes a way of approaching and understanding life. In this respect, even Thomas 
Docherty, in arguing precisely for a reconsideration of the aesthetic value of art, 
vigorously reasserts the importance of play. Already for Schiller, he makes clear, 
play and the “play-drive” – der Spieltrieb – was central to aesthetics. For Schiller, 
explains Docherty, the play “regulates the oppositin in our consciousness between 
the two competing drives of ‘sense’ and of ‘form’” (Docherty 30), i.e. between 
sensibility and reason, between particulars and universals. In other words, play 
becomes a fundamental cognitive activity by means of which we can approach life 
and appreciate a work of art.   
What I read in Brooke-Rose is thus an attempt to reurn to and reaffirm the 
“singularity” of literature. Anticipating the claim of the New Aestheticism, she 
suggests that art isrreducible to any kind of sociological or political ideology. She 
thus refutes the nihilistic (value negating) aspect of the postmodern debate and 
reaffirms the aesthetic in a different way and to adifferent end than postmodernism.  
In “The Literature of Exhaustion”, Barth praises Borges’ accomplishments and 
admires in particular his story “Pierre Menard, Author of the Quixote”. Barth’s 
words, in my view, perfectly apply to Brooke-Rose’s Thru and sum up what I hope I 
have demonstrated as the main achievement of the nov l. In fact, I believe that 
Brooke-Rose’s “artistic victory, if you like, is that [s]he confronts an intellectual 
dead end and employs it against itself to accomplish new human work” (Barth 1967 
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31). As opposed to the dead end of “crisis thinking” and impossibility of 
representation of much postmodernist theories, Brooke-Rose reaffirms the role of 
language and the value of the aesthetic in a more enabling and positive (playful) way. 
In the face of the postmodern despair about the collapse of universal truths, Brooke-
Rose stresses the importance of literature as literature and reinstates its cognitive 
value. She therefore avoids the ultimate collapse into nihilism which the main tenets 
of postmodernism, interpreted in a dogmatic and absoluti t way, can generate. Rather 
than positing literature as merely collapsing into theories of textuality and 
representation, Brooke-Rose provides a constructive pathway for considering and 
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